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THE POLITICS OF PHYSICAL PLANNING PRACTICE:

THE CASE OF THE INDUSTRIAL AREAS IN TENTH OF RAMADAN CITY,
EGYPT

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ABSTRACT

This study is concerned with exploring, analysing and documenting the interlocking dynamic relationship between physical planning practice, political economy change at the national and global levels. To do this, it examines the institutional arrangements and power structures in Egypt and in the specific context of the industrial areas in Tenth of Ramadan City (TRC), which was constructed as part of Egypt's New Map Policy (ENMP) and the New Towns Programme (NTP) since the mid 1970s. The Programme aimed, among other goals, to redress a perceived imbalance in Egypt's human settlements pattern while providing support to successive economic development strategies. The study involves a critical examination of the impact of such interlocking relationship on the allocation of power and resources between the institutions, agencies and individuals affiliated to the central government, the local authorities, and the private sector (referred to here as the 'triangle of power'), decision-making within the urban development process, and on the resulting physical plans and land use patterns of the physical planning formulation and implementation processes respectively in the context of the case study.

The empirical evidence of the research reveals that the dynamic interests and power interactions between successive political leaderships and powerful agents, socio-political and socio-economic structures, and the powerful interests of the various international and national interest groups directed and influenced the formulation of successive national urban development policies, the creation of specific planning institutions and agencies, and the allocation of power and resources between and within the institutions and agencies involved. It also shaped the planning approaches adopted by the government in dealing with land and development and its physical outcomes, and constrained the implementation of planning policy objectives in the period 1974-2002. Such impact is examined during both physical planning formulation and implementation; and is manifested when certain concessions were awarded to specific institutions, agencies and individuals (central/local and public/private) thus guaranteeing them more political and financial powers and spatial advantages through the practice of physical planning.

The findings of the research endorse the research hypothesis, which postulates that the failure of physical planning practice in achieving the goals and objectives of successive urban development policies and local physical plans resulted from the continuous shift in the allocation of power and resources within the 'triangle of power', as the national political economy, institutional arrangements and power structures at the national and local levels changed in the period 1974 - 2002.

The research hypothesis was empirically tested using an analytical framework supported on various theoretical debates, claims, arguments, and criticism within two dynamic and interrelated areas of knowledge: first, different approaches to social structures with particular reference to the concepts of structure and agency, which provide various interpretations to the way societies work and manage their common affairs, such as the way governments deal with different interest groups throughout the urban development process and physical planning practice in a specific time-space edge. Second, shifts in the planning paradigm that comprises planning traditions, planning methodologies, and planning theories and approaches to land and development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACR	Advisory Committee for Reconstruction
ANUC	Agency for New Urban Communities
ARP	Agency for Research and Projects
ASMINC	Association for Developing Small and Medium-Scale Industries in the New Cities
BOT	Board of Trustees
CAO	Central Auditing Organisation
CAPMAS	Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIPL	Committee for Industrial Production Licenses
COPA	Consulting Office for Planning and Architecture
COR	Central Organisation for Construction
EEAA	Egyptian Environmental affairs Agency
ENMP	Egypt's New Map Policy
EO	Economic Organisation
EPPP	Environmental Pollution Protection Project
ERSAP	Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme
GAIFZ	General Authority for Investment and Free Zones
GCRDA	Greater Cairo Regional Development Authority
GOFI	General Organisation for Industrialisation
GOPP	General Organisation for Physical Planning
HCRP	Higher Committee for Regional Planning
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRP	Intellectual Property Right
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOH	Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities
MOI	Ministry of Industry and Technological Development
MOP	Ministry of Planning
MSEA	Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs
NCP	National Council for Production
NRDA	New Regions Development Authorities
NTDA	New Towns Development Authority
NTP	New Towns Programme
ODP	Open Door Policy
ODEP	Open Door Economic Policy
OWP	October Working Paper
PO	Public Organisation
POWP	Policies of October Working Paper
RDA	Regional Development Authority
RPA	Regional Planning Agency
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRC	Tenth of Ramadan City
TRDA	Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority
TRIA	Tenth of Ramadan Investors' Association
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER 1: MAKING THE CASE AND SETTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

After the 6th of October War in 1973 between Egypt and Israel, planning new industrial areas or extensions for the existing ones became one of the main aims of the Egyptian Government. This sought to speed up the industrialisation process started in 1957 after long periods of colonisation and exploitation of the country's natural resources by foreign powers. The guiding aims were to build a prosperous economy to maintain the rapidly growing population, to attract local and foreign private capital to the industrial sector, and to create job opportunities to raise living standards. This was coupled with attempts to reduce the degradation of the built environment in existing cities, specifically Cairo and Alexandria largely resulting from polluting industries, and to tackle a growing volume of rural-urban migration after the 23rd of July 1952 Revolution (Ayubi 1991; Aliboni *et al* 1984; Egypt 1985; Giugale and Mobarak 1996; Zaalouk 1989; Rivilin 1985).

It has been widely observed and documented that after decades of state-dominated economic activities, governments all over the world are increasingly relying on the private sector to foster economic growth and to build prosperous economies. Governments are becoming less engaged in the direct provision of goods and services and more active in developing markets, creating supporting institutions and providing safeguards to ensure equitable distribution. However, economists have come to believe that private sector decisions depend on the incentive structure[1] reflecting the scarcity of resources (including land) as well as incentive structure provided by the prevailing institutional framework (Serven and Solimano 1993; Clague 1997; Abou-Zeid 1995; Fawzy 1998)

Nevertheless, practitioners and theorists, who have studied the issue of economic growth in relation to the built environment, stress that building a prosperous economy that achieves high rates of economic growth but fails to protect the built environment surrounding economic activities not only increases the health hazards for its users (i.e. workers and residents surrounding the economic activities) but also runs the risk of international economic sanction through trading restrictions, the withdrawal of borrowing rights and other measures, such as tariff-based actions. Above all ignoring the need to manage the physical capacity and the quality of the built environment within

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[1] "The broad definition of the incentive structure is often referred to as 'business environment'. A sound business environment is based on two complementary preconditions: an appropriate and stable economic environment and efficient institutions" (Fawzy 1998, p. 1)

which economic and social development takes place, has proved to be costly and even fatal to the natural environment, economy and society at large (Cohen 1993, p.17; Walker 1994, p.28).

As a consequence, whilst trying to achieve a 'balance' between economic and social needs and environmental capacities[2] within given physical boundaries, the urban development planning field has attracted analysts and theorists trying to analyse, theorise, and create models for the urban development planning process, some of which are concerned with certain stage(s) within such process. For instance, some analysts, scholars and theorists are concerned with the process of setting goals and addressing the 'public interest', others with the decision-making process, and yet others are interested in the design and formulation of physical plans and the implementation process. Nevertheless, since the early 1970s, a few analysts, scholars, and theorists have gone beyond modelling and theorising the urban development planning process itself and have tried to understand and document the forces within society that are responsible for either the 'success' or 'failure' of such processes and how such forces affect the adoption and application of certain planning approaches rather than others in dealing with land and development in a specific 'time and space edge' (Rose 1981, see also chapter 2).

The urban development planning process and the built environment have become more and more explicitly analysed not only in connection to the economic environment but also to the political and social context within which the urban development process takes place. According to this viewpoint, it has become crucial to explicitly analyse such process through an in-depth understanding and examination of the institutional arrangements, power structures, and interests of key actors involved. This involves attempts to critically understand, analyse, and examine the evolving and ever changing relationship between the state institutions and agencies and the different societal groups and individuals who have different, and yet most of the time conflicting, interests and agendas in relation to the urban development process (Beck 1997, p.23; Dobson 1998, pp.12-30). In their analytical study on the British urban development planning process using different case studies, Brindley *et al* (1996, pp. 175-6) stress that such relationship not only affects the urban development planning approaches adopted and applied by the state to meet the different interests within society with respect to land

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[2] Environmental capacities are the physical (including renewable and non-renewable resources and waste production), cultural, and aesthetic limits to what the environment can provide (Jacobs 1993, p. 11).

development, but also affects the built environment resulting from such process. The latter emphasis explicitly calls for a critical understanding of social structures[3] within which the urban development planning process takes place. In this sense, the recognition of one of the main dichotomies in social science, the concept of structure and agency[4], which aims at understanding social structures, is extremely important when analysing the urban development planning process in its real-life context (Walsh 1998).

1.1 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES

In Egypt, since the adoption of the Open Door Policy (ODP) in 1974, what determined the urban development decisions and planning approaches to land development had been the political values and interests of actors involved in the decision-making process all along the planning process. In their struggle for power, long-term management objectives had been displaced by short-term political and financial advantages and most of the planning decisions had involved political choices - choices between competing interests or claims; choices between alternative policies and physical plans with various advantages to different interests groups; choices between different organisations and institutions to decide, manage and implement planning policies and objectives; and choices between alternative uses of resources. The above choices often resulted in fierce political conflicts and clashes of interests between key institutions, agencies, and individuals involved in the urban development process of Tenth of Ramadan City (TRC). This study reveals that such conflicts of interests had considerable negative impacts on the physical planning practice and the outcome of the urban development planning process in Egypt at large and more specifically in TRC.

This study has both theoretical and analytical objectives. The main theoretical objectives are: first, to seek a clearer understanding of the different theoretical approaches to the understanding of social structures with specific reference to the concept of structure and agency. This provides the broader theoretical basis to describe,

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[3] '*Society*' is the various patterns of social relationships that emerge, structure, organise, and develop between its members; '*Social structure*' is the concept that sociology uses to capture and describe the organisation of these patterns and the shapes that they take (Walsh 1998, p. 8)

[4] On the one hand, the concept of '*structure*' is usually employed in the literature to refer to any recurring patterns of social behaviour, which has constraining effect on individuals, groups, institutions, and co-operations (i.e. agency) within society acting in accord with the pressure exercised by social structures. On the other hand, the concept of '*agency*' refers to the degree of intensions combined by free will exercised by individuals, agencies, institutions, groups, and co-operations in their social actions, which enables them to meet their interests and needs (Giddens 1995)

analyse and explain the changes that took place in the relationship between the Egyptian government and the private sector since 1974. Such analysis helps in presenting a clearer perception of the context through which goals, priorities, plans, decisions and outcomes of the urban planning process were formulated both at the national and local levels. Second, to build an analytical framework upon which the empirical explanation and analysis of how in certain periods the changes in the political economy both at the national and local levels and the shifting allocation of power and resources within the 'triangle of power' (i.e. the institutions, agencies and individuals of the central government, local authorities, and private sector) influence the existing state-private sector relationship, which in turn affects the urban planning process and its physical outcome. A presentation of the theoretical debates in two flexible, dynamic and interlocking areas of knowledge, first, social structures, with specific reference to the concept of structure and agency, and second, urban development planning approaches in dealing with land development, provides the basis for defining an analytical framework to describe, analyse and explain the physical planning practice within the context of TRC, with specific reference to institutional arrangements, power structures, and interests of key institutions and agencies involved in the urban development planning process, planning politics, planning tools and procedures, and the decision-making process.

As regards to the analytical objectives, this study is an explanatory, descriptive and analytical one. It seeks a critical understanding of a socio-political and socio-economic phenomenon that affects the physical arrangements of the built environment, and thus, adopts the case study strategy as a research technique, focusing on refuting and supporting theories that explain how the social world operates (Merriam 1988; Eisner 1991; Bogdan and Biklen 1992). In other words, it seeks a deeper and clearer understanding of "a meaning of a process" (Merriam 1988, pp. 19-20; Cresswell 1994, p.2). However, it has to be stressed that this study does not aim to answer a policy question or to solve a pressing social problem, but rather to explain the causes behind and consequences of the politics of planning practice and decision-making. It aims to recount and analyse the urban development process of TRC within the context of the shifting allocation of power and resources within the 'triangle of power' and the changing political economy of Egypt since 1974 when a policy of promoting urban development (i.e. desert occupation) was adopted to assist with the resolution of Egypt's human settlement problems.

The study also discusses and explores the impact of the changes in the national political economy on the state-private sector relationship since 1974 with specific reference to the case study. It seeks to understand and to critically examine how such impact affected the institutional arrangements, values, interests, and motivations underpinning the planning practice. It also seeks answers to other questions, namely, how did the changes in the institutional arrangements and power structures at both the national and local levels and interests, values, and motivations of interest groups involved in the planning process, influenced the adoption and application of conflicting planning decisions and approaches in dealing with land development in the industrial areas within TRC? How did the adoption and application of such conflicting planning approaches and decisions impact upon the outcome of physical planning practice? What are the current perceptions of the workers and planners about the effectiveness of physical planning practice in creating an environmentally sound built up space (i.e. the green areas, services, utilities, buffer areas, location of industries, and the mix of industrial classes) in the industrial areas in TRC? In other words, the research directly addresses the call for more empirical studies that might support the theoretical analysis of the role and impact of interest groups and their relationship with the national and local government institutions, agencies and individuals (i.e. the triangle of power) on physical planning practice and on the urban development process as a consequence (also see appendix IV).

1.2 THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

This research postulates that the failure of the physical planning practice in achieving the goals and objectives of the successive urban development policies and local physical plans resulted from the continuous shift in the allocation of power and resources within the 'triangle of power', as the national political economy, institutional arrangements and power structures at the national and local levels changed in the period of 1974 till 2002.

1.3 THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

Egypt has an area of 1,001,450 square Km, nearly the size of Spain and France together (see figure 1.1), an estimated population of around 74 million, and an annual population growth rate of 1.88 percent (CIA 2003). Egypt faces a number of human settlements and economic challenges, discussed in further detail in chapter 4, that on the one hand, hinder all effort of development and economic growth, and on the other, have represented the major challenges to the successive Egyptian Administrations since the

early 1952 after the Independence Revolution (July Revolution, *Thawret talata wa e'shreen youlew*). The human settlements challenges include: the concentration of 98 percent of the total population in the Nile Valley and Delta (4% of the total area of Egypt), the imbalance between the inhabited and deserted areas, the rapid population growth and its negative consequences, the over expansion of the urban areas over the arable land, a rapid rise in the number and size of illegal settlements, the ongoing mismatch between the administrative and urban development borders of the economic and urban development regions and the ensuring political conflicts, rapid rural-urban migration, and the pressing need for housing and services (The Development and Construction Map 1998, p. 73; see also Attia 2001; Abouzeid 2000; Ali 2000).

Figure 1.1 Map of Egypt

Source: UT (2003)

The economic challenges are represented in the continuous struggle to sustain the economy from sources outside the country's own productive capacity (see chapter 3), the unsatisfactory performance of the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, high rate of unemployment, skilled labour shortage, weak Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, very low per capita income, strewed and worsening distribution of income, high rate of inflation, balance of trade and balance of payments deficits, and distorted and ineffective government subsidies (WB 2003; HSBC 2003; IMC 2003; Attia 1999; Ayubi 1989, 1991; Zaalouk 1989; Rivlin 1984, 1985; Cooper 1982).

Successive and divergent political economy regimes have imprinted the landscape of Egypt's urban centres in greatly dissimilar patterns. In 1952, Egypt experienced a radical shift when President Nasser (1954-1970) and a group of military officers overthrew the British-backed monarchy and established a republic-type governance system. At the time, the Egyptian Administration eventually adopted socialist principles as a result of its close relations with Russia and China. Accordingly, the government policy was characterised by property redistribution, housing reform, construction of large-scale urban projects, the promotion of a massive industrialisation programme in 1957 to substitute the agriculture sector in leading economic growth, and the construction of a powerful public sector to lead the national development process at the expense of the private sector. Such regime was inherently anti-imperialist in its stance, and the elite class and entrepreneurs, who dominated the imperialist period before the 1952 Revolution, found themselves directly threatened with respect to their political situation and their control of wealth. To the new regime, the elite class and entrepreneurs represented the bourgeoisie and the excesses of imperialism. In reaction to the previous imperialist phase, little efforts were made either to attract foreign capital or to encourage the domestic private sector to participate in the national development process (including urban development) (Stewart 1999; AUC 2003; Tripp and Owen 1989; Ibrahim 1987; American Development Bank 2000)

In line with its socialist ideology, the state became involved in large-scale provision of welfare functions including those related to housing, health, cultural and social services and food provision. It is widely documented that such political economy environment had a devastating impact on the private sector operation in Egypt through the adoption of a nationalisation policy applied during the second half of the 1950s till 1961 and the application of the five-year development planning system starting from 1960 (see chapter 3). Nevertheless, during the period of 1960 till 1965, although the

share of the manufacturing sector in GDP was 16.9 percent while employing 11.3 percent of the labour force at the time, the agriculture sector was still in the lead with a share in GDP of 35 percent and 52.5 percent of the labour force (Ayubi 1991; Aliboni *et al* 1984; Zaalouk 1989; Rivilin 1985; WB 1997; El-Hoseni and El-Sheikh 1988; Soliman 1981).

After 1965, the bulk of the Egyptian Administration's efforts was directed at strengthening the Military budget aiming at building an army that was capable of defeating Israel and liberating Palestine. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Army was defeated in 1967 and lost Sinai to Israel. Since 1967 till 1973, even after Nasser's death in 1970, the Administration focused on the military and on the military manufacturing industries to re-build the army with the aim of returning Sinai back to Egypt. In October 1973, the Egyptian Army managed to achieve its goals and retuned back Sinai to the Egyptian control. The period of 1966 till 1974 saw a steady decline in the rate of economic growth, with a marked fall in both the rate of investment and domestic savings. The economy was suffering from a multitude of problems. These included uncoordinated economic policies, which failed to recover the Egyptian economy from the impact of Yemen and Arab-Israeli wars in 1962, 1967, and 1973, and the correspondingly heavy defence burden; the inefficiencies of the public sector and the misadministration of prices, foreign trade and investment programmes; and the cumulative effects of the population explosion (Aliboni *et al* 1984; Egypt 1985; Giugale and Mobarak 1996; Zaalouk 1989; Rivilin 1985; Mabro 1974).

The above trend came to an end when President Sadat (1970-1981) began the process of reconnecting Egypt with the world economy through the launch of the Open Door Policy (*Al-Infitah*) in April 1974 composed of the Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP, *Al-Infitah Al-Iktisadi*) and Egypt's New Map Policy (ENMP, *Kharetet Al-Taameer)*. Such new national development planning policies had three significant features that would guide the development process in Egypt till 1991, as discussed in further detail in chapter 3. The first feature was to re-introduce, encourage, and give the lead to private sector (foreign and domestic) investment, while reducing the role of the public sector in the development process. The second feature can be recognised as the natural response to some of the ongoing national development problems at the time (e.g. availability of land, water scarcity, and the high cost of land reclamation) hindering any efforts of economic development led by the agriculture sector. As a consequence, the Egyptian Administration focused its investments, laws, and economic incentives on the

manufacturing sector along side the encouragement of the private sector investment (Ayubi 1991; Attia 1999; Salem 1997; Aliboni *et al* 1984; Egypt 1985; Giugale and Mobarak 1996; Zaalouk 1989; Rivilin 1985).

The third feature was directly linked to both the human settlements and economic challenges (see chapter 3). The aim of constructing new settlements across the desert to accommodate economic activities, including manufacturing industries, and to help alleviate the pressure on infrastructure networks, utilities and services in the existing main urban centres (e.g. Cairo and Alexandria) became the focus of successive national urban development policies since 1974. In other words, the construction of new settlements through which Egypt would be able to tackle the human settlements and economic challenges, was seen as the prime link between successive national economic development policies (e.g. Open Door Economic Policy) and national urban development policies (e.g. Egypt's New Map Policy) (Attia 1999; Stewart 1999; Salah 2001; Shalata 1997)

Nevertheless, the ODP and its following policies under Sadat was never a complete transition to a capitalist economic system. The national economy remained dominated by the public sector and central planning, and only a very limited amount of capital was attracted from multinational companies due to some regional and national conflicts (see chapter 3). Moreover, it seems only a small circle benefited from the ODP, creating a new bourgeoisie with large amounts of wealth. During the period of 1974 till 1981 the share of manufacturing sector in GDP rose from 16.9 to 18.3 percent and employed 11.9 percent of the labour force compared with the reduced share of agriculture in GDP of 26 percent and 47.7 of total employment. Although the share of the manufacturing sector was still less than of the agriculture sector, the manufacturing sector had the largest share in total investment. The share of the manufacturing sector in the total investment increased from 25.8 percent during the period of 1960 till 1965 to 26.1 percent during the period of 1974 till 1981 where the share of the agriculture sector decreased from 6.75 percent to 6.3 percent respectively (Fawzy 2000; El-Hoseni and El-Sheikh 1988; Soliman 1981; Rivilin 1985; Moore 1995; Steinberg 1991).

Under President Mubarak (1981 till now), who succeeded Sadat after his assassination in 1981, Egypt was more fully, if somewhat reluctantly, pushed into a capitalist system. Egypt's transition to capitalism was heavily instigated by outside forces, especially the World Bank and other creditors, who viewed extensive economic

reforms as the only means to save Egypt from its debt-ridden and low-productivity economy. In May 1987, the Government announced economic reforms in order to meet the requirements for an IMF loan, gain access to credit and permit renegotiation of Egypt's $40 billion foreign debt (Springborg 1989). Nevertheless, it was not until 1991 with the institution of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) that Egypt somewhat unwillingly embraced the World Bank ideology of free market enterprise. The ERSAP created sweeping changes in the Egyptian economy including the elimination of many consumer subsidies, privatisation of state owned industries, currency devaluation and large reduction in public spending (Holt and Roe 1993; Sullivan 1990; IMF 2003a and 2003b; World Bank 2003a).

Since 1991, the government introduced far-reaching economic reforms and stressed that the transformation to liberalisation could never be fostered without the growth of the private sector. The main objectives of the ERSAP were: to continue targeting the manufacturing sector as a growth area and, in particular, to promote manufacturing exports; and to further the leading role of the private sector in the development process specifically in the manufacturing and tourism sectors. It can be said that the private sector responded positively to the encouragement of the newly promoted ERSAP where it is increasingly becoming the driving force for economic growth. For instance, in 1996, private investment was more than 50 percent of the total investment in the country indicating the commitment of the Egyptian Administration to dissociate from investment activities and instead facilitate and promote increased private sector involvement in the economy (Fawzy 2000, 2002; American Development Bank 2000; Salem 1997, Salah 200; HSBC 2003).

The share of the private sector in GDP has increased from 62 percent in 1993 to 74 percent in 1999. The increasing confidence in the private sector is exhibited in rising investment, increasing growth and incomes as well as continued active private participation in the manufacturing sector where the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP increased from 23 percent during the period 1987 - 1991 to 32 percent during the period 1997 - 2002 while the share of the agriculture sector declined from 17.6 percent to 17 percent respectively. Moreover, the share of manufacturing sector in total employment also increased from 12,6 percent to 22 percent during the same periods while the share of the agriculture sector declined from 39.4 percent to 29 percent respectively (Fawzy 2000; HSBC 2003, ACCE 1998; American Development Bank 2000; The Economist 1994, 1999; Daily Star 2003).

Nevertheless, although Egypt is faced with the fact that the manufacturing sector has a few dominant large-scale enterprises and a very large number of small and medium enterprises (more than 90 percent of total manufacturing establishments), the Egyptian Administration focused its attention on the large-scale enterprises given the ongoing economic challenges facing the country (see chapter 3). Guigale and Mobarak (1996) and Fawzy (1998) stress that small and medium-scale manufacturing enterprises, mainly serve low-income consumers, provide low-quality and low-price products, use obsolete technologies, and more than 90 percent of such firms take the form of partnership and run on a family basis rather than on a corporate basis. Conversely, while large-scale manufacturing enterprises are relatively well developed and are able to export their products, they are too few in number to generate linkages that foster a more active private sector. The above situation had its echo in the urban development process where the powerful entrepreneurs who own large-scale enterprises, backed by the state institutions and agencies, achieved control of the urban development process at the national level and more specifically within the context of the case study (Fawzy 2000; American Development Bank 2000; Attia 1999; The Economist 1994, 1999; Salah 2001; Salem 1997; Abdel-Latif and Selim 1999).

1.4 THE CASE STUDY CONTEXT

A justification has to be provided for, on one hand, the choice of one case study rather than multiple case studies and, on the other hand, the choice of Tenth of Ramadan City as the research case study. The adoption of a single case study approach was based upon two main reasons. First, the aim of this research, as discussed above, does not involve a statistical comparison or an attempt to generalise but it seeks instead to provide an in-depth analytical study of a process in its real-life context. Second, the researcher faced funding and time constraints during the fieldwork period, since, according to the research sponsor's regulations, the collection of the empirical evidence had to be conducted in a period limited to three months with half of the regular monthly maintenance budget.

In addition to the extensive knowledge the researcher has about TRC, having been one of the physical planners who participated in the physical planning formulation of the extension of the heavy industrial area in 1999, TRC was chosen as the research case study for many established facts. First, TRC has a unique political and economic profile among the new settlements planned around the period of the mid 1970s. TRC

was the first of the two new cities (TRC and Sadat City) to enter the physical planning formulation process in early 1975 and to enjoy significant political as well as funding support at the time from President Sadat and the Minister of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities (Osman A Osman). This was mainly because TRC was promoted, at the time, as the prime example of the new cities to follow what would serve as the physical link between the ODEP and ENMP as discussed in further detail later on. Moreover, the city was classified as the first city of the first generation of new cities to complete a first stage of urban development in 1989[5].

According to several reports concerning the evaluation of the new settlements programme (e.g. Arab Republic of Egypt 1989, 1993; AAW 1999; Shetawy 2000), TRC was regularly ranked the top city among the new industrial cities in Egypt with respect to manufacturing development in terms of the number of producing manufacturing establishments, number of manufacturing employment, and the size of manufacturing investments and exports (see table 1.1). It was even claimed that in the year 1999/2000 TRC contributed 25% of Egypt's manufacturing exports (TRIA 2000).

Figure 1.2 The Regional Location of TRC

Source: (Shetawy 2000, p. 205)

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[5] According to the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities 1989, the first generation of new cities - cities completed their first stage of development – includes: TRC, Sadat City, New Ameriya, 6 October, 15th May, and Salehia city. The second generation of new cities – cities within the process of construction of the first stage of urban develeopment – includes: New Damietta, Badr, Noubariya, Beni Swef, New El-Menia, and El-Obour City. The third generation of the new cities – cities still in the physical planning formulation process – includes: El-Amal, and El-Safaa (i.e. New Assiut) City

Table 1.1 The Relative Importance of TRC in Comparison with the main New Industrial Cities

		10th Ramadan City			Sadat			6 October City			New Ameriya City		
		7/6/1988	13/2/93	1/1/00	7/6/1988	13/2/93	1/1/00	7/6/1988	13/2/93	1/1/00	7/6/1988	13/2/93	1/1/00
No. of Manufacturing establishments	• Productive • Under construction • Total	259 359 588	531 263 794	923 352 1275	39 133 172	96 82 178	126 108 234	104 50 154	286 245 531	392 355 747	30 63 93	146 77 254	231 135 366
Capital invested (1000 L.E.) at factor cost	• Productive • Prospective • Total	329375 247826 577201	2542361 904046 3446407	14015761 1249039 15264800	129265 166513 295778	309869 501995 811864	425300 585380 1010680	211380 51283 262663	664674 378487 1043161	258113 291433 317246	43330 99668 142998	439996 281515 721512	651800 314960 966760
Employment	• Productive • Prospective • Total	19690 19136 38826	36625 16622 53247	104608 11114 115722	9254 5875 8829	5510 4327 9837	6545 5710 12255	5666 3745 9411	28899 12240 41139	102850 40617 143567	1360 5768 7128	8835 5294 14129	13723 5264 18987

Adapted from:

Arab Republic of Egypt, 2000, *Twenty Years of Achievements: We Build for People*, New Communities in Egypt, Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities, Al-Ahram Commercial Press, Kalyoub, Egypt;

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TRIA, Tenth of Ramadan Investors Association, 2000, *10th of Ramadan Investors Association Directory;* and

TRC 2002, *General Information*, Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority, Alpha Co. Press, Six of October City, Egypt.

Second, the location of the city is a unique one. As may be seen from figure 1.2, the city is located on one of the six development corridors of the Greater Cairo Region (GCR), the Cairo/Ismailia highway, 55 km east of down town Cairo (i.e. El-Tahrir Square), 65 km from Ismailia City located on the west bank of the Suez Canal, and 25 km from Blebis City (AAW 1999, P.1/2). The choice of the city location was mainly due to political and economic reasons. For instance, Abdel-Aziz[6] (2002) stresses that the city was located in the east desert towards Sinai as a part of a defence strategy in case of future threats from Israel and near to the Suez Canal to facilitate the export of its industrial production. In addition to the political and economic aspects of the location choice, there were interests of specific powerful agencies and individuals involved the choice of such location. Such location proved to be a strong incentive to the private sector to invest in this specific city compared to any other new industrial city (see table 1.1).

Figure 1.3 Population Growth in TRC

Source: Ain Shams University 2002

Third, the City had an exceptional urban development process that can only be described as 'up-normal and irregular' (see chapters 4 and 5). Although a high rate of growth characterised the urban and economic development of its industrial areas, TRC had failed dramatically to attract the target population planned for (i.e. 500.000 inhabitants by the year 2000) (see figures 1.3 and 1.4). Moreover, as it is discussed in greater detail in chapters 4 and 5, it has been documented that there is a dramatic

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[6] In an interview with the researcher in March 2002

deviation between the original land use plans and the implemented patterns of the industrial areas in TRC. Such gap is often explored, analysed, and documented in relation to industrial location within the urban agglomeration of the city as a whole and more specifically within each industrial area, the buffer zones between the industrial and residential areas, the lack of local facilities and services within the industrial areas, and the buffer zone of the flood plain in the heavy industrial area (A1) (for instance, see table 1.2).

Figure 1.4 The Development of Land Use Activities in TRC

	Industrial areas	Residential areas	Services and Utilities	Open spaces
Planned (1976) in Km2	14.8	32	5.6	3.6
Existing (2002) in Km2	42	21.6	14.0	13.8

Source: Ain Shams University 2002

Table 1.2 The Deviation of the Industrial Allocation in a Sample of the Industrial Areas in TRC

Area* Plot Size	A1	A2	A3	B1	B2	C1	C2	C3	Total
Large (no.)	29	18	6	12	7				72
Medium (no.)	11	47	18	15	29	2			122
Small (no.)		6	19	4	16	53	10	6	114

Source: AAW 1999, 40/2

* There are three types of industrial areas in TRC: the heavy industrial areas (type A), the medium industrial areas (type B), and the light industrial areas (type C). Such classification was based upon specific environmental criteria related to the type, size, and requirements of manufacturing establishments. The analysis of such arrangements will be discussed in further details in the physical planning formulation analysis chapters.

Fourthly, the city was physically planned three times, which are represented in the 1976, 1982, and 1999 physical plans (see Appendix I). Each of such plans took

place within different political economy environment, institutional arrangements, power structure and interests of the key actors involved in the planning process. The city also went through three main periods of macro-economic and political change in which the above-mentioned aspects had a major impact on the outcome of the implementation process, as discussed in further detail in chapters 4 and 5.

Finally, TRC represents an appropriate case study through which the impact of the changes in the political economy since 1974 and, as a consequence, in the state-private sector relationship on the physical planning practice in the urban development process of the industrial areas can be traced, analysed and documented. It has a fairly moderate size in terms of population and urban agglomeration that could be managed, given the time and funding limitations of the fieldwork.

1.5 THE THEORETICAL SCOPE

The substance of this research relates to a wide range of theoretical and applied disciplines including urban development planning, development administration, urban management, social and political science, economic development planning, environmental planning, and public policy analysis. Given the limited time and funds, emphasis has been given to the socio-political and socio-economic dimensions of the urban development planning process, public sector management, institutional arrangements, and the decision-making process of urban development planning practice and the extent and nature of the state and private sector interventions in such practice. It has to be stressed that no attempt is made to conduct a comprehensive review of the urban development planning practice literature in this research. Nevertheless, many of the key English-language works in this field were consulted (for example see, Healey 1983a, 1983b; 1996, 1997; Beauregard 1996; Sandercock 1998; Moser 1993; Campbell and Fainstein, 1997; Faludi 1986; Innes 1995; Davidoff 1996; Scott and Roweis 1977; Krumholz 1994; Harvey 1989a, 1989b; 1996; McDougall 1982; Albrechts 1991; Rees 1999).

The aim is to focus on and critically examine the gap in the literature with respect to the link between urban development planning theory and practice and the different approaches to social structures, with specific reference to the concept of 'structure and agency', where an analysis of the institutional arrangements, power structure, interests, values, motivations and behaviour of the key actors involved in

urban development planning practice and decision-making process is often considered to be part of a 'black box' for researchers.

The theoretical context of this research addresses the need for developing an analytical framework particularly applicable to the context of the non-western developing world. There is a rich body of English-language literature on physical planning practice and urban development planning theory with specific reference to the socio-political and socio-economic dimensions of urban change in the context of the developed industrial world (for example Beauregard 1989, 1996; Harvey 1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1996; Healey 1996, 1997; Vance 1990; Cybriwsky 1991; Rowntree and Conkey 1980; Davidoff 1996; Rees 1999). While the current body of literature has greatly expanded our knowledge of the dynamic of the relationship between the economy and political forces and urban development planning practice within the western context, it is of limited utility for understanding non-western countries, which engage with the world capitalist system in a different manner (Stewart 1999; Healey 1997). Countries of the developing world, such as Egypt, neither share the common history of the industrial economic development model, which originated in Europe and the United States, nor do they share the exact forms of social structures, culture, politics, and governance, which are rarely comparatively examined. This further limits the applicability of such western-based analytical frameworks to the context of many developing countries.

In striving to develop a more relevant analytical framework for the analysis of physical planning practice in the context of developing countries as well as more sensitive to the key social structures within which such practice is carried out, and to the national and local socio-political and socio-economic forces that shape the form of the city, urban development planning practice, therefore, is viewed as a social product that reflects changing societal values, perceptions, interests, behaviour and motivations. It also echoes the institutional arrangements of the urban development process and the power structure of the various societal groups. This is theoretically examined through a critical analysis of the extent of intervention of state institutions and agencies and private sector agencies and individuals in urban development planning practice. Putting on such analytical spectacles, it has become pressing to examine the different theoretical approaches to the understanding of social structures, with specific reference to the concept of 'structure and agency' and to critically analyse the various urban development planning theory and practice while exploring the interlocking relationship between the above areas of knowledge.

1.6 THE METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

This section describes the process of research and discusses some of salient methodological issues regarding the nature and shortcomings of the information used. The reader will come across additional short methodological explanations at different points of the dissertation in connection with analytical procedures, and the use of terms, concepts and data in specific contexts. The research sought to understand the politics of the planning practice simultaneously from the viewpoints of different actor groups within the study population, which involved consulting both primary and secondary information. The research comprised a series of stages that include a review of the literature in connection with both the analytical framework and case study, discussions with experts on the subject and other informants concerned with, and influenced by, the research problem, acquisition and analysis of both qualitative data acquired from the interviews and quantitative data including official (secondary) and non-official (primary) statistical data. It also involved a design of a sample survey, collecting and processing of sample data using the statistical software SPSS, and finally the process of writing up.

1.6.1 The Research Strategy

Although there are many research strategies, the more common used ones, as Yin (1994, p. 3) states, are the experiment, survey, history, computer analysis of archival records, and the case study research strategy. Each of these research strategies is a different way of collecting and analysing empirical evidence and follows its own logic and assumptions. Many scholars and analysts emphasise that any research strategy can be used for all research purposes (i.e. exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive). In this sense, there may be exploratory case studies, explanatory case studies, and descriptive case studies; and the same can be applied to any research strategy (Yin 1981; Cooper 1984; Hedrick *et al* 1993; Yin 1994). There is an agreement among scholars and researchers that the choice of research strategy depends on the nature of the research question(s), the extent the researcher has control over behavioural events, and the degree of focus on specific events rather than the purpose of research (Hedrick *et al* 1993). Yin (1994) summarised the relation between research strategies and types of research questions as follows:

> "… The first and most important condition for differentiating among
> the various research strategies is to identify the type of research
> question being asked. In general, "what" questions may either be

exploratory (in which case any of the strategies could be used) or about prevalence (in which surveys or the analysis of archival records would be favoured). "how" and "why" questions are likely to favour the use of case studies, experiments, or histories"   (Yin, 1994, p. 7)

Given the main research questions stated above, it is obvious that this research could be located within the boundaries of either history or case study strategy. However, as Platt (1992a; 1992b) points out, history strategy is usually adopted in situations when a researcher is dealing with the "dead-past" when no relevant persons are alive to report, even retrospectively, what occurred, and when the researcher must rely on primary documents, secondary documents, and physical and cultural artefacts as the main source of evidence. Nevertheless, in certain cases historians have to deal with contemporary events. In this situation, history strategy begins to overlap with the case study strategy. In such situation, many analysts (Campbell *et al*, 1982; Cooper, 1984) claim that it is preferable to adopt a case study strategy. This is because in these situations case study strategy has two main advantages that are the ability of using systematic interviewing and direct observation methods. Supported by the later arguments and discussions, this research adopts the case study as a research strategy in collecting and analysing the empirical evidence.

1.6.2 Limitations of Case Study Strategy

It must be said that there are theoretical and practical advantages and disadvantages of the case study strategy. Schramm (1971) argued that the essence of case study, the central tendency among all types of case studies, is to illuminate a decision or sets of decisions: why they were taken, how they where implemented, and with what results. Platt (1992) emphasises that, as a logical way of design research methodology, case study strategy has both a scope of study and data collection and analysis techniques. Regarding the scope of study, a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1994, p.13). Furthermore, in relation to the technical characteristics, including data collection and data analysis techniques, the case study inquiry, as Yin (1994) claims,

"… copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result it relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result it benefits from the prior

development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis"   (Yin, 1994, p.13)

Given the main features of case study strategy and its potential, case study strategy has often been criticised for specific disadvantages that affect the process of data collection and data analysis. First, the greatest concern has been over the lack of rigour of case study research. This is because, as Sudman and Bradburn (1986) claim, too many times the case study researcher has allowed equivocal evidence or biased views to influence data collection and data analysis process, in other words the direction of finding and conclusions. Although this disadvantage is not different in any other research strategy, it has been more frequently encountered and less frequently overcome in case study strategy (Yin, 1994, p.10).

The second common concern about case study strategy is that it provides little basis for scientific generalisation. The repeated question among scholars and analysts is how can we generalise from one single specific case study? Like the first disadvantage, this one can be found in any other research strategy. It can be argued how can we generalise from a single experiment, specific historical position, single annual archival record, and sample survey conducted in a specific context? Although the later argument can be the answer to scholars who criticise case study strategy, many scholars defend the case study strategy by claiming that the main aim of case study strategy is not statistical generalisation but rather analytical generalisation that supports the research goal to expand and generalise specific theoretical propositions (Creswell, 1994, pp.143-171).

The final and frequent complaint about case study strategy is that it requires too much time and the resulting data is so large that it cannot be easily organised and categorised. However, this disadvantage, as Feagin *et al* (1991) point out, appears in the case study strategy because of the misunderstanding and continuous lack of distinction between case study as a research strategy and the techniques used by such strategy to collect and analyse date. Hoaglin *et al* (1982) claim that in the past, case study strategy was usually connected with ethnography and participant observation techniques (or methods), which require too long time to be carried out. Nevertheless, there are many other techniques that can be used with the case study strategy and would not require such long time. These include interviews, sample survey, documentation, archival records, and direct observation.

1.6.3 The Research Methodology Approach

Many scholars and analysts, such as Van Maanen (1988); Strauss and Corbin (1990); and Yin (1994) point out that the case study strategy should not be confused with qualitative research. Case studies can include, and even limited to, quantitative evidence. Lincoln and Guba (1986) claim that the contrast between qualitative and quantitative evidence does not distinguish the various research strategies. In this sense, case study strategy can be based on both qualitative and quantitative evidence and as a result can use mixed techniques (or methods) to provide such evidence. On the one hand, qualitative research is an investigative process within which the researcher gradually makes sense of social phenomena by contrasting, comparing, and analysing the responses of informants. On the other hand, quantitative research seeks facts about specific phenomena, events, roles, groups, or situations rather than seeking an in-depth understanding of a specific phenomenon or process in its real-life.

Given the main research questions and objectives, a combination of both qualitative and quantitative research methodology was adopted as an approach in dealing with data collection and analysis. The aim of the adoption of the quantitative research methodology, as stated above, was to provide the evidence that supports the outcomes of the qualitative research methodology seeking an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon being studied. Cresswell (1994, p. 184) claims that this situation called a "dominant-less dominant" research methodology situation within which the research methods and results relate to a dominant research paradigm in use (qualitative research methodology in this research), with a small segment for methods and results for the less dominant paradigm (the quantitative research methodology in this research).

1.6.4 Study Population and Units of Analysis

The study population involved in the physical planning practice and the urban development process falls into four categories: the government (both at the central and local levels), the interest groups, the consultants and advisors, and the manufacturing workers. The central government officials include: officials in the Ministry of Reconstruction, Housing and New Communities (MOH), which includes Authority for New Urban Communities (ANUC), General Organisation for Physical Planning (GOPP), Advisory Committee for Reconstruction (ACR), Tenth of Ramadan Environmental Inspection Unit (TREIU), and Agency for Research and Projects (ARP); Local Government Officials include: Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority

(TRDA), and Board of Trustees (BOT). In addition to administrators, permanent staff, and politicians.

The interest groups outside the central and local governments structures include: Tenth of Ramadan Investors Association (TRIA), Department of Environment within TRDA, and Association for Developing Small and Medium-Scale Industries in the New Cities (ASMINC), manufacturing establishments owners and managers, manufacturing workers within the industrial areas A1, B1, and C3.

The consultants and advisors include: the Egyptian consultancy firm (COPA), Ahmed Abdel Warith Consultancy Firm (AAW), academics, experts and advisors including planners, sociologists, economists, environmentalists, lawyers. For each study population, a specific methodology technique and research method was adopted to collect data. The workers included: a sample from workers in A1, B1 and C3 industrial areas working living and commuting everyday to and from TRC. Appendix II presents research methods and related study population and sampling techniques. In section 1.6.6, such research methods and their advantages and shortcomings in the process of data collection in the fieldwork will be discussed.

1.6.5 The Fieldwork Constraints

Three specific fieldwork constraints hindered the process of data collection in connection to specific study population groups. First, as a consequence of currency devaluation in August 2001, almost all manufacturing establishments tended to cut back their spending to cope with the newly established economic situation. One of the main policies was to pressure their workers by reducing their salaries by half (in some cases by two thirds) or being fired. Given the above situation as well as the need for money to support their families, almost all of the workers preferred not to register with the national insurance system and employment offices. This is to save some extra money from not paying the monthly insurance fees automatically deducted from their salaries. This led to the situation where they had to accept the entrepreneurs' (i.e. establishments' owners and managers) blackmailing and manipulation. With the continuity of the crushing economic situation and the loss of every hope that the economic situation would get better and their salaries would be the same again, the workers could not support their families solely with their newly imposed salaries. As a consequence, there were several demonstrations and protests within the industrial areas in TRC and other new cities, which were dealt with by a heavy-handed police force. Such social unrest

made the industrial entrepreneurs anxious and irritated about interviewing their workers and the subject that would be discussed.

The second constraint was in connection to the tragedy of September 11th 2001. After such tragedy, the Egyptian government took very strict security measures all over Egypt. One such measure, as it was discovered when interviewing the workers, was to arrest every single adult male living and working in TRC, under the emergency law initiated after president Sadat assassination, to be questioned and investigated for having any connection with terrorist groups in both the national and international levels. Such situation created an environment of fear among residents to give any statement or to be interviewed thinking that the researcher is from the intelligence.

Thirdly, it was confirmed by a senior police officer that the intelligence seized a spying operation that was about to be terminated in TRC where two MOSAD agents were arrested while operating as two planning students from the UK. This situation led to, first, the local police to be vigilant regarding my movements and to arrest the researcher several times for taking photos within the industrial areas and the city residential neighbourhoods. Second, it also led the residents to be over-suspicious about the researcher and not willing to participate in any interview. Finally, there were clear and strict orders from senior government officials both at the local and central government levels to limit handling and circulating any information or documents with the 'public'.

1.6.6 Conducting the Case Study: Collecting the Evidence

The empirical evidence of this research originated in different sources (or research methods). No single source of evidence, as Yin (1994) claims, has complete advantage over all the others. Sources of evidence for this research are documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, and a sample survey. The characters of each source and the way that contributed to the data collection process was as follows:

1.6.6.1 Documentation

Documentation source plays an explicit role in data collection process in dealing with case study research. The forms of documentary evidence could be unlimited, however, the documentary information supporting this research is based on specific forms. These forms included books, articles, research reports and proposals, postgraduate dissertations, and published and unpublished studies and evaluations for

the same case study; in addition to newspapers clippings. A number of libraries and documentation centres in both the UK and Egypt were consulted throughout the research (see Appendix III). The strengths of documentation evidence was in its given advantage to be reviewed repeatedly, to help verifying the correct spelling of titles and names of organisations that might have been mentioned in the interviews and questionnaires, to include exact references and details of the case study, to corroborate information from other sources, and in most cases to contain a broad coverage of long span of time and many events.

In spite of the overall potentials of the documentation source of evidence, some of the documents provides data that are extremely biased, in the sense that such documents provide information directed to specific audience or were written for some specific purposes rather than those of the case study analysis. Such concern was recognised in the case of local government's reports that aim only to show its achievements rather than providing and presenting non-biased information. At the beginning of the fieldwork, some specific documentary information had been deliberately blocked from being accessed as been classified or politically sensitive. For instance, I was blocked from having access to the specific maps that show the specific terms of reference of the land uses and type of industries to be established in each industrial areas, the official decision-making steps to locate land for specific use and approve industrial projects, and the ministerial decrees regarding the creation of the BOT and its official role in managing the urban development process in TRC and its relation with TRDA. However, the later problem was overcome through direct personal contacts with senior government officials both at the central and local government levels.

1.6.6.2 Archival Records

The usefulness of the archival records varies from case study to another. For some case studies, archival records can be the main sources of primary information and in other case studies, archival records can serve as supporting sources of evidence or providing background evidence. For this research, archival records were not the main source of information but were rather a supportive one. Like the documentation source of evidence, archival records can take many forms. For this research, the forms of archival records were maps of the geographic characteristics of the case study, list of

names, addresses, and other relevant information, and survey data previously collected during the MSc fieldwork trip[7].

Although archival records share the main strengths of documentary information, they have a distinctive advantage. Archival records are supposed, if not biased, to be precise and quantitative and to provide direct and hard scientific evidence. However, archival records can be extremely difficult to obtain specially if personal and/or categorised information are included in such records. As mentioned above the problem of inaccessibility to such records was extremely noticeable in the context of Egypt specially when dealing with records related to the economic development and political fields. Such problem drives partly from, as many reports, articles and newspapers confirm, the steps that the Egyptian government took regarding currency devaluation in August 2001 and the rise of basic goods prices (e.g. wheat, rise, cooking oil, sugar) and the resulting social unrest. Nevertheless, data collected for economic records were mainly obtained from the online World Bank site, The Economist, and other documents published by the Egyptian American Chamber of Commerce.

1.6.6.3 Interviews

"Interviews are an essential source of case study evidence because most studies are about human affairs. These human affairs should be reported through the eyes of specific interviewees, and well-informed respondents can provide important insights into a situation"

(Yin 1994, p. 85)

This research adopted face-to-face semi-structured and structured interviews techniques (see Appendices IV and V). On one hand, regarding the semi-structured interviews, a list was prepared for key actors identified to be interviewed before the fieldwork. Some actors in such list were contacted both by phone and email if found. All key actors that had been contacted before the fieldwork agreed and welcomed to be interviewed, seeing the research as both interesting and worthwhile, and gave their time unstintingly. The only refusal, disappointing in view of willing participation of very senior planning consultant and academic staff, was the senior planner for the third and fourth phase of residential and industrial areas in TRC. This was a result from his personal and financial dispute with AAW, his view that such interview would not make

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[7] TRC was the case study of the researcher's MSc research in 2000. The researcher had to collect primary data about the demographic, micro-economic contexts as well as the gap between the successive original physical plans and the implemented land use patterns at the time.

any difference for the existing situation in TRC industrial areas, and his concern about the politically sensitive nature of discussion[8].

Such list was continually enlarged during the period of the fieldwork in a snowballing manner, as some interviewees recommended others to give more detailed discussions about some specific points that they do not know about. Appendix VI presents the last updated list of informants interviewed. In all cases, interviewees were contacted by phone, it was possible to hold a relaxed discussion with the subject even with the most senior politicians or administrators, and the researcher's intervention was limited as necessary that the key issues were covered. Given the tragedy of September 11th and its consequences on the security environment in Egypt at all levels, as discussed above, it was impossible to record a single interview. In four cases (i.e. the secretary of the BOT, the director of the department of development in TRDA, and two members of the department of public relations in TRDA) detailed written record or just taking notes was absolutely refused mainly because of the politically sensitive discussions. In such cases, the researcher had to remember the key answers to the interview questions and record them instantly after each interview.

The discussions generally took between one and two hours each, occasionally longer, and in some cases more than one discussion was held with the same person (mainly with the above mentioned interviewees). The aim was to test accuracy by checking such discussions for internal consistency, checking the validity of recorded notes, checking for consistency between stories as reported by others who were interviewed and has been involved. The research utilised only the information, gathered from the semi-structured interviews that was consistent in discussions with at least three interviewees in order to guarantee the reliability and quality of data. In case of mismatch between stories presented, this was of a particular interest.

On the other hand, regarding the structured interviews, before the field work it was planned that the researcher would carry out two sample surveys with two different study population to guarantee data reliability. It was planned that a sample survey is to be carried out with manufacturing workers within A1, B2 and C4; and another sample survey to be conducted with residents around such areas. The choice of such industrial areas was mainly based on one of the city reports confirming that such areas were the first to be planned, and thus it would be a justified choice for tracing the urban

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[8] I have not displayed a structured cross-referencing of the interviews to protect the identity of the interviewees.

development process and planning practice within the industrial areas in TRC. Nevertheless, after two days in the field, it was recognised that such industrial areas were not the first to be either planned or constructed instead they were A1, B1 and C3 industrial areas. Given such circumstances, the two samples (i.e. workers and residents samples) had to be redesigned.

It has to be said that it was assumed and planned that the researcher would be able to meet the workers in front of the manufacturing establishments on their way in and out, in mornings and evenings on their way home; and would be able to knock at the sample residents' doors and conduct the face-to-face structured interviews. However, this proved to be extremely dangerous and naïve as the researcher was nearly arrested by the local police several times for security reasons. The strategy for the workers sample had to be changed to an official one that depended on contacting the manufacturing establishments and asking for their permission to interview their workers. This proved more effective although the researcher had some doubts about data bias in terms of expecting establishments to choose the workers to be interviewed rather than the researcher himself using less biased methods. This was a false expectation, as almost all the establishments' managers gave the researcher full access to any worker of his choice while touring the establishment accompanied by an engineer away from managers and other colleagues. To the researcher's satisfaction, the interviewees were checked carefully not to have any previous knowledge about either the interview or the subject that would be discussed.

There were only three refusals to provide such access and even face-to-face interviews and asked for the interviews forms to be collected later on, after two days of their delivery. It was discovered, in each of such cases, that all the collected forms were the exact copy written by the same person and even the same pen. The reason for such action was connected to the very politically sensitive posts that their owner holds, as all of them are Members of the Egyptian Parliament. In A1 industrial area, out of the original sample there were four refusals to conduct interviews, five closed down establishments, and four with no reply to my request. In B1 industrial area, there was only one refusal, one did not reply my request for interviews, and one closed down establishment. In C3 area, all the original sample establishments and their workers had been interviewed. For those refusals, closing down, and no reply establishment, the researcher chose other establishments to conduct the structured interviews with their workers and managers.

Although the obstacles that faced the conduct of the workers sample could be overcome, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conduct a single structured interview with any resident. The residents' sample survey had to be cancelled because of security reasons stated above. It has to be mentioned that because of the good relations that the researcher had built with the public relations employees in TRDA during the first month of the fieldwork, the researcher was offered several times by such employees to fill in the survey forms as a favour. However, such offers meant to turn a blind eye on such process, as the data to be collected would neither be valid nor reliable and oppose research ethics, as all forms would be filled in by such employees.

1.6.6.4 Direct Observation

There is a common agreement between scholars and analysts such as Cresswell (1994), Yin (1994), and Woodhouse (1998) about the importance of the direct observation method when dealing with case study research. Direct observation refers to the visits that a researcher may carry out to the case study site in order to observe relevant behaviour or environmental conditions to the phenomenon being studied. Direct observation method is often very useful in providing additional information about the topic being studied to support other empirical evidence. Dabbs (1982) claims that direct observations are valuable when the observer may consider taking photographs to support his/her observations and to convey important case characteristics to outside observers.

The direct observation method was adopted to achieve three main objectives: to update existing land use patterns of the industrial areas in TRC, to observe investors who need to apply for industrial land regarding their reaction and response to rules and regulations at both the central and local government levels, and to take photos of the utilities and services within the studied industrial areas. Although the first objective was achieved with no obstacles, the second objective had to be dropped for two main reasons. The first was the total blockage to gain access to meetings between government officials and investors at any level. The second reason was the fact that such meetings are rarely carried out through official channels. The third objective was achieved, however after the researcher had been arrested. After checking the needed documents that confirmed the approval for conducting such research, permission was provided to take photos and even video recording of the industrial areas.

1.6.6.5 The Sample Survey

As mentioned above, this research adopted the sample survey method to collect evidence regarding the perception of workers about the decision-making process regarding land development and the effectiveness of physical planning practice in providing an environmentally sound built up space in the industrial areas. Prior to the fieldwork trip, it was recognised that the demographic statistics provided by TRDA were extremely biased and unreliable. This is because such statistics aimed at showing the central government and the people's assembly the success of TRDA to attract workers and residents to TRC. The empirical findings of the pilot fieldtrip in May 2001 confirm that the procedures and basic factors upon which such statistics were gathered are unreliable.

For instance, TRDA demographic statistics claim that the total population of the city reached 100,000 in 1996 (AAW, 1999, p.2/14) and 148,000 in 2001 (Pilot field trip, May 2001). However, from the pilot trip findings in May 2001, such statistics were based upon calculating (and not surveying) the total population at daytime not at nighttime. This means that workers, who work in the industrial areas and then return back home to the neighbouring cities at the end of the working day, were counted in such statistics. The Chief Engineer in TRC stresses that the nighttime population is, at most, 48,000 inhabitants and the number of manufacturing establishments in the official records neglects the production status of each establishment (i.e. under construction, producing, or closed down). In addition to the bias of such statistics and records, the official national statistics and records provided by the Central Agency for Population Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS) do not include any separate demographic statistics for either the workers or residents of TRC. This is because, as revealed by the findings of the pilot fieldtrip in December 2000, the population of TRC were simultaneously added to either the population of Belbis City (the nearest existing city) within Sharkia governorate or the population of Cairo City where TRC was seen as one of their suburbs. Furthermore, The exact number of workers in each establishment was difficult to obtain. This is because the actual archival records of workers in each establishment are seen as classified internal information because of their direct connection to taxation and employment rights.

A combination of up to date EEAA land use plans and the TRDA and TRIA lists of producing establishments were used to provide the sample framework[9]. For instance, in the heavy industrial area (A1), according to the TRDA statistics, there have been 140 registered working establishments. However, according to EEAA (2002), there are only 81 establishments currently in production. The same case is applicable within both industrial areas (B1) and (C3). Moreover, the EEAA maps and reports provide a helpful updated sample framework regarding the number of workers in each working establishment classifying them into three categories that are: establishments that have more than 50 workers, establishments that have from 10 to 50 workers, and establishments that have less than 10 workers. With the help of the computer software Excel under Windows 2000 operating system, a systematic random sampling technique was processed to provide the logic of choosing the exact establishments needed to interview their workers in recognition to the EEAA establishments' classification in relation with the number of worker within each establishment.

Three industrial areas were chosen to conduct a sample survey within each. Such choice was crucial since the time and funds of the fieldwork were limited. From the five heavy industrial areas in the city, the heavy industrial area (A1) was chosen. The choice of this area was due to three main reasons. First, the heavy industrial area (A1) was the only heavy industrial area that both a foreign, Swedish (SWECO) and Egyptian (COPA) urban development planning consultancy firms designed detailed land use plan models for. Second, it was re-planned by the Egyptian private consultancy firm (COPA) to meet the market needs within the local context and yet modified several times by the department of planning in TRDA. Finally, it was the first heavy industrial area to be implemented in the city. From the four medium industrial areas (i.e. B1, B2, B3 and B4) in the city, the medium industrial area (B1) on the western side of the city was chosen. The choice of the medium industrial area (B1) was based on three reasons. First, like the heavy industrial area (A1), the medium industrial areas (B1) and (B2) were the only medium industrial areas to be planned by both the Swedish and Egyptian consultancy firms. Second, the B1 area was re-planned and modified by the TRDA. Finally, it was the first medium industrial area to be implemented in the city. Furthermore, the light industrial area (C3) was chosen from the four light industrial areas in the city because of

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[9] Such land use maps and information about the number of workers and environmental status within each industrial establishment were provided by an environmental research project to announce TRC as the "first environment friendly" city in Egypt. This project was run during the period of August 1998 to January 2001 under the authority of the EEAA Environmental Inspection Unit, funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and managed by Roche-Intelec Consortium.

its location next to the medium industrial area (B1). This gave the researcher the chance to concentrate his efforts on one specific zone to save time, fund and effort.

It has to be stressed that the sample survey is not a strictly representative sample. Given the time and funding limitations of the fieldwork, the aims of the ample survey, as less-dominant quantitative method, are to explore a wide range of manufacturing workers' perceptions about the urban development process and physical planning practice as well as to endorse the validity and reliability of the primary data collected by the dominant quantitative methods. Therefore, a sample survey was designed to choose 20% of the establishments in each industrial area, with four workers to be interviewed from each establishment. This gave a total of 116 workers that had been interviewed. A total of 17 establishments from (A1) area, 8 establishment from (B1) area, and only 4 establishments from (C3) area were randomly chosen to provide the list of establishment that were to be contacted to have their permission to interview their workers. Nevertheless, since the establishments have been classified into three categories regarding the workers size factor, the sample of establishments was based on the percentage of every category as seen in table 1.3

Table 1.3 The Sample of Manufacturing Establishments

Industrial areas	No. of establishments in production (TRDA)	Size (No. of workers)	Actual no. of establishments in production				Systematic random sampling
			Census	Total	Sample (20%)	Total	
(A1)	140	>50	55	81	11	17	1:5
		10-50	22		5		1:4
		<10	4		1		1:4
(B1)	59	>50	20	36	4	8	1:5
		10-50	14		3		1:4
		<10	2		1		1:2
(C3)	34	>50	2	12	1	4	1:2
		10-50	8		2		1:4
		<10	2		1		1:2
Total			**129**	**129**	**29**	**29**	

1.6.7 Data Validity and Reliability

Given the criticism of case study strategy, discussed earlier, the problem of data validity and reliability had to be overcome to avoid data bias. The following measures were adopted to support and strengthen the validity and reliability of data collected:

1- *Triangulation of data*: Woodhouse (1998) defines triangulation as "the use of multiple source of evidence to test or modify one's understanding of a given problem or situation" (p. 137). In this sense, the researcher used different sources of evidence that are documentation, archival records, structured interviews (questionnaires) in a sample survey, semi structured interviews, and direct observation.

2- *Creating a case study database*: a case study data base was constructed throughout a case study to record personal feelings, thoughts, perspectives, and notes about interviews, observations, and documents; *case study documents* which were collected during the fieldwork from the local and central government and from different documentation centres and libraries; *tabular materials* which were created from the sample survey.

3- *Repeated observations at the research site*: regular and repeated observations of the phenomenon being observed were repeatedly done on-site over the three months fieldwork.

4- *Participatory modes of research*: the researcher was involved in all phases of this study, from designing of the fieldwork to analysing responses and presenting the conclusion.

5- *Peer examination*: my supervisor served as a peer examiner to help maintaining the chain of evidence and to help reducing both sampling and non-sampling error.

6- *Carry out several pilot trips*: to help the researcher to refine, organise, and sharpen the questions of the interviews and questionnaires. The research carried out two pilot trips one in December 2000 and the other in May 2001. The first pilot trip was carried out among TRDA's staff who are current residents around the industrial areas in TRC and the second pilot trip was conducted among the academic staff of the Department of Urban Planning, Ain Shams University, with the attendance of my supervisor.

7- *Fieldwork plan*: given the fieldwork time factor, a timetable was set for the activities that were held in the field trip. A list that was amended in

the course of the fieldwork, was prepared prior the fieldwork with those identified as key actors to be interviewed (see Appendix VI).

8- *Clarification of the researcher's bias*: my bias towards the choice of the case study and the relation to the field of physical planning in this specific case was clearly stated before.

1.7 DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES AND THESIS ORGANISATION

The data collection phase resulted in producing both qualitative and quantitative data, each of which was dealt with in different procedures. Merriam (1988) and Marshal and Rossman (1989) claim that data collection and data analysis must be a simultaneous process in qualitative research. This simultaneous process includes a continuous classification of things, persons, responses, and events. Jacob (1987) points out that this classification of information is always carried out throughout the data analysis process by indexing or coding the outcome data. This is to help the researcher to identify and describe patterns and themes from the perspective of the participants, and then attempt to understand and explain these patterns and themes (Agar, 1980). Therefore, during the qualitative data analysis, data were organised categorically and chronologically, reviewed repeatedly, and continually coded; and the field notes and diary were regularly reviewed. In addition, the resulting quantitative data were analysed using the statistical software package (SPSS) and all maps and figures were produced using Autocad, Photoshop 6, and Microsoft Office 2000 software packages.

The thesis is organised in a logical manner to support research arguments and to highlight research findings as follows: this first chapter aims at providing a brief background on the national context while illustrating the relative importance of the industrial sector recognised as the prime economic base of the case study among the economic sectors of the Egyptian economy. It also justifies the choice of the research case study by illustrating the relative importance of the TRC among the major new towns built since 1974 all over Egypt with specific reference to achieving national and regional urban development planning objectives. Moreover, it introduces a brief background regarding the context of the case study in specific and its relation to the changing national and regional urban development planning objectives in the period of 1974 till 2002.

As well as providing such brief contextual background, this chapter sets the basic lines of arguments and key conceptual framework upon which the theoretical and analytical contexts of the research was built. This, according to Neuman (1997), provides a background or a context setting by placing the research within the broader theoretical and practice context. This chapter, moreover, while providing the research focus, objectives, and context, outlines and justifies the basis upon which the methodology of the research has been built to conduct the case study and to collect the empirical evidence. It also states the precautions taken to provide and present valid and reliable empirical evidence as well as the data analysis procedures. Finally, it outlines the contributions and limitations of the research.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical debate upon which the research constructed a analytical framework to analyse the empirical evidence collected from the field. It critically focuses the theoretical discussion on the gap in literature related to the connection between the approaches to social structures, with specific reference to the concepts of structures and agency, and urban development planning theory and practice. To achieve such objective, the chapter is divided into three main sections. The first discusses the different stands of scholars, analysts, and researchers to explain and describe social structures with specific reference to the concept of 'structure and agency'. It stresses the argument that social structures cannot be explained using approaches to social structure stressing one concept of the conceptual dichotomy of 'structure and agency'.

The second section critically debates and examines urban development planning theory and practice within a chronological taxonomy. To theoretically overcome the complexity of the 'planning' paradigm, this section breaks down the paradigm in its three basic components. The first is planning traditions referring to the different professions (i.e. practice) related to the paradigm; the second is planning methodology introduced to carry out such practice; and thirdly, planning approaches (styles) adopted and applied by governments in dealing with land and development. This section stresses the fundamental theoretical arguments, debate, and views about the form of social structure within which urban development practice is carried out. It also emphasises the role of the state, the role of planners, attitude to market processes, purpose, scope, and planning processes of each theoretical stand.

The third section aims at supporting the theoretical positions that underpins this research. It constructs the analytical framework that makes use of the different theoretical arguments, claims, discussions, principles, and stands of the approaches to social structures theory and of the theories and approaches to the three components of the 'planning' paradigm (i.e. urban development planning practice, methodology, and theory). It also provides the analytical criteria and entry points to the analysis of the urban development planning process and physical planning practice in the context of Egypt at large and more specifically in the context of the case study.

Chapter 3 provides a critical analysis for the changing political economy of Egypt between 1974 and 2002. It explores and analyses the political, social, economic and institutional contexts at the national level. It also critically examines the main national development challenges and policies adopted during the concerned period to deal with such challenges; and the objectives of subsequent national and regional urban development plans. The aim is to highlight the systematic socio-political and socio-economic factors that affected the urban development planning process and physical planning practice at the national level. Moreover, the chapter stresses the direct link between the socio-political and socio-economic context of the case study (TRC) and those at the national level. It also emphasises the impact of the above-mentioned national and regional urban development objectives on the micro-scale of the case study context. The chapter highlights, through illustrative empirical evidence, the gap between policy and practice stressing the impact of institutional arrangements, power structures, and interests of the key actors involved in the urban development planning process on such gap.

Chapter 4 analyses both the primary and secondary data collected from the field. It explicitly explains what happened during the formulation processes of the different physical plans of the industrial areas in TRC (i.e. the 1978, 1982, and 1999 physical planning formulation) in light of the changing objectives of the national urban development planning policies. It focuses on the relationship between the institutions, agencies, and powerful individuals in the central and local governments as well as in the private sector at the national and local levels. It also critically examines the impact of institutional arrangements, power structures and interests of the key actors on planning decisions. The aim is to provide the empirical evidence for the impact of the changing socio-political and socio-economic environment at the national level on the case study

context and on urban development planning process and practice, with specific reference to the resulting successive physical plans.

Chapter 5 focuses on the how and why the gap between the original physical plans and the existing land use patterns of the industrial areas during the study period. This chapter focuses on the politics of the implementation process of the successive original physical plans. It discusses the relations between the different government levels, the interest groups, power structures, motivations and interests of the key actors and institutions involved in the decision-making process and their impact on the implementation process. It illustrates how decisions affecting the implementation process as well as the nature of the state and private sector intervention evolve from fierce political conflicts and struggle for political and financial gains. This chapter empirically confirms that the failure of physical planning practice in achieving its prime resulted from short-term political expediency, promoted by powerful interest groups, which directed and controlled the implementation process during the concerned period.

The final chapter presents the conclusions arising from the research and identifies some issues for future investigation.

CHAPTER 2: SOCIETY, POLITICS AND PLANNING: THEORETICAL DEBATE AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

> "… Any evaluation and critique of planning systems and practices
> needs to engage with understanding of the social processes through
> which concerns about space, place and biosphere are generated, and
> with the political process [….] through which societies develop ways of
> managing their common affairs. The understanding and practice of
> planning is thus the interlocking of the study of the dynamics of urban
> and regional change and the study of normative practice of
> governance…"   (Healey 1997, p. 4)

All societies have some kind of mechanisms and urban planning systems in dealing with land development, which vary according to, first, the social context within which land is given meaning. Second, the political and economic context within which land is produced as an environmental good to be consumed by different interest groups within society, each of which has its goals and agendas (Healey 1997, pp. 73-87). This means that the way in which such mechanisms and systems are established and the built environment that they give rise to, are always affected by the changes in the political economy, socio-political and socio-economic contexts as well as the interaction of interests and values of societal groups, institutions, agencies, and individuals in society.

Brindley *et al* (1996, p. 7) argue that the establishment of such mechanisms as well as urban planning systems of practice are specifically affected not only by the international and national changes in political economy but also by the political economy changes at the level of the locality. Brindley *et al* (*op. cit.*), Healey (1997), and Rose (1981) stress that the continuous change in the relationship between the national and local contexts, central- local governments, and public-private sectors are also seen as the direct, and in some way the natural, result of the change of the global and national political economy contexts as well as the interaction environment of interests and values of the institutions, agencies and individuals in society at both the national and local levels. Therefore, urban development planning policies and its subsequent physical planning practice mechanisms and systems, promoted by the state, were initially built to respond to the demand on services, utilities, and resources such as land required for development by the various interests represented in institutions, agencies, and individuals in society.

While stressing the socio-political, socio-economic, and political economy contexts underpinning the urban development planning process, Mocine (1966, p. 33)

claims that it is widely accepted that regardless the urban development planning approach or style adopted by the state in dealing with land development, physical planning practice is recognised as the end stage of the whole urban development planning process. Mocine (*op. cit.*) also stresses that Physical planning practice has conventionally been concerned with single, end-state blue print physical plans, which are meant to reflect an overriding 'public interest'. The size, scope, legal standing and position of such outcome physical plans used to be relative to specific regulations (e.g. land use planning, zoning, etc). Although the previous claim is generally associated with the traditional rational comprehensive planning approach, which dominated the planning field after the second world war for two decades in much of Europe and the USA, the above system of practice can still be recognised in both developed and developing countries under different planning approaches (see Hameed 2000, pp. 81-6)

Nevertheless, one of the major problems resulted from physical planning practice is the continuously reported gap between the original physical plans (e.g. zoning, master plan, land use plans, detailed plans) and the implemented land use patterns (Devas 1993, pp. 73-4; Hai 1981). As a consequence, planning practitioners and analysts have tried and are still trying to describe, explain, and analyse such gap that affects the physical distribution of activities within the built environment. As it is well documented in both developed and developing countries, such outcome patterns are usually critical when dealing with the location of polluting industrial activities that produce risks for both the surrounding natural environment and people's health (Jacobs 1993, See also Appendix VII). Many analysts and scholars have linked such gap with local conflicting political interests, corruption, and decision-making process (Devas 1993, pp.77-8), others with the inefficiency of the institutional arrangements that are responsible for the Physical planning process, legislative weakness, and lack of enforcement (Foglesong 1996; Mattingly 1993, p.113). Few, however, have tried to explain such gap in relation to the broader concepts of structure and agency, which help providing an insight into the reasons and causes behind the existence of the above problems and conflicts in the first place (Healey and Barrett 1990).

Critically examining and analysing the physical planning practice in specific time and space edge, with specific reference to the concepts of structure and agency, provides an opportunity to describe, explain, and analyse the reasons and causes behind the emergence, as well as the disappearance, of specific interests, institutions, agencies that have significant influence on such practice. It is also seen as an effective broad

framework by which the impact of the changes in the local and national political economy on state-society, central-local government, and public-private relationships, with respect to the urban development planning process and physical planning practice, could be critically examined, analysed and documented. In this sense, the concepts afford the opportunity to analyse the various forces (i.e. political, economic, social, and physical) underpinning the urban development planning process and physical planning practice and their outcome in the context of the case study.

2.1 SOCIAL STRUCTURES

In order to better understand how interest groups within society affect the physical distribution of activities, an understanding of the role of the state and its relation with different societal groups is necessary. Such relationship affects the political framework adopted by the state through which it can mitigate, neutralise, or adopt some of these interests in order to continue to govern. Not only a better understanding of state-society relationship is important, but also analysing the context within which such relationship takes place, and the underlying constraining and admissible conditions that either hinder or enable agents to pursue their interests, become crucial. In other words, the understanding of different approaches to explain, describe and analyse social structures from a structure and agency perspective is a core issue to evaluate and criticise planning systems and practices and its outcome in any society (Healey 1997; Walsh 1998, p.8). The core theoretical debate between the broader structure and agency concepts and their related social structure approaches emerged from two specific questions. Do social relationships achieve an autonomous identity that determines the activities of members or individuals of society as they interact and relate to it? Or is society a collection of individuals who actively interact with each other and in doing so they create society?

A positive answer to the first question is the basis of the notion of 'structuralism' and the concept of 'structure', which treats society as a 'system' of social relationships. Such system is seen as an external and/or internal pressure, which always constrains and directs the behaviour and activities of members of society. The second question leads to the notion of 'individualism' and the concept of 'agency', where society is viewed as an aggregation of actions of its members each of which is an enabled agent of his/her own action without any 'external' and/or 'internal' pressure to direct such actions (Giddens 1995; Walsh 1998; Carlstein 1981; Bhaskar 1979).

However, both approaches (i.e. structuralism and individualism) have been proven to be problematic when attempting to adopt either of them to deal with the actual nature (i.e. the reality) of social relationships (Cuff and Payne 1979). As a consequence, many analysts and theorists such as Giddens (1995), Walsh (1998) and others argue that social relationships are neither only an aggregation of individuals whose actions create society nor are only a system that controls and directs individual actions but they are rather a combination of both. Social relationships are both products of human agency and conditioned by social structures within society. Such argument led to the emergence of another new approach in dealing with social structure that is known as the inter-relational approach or the 'structuration theory' (Giddens 1995).

This approach emphasises the link between the power interaction between the enablement conditions in society, which trigger the creation and empowerment of certain institutions, agencies and individuals in specific time-space edge, and the constraining conditions of existing social structures, which either admit or resist such empowerment (Giddens 1995). Healey (1996) argues for such an approach, after building the collaborative planning approach in dealing with land and development on its principles, as an efficient framework to explain and analyse land and development plans in relation to power relations and interest groups strategies within society and how such interest groups can affect and are affected by public policies. She supports her argument by the claim that interests and strategies of actors and the nature of the relationship between them have been well identified, described and analysed in research as well as the institutional forms, rules and regulations. However, as she stresses that the link to what generates interests and strategies and how interests affect existing structures is often weakly developed (Healey and Barrett 1990, p.91; Healey 1997).

The three approaches to analyse social structures, with specific reference to the concepts of structure and agency, will be presented and examined through the following sections: structuralism, individualism, and structuration theory. The presentation, analysis, and critique of arguments, debates, and claims provide the basis and principles of each approach to help building the research analytical framework through which the physical planning practice in 10th of Ramadan City will be presented, explained and analysed.

2.1.1 Structuralism

The notion of 'structure' is at the core of structuralism. Giddens (1995) claims that although the concept of structure is very prominent in the writing of most functionalist authors, it has lent its name to the traditions of 'structuralism'. Functionalism[1] and structuralism have some notable similarities, in spite of the marked contrasts that exist between them. Both of them share the tendency to express a naturalistic standpoint and both of them are inclined towards objectivism. This means both tend to recognise social structures as fixed and repetitive 'patterns' of social relations or social phenomena (e.g. tribe or family members relationships) within time-space edge. In other words, both see social structures as 'systems', each has its own constraining conditions that affect and direct the social behaviour of society members, agencies, institutions, and groups.

However, Functionalist thought has particularly looked towards biology as the science providing the closest and most compatible model for social science. For them, Biology has been taken to provide a guide to conceptualising the structure and functioning of social systems and to analysing process of evolution via mechanisms of adaptation. On the contrary, structuralism thought has been hostile to the notion of 'evolutionism' and the free form of biological analogies. Such notable difference can be seen, as Carlstein (1981, pp. 52-3), Layder (1981), and Giddens (1995) point out, in the difference between natural and social science. Giddens (1995) concludes the following:

> "…. Here the homology between social and natural science is primarily a cognitive one in so far as each exposed to express similar features of the overall constitution of mind. Both structuralism and functionalism strongly emphasise the pre-eminence of the social whole over its individual parts (objects)…." (Giddens 1995, p. 1)

Although functionalists and yet the vast majority of social analysts usually understands the concept of structure as 'external' to human actions, as a source of constraints on the free initiative of the independently constituted subject, both traditional structuralists and post-structuralists argued against such definition as

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[1] 'Functionalism' is an influential theory that developed in Sociology and Anthropology before the 1960s. It supposes that all social action and all social institutions operate with a purpose, that is, they function to the benefit of the totality. The causes of all behaviour can thus be explained in terms of function. Such theory has trouble explaining behaviour that it sees as deviant, destructive and therefore dysfunctional (see Durkheim 1962; Bottomore and Rubel 1965; Cohen 1968; Cuff and Payne 1979; Giddens 1995; and Walsh 1998).

'incomplete'. For them structure not only refers to the 'external' but also the 'internal' constraints, such as the norms and values of social agencies. This is evident in the work of Marx when discussing the notion of 'class' and Durkheim when introducing the issue of 'culture' (see Durkheim 1962, 1982; Scott and Roweis 1977; Harvey 1996; and Giddens 1995).

Despite such agreement, there is usually ambiguity between the traditional structuralists and post-structuralists over whether the concept of 'structure' refers to rules of transformation or a matrix of admissible transformations (Giddens 1995, p. 17). Such ambiguity led to the confusion that whether structure is to be equated only with constraint or it can be both constraining and enabling. Giddens (*op. cit.*) stresses that the latter argument resulted in the introduction of the expression 'the duality of structure'. This means that the structured properties of social systems are extremely difficult to be prevented from stretching away, in time and space, beyond the control of any individual actor while, at the same time, the power and activities of social agencies help reifying and changing those existing structures in specific time-space edge.

On the structuralism side, the thoughts of Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim can be recognised[2]. Cohen (1968) claims, for Marx, human beings as agents make their own history but in the existence of specific circumstances that have to be met within the context through which their actions take place and allow them to do so. This means, such circumstances are not of their own choosing and act as constraints on their actions. Marx developed an analysis of how agents' actions are organised by such circumstances (i.e. the material conditions of production), which determine and structure social relationships generated by particular material forces including raw materials, technology, and labour force (Cohen, 1968). For Marx, social structures are always created by, what he calls, material forces of production. Such forces not only create social structures but also control and direct agents' actions externally and internally. In other words, they control not only the behaviour of agents when dealing with each other but also agents' consciousness, which was clearly presented through arguments about 'class structure' and 'class struggle'. Given the latter argument, Walsh (1998) refers to Marxian thought regarding the constraining factors within the concept of structure as follows:

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[2] Presenting arguments for and against, discussions about, and even detailed exposition of Marxian and Durkheim thinking is beyond the scope of this research. However, their thoughts, with specific reference to the concepts of structure and agency, are presented briefly as examples of structuralism to strengthen and clarify the debate about the concept of structure.

"…So, for Marx, the material forces of production create a mode of production, which is a system of social relationships that is determined by it and which generates the whole institutional and cultural framework of society. At the heart of this system is the class structure of society which differentiates its members into opposed social groups with competing interests and this determines how individuals participate in society and the way in which they act within it [….] in these terms then it is clear that, for Marx, human actions as a productive activity are circumstanced by the material conditions within which they take place and which establish their organisational limits and structure the social relationships that emerge between the members of society and the institutional forms which they can take"

(Walsh 1998, pp.16-7)

For Marx, the material conditions of production, which govern social relationships within a particular mode of production, yet can be changed by human activities. The basis on which workers, collectively, can become agents for the creation of a society which can meet their needs is still conditional on the emergence of a mode of production that can give them the chance to use labour power to change the existing one and to become agents of their own lives (Bottomore and Rubel 1965). Although building his thoughts on the constraining factors that exist in the concept of structure regarding class structure, labour force, and modes of production, yet when discussing the notion of agency, Marx recognised, in certain circumstances, the ability of agents, not individually but collectively, to challenge and change existing social structures. This means that the concept of structure in Marxian thought does not only refer to constrained transformations but also to admissible transformations, and though structure is not always constraining but sometimes enabling and, in other words, yet has a duality feature.

Contrary to Marxian thinking, Giddens (1995) claims that most forms of structuralism from Durkheim onwards have been inspired only by the idea of the constraining properties within the concept of structure rejecting arguments about the admissible transformation and duality feature of such concept. Although Marx and Durkheim, as structuralism scholars, were both inspired by the same constraining properties of the structure concept, each of them built his thoughts on different core arguments. While Marx was inspired by the constraining factors of social structures presented in the arguments about modes of production and class struggle, Durkheim

was attracted to the constraining factors of 'cultural inheritance'. After analysing Durkheim thought, Walsh (1998) concludes the following:

> "…His very starting point is that human actions create an entirely new level of reality with its own properties. And this reality consists of social facts which are typical forms of the actions of human beings, and they are not derived from the individuals who engage in them but from society itself, which is an external and constraining force upon the individuals who live within it [….] the original foundation of society is a collective consciousness – a collective body of ideas, values and norms – which binds the members of society into a community through their resemblance to one another, as the consciousness of the individuals is only a reflection of the collective consciousness installed in each person" (Walsh 1998, p. 19)

In this sense, individuals' actions are constrained by pre-installed norms, values, and beliefs. So, for Durkheim, no individuality or individual action can exist in society. Although Marx accepts agents' action, collectively not individually, to change existing social structures, however in specific circumstances, Durkheim denies such action either individually or collectively and in doing so, he rejects the existence of the concept of agency. Even when challenged to explain the changes that happened in modern society, regarding industrialisation process that took place in western European countries, Durkheim argued that such change was produced by labour force and technology that changed the pre-installed values, norms, and beliefs within society members to new ones. Such change happened through the participation of society members in the new mode of production by taking positions and roles within society in terms of the tasks and rules, which it involves (Archer 1982). This means that individuals have neither the 'free will' to plan for the future nor control over their past and present actions as they are acting as cogs in a 'complicated machine' called society operated by a pre-installed programme of norms, values and beliefs.

For Durkheim there are three senses of constraints within the concept of structure. First, what has been argued before regarding the pre-installed norms, values, and beliefs that constrain actions of individuals. Second, the structural properties of social systems are exterior to the activities of the agents. As he argues that, by giving the example of bronze and water, each individual within society has his/her own norms, values, and beliefs and by interacting with each other they create a new set of norms,

values, and beliefs that are not certainly the same as their own ones (Bhaskar 1979, p.42). Durkheim clarifies this point within his writings as follows:

> "…. The hardness of bronze lies neither in copper, nor in tin, nor in the led, which have been used to form it, which are all soft and malleable bodies. The hardness arises from the mixing of them. The quality of water, its sustaining and other properties, are not in the two gases of which it is composed, but in the complex substance which they form by coming together. [….] If, as granted to us, this synthesis *sui generis*, which constitutes every society, gives rise to new phenomena, different from those, which occur in consciousness in isolation, one is forced to admit that these specific facts reside in society itself that produces them and not in its parts – namely its members. In this sense therefore they lie outside the consciousness of individuals as such, in the same way as the distinctive features of life lie outside the chemical substances that make up a living organism"   (Durkheim 1982, pp. 39-40)

The third constraint is related to agent actions. For Durkheim, as Giddens (1995) concludes, social facts are just obligations that confront each single individual as limits to the scope of their action. In this sense they are not just external constraints but also extremely defined, incorporated in what other members of society consider proper, right, or bad to do (Giddens 1995, p. 172). Supporting such argument Durkheim (1982) gives the following example among several:

> "… When I perform my duties as brother, husband, or citizen, and carry out the commitments I have entered into, I fulfil obligations, which are defined in law, and custom, which are external to myself and my actions. […] Even if they conform to my own sentiments and I feel their reality within me, that reality does not cease to be objective. For it is not I who have prescribed those duties"   (Durkheim, 1982, pp.50-2)

Unlike Marx, Durkheim rejects the admissible transformation feature, in other words the 'duality' feature of the concept of structure. He always discusses the concept of structure form a constrained transformation perspective rejecting the concept of agency as a whole. So, for structuralism scholars including both Marx and Durkheim, the constraining properties in the concept of structure can be easily recognised. However the widely agreed rejection to the ability of agents, as individuals, to change existing social structures, there is ambiguity between structuralism scholars over the recognition of the concept of agency itself. In this sense, when adopting the structuralism approach to analyse social relationships, for many analysts, researchers,

and practitioners, it proved to be problematic to describe, explain, and analyse interests and strategies of actors and the nature of the relationship between them and how they, as individuals or agencies, change social structures (Healey and Barrett 1990, pp.90-1).

2.1.2 Individualism

Just as the concept of structure is at the core of structuralism, the concept of agency is at the core of individualism in dealing with social structures. From the literature, the arguments that deal with explaining and analysing social structures, with specific reference to the concepts of structure and agency concepts, take many forms such as constraining versus admissible, rules and regulations versus actions, and constraining versus enabling. Like the ambiguity over the understanding of the concept of structure presented in the previous section, there is a discrepancy over the concept of agency. On the one hand, individualism scholars use the concept of agency referring only to powerful individuals who have the power to act, in other words, as Giddens (1995) states, "to make a difference". On the other hand, 'agencism'[3] scholars tend to use the concept of 'agency' not only referring to powerful individuals but also to social institutions, agencies, and interest groups who have the power and resources to act and change existing social structures (Walsh, 1998). In other words, it is, again, the recognition of the difference between individuality and collectivism in actions. Despite such distinguishing difference between individualism and 'agencism', both of them share the same underlying assumptions and principles.

While structuralism scholars argue that individuals' actions are controlled and directed by existing social structures, individualism scholars' challenge the latter argument by the claim that history is not an autonomous process of change that governs and controls itself but changes occur because humans make them happen. So, for individualism scholars, such as Max Weber, society consists of a collection of individuals and they are the authors of their actions. In this sense, agents are the actors who create social structures through their interaction with each other to meet their needs and interests, and to settle their priorities. Bhaskar (1979) points out that in many contexts of social life the reproduction of social structures is not an operation of repetitive casual loops but, rather, it includes a process of selective "information

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[3] There is no distinctive word in the literature that refers to agency as an approach rather than the word agency itself. Therefore, seeking clarity and avoiding confusion between agency as a concept and agency as an approach, the researcher uses the term 'agencism' referring to agency as an approach in dealing with social structures.

filtering" made by individuals in society. Such individuals, reflexively as agencies, use the information power to challenge and change the overall existing social structures (Bhaskar 1979, pp.78-9; Giddens 1995, pp.27-8). Such connection between the concept of agency and power is evident in the writings of Giddens and Mackenzie:

> ".... To be able to 'act otherwise' means being able to intervene in the world, or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of a specific process or state of affairs. This presumes that to be an agent is to be able to deploy (chronically, in the flow of daily life) a range of causal powers, including that of influencing those deployed by others. Action depends upon the capability of the individual to ' make a difference' to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to 'make a difference', that is, to exercise some sort of power…"
>
> (Giddens and Mackenzie 1982, cited in Giddens 1995, p. 14)

In this sense, agents do not only create social structures through their interaction with each other but also they continuously challenge and change existing social structures to meet their interests as well as others. The way in which agents can change existing social structures depends upon the kind of resources (including information) they obtain through their interacting with each other. Walsh (1998) summarises the individualism argument as follows:

> ".... The starting point of the action position […] is the individual and his or her action, which is essentially and subjectively meaningful to an individual in the sense that it is directed and undertaken in terms of interests, purposes, values, and motives of the individual as a subject in the light of his or her needs. […] This leads to the development and construction of mutual forms of the regulation and organisation of relationships between individuals that are based upon a reciprocity of understanding and expectations which then license and control their interactions with one another […] but these understandings, expectations, rules, and regulations […] are not objects and forces in their own right […] ultimately structures are what people do together with one another"   (Walsh 1998, p. 12)

The enabling feature in the concept of agency inspired individualism scholars such as Max Weber who is recognised as the chief protagonist of such approach. For Weber, Runciman (1978, 1983) claims, action is meaningful to the actor in the sense that it is determined by his or her needs, interests, values, and beliefs, which leads to a

pattern of social interactions (i.e. social structures). Therefore, social relationships are organised and structured through shared interests, purposes and values, and shaped by actors interacting with one another on this basis. For Weber, social institutions such as the state institutions and social classes reflect the way in which individuals interact with each other and are not autonomous entities. In this sense, Giddens (1976) points out, social institutions have their basis in shared interests that lead to rational organisation of such interests to attain the needs of the members of society. This means that the form of social structure depends on the fixed patterns of relationships between members of society according to their own interests, purposes, and values and beliefs.

Nevertheless, when Walsh (1998) analysed Weber's approach to explain social structures, he argues that Weber is forced to admit the autonomous property of social structures in the sense that the outcome of purposeful rational actions can lead to a pattern of irrational actions. This means that the outcome of purposeful actions does establish a pattern of social relationships that was not necessarily intended by actors. This new pattern, as Weber characterises, is a 'supra-individual' character, which shapes the possibilities of consequent activities and in this sense it can enforce itself upon actors in society (Walsh 1998, pp. 23-4). Yet, for Weber, as interactions between agents create social institutions and social relationships, they affect individual actions and cannot easily change at the will of actors.

While for structuralism scholars, namely Marx, the role of agents to change existing social structures, rules, and regulations cannot be denied, for individualism scholars, the constraining properties that are embedded in the concept of structure cannot be avoided. For such recognition, in 1984 Anthony Giddens introduced a new approach to explain and analyse social structures by combining both structuralism and individualism in his well-known book "*The Constitution of Society*". Such approach is known as the Structuration Theory (Healey and Barrett 1990).

2.1.3 The Structuration Theory

There has to be a clear distinction between the theoretical basis of the Structuration Theory with respect to the concepts of structure and agency and its resulting echo in the political and social science with specific reference to the area of public policies (i.e. the Third Way approach). The Structuration Theory, the 'inter-relational approach', and 'Giddens Theory' are different names for the same theory. On the one hand, both the duality feature of the structure concept and the enabling features

of the agency concept regarding agencies abilities to change social structures theoretically inspired Anthony Giddens to introduce the Structuration Theory in 1984 (Giddens 1995). On the other hand, he was practically inspired by the interlocking relationship between the global and national political economy and the rapid change of the former in the past five years, especially after the meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Seattle in late 1999 to discuss the consequences of the globalisation movement; and the shift of the politics of the elections in the USA and UK during the 1990s and the re-labelling of the New Democrats and New Labour (Giddens 2000). The Third Way approach[4] was first documented and introduced to the political and social science academia in (1998) and (2000) via Giddens' relevant key texts " *The Third Way*" and "*The Third Way and its Critics*" respectively.

Regarding the Structuration Theory, the starting theoretical point for Giddens is that, as he argues, to be an agency (individual/agency) is to be able to deploy a range of causal powers, including that of influencing those deployed by others. In this sense, actions of agents depend upon their power to change, or as he wrote to 'make a difference' to the pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. Starting from the previous argument, like the individualism scholars, Giddens underpins the connection between action and power. And in doing so, he goes to the debate over the concept of power. Giddens argues that power not only constrains the actions of agents but also enables them[5]. He defined power as "the capacity to achieve outcomes, whether or not these are connected to purely sectional interests" (Giddens refers here to the debate over 'class struggle' in Marxian thought). He added that power is not an obstacle to freedom, not necessary linked with conflicts of interests, and not inherently oppressive supporting his argument by writings of scholars in both sides who argue for and against the constraining properties of power, as follows:

> "…. Power is very often defined in terms of intent or the will, as the capacity to achieve desired and intended outcomes. Other writers, by contrast, including both Parsons and Foucault, see power as above all a

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[4] The 'Third Way' term is an old one that has surfaced often in the history of political thought and political practice. It has been used by a diverse of political groups some more from the right than the left. It was resurrected by Bill Clinton and the Democratic Leadership Council in the USA in the late 1980s, and was taken up by Toney Blair and the New Labour in Britain. Hence some social democrats – inside those countries and elsewhere as well – have come to identify the Third Way either with policies adopted by the New Democrats and New Labour, or with the socio-economic frameworks of the USA or UK (Giddens 2001, p. 1).

[5] This study focuses on the practice of power rather than power as an abstract philosophic concept. For further in depth theoretical arguments and debate over the concept of power, see for example Giddens and Mackenzie (1982); Lukes (1974); and Bachrach and Baratz (1962).

property of society or the social community […] Bachrach and Baratz are right when, in their well-known discussion of the matter, they say that there are two faces of power (not three as Lukes declares) (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974). They represent these as the capability of actors to enact decisions which they favour on the one hand and the mobilisation of bias that is built into institutions on the other" (Giddens 1995, p. 15)

Giddens is inspired by the thoughts of Weber regarding the notion of power and its relation with individual actions, specifically his argument for the power of agents to change existing social structure depending upon information they obtain through their interaction with each other. However, unlike Weber, Giddens connects another dimension to the previous argument that is the notion of 'resources'. For him, as he states, resources are structured properties of social systems, drawn upon and produced by 'knowledgeable' agents in course of interaction (Giddens 1995, p. 15). He even goes further classifying resources into two interconnected categories in relation to the arguments around the 'external' and 'internal' constraining features of the concept of structure. The first category, connected to the Marxian arguments about the material forces of production, is the 'allocative resources' (i.e. the material resources) including: the material features of the environment (raw materials, material power resources), means of material production and reproduction (instruments of production, knowledge and technology), and produced goods (artefacts created by the interaction of 1 and 2).

The second category is the 'authoritative' resources, which he named the 'unseen' or the 'hidden' resources. The authoritative resources include: 1) Organisations of social time-space, which refer to the form of regionalisation within and across societies in terms of which the time-space paths of daily life such as the 'unseen' features that govern hunting-and-gathering societies across time and space including the notions of culture and class. He supported his argument by the example that "hunting-and-gathering societies have been the most typical form of human social organisation upon this earth until very recent times" (Giddens 1995, p. 260). 2) Production and reproduction of social relations (organisation and relation of human beings in mutual association). This refers to the resources that either constrain or enable the production and reproduction of specific type of social relations either between individuals or between individuals and system organisations and social institutions. 3) Organisation of life chances (constitution of chances of self-development and self-expression).

For Giddens it is clear that it is not complete enough to present his theory without giving attention to the notion of time-space edge. He stresses that all social interactions are suited interactions in both time and space edges. Such time and space edges, for Giddens, refer to the interconnections, and differentials of power and resources, found between societal types as between agents and agents and social institutions. Given the latter argument, societies as he defines, therefore, are social systems, which stand out from a background of a range of systematic relationships in which they are embedded. They stand out because definite structural principles serve to produce a specifiable overall clustering of institutions across time and space (Giddens 1995, p.164). Moreover, the more social institutions of social systems exist into time and space the more resistant they are to the manipulation or change by social agency. From this view, he defines structure as follows:

> "…. Structure refers to the structuring properties allowing the 'binding' of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them 'systematic' form."
>
> (Giddens 1995, p. 17)

In this sense, yet Giddens started with the critical link between actions of social agencies and knowledge and information they can obtain from their interactions with others and existing social structures. Then he emphasised the connection between knowledge and the two types of resources that enable social agencies (provide them with the needed power) to act reflexively to meet their needs, interests, and purposes. Developing this line of argument, Giddens stresses the following:

> "…. Rules cannot be conceptualised apart from resources, which refers to the methods whereby transformative relations are actually incorporated into the production and reproduction of social practices. Structural properties thus express forms of *domination* and *power*"
>
> (Giddens 1995, p.18)

From the previous arguments, Giddens, on the one hand, connects rules with resources in the sense that rules cannot be implemented without the supporting resources; and on the other hand, such resources are needed to change rules in connection with agents' actions. Following the same argument, this means that existing social structures can be changed or neglected if social institutions such as the state institutions do not have the needed resources to sustain the production and reproduction

of such structures. In this sense, agents, who have resources, have the power to change existing social structures and *vice-versa*.

Boucher (2004) points out that Giddens' theoretical arguments, debates, and methodological stance and positions in social theory, illustrated above, were elaborated in the core arguments upon which the Third Way approach to the politics of public policy was built. Since the late 1980s, after introducing the Structuration Theory to the field of political and social science, and for the next fifteen years, yet Anthony Giddens simultaneously maintains that philosophy cannot dominate social theory and so refuses a strictly philosophical discussion of his theoretical position introduced in the Structuration Theory. Instead,

> "Giddens concentrates on finding specific solutions to context-bound problems, in line with his belief that social practice fundamentally represents the effort to respond to the perennial social question, 'what is to be done?' philosophical positions and social theories represent tools for the solution of political problems and for the investigation of social question". (Boucher 2004, p.1)

Nevertheless, despite using the 'Third Way' term, Giddens (1998) argues against the traditional identification of the Third Way approach in the political thinking as "advocating the Anglo-American society as a desirable model for others to follow or simply to be identified solely with the outlook and policies of the New Democrats, New Labour, or indeed any other party". He stresses that the Third Way is rather a global ideological stream that combines social solidarity with a dynamic economy (Giddens 2000, p.5).

The Third Way approach, therefore, was constructed to explore, analyse, and guide the politics of public policies in relation to the changing global political economy in specific time-space edge. Despite Giddens (2001, p. 3) emphasis that the Third Way approach is "still in the process of construction rather than being a fully developed approach", it was practically built upon two main core stands. First, it was built upon the analysis of the development and rapid change of the global political economy in the past five years. Second, it stresses, through an in depth analysis, the failure of the existing 'two ways' based on the structuralism and agencism thoughts (i.e. the traditional socialism and neoliberalism respectively), dominated political thinking since the Second World War, to deliver equality and social justice (Giddens 2001). In doing so, Giddens was also pushing towards empirical support for the Structuration Theory

debate in explaining the 'reality' of social structures (Giddens 1998, 2000). The latter stand was illustrated in Giddens words as follows:

> "… Traditional socialist ideas, radical and reformist, were based on the ideas of economic management and planning – a market economy is essentially irrational and refractory to social justice […] The 'Keynesian welfare compromise' has been largely dissolved in the West, while countries that retain a nominal attachment to communism, most notably China, have abandoned the economic doctrines for which they once stood. The 'second way' – neoliberalism, or market fundamentalism – has been discarded even by most of its rightist supporters. The East Asian crisis of 1997-8 showed how unstable, and destabilising, unregulated world markets, especially financial markets, can be. They do little to help alleviate the extreme inequalities that exists between the poorest and richest countries"   (Giddens 2001, p. 2)

The former critical stand was introduced via the analysis of three significant global transformations, which are altering the landscape of politics and are posing as significant challenges to governments in both the developed and less developed countries that are: globalisation, the emergence of the knowledge economy, and the profound change in people's everyday lives (or the rise of individualism as he stresses) (Giddens 2000). Giddens (2001, p. 3) points out that there had been some doubt about whether globalisation was a reality prior to the meeting of the WTO in Seattle in late 1999. Nevertheless, since the early 2000, discussions continue about how to conceptualise globalisation where few would any longer deny its influence given the evident impact of the global financial markets on national economies all over the world and the new developments in the electronic communication and the geopolitical transitions for instance in Europe (also see Galston and Kamarch 2001; Kapstein 2001; Held 2001).

It has to be stressed that there is still much disagreement about how the knowledge economy should best be understood and what its dynamics are. Nevertheless, Giddens (2000) stresses that the origins of knowledge economy stretch back some thirty years, to the time when information technology started to influence production and distribution processes. Giddens (2001) emphasises the impact of the knowledge economy on global manufacturing as well as employment as follows:

> "…. Technological innovation is the main factor involved in the rapid and progressive shrinking of the manufacturing sector in the advanced

economies […] the blue-collar working class is disappearing. It is not true that manufacturing jobs are simply being replaced by routinised service occupations or 'Mcjobs'. It is skilled workers, especially, who are in demand in the knowledge economy, not unskilled workers, who are in fact threatened with marginality […] the coming of the internet will push these changes even further. No one knows what the full effect of the internet is going to be. Finance and banking are among the areas where internet and intranet technologies have already promoted large-scale restructuring"   (*ibid,* p. 4)

The third significant transformation is the rise of individualism. Galston and Kamarch (2001) stress that many of the left politicians tend to perceive the rise of individualism as equivalent to economic selfishness or consumerism promoted by the expansion of a market economy. Nevertheless Giddens (2001, p. 4) argues against such perception by stressing that individualism is "a structural phenomenon in societies breaking free from the hold of traditions and customs". The rise of individualism is evident in the areas of, for instance, family and gender relations, Women in development and labour force, and the emphasis on the private sector in development since the mid 1980s.

Given the two critical stands upon which the Third Way approach was built, it has to be stressed that there will never be a single version of Third Way politics where the national reaction to the above global challenges as well as others, discussed in section 2.3.4, varies substantially from country to another as the interaction between existing socio-political and socio-economic structures, interests of the powerful international and national agencies, and the interests and values of powerful individuals varies significantly within each context (Giddens 1998, 2000, 2001; Merkel 2001; Latham 2001). Although stressing the latter ideology, Giddens identified ten key areas of structural reform, which serve as the corner stones of the Third Way approach to the politics of public policy, to guide governments in tackling the above global challenges. The ten suggested key areas of structural reform are:

"…. 1) Reform of government and the state as a first priority. 2) The state should not dominate either markets or civil society, although it needs to regulate and intervene in both. 3) An understanding of the core role of civil society. 4) We need to construct a new social contract linking rights to responsibilities. 5) We must not give up on the objective of creating an egalitarian society. 6) The creation of a dynamic, yet full employment economy. 7) Social and economic policy

should be connected. 8) Reform of the welfare state. 9) Active policies are needed to combat crime in the here and now, as well as in a long-term sense. 10) Policies have to be forged to cope with the environmental crisis"   (Giddens 2001, pp. 5-12)

Both the Structuration Theory and its elaboration in the political science, the Third Way approach to the politics of public policies, were mainly criticised by scholars from within the social and political stances.

On the one hand, the Structuration Theory was mainly criticised in relation to the theoretical perception of the agency concept. It has to be stressed that there is much confusion and conflict over the interpretation of the definition of the agency concept in the structuration theory. Scholars, such as Gimenez (2004), interpret Giddens' arguments over the concept of agency as perceiving society as a collection of individuals where others, such as Mouzelis (1989) and Sewell (1992), stress that Giddens emphasises the individual agents to the neglect of collective action. Such confusion and contradicting interpretations mainly resulted from, as Boucher (2004) points out, Giddens strict refusal to participate in a philosophical debate over his theoretical position. Nevertheless, after consulting the original text of the Structuration Theory, '*The Constitution of Society*' (1995), there are much evidence to endorse that Giddens defines the concept of agency as being collective as well as individual in nature (see also Macintosh and Scapens 1990; Macintosh 1994; Buhr 2004). Archer (1982) and Bertilson (1984) criticise the Structuration Theory for the lack of insight as to when agents become transformative, have the ability to challenge and change existing social structures, instead of being reflexive to them, while Sewell (1992) argued that the capacity of agency to be transformative not only depends on, as Giddens stresses, knowledge and resources but also on social positions. Nevertheless, Giddens debate and discussions over the notion of power, action, and resources and their interlocking relations, illustrated above, provide a solid stand against such criticism.

On the other hand, the Third Way approach was criticised for being an amorphous political project, difficult to pin down and lacking directions. Such criticism was presented, for instance, in an article in *The Economist* (1998), titled 'Goldilocks of Politics', stressing the "fundamental hollowness" of the Third Way approach "like wrestling with an inflatable man. If you get a grip on one limb, all the hot air rushes to another". In line with the above criticism, Faux (1999) argues that the Third Way is not in fact a systematic political approach at all, but developed as a tactical response to

Democratic failures in the USA presidential elections of 1980 and 1984. He added that the claim that Third Way thinking has fashioned a strategy effective in the new global political economy is not persuasive. For Faux (1999), Third Way thinking seeks to expand opportunities, but is silent about the unequal distribution of wealth and power. Ryan (1999) elaborates that the Third Way attempts to avoid an excessive domination of the state over social and economic life, but does not accept that the market can be left in its own devices. He adds, such stand is not a new one, it is the exact views held by the neoliberalism and in fact it accepts its basic framework with respect to the global marketplace. He even extends the argument to stress that the Third Way approach has no distinctive economic policy rather than this of neoliberalism thought.

Despite the above criticism, both the Structuration Theory and the Third Way approach attracted a great deal of interest in the sphere of practical politics over the past five years. They also have very wide purchase, since political parties and governments all over the world have to respond to the above illustrated global transformations while promoting public policies that position equality and social justice as core objectives (see, for example, Meyer 2001; Daziel 2001; Ferrera *et al* 2001; and Downes 2001). Nevertheless, despite the significant impact the Structuration Theory has on the area of practical politics and social science, illustrated above, there has been an exceptionally limited debate and discussions in the literature of planning theory and practice in relation to such theory with specific reference to the concepts of structure and agency.

This research attempts to cover such gap in literature through constructing an analytical framework for the analysis of physical planning practice that underpins the debate over the concepts of structure and agency and the political economy change at the global as well as the national and local levels. Before constructing such analytical framework, an in depth theoretical and empirical understanding to the area of planning theory and practice as well as the planning paradigm shift is a must. The aims are to explore, illustrate, and analyse, first, the fundamental arguments, claims and discussions of each planning theory and approach and their underlying assumptions about social structures within which they suppose to operate with specific reference to the concepts of structure and agency; and second, the effect of the global political economy change on the planning paradigm shift and the consequences in the field of physical planning practice.

2.2 PHYSICAL PLANNING PRACTICE

There is misuse, vagueness and generalisation in the literature of planning theory and practice over the use of the 'planning' term. This is seen as a direct result of, on the one hand, ignoring the shift of the planning paradigm where 'planners' are treated as doing the same type of activities and as if the 'planning' term refers to a fixed and well-defined set of practices; and on the other hand, the extreme complexity of the planning paradigm to tackle and to define where it is neither developed within nor belongs to specific well defined boundaries of literature. From the literature review, those who have explored the area of planning practice including Michael Safier (1983,1990, 1996, and 2002), Caroline Moser (1993), Patsy Healey (1996), Robert Beauregard (1996), John Forester (2000), and others, often identify planning practice as " a professional activity, a range of different traditions, each with an associated methodology and relative perception relating to the 'neutrality' of such activity" (Safier 1990 cited in Moser 1993, p. 83). In other words, a Safier defines[6], it is the way in which planners identify themselves and the fellow planners and their activities in the field of practice.

Hence Kuhn (1963) defines the notion of paradigm as "a set of values, beliefs and practices of empirical reality together with a body of theory used by scientists to explain and understand practice", planning like any other paradigm comprises three intersecting dimensions. First, a body of theory that reflects different concerns, principles, assumptions and debates in connection to planning practice. Second, planning methodology defined as "the process of providing organised technical guidance for planning practice". The third dimension is planning traditions referring to "the different forms of planning, each with its own focus and objectives, knowledge base, process and organisation" (Safier 1990 cited in Moser 1993, p. 83). Given the above dimensions as well as the wide range of academic disciplines underpin each dimension, therefore, the definition of the planning term depends on some hard to tackle variables including the academic, social, and political background of agencies, their values and interests as well as the context within which they define planning. But before going into exploring the three dimensions of the planning paradigm and its link with physical planning practice, as a part of planning practice, it is crucial to present a brief background about the origin of physical planning. This is to understand its complexity and traditional linkage with the social and political science.

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[6] In an interview with Michael Safier in January 26, 2003

Although the origin of physical planning can be traced in Europe and the European colonies back to the seventeenth century (see Foglesong 1996), in both the USA and the UK, state physical planning lies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and with local responses to the issue of built environment including its degradation, functional chaos, and the miseries suffered by the working class all over their main cities resulted from the industrial revolution (Scott 1969; Sharp and Wallock 1987). Such interest in the control over the built environment together with social problems related to massive in-migration (rural-urban migration) and population growth in urban areas triggered vast interest in the institutionalisation of physical planning practice across industrialised countries.

Physical planning practice started to shape as a part of several social movements across Europe and the USA, which was centred on middle white class male and supported by two groups of reformers (Fairbanks 1988; Beauregard 1996). On the one hand, social movements interested in public health and population congestion grabbed the attention of the first group of reformers. They with the help of the grassroots lobbied the state to issue several local and national legislations and building and housing codes in relation to improving working class slums and houses. Given their interest in housing, healthcare, and living and working environment, they were known as the "housers" group. They helped to focus public attention on the importance of the provision of sewage, sanitation, clean water supply and garbage collection to control the over spreading epidemics within cities across Europe and the USA. Such attention was intersected with the imposition of public health regulations such as the fire-prone laundries regulations issued in the USA (Peterson 1983). On the other hand, another group of reformers, working out of state structure, known as the "Utopian Planners" with very close connection to the field of architecture, focused on the more broadly emerging forms of industrial cities and their chaotic distribution of land uses (Beauregard 1996).

Both "housers" and "Utopian Planners" merged to lobby the state to support as well as to control the rapid urban growth through the establishment of state planning (Beauregard 1996). Together they formed the start of physical planning practice and undertook various individually conceptualised 'master plans' which focused on the physical arrangements of activities, in relation to their functions and aesthetics within the built environment, in other words the physical distribution of land uses and economic activities (Levy 2003). Their very starting actions were the base upon which

the 'master plan' tool was founded and developed in the field of practice over time. They were supported by the belief that "organised and physically coherent cities grounded in good functional and aesthetic principles are better than those are not" (Beauregard 1996, p. 215). Walker (1978) stresses that such belief was practically inspired and influenced by the awareness of and the need to confront the inequalities of capitalist urban development promoted over time during the industrial revolution and after. Beauregard also emphasises the later point as following:

> "…Planners grasped early on that different capitalists pursue different spatial investment strategies in an uncoordinated fashion, thus creating an intra-capitalist competition alongside a capital-labour struggle for control over environment. If the industrial city is to be an efficient mechanism for capital accumulation, and if labour was to be allowed respite from the ever expanding oppression of the factory system and be given protection from unrestrained property capital (Walker, 1978), someone had to bring order to its fragmented form"   (*ibid*, p. 215)

While stressing the emergence of these two groups and the physical direction that planning practice took, several scholars including Michael Safier, Caroline Moser, Patsy Healey, and Robert Beauregard point out that it was not until the 1890s that physical planning started to be recognised as an emerging profession, when in 1893 the Chicago World's Fair set forth one model of downtown design that could be used to situate public buildings (e.g. post office, library, and city hall) and capitalist infrastructure (e.g. railroad station and office buildings) around public space. From the year 1893 and on, several planning traditions started to emerge in the field of planning practice, each with specific focus, interest, objectives, type of activities, and methodology, and some key globally supporting institutions (see table 2.1). With the emergence of such new traditions, developed within a wide range of academic disciplines, into the field of planning practice, the planning paradigm started to adapt considerably and the planning term was to be defined and redefined numerously.

It is essential to clarify three commonly confusing issues in relation to the field of physical planning practice. First, a distinction should be made between planning traditions, planning approaches, and planning methodologies while understanding their link with the area of physical planning practice. Secondly, is the need to acknowledge that different planning traditions have adopted different planning approaches and methodologies developed over time. Third, is the connection between planning approaches and the broader debate over the concepts of structure and agency.

Table 2.1 The Planning Traditions Involved in Urban Affairs in the Period 1890 - 2002

TRADITIONS	PHYSICAL (CLASSIC) TRADITIONS				APPLIED TRADITIONS				TRANSFORMATIVE TRADITIONS			
ELEMENTS	URBAN DESIGN	TOWN PLANNING	REGIONAL PLANNING	TRANSPORT PLANNING	SOCIAL PLANNING	CORPORATE PLANNING	ECONOMIC PLANNING	PROJECT PLANNING	DEVELOPMENT PLANNING	ENVIRONMENT PLANNING	GENDER PLANNING	CULTURAL PLANNING
ORIGIN	Europe 1890-1920	Britain 1890-1914	USA/USSR 1925-1935	USA 1950s	UK 1945	UK 1965	Global 1970s	Global 1970s	LDCs 1960	USA/UK 1965	UK 1975	LDCs 1980
DISCIPLINE	Architecture	Estate Management	Geography	System Engineering	Sociology	Management Studies	Economics	Finance	Development Studies	Environment Studies	Women/gender Studies	Global
FOCUS	'Built Form'	Urban Land	'Space'	'Movement'	'Community'	'Organisation'	'Resources'	'Investment'	'Needs'	'Environment'	Gender	Culture
OBJECTIVE	'Function'	'Order'	'Balance'	'Mobility'	'Welfare'	Integration'	'Growth'	'Efficiency'	'Development'	'Sustainability'	'Emancipation'	'Diversity'
PLANNING ENTERPRISE (Why do we need it?)	Creating a functionally aesthetic urban space to accommodate required functions of modernisation	Organising Compatible land uses to improve the living and working environment of cities accommodating changing activities	Efficient and equitable distribution of population, economic activity and social provision between areas and locations	Optimum Movement system for predicted pattern of movement requirements	Equitable distribution of economic resources between social/client groups in need	Maximum organisation resources-use to achieve corporate strategy	Productive use of economic resources for maximising level of income and wealth	Maximum benefits achievable from optimum selection of projects portfolios	Maximum contribution of the urban system to satisfaction of basic needs	Conservation and enhancement of urban habitat and ecological system	Achieving gender-specific equality, equity and status	Achieving reorganised equivalence and expression of diverse cultural traditions
PLANNING AGENDA (What is to be planned?)	- Human activity patterns - Construction materials - Building types - 'Created' urban space	- Land issues - Land tenure - Infrastructure - Movement patterns - Building densities and layouts	- Territory - Resources - Infrastructure - Settlement system - Inter/intra regional relations	- Movement demands - Activity locations - Infrastructure technologies - Transport modes	- Social groups Communities - Socio-economic structures - Sectors of welfare provision - Institutions	- Departments - Budgets - Manpower - Management operations - Corporate environment	- Macro economic relations - Production factors - Externalities Social investments - Institutional allocations	- Investment resources - Financial resources - Project portfolios - Cost components - Institutions	- City system - City resources - Categories of need - Spatial and physical organisation	- Habitat ecology - Energy systems - Waste and pollution patterns - Environmental externalities	- Understanding of household relations - Household economy - Division of labour - Service provisions - Institutional directions	- Culture and civilisation traditions - Transnational systems - Cultural industries - Communal relations - Urban forms
METHODOLOGY	Blue-Print Methodology ·····················〉 Scientific Rational Methodology				Scientific Rational Methodology				Scientific Rational Methodology ···············〉 Communicative Rationality Methodology			

Continue Table 2.1 The Planning Traditions Involved in Urban Affairs in the Period 1890 - 2002

TRADITIONS	PHYSICAL (CLASSIC) TRADITIONS				APPLIED TRADITIONS				TRANSFORMATIVE TRADITIONS			
ELEMENTS	URBAN DESIGN	TOWN PLANNING	REGIONAL PLANNING	TRANSPORT PLANNING	SOCIAL PLANNING	CORPORATE PLANNING	ECONOMIC PLANNING	PROJECT PLANNING	DEVELOPMENT PLANNING	ENVIRONMENT PLANNING	GENDER PLANNING	CULTURAL PLANNING
SOCIAL STRUCTURE (View about society)	Individualism (Conflict-free society) "Public interest" will be reached using only a technical methodology				'Agencism' (Conflict-free society) "Public interest" will be reached in the end of a negotiating process based on a combination of both technical and political rational				'Agencism' However the conflict in society, "Public interest" will be reached in the end of a negotiating process based on both technical and political rationality ············>		Structuration Theory (Conflict-ridden society) Growth cleavages in society on the basis of class, race, ethnicity, gender, age, etc, as groups express diversity and challenge exclusion	
ECONOMIC PROCESS MODEL	Economic Growth Model (i.e. Accelerated Growth Model) Opposing capitalist mode of production and its effect on the built environment				(Redistribution with Growth Model) Opposing market processes and stressing the importance of state to provide goods and services for the "needy" people and to create waged employment		(Accelerated Growth Model) Stressing the importance of investment in large scale infrastructure and the modernisation of agriculture Investment can be national or with the help of foreign aid to help generate waged employment and more cash for consumption		(Redistribution with Growth Model) Stressing the distribution of costs and benefits between members of society ············>		"We are a reality in global society but we have to reflect locality"	
KEY GLOBALLY SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS	CIAM RIBA UNESCO	RTPI UNCHS	IRSA UNCRD	PTRC	UNICEF	UNPTC	UNDP	IBRD	IBRD UNCHS	UNEP	UNIFEM DAC	UNU UNESCO

Source: adapted from

Beauregard R., 1996, Between Modernity and Post-modernity: The Ambiguous Position of U.S. Planning, in S. Campbell and S. Fainstein (Eds.), *Readings in Planning Theory*, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, UK, pp. 213-234;

Levy C., 2003, Urban Policy, Planning and Management, UO2 Module on MSc in Urban Development Planning, Development Planning Unit, University College London; Safier M., 2000, Lecture on Planning Traditions in Urban Affairs, MSc in Urban Development, Development Planning Unit, University College London;

Moser c., 1993, Moser C., 1993,Gender Planning and Development: Theory Practice and Training, Routledge, London and New York, Chapter 5: *Towards Gender Planning: a New Tradition and Methodology*, pp. 83-108;

 (Also see Healey 1996, 1997 and the various references provided within the text for every tradition)

2.2.1 PLANNING TRADITIONS AND METHODOLOGIES

From the literature review, it was recognised that few scholars have touched the issue of planning traditions, which is related to the development of planning as a profession over time. Apart from the several attempts by many scholars and analysts to trace back the history of planning traditions (see Beauregard 1996; Sandercock 1998; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1997; Moser 1993; and Healey 1996), in 1990 Michael Safier introduced the most extensive and focused classification for planning traditions. Such classification categorises planning traditions into three broad and distinct groups or 'generations'. Such traditions are: the physical traditions (or the classic tradition as Beauregard 1996 and Moser 1993 named), the applied traditions, and the transformative traditions.

Although the focus of this research is the physical (or classic) planning traditions, the practice of such traditions are always being influenced by the concerns, assumptions, interest, and practice of the other traditions as well as the development of planning methodology over the time. Presenting not only the physical planning traditions but also the other traditions and their underlying thoughts about society and economic processes is crucial to understand the planning paradigm shift and the influence on the physical planning traditions in an integrated perspective.

2.2.1.1 The Physical (Classic) Traditions

The first group of planning traditions is the physical traditions concerned with the physical and spatial problems of city growth. They are seen as various extensions of the different activities practiced by the merged reformers groups (i.e. housers and utopian planners). Moser (1993) points out that although the four traditions (i.e. urban design, town planning, regional planning, and transportation planning) have different objectives, foci and planning agendas, they commonly followed the traditional 'blue-print' planning methodology at the early period of their emergence.

> "…. The planning most widely identified with these traditions was the traditional survey-analysis-plan, or the so-called 'blue-print' approach to planning. Product oriented in its focus on plans […] the methodology comprises straightforward stages from survey to analysis, both of which social scientists undertake. Implementation of the plan follows. Most frequently spatial in nature, engineers and architects usually execute it. The methodology assumes a consensus on values

and policy directions in the management of change, encapsulated in the notion of 'public interest'" (Moser 1993, p.84)

Around the mid 1940s, after the Second World War, the scientific rational methodology, recognised as an extension development of the blue-print methodology, was introduced to the field of practice while the increasing complexity of the global economic system and the dominance of both the functionalism approach in social science, which believe that society is made of components that function together to make the whole body in a "comprehensive" way. Second, is the dominance of the scientific approach to problem solving in natural science based on technicalities and rationality (i.e. logic and reason) in connection with the debate over the notion of 'ends-means'. In other words, focusing on the means to achieve specific and pre-stated ends using a scientific rational methodology[7] (Healey 1983a, 1996). It was seen as the pragmatic alternative to the failure of the blue-print methodology regarding its lack of "comprehensiveness" and "rationality" (Healey 1983b; Moser 1993).

The scientific rational methodology "consists of several logical stages. These start with problem definition, and develop through data collection and processing. The formulation of goals and objectives and the design of alternative plans follows. Finally there are the processes of decision-making, implementation, monitoring and feedback" (Moser 1993, p. 85). Healey *et al* (1982) stress that scientific rational methodology and its application in practice remains the predominant planning methodology and yet the vast institutions including government institutions, donor agencies, NGOs, and private corporations use it for their planning procedures. Despite its popularity, it has been heavily criticised over time, as been "contextless" and "contentless" because of its inflexible step-by-step procedures, pre-stated and fixed assumptions about society, and lack of recognition to social, economic, and political context within which planning practice takes place. In other words, it is the same set of procedures and assumptions applied to different contexts in the same systematic manner (Scott and Roweis 1977, p. 1113; Moser 1993, p. 86; Hambleton 1986).

From the above quotation, the physical traditions share the same basic assumptions about society and economic processes. They base their traditions, as Healey (1989) argues, on the assumptions that, on the one hand, state bureaucrats as

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[7] Scientific rational methodology includes a systematic and explicit relation of ends to means and vice versa, the logical presentation of argument, and the systematic relation of evidence to argument (Healey 1983a, p.20)

agents in charge of the development process from the planning to implementation stages, with the help of experts (as individual agents) could translate knowledge about economic, social and environmental needs into spatial and physical forms. Like the individualism approach to social structures, the physical traditions share the belief that individual agents, as experts using their knowledge, can "make a difference" to the existing course of events or status of affairs, direct the future development of social structures through controlling the physical arrangement of the built environment, and provide wealth and welfare to members of society (Althshuler 1973, p. 197; Lindblom 1996). On the other hand, they assume reaching a consensus on values and needs of the "public", regardless the debate over the notion of "diversity".

Around the mid 1980s, these two very basic assumptions were the main reasons to lead to the questioning of the scientific rational methodology upon which the physical planning traditions can bring about change to the physical, social, economic, political and environmental arrangements. This led many scholars such as Healey (1989) to conclude that the scientific rational methodology is both politically authoritarian and epistemologically naïve (Moser 1993; Healey 1983b). Though, there was an ambiguity within planning scholars over the rejection of such methodology and its basic assumptions about society. Some scholars such as Davidoff (1996), Harvey (1996), Cornwall (2002), Krumholz and Clavel (1994) undertook interest in its development to add to the on going criticism regarding the notions of "diversity", "participation", "democratic pluralism" and "interests". And others such as Safier (1990), Healey (1996), Moser (1993), Sandercock (1998), Allen and You (2002), reject and challenge such methodology as a valid one within the ongoing challenges of post-modernity in connection with issues of "globalisation", "culture", "identity", "gender", and "sustainability". Table 2.2 shows the challenging of stereotype assumptions about households in planning intervention that had led to biased planning processes.

Levy (2003) points out that physical planning traditions not only share the very basic assumptions regarding their perception about society but also the interest in the economic growth model (or the accelerated growth model) - the model based on the belief that through physical planning (i.e. the investment in large-scale infrastructure and mechanisation and modernisation of agriculture), the state can bring order, welfare and better social processes. This model, which triggered the debate over formal/informal labour introduced by the ILO (International Labour Organisation) and the arguments about its connection to the widely spread phenomenon of the informal

settlements and income inequality, proved to be "utopian" and naïve as investment only in the physical infrastructure is necessary but not enough to generate waged employment to provide more cash for consumption for everyone in society (Mishan 1977; Bowen and Svikhart 1974).

The urban design tradition, originally formulated within Europe around the 1890s, is heavily influenced by the field of Architecture and is supported internationally by CIAM (*Les Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne*), RIBA (The Royal Institute of British Architects), and UNESCO (United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation). It is seen as doing for the city what architecture does for the home. This means that its main purpose is to improve the built environment to raise amenity levels and to promote health, safety, and convenience. In other words, is to create a "functionally" aesthetic urban space to accommodate required functions of modernised society (Hall 1988, 2002). Given the focus of this planning tradition, it underpins the importance of studying, gathering data about, and analysing human activities patterns; search for new construction materials and new types of construction; and creating a healthy and functional urban space. Its practice follows simple linear procedures that start from the project briefing to functional analysis (e.g. the functional bubble diagram) and then the design stage ending with project specification (Gosling and Maitland 1984; Banerjee and Southworth 1990; Cerver 1996; Klosterman, 1996).

Like the urban design tradition, the town planning tradition was introduced in Britain around the 1890s. However, it focused the attention on the notion of "urban land" and is deeply rooted within the estate management discipline. The UNCHS (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements) and RTPI (The Royal Town Planning Institute), among others, globally support the practice of this tradition. Its main objective is to create an "orderly" planned city. This means that the aim is to organise a compatible set of land uses to improve living and the working environment of cities. Town planners' main activities are linked with issues of land tenure, infrastructure, and building densities and layouts (Banister *et al* 1999; Berry and McGreal 1994; Grayson 1990; Barlow 1984; Delafons 1969). Yet town planning process starts from surveying and collecting data to stating the goals and objectives then planning studies and analysis stage to generating planning alternatives and then the evaluation of alternatives and the choice of the "best" alternative then finally the plan specifications step (Safier 2000; Kivell 1993; Darin-Drabkin 1977; Linchfield and Darin-Drabkin 1980; Larsson 1993).

Table 2.2 Challenging Stereotype Assumptions About Households in Planning Intervention

ASSUMPTIONS		EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE			
		GENDER	AGE	ABILITY	CULTURE
The structure of the household	Nuclear Household (hh) Ageing is an issue of the North but not the South Disabled hh members are taken care in special community clinics and institutions	High proportion of other hh structures (e.g. extended and women-headed hhs)	Elderly parents and relatives of different age can be found in all types of hhs and in both the North and South	Possible presence of different disabled hh members with varied age and sex	All these assumptions are 'western'- result in western bias in planned intervention which in turn result in: – Makes differences in access to and control over resources by gender, age ethnicity, religion and ability – Traditional cultural is viewed as constraint on development Increasing mix of people in cities because of – Effect of globalisation and its impact on cities, including increasing global mobility There is an increasing sense of cultural revival and reassertion of identities
The organisation of tasks in the household	The man is the house breadwinner and the family representative in the politics sphere The woman is a housewife Elderly and disabled hh members are a drain on hh	Women primarily responsible for childcare and domestic work But in the same time, they share men in income learning under different conditions	Elderly women and men, boys and girls contribute to domestic chores Elderly women and men, boys and girls contribute to hh income	Depend on the disability problem Their care is the responsibility of women and possibly children If the disabled hh member is the woman and has to contribute to hh chores, they are pushed to earn income	
The access to and control over resources and decision-making in the household	All hh members have equal access to and control over resources The hh works as a harmonious unit (The hh is treated as a unit)	Often there is unequal access to and control over resources by different hh members The hh works on the basis of co-operative conflict (Must disaggregate the hh)	Elderly women and men differ in how they can look after themselves and may not get the support and resources they need Boys and girls have different access to and control over resources (Must disaggregate the hh)	Disabled hh members may not get the support ad resources they need and may receive different treatment depend on their gender and age (Must disaggregate the hh)	

Source: adapted from
Levy C., 2003, Urban Policy, Planning and Management, UO2 Module on MSc in Urban Development Planning, Development Planning Unit, University College London;
Moser c., 1998, "Gender Planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Gender Needs", *World Development, Vol.17, No. 11*
(see also Beall 1993; Elison 1995; ESCAP 1999; Nieuwenhuys 1994; Tamang *et al* 1996; and Wilson and Frederiksen 1994).

The period of the mid 1920s till the mid 1930s (i.e. just before the start of the Second World War) had witnessed greater emphasis on highway and subdivision planning (i.e. detailed planning), and the emergence of zoning as a local regulatory device to displace the master plan. In addition to the previous interests that emerged into the field of practice, the specific recognition of the notion of "space" on the regional level directed the planning practice towards a new tradition that is the regional planning tradition. Such tradition was introduced in both the USA and USSR and is originally rooted in the discipline of geography and is globally supported by UNCRD (United Nations Centre for Regional Development) and IRSA (International Rural Sociology Association). Its main concern is the notion of the regional "balance" between cities within same or different regions within a country. This includes the efficient and equitable distribution of population, economic activities and social provision between areas, localities, and cities. Of course, driven by its focus on the notions of both 'space' and 'balance', town planning tradition directed its activities towards the areas of territory, resources, infrastructure, settlement systems, and inter-regional and intra-regional relations (Johansson *et al* 2002). Yet the regional planning process starts by survey and stating goals, then sectoral and location analysis, regional projects plans, then recommending the needed, either existing or new, supporting institutions (Barnier 2001; Safier 2000)

After the Second World War most of cities across Europe were destroyed. This led to the active involvement of all states across Europe and the USA in the process of reconstruction, as the scale of destruction was huge. This was accompanied with the formulation of many legal planning acts in European countries mainly focusing on urban land uses, such as the 1947 planning act in the UK. Such planning acts boosted and strengthened the planning practice as it gives planning, as became part of the state, the legal "muscle" to act on behalf of the "public" (Healey 1983b). Issues of housing, zoning, and transportation planning tradition had flourished. At the same time urban renewal was added to the practice of planning, itself helping to revive, though only temporarily, the master plan tool (Beauregard 1996)

Transportation planning found its roots in the USA within the discipline of Systems Engineering and is globally supported by PTRC (Planning and Transport Research and Computation). Such tradition focuses on the notion of "movement" that aims at discussing the 'mobility' of humans and goods (Vigar 2002; Beauregard 1996). This means to focus on the optimum movement system for predicted pattern of

movement requirements (Safier 1990). Given the distinct focus of this planning tradition, the emphasis shifted towards issues like movement demands, activity locations, infrastructure technology, and transport modes. While shifting the focus of planning practice, transportation planning process still has the same linear pattern of procedures starting from flow forecasts to system coasts then system modelling to evaluating and finally project design (see Cardia and Junyent 2000; Giorgi *et al* 2002; and Mahmassani 2002).

2.2.1.2 The Applied Traditions

The second 'generation' (or group) of planning traditions is called the applied traditions (i.e. social, corporate, economic, and project planning traditions) as they borrow their analysis from other areas of knowledge such as Sociology and Political Science. At the time of their emergence, after the Second World War, planning practice started to take on board the interests in the economic, political and social factors that underpin the development process together with the traditional physical interest. And though the focus of applied planning traditions has shifted from the physical and spatial current towards the underlying economic, social, and governance systems that generates contemporary patterns of growth. Unlike physical traditions, which only emphasises individuals' knowledge and their ability, as experts, to reach the "public interest" using technical methods, applied traditions not only focus on individuals but also on the importance of public institutions, societal groups, government agencies, non-government organisations (NGOs), community based organisations (CBOs), as agents, to determine future course of events and directions of development as a core issue. And though they call for reaching the "public interest" using a combination of both technical and political procedures, based on "logic" and "reason", under the umbrella of scientific rational methodology within a pluralism environment. In other words, they took the stand of the 'agencism' approach to social structures.

Nevertheless, there is an ambiguity over the assumptions about economic processes. Although both economic and project planning traditions analyse economic processes from the accelerated growth model perspective, social and corporate traditions based their practice on the redistribution with growth model to economic processes. Supporters of the later model claim that the accelerated growth model did not simply work, it did not end up solving all problems of cities, and this is mainly because of ignoring the notion of "distribution" stressed by both the social and corporate

traditions. They support their claim by several reports from the UN stating that "rich are getting richer and poor are getting poorer". While supporting and strengthening their later argument, they contributed to the emergence of the redistribution with growth model. They build their vision on two main elements; first, it is not only the market that creates waged employment but also, and in the first place, governments have the main share of doing so. Second, on behalf of the needy people, defined as the "poor", governments have to find ways to distribute growth and to provide goods and services. Unlike the accelerated growth model, which aims at providing more cash for consumption, the redistribution with growth model calls for providing more basic needs for the "poor" such as water, sanitation, and housing (Adams 1993; Rees 1999; and Haughton 1999).

Social planning tradition was originally introduced in the USA in the mid 1940s, was formulated within the sociology discipline and is supported globally by the UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund). Developed during the period of the emergence of several grassroots social movements concerned with issues of housing location, healthcare, policing and occasionally jobs, its core focus is community welfare, mainly within the neighbourhood level (see Krumholz and Clavel 1994; Checkoway 1994). Healey *et al* (1982) claim that social planning is recognised as "the idea of using a plan or planning process as a programme through which society controls and directs itself" (ibid, p. 18). And in this sense, the need for social planning tradition stems from the urge to aid establishing an equitable distribution of resources between social/client groups in need, in other words, is to practically help support the notion of 'social justice' regarding its distributive dimension (Young 1990; Visser 2001). By touching the notion of "distribution" and "social Justice", social planning tradition is much linked with issues of interest groups, community needs, socio-economic structure, sectors of welfare provision, and social institutions. Its planning process starts by client and community identification and needs analysis, then resources availability then finally programmes design and delivery stages (Safier 2000; also see Kleinman and Piachaud 1992; Le Grand 1993; O'Malley 1977).

Corporate tradition, which emerged into the field of planning practice around the mid 1960s, has its roots within the management studies discipline in the UK and finds the support within the United Nations institutions in general and specifically within the UNPTC (United Nations Programme of Technical cooperation). Taking the notion of "organisations" as a core focus, such tradition focused the attention of planning practice

on the area of resources management, manpower, budgets, and institutional arrangements. Corporate planners argue for the need for this tradition within the planning practice in the sense that exploring, analysing, and managing the issue of resource-use organisation to achieve corporate strategy is crucial. They also call for the maximum integration between central co-ordination departments within the state and its executive agencies to achieve the overall pre-stated goals. For them, the corporate planning process starts from stating programme goals then formulating strategies and their related projects to achieve such goals then followed by the budgeting step and finally programmes specifications (see Lynch 2002; Dunphy *et al* 2003; and Moingeon and Soenen 2002)

Economic planning tradition, which was shaped within the discipline of economics, was globally supported by the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) in the 1970s. Its core focus is the notion of "resources" with specific objective towards achieving economic "growth" using the accelerated model of growth. The core practice activity is to maximise the productive use of economic resources for maximising levels of income and wealth. Given its core activity and focus, economic planners became attached to issues in connection with macro-economic relations between countries and regions, factors affecting the production process, the notion of "externalities" and "competitiveness" that affects the local and national productivity, sectoral investment, and institutional allocation for managing resources (Moser 1993; also see Harris 1983; Mishan 1977; Dobb 1960; Bowen and Svikhart 1974).

The fourth tradition that belongs to the applied traditions is the project planning tradition. It was introduced globally by IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) to the field of planning practice during the 1970s and developed within the discipline of finance. Project tradition is mainly interested in the notion of " investment" with specific focus on "efficiency". This means that project planners core activity is to "maximise benefits achievable from optimum selection of projects portfolios" (Safier 2000). By focusing their activities towards investment, they linked the practice of this tradition to the issues of investment resources, financial resources including foreign aid, project portfolios, cost components, and institutions. Project planning process starts with project cycle[8] then project identification and analysis

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[8] Each project passes through a cycle that with some variations, is common to all [….] each phase leads to the next, and the last phase in turn produce new project approaches and ideas and lead to the identification of new projects, making the cycle self-renewing (Baum 1982, p. 5)

design then the appraisal choice and finally the implementation and evaluation (Baum 1982; also see Barbant 1987; Padoa-Schioppa 1987).

2.2.1.3 The Transformative Traditions

The transformative traditions are the third group of planning traditions that emerged into the field of planning practice around the early 1960s, still currently undergoing evolution, and yet to be fully established. Their very starting point is that the current planning practice is not enough to deal with the growing problems in cities mainly those that are related to issues of "diversity" and "globalisation". The challenges facing the planning practice by such issues forced them to deconstruct planning practice from its core starting by totally rejecting the notion of "public interest" and ending with the claim that planning practice is just like any other social practice in society, and though it reflects the "power structure" in society (Levy 2003). Given the ongoing challenges to the planning practice, it is no longer an issue of adding new layers of planning traditions to deal with each challenge separately, however, the call is to formulate new planning traditions that are able to cut across all existing ones. In other words, they call for, as Levy 2003 named, "intellectual infrastructure". For transformative planners, it is not only an issue of economy or spatial and physical arrangement of the built environment within the context of, as Safier (2002) calls, "turbodynamic globalisation" but also an issue of "communicative actions" and respecting differences (Healey 1996). Within the transformative traditions, development planning, environmental planning, gender planning, and cultural planning traditions can be recognised.

All transformative traditions, upon their emergence to the field of planning practice, were interested in the notion of equitable distribution of resources with specific reference to the redistribution with growth model to economic processes using the scientific rational methodology. However, upon the recognition of the post-modernism thoughts around the mid 1980s, over time one by one started to take on board some distinguished features of such thoughts. The starting point of transformation was that planning practice should not only focus on the material perception of distribution but also on the perception of power distribution, which cleavages other than economic class, notably those of gender, race, age, ethnicity, religion and ability. In other words, appreciating diversity and recognising differences requires collective action to be informed by principles of tolerance and respect (or communicative rationality

methodology). This led transformative planners such as David Harvey, Patsy Healey, and Caroline Moser, to start questioning the validity of the scientific rational methodology (see section 2.2.1.1), and start formulating the so-called "communicative turn in planning" (Healey 1996, p. 242). Patsy Healey, as one of the core founders of the communicative approach to land and development, summarised the transformation process of thoughts both about society and economic processes as follows:

> "…. The notion of the self-conscious autonomous individual, refining his/her knowledge against principles of logic and science, can be replaced by a notion of reason as inter-subjective mutual understanding arrived at by particular people in particular time and places, that is, historically situated [….] "right" and "good" actions are those we can come to agree on, in particular times and places, across our diverse cultures and inclinations. We don't need recourse to common fundamental ideals or principles of "the good social organisation" to guide us. Planning and its contents, in this conception are a way of acting that we can *choose* after *debate* [….] to be liberating rather than dominating, inter-communicative reasoning for the purpose of "acting in the world" must accept that differences between which we must communicate are not just differences of economic and social position, or in specific wants and needs but in *system of meaning*"
>
> (ibid, pp. 243-4)

From Healey's quotation, the transformation process happened within three main elements. First, it is not only an issue of agents' (individuals or agencies) knowledge to direct future course of events but also the recognition of the varied social structures (e.g. culture, gender, age, class, ethnicity, religion, and ability) constraining agents' actions in specific context within specific period of time is crucial. This means to acknowledge that the limits of agents' power to change existing social structure depend on the level of conflict between interests and power obtained by different agencies in society.

Second, as society is no longer viewed as "conflict-free" as consensus will be reached in the end of technical and/or political process based on scientific rationality, however, society has to be seen as "conflict-ridden" environment. Though we, as planners, have to engage in a communicative process with the very different groups in society based on "rationality" and "respect". However, in their criticism to the scientific rational methodology, transformative scholars kept the notion of rationality in the newly introduced methodology (i.e. communicative rationality methodology). They believe in

that the effort of constructing mutual understanding as the locus of reasoning (or rational) activity replaces the subject-centred 'philosophy of consciousness" (Habermas 1987). In other words, a conscious inter-subjective understanding of collective communicative work is a force to sustain an internally critical democratic effort, resisting the potential domination of "one-dimensional" principle whether scientific, moral or aesthetic. Healey (1996) concludes the following:

> "…. Such interaction assumes the pre-existence of individuals engaged with others in diverse, fluid, and overlapping "discourse communities", each with its own meaning systems and hence, knowledge forms and ways of reasoning and valuing. Such communities may be nearer or farther from each other in relation to access to each other's languages, but no common language or fully common understanding can be arrived at. Communicative action thus focuses on searching for achievable levels of mutual understanding for the purposes in hand, while retaining the awareness of that which is understood (that is, we may not understand why someone says no, but we should recognise the negation as valid; that we know there is a reason " (*ibid*, p. 247)

Third, the economic processes are not the only factor that affects agents' actions, however, a combination of the multiple factors stated above. And though there is no "good" or "right" economic model that can be applied in any context across time rather through communicative rationality methodology society would come to agree upon the common "good" and "right" model for them at specific point in time. This means, through communicative action societies not only would be able to invent new models for economic processes that match their contexts, but also constructing arenas within which these new models and programmes are formulated and conflicts identified and mediated (Forrester 1987).

The development planning tradition started to emerge in the field of practice around the early 1960s and was introduced in the LDCs (The Less Developed Countries) under the umbrella of both the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). It first emerged and developed as a part of the development studies discipline and is supported globally by the IBRD and UNCHS. The notion of "needs" is the core focus of this tradition aiming at achieving maximum contribution of the urban system to satisfaction of basic needs. It touches the areas of city system (economic, social, political, and environmental), city resources, categories of needs, and the spatial and physical

organisation of the built environment. Upon its emergence and yet till mid 1990s, however its efforts to introduce a new tradition to cut across all previous traditions, the development planning tradition got caught in the economic "zone". Its interest in the notion of 'needs' with specific reference to the LDCs (Less Developed Countries) focused its attention towards the notion of 'poverty' and forced its practice continuously towards the economic dimension rather than all development dimensions. And in doing so it drifted towards the applied traditions taking the redistribution with growth model to economic processes as a guiding mechanism towards achieving development and adopting the scientific rational methodology through planning process (see Peattie 1981; Conyers and Hills 1984; Moughtin *et al* 1992, Moser 1993; and Safier 2002).

Environmental planning tradition was first introduced in the mid 1960s in both the USA and the UK and is supported by the UNEP, accompanying several grassroots environmental movements, such as the green movement, interested in the notion of environment as "nature", resources, waste generation, pollution control, health, activities locations within the built environment. Its main focus is the "environment" with specific objective towards the notion of "sustainability". Given its focus and objectives, environmental planning tradition is linked with issue of habitat ecologies, energy systems, waste/pollution patterns, natural resources, and environmental externalities. Upon its emergence, like the development planning tradition, environmental planning tradition commonly used the scientific rational methodology as a planning methodology to achieve its objectives. This starts with environmental assessment and impact analysis, mainly using the EIA tool (Environmental Impact Assessment), then responsive strategies, to programme design and then finally the regulatory interventions (Healey 1996; Satterthwaite 1999, 2000; Thomas 2002; Brownhill and Rao 2002; Zetter and White 2002; and WB 2003). Although, for more than three decades, environmental planning tradition took the stand of the agencism approach by stressing the command and control approach and the market based approach in solving environmental disputes (see Bernstein 1991, 1993; Dryzek 1997; Hajer 1995; Glasson 1995; Tharivel *et al* 1992; Amsberg 1995; OECD 1997; Connelly and Smith 1999), it started to shift its perception about society in mid 1990s towards the third way approach to social structure and to adopt and apply the communicative rationality methodology with the emergence of the co-operative governance and the self-regulation approaches to manage environmental conflicts (see Lee 1993; Marsh and

Rhodes 1992; Glasbergen 1996; Fiorino 1995, 1996; Meadowcroft 1997, 1998; Afsah *et al* 1996; O'Connor 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1996; World Bank 2000).

Gender planning tradition, which was introduced to the field of planning practice in the UK around the mid 1970s, is supported globally by UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) and DAC[9] (the Development Advisory Committee of the OECD). The popularity of the practice of this tradition specifically within the UN institutions during the period of 1976 to 1985 (the first UN decade on women) gave it the inertia to continue evolving yet so far. Gender planning tradition takes the notion of 'gender' at the core of its practice with specific objective to achieving gender specific equality, equity and status. The practice of this tradition focuses its activities on issues in relation to understanding of household relations, household economy and division of labour, service provisions, and institutional directions. Safier 1990, 2000; and Moser 1993 point out, yet like all other transformative traditions, gender planning tradition has adopted and applied the scientific rational methodology as the dominant methodology upon its formulation. This starts with gender diagnosis including gendered consultation and participation, then the gender entry strategy for implementation of gender planning practice (or the socio-economic and political interventions), which includes institutional structures, operational procedures, planners' gender training, and societal blockages and opportunities, then monitoring, evaluation, and feedback step leading back to gender entry strategy step. Unlike development planning tradition, which considers the 'poor' as the needy people, gender planning tradition focused on the oppressed and excluded people as the needy for support as the oppression can not only from the economic perspective but also includes social status, thoughts, rights, division of labour. In this sense, upon its formulation, gender tradition was interested in the redistribution with growth model to achieve the equitable distribution of goods and services (see Moser 1993; Safier 2000; Duncan 1990; Duncan *et al* 1991; Macdonald 1994; Little 1994; and Bingaman *et al* 2002)

Like the development planning tradition, the cultural planning tradition was introduced to the field of planning practice via the LDCs, however, during the 1980s with the support of both the UNU (United Nations University) and UNESCO. It can be recognised that the issues of "culture" and "diversity" are at the core focus of this

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[9] DAC is the principal body through which the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) deals with issues related to co-operation with developing countries.

tradition aiming at achieving recognised equivalence and expression of diverse cultural traditions (Safier 2002). Given such focus and aim, cultural planning tradition directs its practice towards issues of cultural / civilisation traditions, communal relations, communicative actions, and urban forms. It adopts the communicative rationality methodology which starts with the step of issue/ component and pattern analysis, then analysing the alternative development model and conflict management then determining the needed socio-cultural interventions (see Safier 1983, 1990, 1996, 2002; Sandercock 1998; Castells 1983; Harvey 1989b; Burbidge 1997; Sassen 2000; and Evans 2001)

From the above illustration of the development of planning traditions and methodology, partially explaining the planning paradigm shift, the physical planning traditions are seen as the origin of the planning traditions. This is to stress that the criticism of physical planning traditions (mainly from social and political perspectives) as well as social change took place mainly in the USA and the UK since the end of the Second World War triggered the development of the other traditions (Beauregard 1996; Moser 1993; Friedmann 1987). Nevertheless, in turn, the physical planning traditions had been significantly influenced by the development of as well as the changing foci, objectives, enterprise, and agendas of the other emerged planning traditions. They had also been impacted upon by the development of planning methodology, where the physical planning traditions progressively adopted the blueprint, scientific rationality, then communicative rationality methodology in practice (Beauregard 1996; Davidoff 1996; Healey 1997; Levy 2003). Nevertheless, the physical planning traditions kept their original foci, objectives, enterprises and agendas, specifically linked to the control over the built environment, land use activities and its distribution, urban growth, and mobility urban growth. In other words, their practice kept focused on the issues of land and urban development. Friedmann (1987); Beauregard (1996); and Moser (1993) stress that with the emergence of the other traditions, the physical planning traditions shifted from being the focus of the lead towards development to be the tools through which powerful agencies can further their interests in the built environment, specifically land.

As the development of planning traditions and methodology partially explains the planning paradigm shift, exploring the area of planning education and theory is crucial. Given the wide range of academic disciplines involved in the development of all planning traditions as well as the volumes of theories constructed in relation to each planning tradition, it is extremely complex, if not impossible, to comprehensively review all such volumes. Therefore, seeking an integrated perspective for illustrating the

planning paradigm shift in relation to physical planning practice, the following section explores, illustrates and analyses the development of assumptions, critique, and debate for and against the different planning approaches to land and development. This is also to present and theoretically debate the links and gaps between physical planning practice and theory (or "styles" as Safier 2003 calls it). In other words, is to confront planning practice with theory.

2.2.2 PLANNING APPROACHES TO LAND AND DEVELOPMENT

In 1914 RIBA (Royal Institute of British Architects) introduced the first planning syllabus into the field of planning education, which was transported across Europe by CIAM (*Les Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne*). It was not until the late 1920s that university-based planning education started to emerge and, however, remained relatively vocational until after the 2nd World War (1939-1945). As the scale of destruction was huge, the need for physical planners to guide state interventions had never been greater. However, at this time planning education began to fracture into two camps: practitioners with professional degrees and theorists ordained as doctors of philosophy. Although the former camp has no problem to define planning (of course from physical/spatial perspective), the later camp claimed that planning has always been difficult to define and it can be said to have had only briefly a dominant paradigm and remained on the fringes of critical social theory (Friedmann 1987, Beauregard 1996). For such planning has always been defined in a broad, and sometimes vague, sense. For instance, Brindley *et al* (1996, p. 2) defines planning as "all activities of the state that are aimed at influencing and directing the development of land. In this sense, state intervention can be concerned with many different purposes, managed through diverse institutions, and can bring into play a variety of social and economic interests".

The year 1947 was a visible mark in the history of planning theory – the year in which the Programme in Education and Research in Planning at the University of Chicago was founded with the goal of training PhD students and thereby establishing planning as a legitimate academic discipline rather than solely as a profession (Beauregard 1987, 1996; Sarbib 1983). Beauregard (1996) points out that this had two main consequences. First, planning education was fragmented into sub-disciplines and students learnt through texts rather than studio model based on direct problem solving and learning by doing, and second, the emergence of planning theorists.

Table 2.3 Planning Approaches to Land and Development

PLANNING APPROACH (STYLE)	RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING	ADVOCACY PLANNING	POLITICAL ECONOMY PLANNING	ENTREPRENEURIAL PLANNING	COLLABORATIVE PLANNING
PERIOD EMERGED	After the 2nd World War (1950s/1960s)	1960s	1970s	1980s	1980s/1990s
ASSUMPTIONS — **SOCIAL STRUCTURES** (View about Society)	Individualism Consensus/ (Conflict-free society) "Public interest" will be reached using only a technical methodology (Society is seen as homogeneous)	'Agencism' Pluralism/ (Conflict-free) society Public interest" will be reached in the end of a negotiating process based on a combination of both technical and political rational (Society consists of different interest groups, each with its own agenda and interest)	Structuralism (Conflict-ridden) society Represented in the notion of "class struggle" (Society consists of two groups: capitalist and labour)	Individualism Society consists of individuals and by maximising their productivity and managing their interests impact of market processes (i.e. inequalities) would be mitigated	Structuration theory (Conflict-ridden society) "Knowledge of conditions, cost and effect, moral values, and aesthetic worlds is not reformulated but is specifically created anew in our communication through exchanging perceptions and understanding and through drawing on the stock of life experience and previously consolidated cultural and moral knowledge available to participants" (Healey 1996, p. 246)
PLANNING	Neutral/ technical activity located with the state	Representative of different group's interest	Open to class alliance	Support individuals and market processes	Open to diverse alliance
ROLE OF STATE	Neutral arbiter looking for stable society based on technical knowledge	Representative of different group's interest parallel to CBOs and NGOs	Open to class alliance Support capitalist interest by sustaining the "status quo" Mediator between labour interest and capitalist interest to guarantee the social reproduction of capitalist society	Support individuals and market processes (State is seen as ineffective and inefficient when trying to control market processes)	State is the general controller and regulator and open to "insurgent practices" (Healey 1997) Open to domination by different factions of capital; and to pressure of political constituencies in insurgent practices (i.e. can dominate, oppress, or can be progressive) State works with link between efficiency and equality
ROLE OF PLANNER	Neutral technical expertise Scientific rationalist controller	No longer controller but rather an advocate who can translate groups interests and needs into plans	Radical activist within the state (politician) Building alliances and bargaining	Entrepreneurial manager Deal maker and city seller	Communicative rationalist who works as a mediator and facilitator of different groups interests Planning to support insurgent practices where state conservative and to promote of the state where is progressive

Continue Table 2.3 Planning Approaches to Land and Development

PLANNING APPROACH (STYLE)	RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING	ADVOCACY PLANNING	POLITICAL ECONOMY PLANNING	ENTREPRENEURIAL PLANNING	COLLABORATIVE PLANNING
ATTITUDE TO MARKET	Market critical Redressing imbalances and inequalities created by market processes	Market critical Redressing imbalances and inequalities created by market processes	Market led Correcting inefficiencies while supporting market processes	Market led Correcting inefficiencies while supporting market processes	"… Capacity for locally-sensitive and globally-aware understanding of trajectories of the mixture of firms existing in a place, from which to identify the local assets and relationships which could help to 'add value' to their operations […] planning to build particular assets, and more importantly develop the 'relational infrastructure' of places" (Healey 1997, p. 161-2)
PURPOSE	Environmental improvement and management in the "public interest"	Improvement of quality of life through participation of all groups	Redistribution of resources through structural change to achieve equity and efficiency	Enable, market and promote city competitiveness internationally to achieve efficiency	Find a new way out !!!!!!!
SCOPE	Physical/ spatial and socio-economic	Interests and needs of the client groups	Scope of analysis: political economy Scope of intervention: initially debated whether planner had role In 1990s trends to building planning constituencies among communities and workers	Minimal economic and physical/spatial intervention by state to support market Shift from state planning to private sector and management	Scope of analysis; interactive; power relations into class, gender, ethnicity, age, etc Scope of intervention: socio-political, economic, environmental, physical/spatial dimensions of cities
PLANNING PROCESS	Problem recognition & definition of planning task (s) Data collection Data processing and analysis Goals, objectives and criteria formulation Design of alternative plans Decision-making Implementation Monitoring and feedback (technical Decision-making politics)	Similar to RCP except: Problems defined by client groups Goals and objectives set by client groups motivated and supported by the advocate planner (Decision-making through improved local democracy)	Explanation of planning activity in socio-historical context and initially ignored planning process 1990s recognition of mobilisation and communication methods (communicative rationality) to interact with communities and workers (like equity planning)	Skeleton RCP focusing on private sector economic management and management techniques (e.g. real estate techniques, corporate co-ordination tools)	Deconstruction of knowledge based on scientific empiricism and reconstruction of knowledge based on communicative rationality and intersubjective mutual understanding "… Expansion from notion of reason as a pure logic and scientific empiricism to encompass all ways we come to understand and know things and to use that knowledge in acting" (Healey 1996, p. 242-3) Listening (as different from hearing) is an important tool in this praxis (Frorrester 1989)

Continue Table 2.3 Planning Approaches to Land and Development

PLANNING APPROACH (STYLE)	RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING	ADVOCACY PLANNING	POLITICAL ECONOMY PLANNING	ENTREPRENEURIAL PLANNING	COLLABORATIVE PLANNING
CRITIQUE	Provide identifiable set of procedures **But** Planning viewed as technical value-free process undertaken by neutral expert planner who can identify "public interest" No recognising to social diversity 'Contentless' and 'contextless' If consultation included, usually towards the end of planning process View as step-by-step process with no recognition of 'disruption of uncertainty or power relations	Recognises different interest groups in plural society and challenges idea of a consensual "public interest" Need for consultation and participation central to problem and goal definition Recognises that some groups are under-represented in decision-making and local democratic processes and need for 'advocacy' **But** Does not recognise powerful and often subversive interests undermining democratic processes and role of planning Some slot back into RCP procedures once problem and goals have been identifies by client groups (i.e. step-by-step approach resumed)	Recognises wider class and ideological interests in capitalist society and their impact on the role of the state Recognises political/technical content of planning (i.e. planning is not neutral activity) Recognises need for autonomous political action for structural change along with any transformative planning **But** With some exceptions, little attention to the planning process and to planning methods Some see no or marginal role for planner as seen being co-opted in the interest of the powerful	Recognition of city within changing global economic forces **But** De-linking and demotion of equity from efficiency Depoliticises planning through technical focus Undermines democracy through privatisation of public goods into structures with no/limited political accountability	Recognition of diversity of identities and means of expressing them Recognition of power and its influence in planning at macro/micro levels More attention to institutionalisation of change (e.g. bias of procedures, language, other visible and invisible mechanisms of exclusion) **But** Implications of methods are developing Guard against relativism Guard against idealist fundamentalism Ideal, utopian, and eclectic

Source: adapted from

Albrechts L., 1991, Changing Roles and Positions of Planners, *Urban Studies, Vol 25, No 1*, pp. 123-137;

Altshuler A., 1973, The Goals of Comprehensive Planning, in A. Faludi (Ed.), *A Reader in Planning Theory*, Pergamon, pp.149-213;

Beauregard R., 1996, Between Modernity and Post-modernity: The Ambiguous Position of U.S. Planning, in S. Campbell and S. Fainstein (Eds.), *Readings in Planning Theory*, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, UK, pp. 213-234;

Davidoff P., 1996, Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning, in S. Campbell and S. Fainstein (Eds.), *Reading in Planning Theory*, Blackwell, pp. 305-322;

Harvey D., 1996, On Planning the Ideology of Planning, in S. Campbell and S. Fainstein (Eds.), *Readings in Planning Theory*, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, UK, pp. 176-198;

Healey P., 1983a, "Rational Method as a Mode of Policy Formulation and Implementation in Land Use Policy", *Environment and Planning B*, Vol 10, pp. 19-39;

Healey P., 1996, Planning Through Debate: The Communicative Turn in Planning Theory, in S. Campbell and S. Fainstein (Eds.), *Reading in Planning Theory*, Blackwell, pp. 234-257;

Healey P., 1997, *Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies*, Macmillan press Ltd, London;

Levy C., 2003, Urban Policy, Planning and Management, UO2 Module on MSc in Urban Development Planning, Development Planning Unit, University College London; and

Lindblom C., 1996, The Science of Muddling Through, in S. Campbell and S. Fainstein (Eds.), *Reading in Planning Theory*, Blackwell, pp. 288-304

(see also the various references provided within the text for every approach)

"…. Once graduated, only a dose of on-the-job training was needed […] the result was to sever professional training from academic training by creating a career path for teachers of planning that did not necessarily intersect with planning practice. This allowed for the emergence of planning theorists who erected the intellectual base for planning practice but did not themselves act as practitioners. Dual career paths, however, undermined the contribution to practice; theorists looked for validation within academia rather than without. The combination of an academic pedagogical model, severance from practice, and creation of alternative career paths was fertile ground for the emergence of abstract theorising distance from the performative demands of practitioners"   (*ibid*, p. 217)

The first planning approach (i.e. rational comprehensive planning) to land and development emerged as a set of procedures that would serve as a joint object for theory and practice and guide practitioners in their daily endeavours. Although from the early 1960s and onward, planning theory is being developed in a separation from planning practice, they kept in contact through planning education. At this time, 1960s, planning theorists started challenging and questioning the very core assumptions of the rational comprehensive planning approach resulting in the emergence of different distinguished planning approaches to land and development each with its own assumptions, scope, purpose, planning process, and intervention methods. As the emergence of various planning approaches to land and development rooted in a variety of disciplines, the field of planning theory became a very complex one. And though, many theorists and analysts had/have tried to clarify such complexity by presenting different classifications to planning approaches based on specific factor(s). Campbell and Fainstein (1996) identify four reasons for the complexity of the field of planning theory and the various attempts to classify planning approaches as follows:

"…First, many of the fundamental questions concerning planning belong to a much broader inquiry concerning the role of the state in social and spatial transformation […] planning theory appears to overlap with theory in all social science disciplines and it becomes hard to limit its scope or to stake out a turf specific to planning. Second, the boundary between planners and related professionals is not mutually exclusive. Third, the field of planning is divided into those who define it according to its objective (land use patterns of the built and natural environments and those who do so by its method (the process of decision-making) […] yet planning commonly borrows the diverse

methodologies from many different fields, and so its theoretical base
cannot easily be drawn from its tool of analysis"

(Campbell and Fainstein 1997, p: 2)

For instance, from the latter quotation, it can be recognised that Campbell and Fainstein (1996) created one of many planning classifications through which planning approaches can be classified based on the planning stages factor. Healey *et al* (1982) created their own planning classification using the attitude to the rational comprehensive approach as a classifying factor. They classified planning approaches to those, which are developed from such approach and those, which oppose it. The same was used by Leonie Sandercock to present a typology of planning approaches and their relation to the rational comprehensive approach (Sandercock 1998). However, Healey (1983b, p.271) and Nuffield Commission of Inquiry (NCI) (1986) point out that that the latter classification raised the tension between planning practitioners, analysts and scholars each of which tried to convince planners about the achievements that can be reached when being adopted. While recognising such tension, they emphasise the importance of the attitude to market process as factor for classifying planning approaches. Such emphasis was presented by the NCI (1986) as follows:

"…. We have to distinguish between planning that takes a positive view of the market, while attempting to correct inefficiencies, and planning that takes a positive role in attempting to redress the inequalities of the market and to make good its omission by measures to increase the access of the disadvantaged to housing, health, recreation and communal activity. This is one of the most important of the dimensions, which we shall analyse" (ibid, p. 184)

Healey *et al* (1982) point out that positions to classify planning approaches, in dealing with land development, can be presented in many ways. Planning approaches can be classified according to those that take a critical stance towards the present structure and values of advanced capitalist societies and those that generally accept the nature of existing society and suggest adjustments to the way in which society operates. Moreover, they can be classified to those that adopt a structural perspective on social organisation and those that emphasise individual interaction and behaviour (Healey *et al* 1982, p. 7). From the various above examples, it is obvious that planning approaches to land and development can be classified using many different factors. Each of which will result in producing different and distinguished planning classification. However, the problem with such different classifications is their narrow focus on specific factor(s),

which may lead to citing conflicting planning approaches in the same classified group. For instance, if we classify planning approaches using the attitude to market factor, rational comprehensive planning and entrepreneurial planning would be cited into opposing classified groups. However if a planning classification is based on the view to social structures, the same previously opposing planning approaches, this time, would be cited in the same classified group as both believe in individualism.

In this sense, using specific factor(s) to classify planning approaches would mislead seeking the clear understanding of each approach. For such, the aim of presenting and analysing different planning approaches to land and development is not to classify them but rather than to critically understand the underlying assumptions, scope, purpose and interests of each approach. Over the following subsections, five distinguished planning approaches will be presented and analysed that are: rational comprehensive planning, advocacy planning, political economy planning, entrepreneurial planning, and collaborative planning (see table 2.3).

2.2.2.1 Rational Comprehensive Planning

For more than two decades after the Second World War, the rational comprehensive approach dominated both fields of planning theory and practice all over the world. It was shaped by and exported from the University of Chicago Planning Programme. The belief in great rationality in public policy decision-making in addressing the public interest, addressing imbalances and inequalities created by the market, the role of experts, including planners to judge and present solutions for urban problems within cities, and the important role of the state intervention in market and social processes, guided this approach in the planning field (Campbell and Fainstein 1996).

From its name, rational comprehensive planning adopts the view of both "comprehensiveness" and "rationality". Comprehensiveness in city planning, Altshuler (1973) concludes, refers primary to the awareness that the city is a system of inter-related, interlocking, and complementing social, political, economic, and environmental variables extending over space. And though, functional programmes (including planning programmes) must be consonant with the citywide system of relationships in the physical and spatial sense; the costs and benefits of such programmes have to be calculated on the broadest possible basis; and all "relevant" variables must be

considered in the design of individual programmes. In other words, it adopts a "holistic" view based on experts' comprehensive knowledge (Altshuler 1973, p. 212-3).

This view is clearly influenced by and shaped within the era of the domination of the functionalist approach in social science presented above in section 2.4.1. On the other hand, the notion of "rationality" often used in evaluating public choices based on both "reason" and "logic". This is in accord with the usage of natural science philosophers but not, as Altshuler (1973) points out, with that of contemporary economic and social theorists later on, as for the later the notion of "rationality" refers to the efficiency of means where ends are known. For rationality planners, "reason" and "logic" replace "greed" and self-regulating behaviour within capitalist societies and the "public interest" would be revealed through scientific understanding of the "organic" logic of society (Beauregard 1996, p. 220; also see Dryzek 1997; Williams and Matheny 1995; and Silva 1995).

Such emphasis on the important role of planner as a technical expert and scientific rationalist controller and regulator to guide state intervention cited the comprehensive approach within the individualism approach to social structures. The belief that planners using their knowledge would be able to meet "public interest" and to guide the future course of events, give rational comprehensive planners a neutrality status. Rational comprehensive planner is recognised as the "knower", expert, scientists who judge, and guide using scientific codes and criteria, and thus his/her actions are far from being influenced by any force within society. Bernstein (1987) claims that as planners laid their activities on scientific and objective logic, this allowed them to be disengaged from the interest of any particular group, to avoid accusations of self-interest, and to identify actions in the "public interest" – actions that benefit society as an organic and "homogeneous" whole. Reiner (1967) summarised the rational comprehensive planners' (or the traditional planners') outlook as follows:

"…. An appealing and plausible idea attracts planners the world over: we are scientists, or at least capable of becoming such. As scientists, or technicians, we work with facts to arrive at truth, using methods and language appropriate to our task, and our ways of handling problems are not subject to outsiders' criticism"   (Reiner 1967, p. 232)

In this sense, rational comprehensive planners could, as Jameson (1984) emphasises, position themselves within the state without having to be labelled "political"; and assert a meditative and neutral role between capital and labour without

been influenced by either of them. Although the "public interest", for rational comprehensive planners, is defined in a unitary term, it always refers to the "white middle class" in industrialised countries as if planners have tried to take the 'median' of society. Beauregard (1996); Hayden (1984); and Gans (1968) support such claim by stating the following:

> "…. The holism that modernist planners propound was dependent both on the economic dynamics of the industrial city and on the parallel rise of a middle class [….] the contradiction between demands made on the work force by industrialists and the consumption demands of an emerging professional and managerial elite were reconciled in the minds of planners by the belief in the *embourgeoisement* of the working class. As capitalism was tamed, the city organised and prosperity diffused socially and spatially, the lower classes would rise to affluence and take the values and behaviours of the middle class (Gans 1968). The expansion of the middle class also validated the belief that society was not ridden by contradictions, and thus the city could be organised physically for "public interest". Invidious class distinctions were being erased by economic growth; thus the city could be viewed as the physical container for the working of a conflict-free society (Hayden 1984)"   (Beauregard 1996, p. 219)

From Reiner's (1967) quotation, the main objective of the physical planner, working under the rational comprehensive approach, is the orderly development of the urban environment. Goals of land use plan are derived from standards that supposedly measure desirable physical arrangements (e.g. the ratio of green space relative to the total industrial or residential area, and the minimum distance between industrial areas and residential areas regarding the industrial classes location in the city such as polluted industries, non-polluted industries) (Fainstein and Fainstein 1996). McNeill (1983, p.118) and Devas (1993, p.71) claim that tools such as master plan, structure plan, land use planning, zoning, detailed plans, legal plans and new towns/settlements have been introduced to the planning field by the rational comprehensive planning approach in dealing with physical land development. Although the potentials of physical planning practice using the rational comprehensive approach in dealing with land and development, it has widely documented constraints (see Appendix 1.1, Torgerson 1990; Walker *et al* 1998, p. 100).

Nevertheless, the rational comprehensive planning approach perceives the implementation process as a separate stage from planning design. This stage is viewed

as a process of compliance by both state agencies under state authority, and by society agencies. State agencies, as the regulator, must establish a mechanism of enforcement of rules and regulations and society agencies being regulated are told exactly what are the permitted bounds of action. They are also bounded by rules of administrative law, the requirements of public interest, and burdened by personal (i.e. managers and government officials) penal responsibility on the decision-making. This approach to implementation is called the regulative or controlled implementation mode, which is the prevalent implementation mode in land use planning (Alterman 1982). Although, there are many books, reports, and articles criticising this approach, Judith Innes (1995) has summarised the critiques as follows:

> "….Rittel and Webber (1973) [….] pointed out "wicked problems" which could not be solved because the problem definition kept shifting and there was no way to aggregate incommensurable values. The unsolvable puzzles were many, including the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968) [….] the failure of collective action (Olson, 1965), the limitation of cost-benefit analysis and other systematic analysis methods (Rivlin, 1971), the indeterminacy of implementation process (Bardach, 1977 & Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973), the inevitability of uncertainty in goal and technology for planning problems (Christensen, 1985), the impossibility of aggregating the public interest so that its optimisation can be amenable to rational systematic analysis (Altshuler, 1965), and the impossibility of relying on the large-scale model for societal guidance (Lee, 1973)"   (Innes 1995, p. 184)

By perceiving the notion of "public interest" from a unitary, homogeneous and consensus stand, rational comprehensive planning failed to link the interests and objectives of planning as a process and the varied interests and agendas of the political, economic, environmental and other societal groups. And thus it failed to recognise the evident dilemma of power structure in any society. This separation between planning process and the context within which it takes place led many scholars to criticise the rational comprehensive approach as being naïve, utopian, 'contentless' and 'contextless' (Faludi 1986; Davidoff 1996; Desai 1996; Scott and Roweis 1977, p. 1113; Moser 1993; Hambleton 1986; Healey 1983a). Evidence from all over the world shows that using such approach to formulate and implement planning policy proved to be problematic in achieving the original planning goals (see the development plan for Kumasi Metropolitan area (1966-2000) 1996; Devas and Korboe 2000; Shetawy 2000).

Hai (1981) implicitly stresses such separation when analysing the Malaysian land use planning system and planning-implementation gap as a consequence as following:

> "…It would be futile to deny that the gap exists […] it is frequently the more brilliantly prepared plans and reports, heavily packed up with massive and impressed collections of data and supporting studies […] fail to go beyond the planning stage. Whilst the sketchily drawn plans, often based on inadequate data and incomplete surveys […] are implemented swiftly, with modifications being accepted […] at each successive phase of the implementation process. Is this the result of administrative perversity or political opportunism, or are there more fundamental reasons […] which seems to be particularly evident in developing countries?"   (Hai 1981, p. 38)

From the later quotation it became evident, in both developing and developed countries, that one of the main constraints of rational comprehensive planning is the separation of the planning process from the social, political, and economic relations within society, which affects the physical and environmental outcomes and, moreover, are affected by planning policy itself. Despite the intense criticism, rational comprehensive planning approach to land and development remained the dominant, if not the only, planning approach in the field of planning till the mid 1960s with the emergence of the civil rights movement in the USA.

2.2.2.2 Advocacy Planning

Advocacy planning approach emerged in the field of planning theory in the mid 1960s parallel to the social movements in 1964-5 in the USA[10]. It was introduced within an article written by Paul Davidoff, a geographer and lawyer and was published

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[10] Those social movements include the civil rights movement which resulted in putting black Americans in the voting process to have a constitutional role; and the women movement which was concerned with the percentage of women participating in both local and national government. By the end of the 1960s the UK followed the lead of the USA as in 1968 Skeffington Report became the first report in the UK to talk about "consulting of people" (Skeffington 1979). This was because of the several anti-colonialism movements across the world. And so, colonial powers recognised the emergency for governing parties to give the people say to calm down this social unrest through a "controlled participation" (Goetz and O'Brien 1995). By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the whole debate concerning "squatter areas" and "land invasion" within city regions, and governments' recognition that there is a limit to bulldoze squatter areas, helped pushing the idea of "involve people and don not bulldoze them" (Cornwall 2002). As a reaction to the growing calls for involving people in the planning process, ILO has introduce the basic needs approach to development in relation to the distribution with growth approach to economy (Levy 2003). This notion of participation triggered the intensive debate over the objective of participation, whether it is a mean to achieve more effective, efficient and cost sharing planning or it is an end of the planning process, and so pushing for community empowerment and building beneficiary capacity (Moser 1989). By 1990s, the issue of participation became much linked with the notions of "democracy" and "governance"; and scholars started to view society, unlike the 1960 as public/private relationship, as public/private/community (Cornwall 2002).

in the *journal of the American Institute of Planners*, titled "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning". In this article, Davidoff built his approach on the criticism of three main inter-locking core assumptions of the pre-dominant rational comprehensive planning approach. These assumptions are those that are linked to the issues of "public interest", "individualism", and "knowledge". His argument over the issue of "public interest" led him to recognise the need for adopting a pluralism perspective that underpins the role of the state to act as a mediator between and a representative of different groups parallel to CBOs and NGOs in society within a liberal democratic environment (Sandercock 1998; also see Lindblom 1982; Mayfield 1996; Nordlinger 1981; Gary 1989; and Polsby 1985). Davidoff (1996) supports such arguments by stating the following:

> ".... Appropriate planning action cannot be prescribed from a position of value neutrality [...] values are inescapable elements of any rational decision-making process and that values held by planners should be made clear [...] the recommendation that city planners represent and plead the plans of many interest groups is founded upon the need to establish an effective urban democracy, one in which citizens may be able to play an effective role in the process of deciding public policy. Appropriate policy in a democracy is determined through a process of political debate [...] the welfare of all and the welfare of minorities are both serving of support: Planning must be so structured and so practiced as to account for this unavoidable bifurcation of public interest [...] why is it that no other organisation within a community prepares a plan? Why is only one agency concerned with establishing both general and specific goals for community development? Why are there not plural plans?"
>
> (Davidoff 1996, p. 306-7)

From the later quotation, Davidoff argues against the unilateral and decision centred planning process, as society can no longer be seen as a homogeneous unit, however, it has to be seen from a pluralism stand, which calls for the recognition of the various interests and needs of different groups in society. Arnistein (1969) claims, when analysing the advocacy planning approach in relation with the physical planning, that such approach is calling for many land use plans rather than one master plan and for an in-depth discussion of the values and interests represented by different land use plans. This was developed by introducing the so called "neighbourhood plans" based on, unlike the master plan tool, community participation and short-term goals; and the widely spread sectoral urban programmes and projects to provide basic needs using foreign aid during the 1960s and 1970s promoted by the IBRD and UNCHS. This stems

from stressing the questions about who gets what and, as a consequence, the distribution of goods and services to meet different interest groups within society. This is evident in Davidoff's words:

"…. Who gets what, when, where, why, and how are basic political questions that need to be raised about every allocation of public resources. These questions cannot be answered adequately if land use criteria are the sole or major standards for judgement. The need to see an element of city development, land use, in broad perspective applies equally well to every other element, such as health, welfare, and education"   (Davidoff 1996, p. 317)

Although putting its faith in planners' knowledge as experts who advocate such knowledge in support of specific set of values, advocacy planning approach dismissed the individualism approach to social structures. It rejects the argument that underpins only planner's (or individual agents) role as a technical guide of future development. However, it calls for pluralism and democracy by stressing the important values and beliefs held by each and every group in society. In other words, advocacy planning stresses the call for adopting the view of the 'agencism' approach to social structures. Davidoff confirms such claim by stating the following:

"…. Here I will say that the planner should do more that explicate the values underlying his prescription for course of action; he should affirm them; he should be an advocate for what he deems proper […] planners should be able to engage in a political process as advocates of the interests both of government and of such other groups, organisations, or individuals who are concerned with proposing policies for the future development of the community […] the planner as advocate would plead for his own and his client's views of the good society. The advocate planner would be more a provider of information, an analysts of current needs, a simulator of future conditions, and a detailer of means […] he would be a proponent of substantive solution"   (Davidoff 1966, p. 307)

For Davidoff and the advocacy scholars, if planning process is to be performed in a democratic and pluralism environment, consensus regarding planning goals, both general and specific, can be reached as the different negotiating groups backed by the knowledge and technicality of their advocate planners will discuss, cross examine, and decide the appropriate set of values of future development. And thus planning activity can be recognised as representative activity of different client groups including, as Davidoff (1996) points out, the state presented in politicians, interest groups including

CBOs and NGOs, and the *ad hoc* protest associations that may form in opposition to some proposed policies.

Clavel (1994) claimed that the main criticism for this approach came from its original questions, presented above. Many practitioners recognise that advocacy approach is, after all, an expert-centred approach through which planners decide for their client groups without encouraging them to participate in the negotiation process by themselves. He claimed that this approach expanded the role of the planner and architect profession and left the power intact confident in the working of plural democracy. Healey *et al* (1982) and Clavel (1994) point out, although advocacy planners assumed the equality in terms of power between the negotiating groups, over time they recognised the fact of disproportional distribution of power.

As a consequence to such recognition, two advocacy practitioners from different backgrounds, chief planner of the city of Cleveland, Norman Krumholz, and head of economic development in Chicago, Robert Mier Krumholz had developed and introduced the equity approach to the field of planning in the 1970s through the planning experience of Cleveland City in the United States[11]. They presented and described the link between the equity approach and the advocacy planning presented by Davidoff as following:

> "…His (Paul Davidoff) article offered practitioners like me a way of broaden our area of concern beyond purely physical planning. We could also accept the deep political nature of our craft, reach out forward the poor, to minorities, and other un-presented groups, and in the process try to serve a more inclusive pluralism. Davidoff's ideas, along with those of Herbert Gans and others, have had a great impact on my work and on the work of many planning professionals, from the 1960s to present" (Krumholz 1994, p. 150)

Unlike advocacy planning, equity planning stresses the need to address power inequalities and disproportional distribution of resources. And thus, for equity planners, all public policies have winners and losers, and usually the losers are those who are already suffering from social and economic disadvantages. Therefore, the role of the equity planner is to advocate his/her knowledge to support and to give wider choices for those interest groups who were left behind rather than planning for all interest groups

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[11] Equity planning is recognised as the extension development of the advocacy approach and both are known as the pluralism approaches (Brindley et al 1996).

within society (Krumholz and Fosters, 1990). Marris (1994) concludes that in the advocacy approach each group of the negotiating groups has its own planner who uses his/her technical skills to meet the group interest. On contrary, in the equity approach the planner has to present only the previously un-presented groups, including poor, working class, and ethnic minorities, in the political arena presented in the negotiation process.

In the same period of presenting equity planning as a development of the advocacy approach, the political economy planning approach was introduced to the field of planning theory rejecting and destructing the core assumptions of both the rational comprehensive and advocacy planning approaches as being utopian, naïve, and out of touch with the real political and economic processes that happen within society and their major influence on planning and planners activities (Harvey 1996). Over the following section the arguments, claims, and vision of the political economy approach will be presented and analysed.

2.2.2.3 Political Economy Approach

"… By the mid-1970s it became clear that the planning inspirations of the 1960s (pluralist planning approaches) had faded and that our main task was to define new horizons for planning into the 1980s – new technologies, new instrumentalities, new goals ……… new everything, in fact, *except* new ideology. Yet if my analysis is correct, the real task was to plan the ideology of planning to fit into the new economic realities rather than to meet the social unrest and civil strive of the 1960s"   (Harvey 1996, p. 192)

David Harvey is recognised as the first radical planner to introduce the political economy approach into the field of planning theory in 1973. By the mid 1970s, he recognised that although the benefits and potentials that pluralism and its planning approaches (the advocacy and equity approaches) presented to the planning field, it became no longer a valid ideology to solve city problems within the changing conditions within which the planning paradigm is being practiced. He stressed such change by underpinning several key events that happened in the USA during the early 1970s till mid 1970s. In 1969-1970, stagflation emerged as the most serious problem resulted in the negative growth rate of the 1970, which indicated that the fundamental processes of accumulation of capital were in deep trouble. And however the boom that happened during the 1972 heavily dependant on the over investment in the land,

property and construction sector, by the end of 1973, it was very obvious that the built environment could absorb no more surplus capital, and decline in property investment and construction sector together with financial instability triggered the subsequent depression. And as a consequence, Harvey points out:

> "…. Unemployment doubled, real wages began to move downward under the impact of severe "labour-disciplining" policies, social programmes began to be savagely cut, and all of the gains after a decade of struggle in the 1960s by the poor and underprivileged were rolled back almost within the space of a year. The underlying logic of capitalist accumulation asserted itself in the form of crisis in which real wages diminished in order that inflation be stabilised and appropriate conditions for accumulation be established. […] Local budgets had to shift towards fiscal conservation and had to alter priorities from social programmes to programmes to stimulate and encourage development often by subsidies and tax benefits"   (Harvey 1996, p. 194)

How to protect the success of the 1960s became the core question around which the political economy approach was built and introduced to the field of planning theory. Political economy planners started with the claim that planning is no longer about participation but rather about understanding how capitalist society works. Society works, after all, on the basic principles that most important activity is that which contributes to its own reproduction (Scott and Roweis 1977). Political economists based their analysis on the assumption that we live in a society that is founded on capitalist principles of private property and market exchange. It is a society that presupposes certain basic relationships with respect to production, distribution and consumption, which themselves have to be reproduced if the existing social order is to survive (Harvey 1996). It is clear that political economists adopted the Marxist approach, in other words a structuralism approach to social structures as the guiding approach to their scope of analysis, which is built on the notion of "class struggle". For them society consists of two main classes that are the capitalist and labour classes.

But what has labour/capital struggle to do with issue of land? Asking such question is essential in dealing with land and development within the context of capitalist society. David Harvey clarifies such link as follows:

> "…. We recognise that social reproduction depends upon the perpetual combination of these elements (land, labour, and capital) and that growth requires the recombination of these factors into new

configurations that are in some sense more productive. These categories, we often admit, are rather too abstract, and from time to time we break them down to take account of the fact that neither land nor labour is homogeneous and that capital can take productive (physical) or liquid (money) form […] we know that land and property ownership comprises residual feudal institutions (e.g. the church), large property companies, part-time landlords, and so on. We know also that the interests of rentier "money Capitalists" may diverge substantially from the interests of producers in industry and agriculture and that the labouring class is not homogeneous because of the stratifications and differentials generated according to the hierarchical division of labour and various wage rates"

(Harvey 1996, pp. 178-9)

Interests in land in a capitalist society differ according to the different perception of each class (labour/capitalist). On the one hand, labour class looks to the built environment as a mean of consumption (e.g. housing, transportation, education, health, and so on); and is very sensitive to the issues of cost of and access to such means, which facilitate survival and reproduction at a given standard of living. On the other hand, capitalists recognise the built environment, first, as a mean of production (e.g. factories, buildings, land, property, machinery, ownership commodities, banks, legal and administrative services, and so on); and second, as a dumping ground in case of over production – the case when market cannot absorb the surplus of production and capitals search for ways to dump such surplus in public infrastructure[12] (Scott and Roweis 1977; McDougall 1982). Given such interests, it can be recognised that competitions for the use of resources, including land, in a monopolistic competitions in space are evident, where capitalists can compete with capitalists to gain extra access to resources and where labourers compete with labourers for survival.

But in all this complexity of social relationships and market processes, what does planning mean? And what is the exact role of both state and planners? While Sandercock (1998) confirms that the political economy approach is an extension of Marxist point of view about planning, she presented the thoughts of Marxian scholars, including the political economists, about planning as follows:

"…. In the Marxist story, planning was no longer the hero but something more like divine fool, naïve in its faith in its own

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[12] Political economists define the built environment as the diverse elements that make the totality of physical infrastructure. The houses, roads, factories, offices, water and sewage disposal facilities, hospitals, schools, and the like are elements that constitute the built environment (Harvey 1996, p. 176)

emancipatory potential, ignorant of the real relations of power which it was serving […] the Marxist urban scholars in university departments […] enjoyed a decade or so 'in the sun', as a powerful critique of mainstream planning, focusing on planning as a function of the capitalist state" (Sandercock, 1998, P: 91)

While constructing a vision about planning activities, political economists started, in addition to the above criticism to advocacy planning, with an aggressive criticism to the rational comprehensive approach as being idealised *optimum optimorum*, utopian, contextless, contentless and fruitless (Harvey 1996; Scott and Roweis 1977). For them, planning is certainly not a neutral activity but rather is influenced, structured and determined by interests of labour/capitalists classes; and it has to be seen from within the historic, social, economic, and political contexts. It is a very important activity used by the state in order to serve labour/capitalists interests and to maintain the *status quo* of existing social reproduction (Mcdougall 1982). In this sense, the state should both support capitalists interests by maintaining and sustaining the reproduction of existing social structures; and to work as a mediator between labour and capitalists to guarantee such reproduction. Harvey (1996) stresses the role of state as follows:

"…. What is important is that it (the state) should ensure the creation of a built environment that serves the purpose of social reproduction and that it should do so in such a manner that crises are avoided as far as possible [13] […] state institutions and the process whereby state powers are exercised must be so fashioned that they too contribute, insofar as they can, to the reproduction and growth of the social system […] it should 1) help to stabilise an otherwise rather erratic economic and social system by acting as a "crisis manager", 2) strive to create the conditions for "balanced growth" and smooth process of accumulation, and 3) contain civil strive and factional struggles by repression (police power), cooptation (buying off politically or economically), or integration (trying to harmonise the demands of warning classes or factions)" (Harvey 1996, p. 185)

But what can planners do within this very structured society? It seems they have nothing to do with planning in the traditional sense. They are no longer planners but rather radical activists and politicians within the state - building alliances and

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[13] A "crisis" is a particular conjuncture in which the reproduction of capitalist society is in jeopardy. The main signals are falling rates of profits; soaring unemployment and inflation; idle productive capacity and idle money capital lacking profitable employment; and financial, institutional, and political chaos and civil strive (Harvey 1996, p. 183)

bargaining using a mixture of cooptation and integration policies that facilitate social control and that serve to re-establish social harmony, to defend the success planning gained in the 1960s in the USA, to redistribute resources through structural change, and to achieve equity and efficiency. To be able to carry out such task, planners need to understand how the built environment works in relation to social reproduction and how the facets of competitive, monopolistic and state production of the built environment relate to one another in the context of often conflicting class and factional requirements. Political economy scholars reached such conclusion after analysing the role of both the rational comprehensive and advocacy planners as follows:

> "… The technocrats helped to define the outer bounds of what could be done at the same time as they sought for new instrumentalities to accomplish dispersal and to establish social control. The advocates for the urban poor and the instrumentalities that they devised provided the channels for cooptation and integration at the same time as they pushed the system to provide whatever could be provided, being careful to stop short at the boundaries that the technocrats and "fiscal conservatives" helped to define. Those who pushed advocacy too far were either forced out or deserted planning altogether and became activists and political organisers"   (Harvey 1996, p. 193)

The introduction of the political economy approach into the field of planning theory triggered a widely spread frustration among theorists and practitioners. It is understandable why practitioners should be angry, but what about theorists? Glen McDougall (1982) presented a comprehensive criticism to the political economy approach within three categories that are: 1) methodological, 2) theoretical, and 3) practical. First, political economy approach shares the criticism made against Marxists regarding their methodology. They were criticised as their work is held to be essentially ideological as they are not only charged with interpreting reality in terms of fixed analytical categories but also with ignoring aspects of reality which may lead to a refutation of such categories. Second, it has been criticised for its perception that such analysis is universally applicable ignoring the uniqueness of specific socio-economic formation within every society. Third, it was criticised for its little attention given to the planning process and methods; and the marginal or neglected role of planners hence they are viewed as being co-opted in the interest of the powerful. As a consequence, they (i.e. planners) have to abandon the profession of planning as a whole and to become radical activists (McDougall 1982, pp. 262-3).

In practice, when adopting the political economy approach to land and development, the traditional physical planning tools presented in the master plan, land use planning, detailed planning, and planning regulations no longer exist. However, they are replaced by more loose physical planning tools to meet the capitalists' interests (Brindley *et al* 1996). Tools such as simplified planning zones, which is presented in Britain, Essex, Colchester area, under the 1986 Housing and Planning Act, assure that developers' interests are to be met with less planning rules and regulations (Farnell 1983; Thornley 1986, p. 63). As a consequence, planners within the state have tried hard to support people to buy buildings and to own properties; and to bargain with the powerful capitalists on planning permissions to provide key facilities for communities all over the UK. However, it is evident, as Brindley *et al* 1996 claim, that whenever adopting the political economy approach to land and development, the results are non-strategic planning policies and decision-making processes. Thus, Brindley *et al* (1996, pp. 15-7) conclude that in practice, political economy planning, as they named 'trend' planning, is only to be adopted in areas that have free urban problems and no public support and subsidies are needed to be invested in. They supported their claim as follows:

> "…. Trend planning in structure and local plans helps private investors and developers to coordinate and manage their investment plans […] Trend planning therefore currently represents the end result of reorienting regulative planning from the public interest to the private interest. The response to the exposure of weakness in development control is not to reform or strengthen it, but to strip it to the bare bones. Only those aspects of planning are retained which seem to be functional for private development […] As such, trend planning is only suited to areas broadly free of urban problems" (Brindley *et al* 1996, p. 17)

After introducing this approach into the field of planning, planning started to face many challenges and the dream of the early reformers seemed to be destructed and wiped out. However the criticism, the theory and practice of planning were deeply undermined and the need to re-establish new counter-attacking ideology to rebuild the early planners dream and re-establish the authority and importance of planners had never been crucial.

2.2.2.4 Entrepreneurial Planning

"…Two factors have led to the lack of discussion about equality. The first is the much increased emphasis on market driven approaches to development over the past 10 to 15 years. The second is an increased willingness to perceive income inequalities as important in providing individual incentives for entrepreneurship. Redistributative strategies have been replaced by a naïve assumption that all can join the market and that those who cannot join the market cannot be helped effectively by intervention from either the state or from development assistance agencies" (Miltin *et al* 1996, p. 3)

The opportunity, which planning theorists have been waiting for to present a new approach to land and development, had emerged globally in the 1980s. Jencks (1985) and Hutcheon (1987) point out that during the 1960s and much of 1970s, planners believed in a future in which social problems could be tamed and humanity liberated from the constraints of scarcity and greed. However, in the 1980s, the state has become more ideologically conservative and more subservient to the needs and demands of capital, turning away from the simultaneous pursuit of both economic growth and welfare (Beauregard 1996). In other words, the focus is no longer how to minimise the socially negative consequences of urban development through redistributive measures, but how to maximise opportunities given to individuals within the changing conditions on the global scale (Albrechts 1991). This refocus was echoed globally through books, articles, and reports on "urban productivity", "urban management", "enabling" market to work, "partnership", and "privatisation" (Levy 2003).

But what are the reasons behind this change? The answer can be found in the revival of the principles of 18th century liberalism, which stresses freedom and individualism and, as a corollary, *laissez-faire* capitalism (Begg 1988). Those thoughts were echoed in the 1980s with the emergence of the expansionist paradigm within the economic discipline and environmental and development studies. While clarifying the influence of such paradigm on the environmental planning tradition, William Rees (1999) laid down the basic principles of such paradigm as follows:

"…. Sustainability sometimes seems a simple business from the expansionist perspective. If there are no general environmental constraints on the economy and we can find technological substitutes for particular resources, then the shortest route to sustainability is to stay our

present course. If we continue freeing up markets, privatising resources and government services, and eliminating barriers to trade, a new round of growth in both rich and poor countries will provide the wealth needed both to redress poverty and inequality and to generate the economic surplus needed, particularly in the developing world, better to husband the natural environment (see Beckerman 1974 for full exposition). In short, "…. The best way to improve your environment is to be rich" (Beckerman 1992, p. 491 cited in Rees 1999, p. 30)"

(Rees 1999, pp. 29-30)

Together with the introduction of the expansionist paradigm into the field of planning through the neo-liberal approach to development and its related structural adjustment and urban management programmes introduced by the IBRD and UNDP. Harvey (1989a) distinguished four basic reasons for the shift towards urban entrepreneurialism. The first reason is the intensive competition within the international division of labour. Harvey (1989b), Ashworth (1989) and Solesbury (1987) stress that during the 1980s, such competition occurred because of both the classical advantages that resulted from some specific geographic and management factors (e.g. the availability of resources, location, climate, regulations and laws, and so on); and the advantage that emerged from the different abilities of both the public and private sector within each country to invest in physical and social infrastructures which strengthen the economic base and the attraction of urban investments. This was presented clearly by Louis Albrechts (1991) as follows:

"…. In activating markets, the emphasis tends to be on the supply rather than demand side. Thus, in general, the favoured package includes training to increase and update skill levels, assistance and support to entrepreneurs in establishing and expanding businesses, relaxation of planning control as in enterprise zones and simplified planning zones, abolition or relaxation of rent controls, diversification of housing tenure, together with financial leverage to stimulate property development to development confidence and attract inward investment"

(*op. cit.*, p. 128)

Second, the aim to improve the competitive position of cities with respect to the spatial division of consumption led to the shift towards entrepreneurialism. This is evident within cities all over the world, where there are intensive competitions to attract consumers looking for quality of life (e.g. tourism, shopping, investment, and so on). To be a winner in such competition, cities have to find ways and to invest heavily in the

physical upgrading of the built environment, consumer attractions and entertainment and cultural innovation (see Harvey 1989b; Albrechts and Swyngedouw 1989). This is to stress that the new aim of planning is to create and present safe to visit, invest, entertain, live, consume in, exciting, creative, innovative cities (Harvey 1989b).

The third reason is the competition for the acquisition of key control and command functions in high finance, government, or information gathering and processing (Albrechts 1991). It is clearly that this reason is in much link with the later. To be able to attract consumers from all over the world, countries have to compete globally to control the key elements that influence the development process; and cities within each country have to compete nationally to control the key factors that direct the national distribution of resources as a matter of survival. This reason led Louis Albrechts (1991) to stress on the emergence of "placeless powers and powerless places" phenomenon (ibid, p.127), David Harvey (1989b) to present and stress such competition as the "intra-urban" and "inter-urban" competitions, and Norman Krumholz and John Forester (1990); and Donald Haider (1992) to warn from "places wars" impact on social equity. However, Albrechts (1991) points out that not all countries or cities are able to plug into such competition as the provision of the needed infrastructure is very expensive. He supported his claim as follows:

> "… These functions need particular and often expensive infrastructure provision. That makes inter-urban competition in this realm very expensive and particularly tough because this is an area where agglomeration economics remain supreme and the monopoly power of established centres (London, New York and Tokyo, but also Paris, Frankfurt, Brussels, etc.) particularly hard to break. Since command functions have been a strong growth sector the pursuit of them within the last two decades has appealed increasingly as the golden path to urban survival. The effect is to make it appear –wrongly - as if the city of the year 2000 is going to be a city of pure command and control functions, an information city, or post-industrial city in which the export of services (financial, informational, knowledge-producing) becomes the economic basis for urban survival (see Harvey 1989b)"

> (Albrechts 1991, p. 128)

Finally, it is the "cut-throat" competition for a share of the redistribution of surplus (LeGates *et al* 1996). Although this growing competition to plug into the globalisation process and the un-resting governments, which adopts the neo-liberal policies to economic processes such as the UK government under Margaret Thatcher,

efforts all over the world to cut back spending on public services (e.g. health, education, transport, and so on), it had proven to be extremely difficult to reach such aim as different groups within society compete to gain access to such services as a matter of survival. Harvey (1989b) concludes that the urban ruling alliance with the different groups in society manage to seize every single available opportunity to exploit redistributive mechanisms as a matter of survival.

Within these global changes that had happened in the 1980s, planning is seen as a synonym of inefficiency, control, regulations and excessive cost, and too much bureaucracy (Levy 2003). Albrechts (1986) stresses that during the 1980s planning (state planning) was often recognised as irritating activities that hinder individual freedom and free market economy. Though, planning had to refocus its objective from the how to plan focus dominated the planning theory over 1950s, 1960, and 1970s to the outcome of the planning process focus that would help cities to plug into the globalisation process of the 1980s and times to come. In this sense, planning main focus is to adjust the physical and institutional settings in which international and national economic forces operate (Sorenson and Day 1981). This led to the refocus on individual experts together with individual entrepreneurs as they have the needed skills and knowledge to achieve such focus. The stress on individualism revived the planners' early dream and gave them the lost confidence wiped out by the political economy approach (Albrechts 1991). However, unlike the vision of the rational comprehensive planning to planners as controllers, entrepreneurial planners are seen as supporters of individuals and market processes. And though, entrepreneurial planners, acting as dealmakers, have to use their skills, knowledge, and technical expertise to "sell the city" and to attract national and international capitals along with their ability to act as entrepreneurial managers, as they will have to negotiate with the various sectors and departments involved in the planning process while taking into account, in a strategic sense, existing power structures between and within social groups. This is to be able to persuade such departments and groups to integrate specific planning proposals into their own programming and budgeting (Albrechts 1986,1991).

The entrepreneurial approach is, as Brindley *et al* (1996) claim, an approach that puts the willingness of state institutions to support private agencies in dealing with land development, including the public-private partnership, in its core. Unlike the traditional technical politics and decision-making in the rational comprehensive approach, the change in the relationship between state institutions and private agencies in the

entrepreneurial approach from regulator/regulated to partnership relationship, directed the state in many countries, such as the UK in the Docklands area (Hall 1983), to adopt a different type of politics in dealing with the decision-making process. Brindley *et al* (1996) and Young (1985) argue that the entrepreneurial approach, the leverage approach as they name it, has a corporatist political style[14] (see Mayfield 1996; Nordlinger 1981; Stepan 1978; Cawon 1978; Schmitter 1974). This is because, as they supported their argument, state officials share some of their decision-making authority with selected interest groups, and while doing so, the selected interest groups recognise the payback action need to be done in terms of their compliance to follow and support the agreed policies which they take part to formulate (Brindley *et al* 1996, p.165; Young, 1985, p.21).

The support of the state can be recognised in both direct and indirect ways. On one hand, Massey (1982) suggests that, the direct support of the state can be in the forms of low land tax, tax allowance, subsidies, and grants. Boyle (1985) stated that such tools have been used in the UK and other forms of financial support such as the Urban Development Grants (UDG) that seeks to support certain firms involved in specific projects. On the other hand, Forrest and Muric (1984) point out that the indirect support of the state to private agencies can take many forms such as the practice of public sector clearing sites and providing physical infrastructure aiming at reducing or eliminating site acquisition costs.

The state has to present and create a distinctive type of institutional arrangement that aggregate both state officials and private agencies to share the decision-making process of development and planning goals, priorities, and policies. Whatever the name given to the institutional arrangements to deal with land and development in this approach such as quasi-government agency, corporation agency, or enterprise agency, they share the same basic principals. LDDC (1987) and Brindley *et al* (1996) states that these agencies have a special purpose that is to stimulate the market in the areas within which it operates. They have to be centrally funded by the state and responsible to a government minister, observed by Parliament, and directed by government officials whose roots, most of cases, in large-scale property development and city finance. Such

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[14] Corporatism is " a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supporters." (Schmitter, 1974, p. 104)

principles are to allow them to bypass the local government and other related government and society agencies. Furthermore, such enterprise agencies make an extensive use of consultants in drawing up area framework, engineering, quality surveying, architecture, and finance and marketing to meet the pre-agreed planning policies.

However, as the entrepreneurial approach using consultants, including planners and architects, to prepare the physical plans in order to start implementations, it adopts most of the physical planning tools that works under the rational comprehensive approach such as structure plan, land use planning, zoning, detailed planning. This is because, as Heseltine (1986) concludes, such approach is more concerned with the physical arrangement of activities within the built environment to stimulate market processes. Meadowcroft (1998) claims that unlike the view to the implementation process in the rational comprehensive planning approach as a separate stage, it is no longer excluded from the planning process in such approach. However, concerned with the process within which decisions have been made and who decides what and why, the entrepreneurial planning approach assume that using the negotiation process, solutions and agreements can always be reached. For the entrepreneurial planning scholars, such solutions reflect the notion of "public interest" and, in this sense, the implementation of such solutions will happen in a natural way without any conflicts throughout the planning process (Meadowcroft 1998, pp.24-25).

The entrepreneurial planning approach has been criticised for more than two decades, however still being used in many countries such as the UK and the USA. Many reports and articles done by government, community groups and private agencies, reported that such approach does not bring direct benefits to existing residents, however, on the contrary it frequently brings real disadvantage including environmental and social disadvantages. They have repeatedly listed the needs for low-income housing to support the working class population, industrial employment, and wide range of social and environmental facilities that are poorly catered for (Brindley *et al* 1996, p. 118). One of such articles presented by Colin Davies criticising the outcomes of such planning approach adopted in the Docklands areas in London states the following:

> ".... Profoundly depressing to those who care about the future of European cities. If cities are about community, democracy, accessibility, public space, and the rich mixture of activities which

creates a culture which all can participate, then Docklands does not
deserve to be called a city"   (Davies 1987, p. 32)

The critique of the entrepreneurial planning can be summarised in the worries of
Mollenkopf and Castells (1991) and Goldsmith and Blakeley (1992) about the
phenomenon of "dual cities with poverty and inequality among some segments of the
population as others prosper"; and the impact of the refocus of planners activities, who
are desperately seeking to attract or retain business and "will shoot anything that flies"
(LeGates *et al* 1996), while most local economic planning is focusing on trying to
reverse the downward slide of cities which are not global cities. It is also evident in the
writings of Levy (1990) and Haider (1992) when stressed their worries over the
domination of "sale type activities" within cities, which Haider (1992) stresses on as "
not social equity activities"; and in Webber *et al* (1991) concerns over the UNDP and
WB practice of the neo-liberal approach to development using structural adjustment and
urban management policies in Madras, India, as follows:

> "…. It is striking that these direct concerns with economic development
> and with human development are not counted in the core of Madras'
> urban development projects. The formal project objectives [...] seem
> only implicitly related. It seems these concerns are central neither to
> Madras' urban agenda. Each agency involved in the programme has
> chosen to focus on less direct influences on the economy and human
> welfare, on the physical environmental infrastructure that only indirectly
> affects economic and human development"   (Webber *et al* 1991, p. 16)

It seems that the field of planning theory was not capable of catching up with the
rapid transitions happening globally. It is clearly evident from the above critique that
the gains of the 1960s and early 1970s, regarding the focus on programmes and projects
to achieve social equity, social justice, participation, and democracy in the name of
"public interest", have been washed away. This led many planning scholars and
theorists to name the 1980s as the "planning crisis" decade (levy 2003). But what is the
way out from all this mess? How can planners revive their traditional dream and defend
the gains of the 1960s while plugging their cities into the rapid global transitions? How
can planners rebuild their profession without being seen as mercenaries? Well, some
answer to these critical questions and others started to take shape while the emergence
of the postmodernism movement around the mid 1980s, however, the complete answers
are yet so far to be fully developed.

2.2.2.5 Collaborative Planning

Around the mid 1980s, much of literature on planning theory is devoid of attempts to view planning theory through the lens of the postmodern cultural critique. Urban geographers including Michael Dear, Philip Cooke, David Harvey, Edward Soja, Edward Relph have initially led such attempts, and later on many others such as Patsy Healey and others joined in. The postmodernism movement in planning has drawn on a terminology first developed in art and architecture critique. Although postmodernism in architecture is primarily a critique of a particular paradigm or style within Western art and architecture, postmodernism in planning is primarily a critique of systematic reason in modern western thought (Healey 1996, p.237).

But first of all, what does "modernity" (or "enlightenment" as Healey (1996) calls it) refer to in planning theory? There is a common agreement among planning scholars that modernity in planning started when traditional planners, after the 2nd world war, started to diminish the dominance of industrial capitalists while mediating the instrumental frictions among capitalists that had resulted in a city inefficiently organised for production and reproduction – "it was modern because it engaged the city of industrial capitalism and became institutionalised as a form of state intervention" (Beauregard 1996, p. 217). Moreover, for postmodernists, modernity in planning theory ended with the globally emerging changes in the 1980s (see table 2.4 for the key global changes in the modernist conditions). Caren Levy (2003) points out that many scholars, including Anthony Giddens, do not recognise postmodernism as a separate period (or era) in planning theory, however, rather than a natural extension of modernism. This perception, as levy (2003) stresses, is problematic as it could be misused to support the idea that underdeveloped countries have to walk the same path of developed countries to achieve development goals. Beauregard summarised the modernity thoughts as follows:

> "…. Modernist project is derived from beliefs about knowledge and society; and is inextricably linked to the rise of capitalism, the formation of the middle class. The emergence of a scientific mode of legitimation, the concept of an orderly and spatially integrated city that meets the needs of society, and the fostering of the interventionist state. Technical rationality is viewed as a valid and superior means of making public decisions, and information gathered scientifically is regarded as enlightening, captivating, and convincing. The democratic state contains an inherent tendency to foster and support reform, whereas its planners

maintain a critical distance from specialised interests. Such beliefs repeat and mimic beliefs about enlightenment that are associated with the rise of capitalist democracies and with the modernist quest for control and liberation"   (Beauregard 1996, p.220)

Stressing on key changes to conditions underpinning the modernism thoughts in planning theory, postmodernists started challenging such thoughts as being irrelevant. First, they stress the change that happened to the economic processes associated with capitalist development. Economic processes are no longer associated with the rise of industrial capitalism (or Fordist) that guided modern planners to seek orderly and functionally organised cities to accelerate capital accumulation. Location is no longer important as technology and communication have been 'revolutionalised'. As a consequence, industrial capitalism is no longer the power, which drives the planning process, but rather financial capitalism becomes more important.

Albertsen (1988) and Cooke (1988) point out that the traditional Fordist means, techniques, and social relations of production no longer exist. They have been replaced by (what they called post-Fordist forms) postmodern forms of production including high-technology products and processes, an expanded emphasis on financial circuit of capital, more flexible procedures and regulations of in the workplace, and a defensive and weakened labour force. Such challenge is linked to Albrechts (1996) terms of "placeless powers (financial capitals) and powerless places (cities that cannot plug into the globalisation process)" presented in the above section.

Second, postmodernists challenge issues of 'embourgeoisement', unitary notion of urban planning, and "conflict-free" society. Davis (1987) emphasises that the increasing fragmentation of capital and labour in the postmodern era resulted to unequal economic growth on local, national and international levels. Soja (1986) stresses that the emergence of modern cities neither achieved its dream of equal participation to different societal groups nor erased the manifestation of past injustices. Beauregard (1996) presents the postmodernist view about society while criticising the modern assumption about conflict-free society as follows:

".... The increasing fragmentation of capital and labour in the postmodern era [....] makes ludicrous any assumption of unitary plan. The postmodern city is layered with historical forms and struggled over by fractions of capital and labour, each of which is dependant upon economic activities that are industrial and post-industrial, formal and

informal, primary and secondary (Davis 1987; Soja 1986). Under such conditions, it is difficult to maintain the modernist commitment to a conflict-free public interest. National attempts to obliterate class distinctions through prosperity and collective consumption and the local attempts to provide events (e.g. multiethnic affairs) that celebrate yet minimize differences have not led to *embourgeoisement* of working class"
                                                                    (ibid, p. 223)

The third change is related to the changing role of the state. Many analysts and scholars such as Feagin (1988) and Gitlin (1988), argue that the modernist assumption that the sate had progressive tendencies, in the sense that it can represent people and support the growth of democracy, no longer exists. The postmodern hyper-mobility of capital and labour together with the four reasons presented by David Harvey (1989b) explaining the shift towards entrepreneurialism, forced the state to retreat to its conservative forms as a matter of survival. In other words, it was forced to de-link the notion of efficiency by supporting market processes from social welfare. This led Feagin (1988) to warn from the result of such de-link in creating a wide-range of environmental and social costs, when analysing the case of Huston in the USA.

Nevertheless, Healey (1997) stresses that the state can no longer been seen as monolithic (i.e. as a one unitary entity), however, it has to be seen as an entity that comprises many sub interacting and competing entities, each of which is open to the domination of some factions of capital and labour power. And though, this may explain the state repression and tolerance in different time and space. The final change is the challenging notion of scientific rationality and its replacement by the communicative methodology (see section 2.2.1.3). Given the main key changes through which postmodernist challenges the modernism thought, Beauregard (1996) summarised the postmodernist critique to modernity from within very succinctly:

> "…. The postmodernist cultural critique is a complex one. It includes a turn to historical allusion and spatial understanding, the abandoning of critical distance for ironic commentary, the embracing of multiple discourses and the rejection of totalising ones, a scepticism towards master narrative and general social theories, a disinterest in the performativity of knowledge, the rejection of notions of progress and enlightenment, and a tendency toward political acquiescence (Bernstein 1987; Cooke 1988; Dear 1986; Gregory 1987; Jameson 1984a, Jencks 1985; Lyotard 1984; Relph 1987; Soja 1989)" (Beauregard 1996, p. 224)

Table 2.4 Postmodernism Challenge to Modernism: Key Changes in the Modernist Conditions

Issues	Economic processes associated with capitalist development	The form of social relations	The role of the state in capitalist development	Methodology
Modernist conditions	Associated with the rise of industrial capitalism ".... Fordist means, techniques and social relations of production" (Beauregard 1996, p. 221)	Rise of capitalism linked to 'embourgeoisement', reduction of class differences and diffusion of middle class (while male) values (Conflict-free society)	State had progressive tendencies (despite alliances with industrial capital Progressive in the sense of appearance of representation and support of growth of democracy)	" Reason […] as logic coupled with scientifically constructed empirical knowledge" (Healey 1996, p. 237)
Postmodernist conditions	Rise of financial capital Globalisation of economic processes (information and communication technology, flexible and fragmented production processes, weakened workforce) (Harvey 1987)	Unequal economic growth (locally, nationally, and internationally Growth cleavages in society on the basis of class, race, ethnicity, age, etc, as groups express diversity and challenge exclusion through insurgent practices (Healey 1997) (Conflict-ridden societies)	State has become conservative, in the name of efficiency (because of alliance with financial capital) Conservative in the sense of abandoning the link between efficiency and welfare; and focus on the market	Deconstruction of scientific rationalism as methodology of 'truth' it is narrow and dominating and excludes 'other ways of being and knowing' (Healey 1996, p. 237) Reconstruction of knowledge through communicative rationality

Source: adapted from

Beauregard R., 1996, Between Modernity and Postmodernity: The Ambiguous Position of U.S. Planning, in S. Campbell and S. Fainstein (Eds.), *Readings in Planning Theory*, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, UK, pp. 213-234;

Healey P., 1996, Planning Through Debate: The Communicative Turn in Planning Theory, in S. Campbell and S. Fainstein (Eds.), *Reading in Planning Theory*, Blackwell, pp. 234-257;

Healey P., 1997, *Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies*, Macmillan press Ltd, London; and

Levy C., 2003, Urban Policy, Planning and Management, Module on MSc in Urban Development Planning, Development Planning Unit, University College London

(see also Allmendinger 2001; Forester 2000; and Sandercock 1998, 1998a).

In 1992 Patsy Healey presented a new theoretical alternative to the existing planning theory, collaborative planning, in an article titled "Planning Through Debate: The Communicative Turn in Planning Theory" published in *Town Planning Review*. Such article together with Anthony Giddens (1995), *The Constitution of Society,* were the base upon which Patsy Healey wrote *The Collaborative Planning* in 1997. She started her argument by analysing and deconstructing the rational comprehensive planning for not providing a mechanism for critiquing the discourse itself rather than a narrow, economistic, and functionalist conception of the dimensions of lifeworlds; and pluralist conception of interest mediation for being interested only in the notion of participation without putting any effort toward "learning about" the interests and perceptions and, with that knowledge, revising what each participant thinks about each other's and their own interest. As a consequence, participation has become manipulated by the powerful and is used to legitimise planning actions (Healey 1996, pp. 250-1).

Although her tolerance towards the political economy approach for its critical analysis and perception about society, state, and planning process, Patsy Healey criticised political economy for focusing their analysis only on the notion of class and ignoring other aspects such as race, age, ethnicity, religion and so on; and for not providing any room for manoeuvre for planners. She also criticised political economy planners working within the state for becoming oppressive by using the rational comprehensive planning tools to legitimise their decisions whether to meet capitalist interests or to support market processes (Healey 1997). Patsy Healey was also tolerant to the entrepreneurial planning approach for understanding the global-local conflict and recognising the changes in modernism conditions. However, she was very critical to such approach for being exploitative to cities' resources, which helps in deteriorating the environment though reducing environmental standards to attract capital and investment; for de-linking efficiency from social welfare and social justice by defining efficiency in terms of the cost and benefits analysis; and for perceiving democracy as something important of its own as a human right issue away from planning decision-making process (Healey 1997).

By adopting the Structuration theory together with the postmodernist cultural critique to modernism assumptions as a background of her perception about society and planning processes, Patsy Healey views society as a conflict-ridden society that consists of different groups, each with different interests, who interact with each other in a co-operative conflict process to achieve communicative action. To achieve such

communicative action, respect for and tolerance toward each group to present their argument through communicative rationality process (see section 2.2.1.3 on the transformative traditions) are crucial. But to put this argument in a reality context in relation to planning activities, what can planning mean in this postmodernist world? What purposes and practices should it have? Healey (1996) states the following:

> "…. Planning is an interactive and interpretive process, focusing "deciding and acting" within a range of specialised allocative and authoritative systems but drawing on the multidimensionality of "life worlds" or "practical sense", rather than a single formalised dimension […] formal techniques of analysis and design in planning processes are but one form of discourse. Planning process should be enriched by discussions of moral dilemmas and aesthetic illustration of experiences […] such interaction assumes the pre-existence of individuals engaged with others in diverse, fluid, and overlapping "discourse communities"
>
> (*ibid*, p. 247)

In this sense, planning is open to diverse alliances internally in terms of planning institutions and agencies engaged in the planning process, and externally by different societal groups with different interests and agendas (Healey 1996, 1997). This is strongly connected to Healey's perception about the state, which she shares with the postmodernist thoughts. She perceives the state as a multi-faction entity (not as a monolithic unit) that each faction is open to diverse alliance, internally by other state factions, and externally by interest groups, including capital and labour, and other agencies involving in the planning process.

Therefore, Patsy Healey calls upon planners to practice what she calls "insurgent practices", which refers to a collective movement of people applying pressure on state to achieve their goals and interests. She echoed political economists call on planners to adopt the principle of " things to defend and things to extend" by searching for strategic entry points to different state agencies to achieve equity and effectiveness within local, national and global processes (Healey 1997, also see table 2.5). Although the emphasis on the role of state to have the capacity for locally sensitive and globally aware understanding of the needs and interests of firms existing in a place, state is regarded as the general controller and regulator that works between efficiency and equality. She supports her argument by stating the following:

Table 2.5 A Review of Intervention in Urban Development: Theory and Practice

CLASSICAL (PHYSICAL) TRADITIONS	APPLIED TRADITIONS	TRANSFORMATIVE TRADITIONS
Rational comprehensive – Master plan – National/regional policies on urban development focus on rural areas to lessen population growth in cities – Zoning and detailed planning – New settlements/towns programmes	**Advocacy** – Neighbourhood plans (local focused plans with short-term goals developed with community participation – Sectoral urban programmes for basic needs programmes that are connected with foreign aid **Political economy** – Activist politics because planners can do nothing as planners in the state – National policy focuses on equality – Urban plans and programmes (things to defend and things to extend) through building alliances and bargains **Entrepreneurial** – Urban management programmes as a way to co-ordinate activities of different actors (state, private sector, community organisations, etc) – Partnership projects, structural adjustment programmes and privatisation – Urban policy (performance criteria to measure efficiency)	**Collaborative** – National cross sectoral policies – Urban policies look for strategic entry points to achieve equity and effectiveness in local, national and global processes – Constituency-based plans and programmes (local and groups)

Source: adapted from Levy C., 2003, Urban Policy, Planning and Management, UO2 Module on MSc in Urban Development Planning, Development Planning Unit, University College London

"…. The critical challenge for local governance capability is how to 'strike a bargain' with businesses, including property interests, which will constrain businesses where it could trample on social relations or undermine environmental capacities; while enabling business activity to flourish […] A major function of local governance is to help firms to overcome hurdles and market barriers, to improve their internal operating conditions. The quality of the way this is done will affect the extent to which 'being in a particular place' adds value to a firm's activities [….] economic activities needs to be understood from the point of view of 'business world'. From that point of view, the qualities of places in which firms are located are an amalgam of physical assets and particular environment qualities, labour market attributes, company networks and market opportunities, spatial organisation and institutional relations through which knowledge about products, markets, opportunities and constraints flows around"   (Healey 1997, pp. 160-1)

While building the collaborative planning approach to land and development on the structuration theory to social structures, Patsy Healey based her scope of analysis on the issues of interactive, power relations into gender, class, ethnicity, religion, age, ability, and so on. As a consequence, collaborative planning expanded its scope to all existing discourse, as it is formulated to guide planning practice to work as a cross-cutting practice to all existing planning traditions (Healey 1996). However its recognition of diversity and power structures; and attention to institutionalisation of changes (e.g. bias of procedures, language, and other visible and invisible mechanisms of exclusion); the collaborative approach has been criticised for many aspects. It has been criticised for not providing yet new practical planning methods in dealing with land and development; and although calling for mutual respect and tolerance, it is in much collision course with both fundamentalism and relativism (Healey 1996). Moreover, it has been criticised regarding its communicative rationality methodology as being utopian ideal and highly eclectic as Beauregard (1996) concludes:

"…. As a body, planning theorists became highly eclectic, pursuing theoretical projects for their own sake. Collectively, they lost the object, the city, which had given planning its legitimacy. Their new objects – the planning process, policy making, and so on – were only tangentially the objects of practitioners; they were procedurally relevant but not substantively. This postmodern fragmentation of planning theory would have been acceptable if it had paralleled a corresponding adoption of an integrative framework that criticised society and advanced planning practice […] practitioners and theorists must rededicate themselves to

the built environment as the object of action and inquiry. At present, the physical city exists within planning as a serious of unconcerned fragments rather than as a practical and theoretical synthesis of planning action and thought […] the physical city is the object of practice and theory that historically enabled state planning to be established. To abandon it is to abandon the meaning of urban planning as well as the source of its legitimacy as a state activity"   (*ibid*, p.228)

Given such criticism to collaborative planning, planning theory and practice has never looked as fragmented and apart. Almost all physical planners practitioners had given up the faith in theorists to present applicable and practical, not analytical or theoretical frameworks and models, upon which they can carry on their practice while continue destructing the "traditional ways". In the same time, theorists gave up trust in planning practitioners to adopt and apply planning theories from a moral and ethical ground. Each group accuses the other for being ignorant about reality and stubborn to accept the other side's arguments and beliefs. Paradoxically, one cannot imagine that these two groups shared once the same aim, beliefs, way of thinking and moral ground.

Given the underlying, historical context, assumptions and beliefs of each theoretical approach (style) to land and development, it can be recognised that each approach, which emerged into the field of planning theory was dominant within and attached to specific planning practice tradition(s) (see table 2.5). This is not to say that physical planning traditions were consistent and systematic in adopting and/or applying a specific planning approach or methodology. However, they progressively and simultaneously adopted and applied different planning approaches and methodologies as a result of the continuous shift of focus and scope of both planning theorists and practitioners. Using the arguments, debate, and analysis illustrated in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the following section will construct the research analytical framework upon which the urban development process and physical planning practice in the context of Egypt in general and of the case study in specific will be explored, analysed and documented.

2.3 An Analytical Framework for the Understanding of Physical Planning Practice

Despite the planning paradigm shift, the fragmentation of planning theory and practice, as well as the widening gap between planning theorists and practitioners, illustrated above, the research identified some systematic entry points to the analysis of the urban planning process and physical planning practice with respect to the arguments and debate over the concepts of structure and agency (see figure 2.1).

First, given the dynamics of the global political economy and its significant impact on the national and local political economy contexts and on the way in which the state relates to interest groups within society and adopts certain urban development planning approaches to land and development in specific time-space edge, it becomes crucial that physical planning practice should not be analysed separately from a critical understanding of such contexts. The impact of change at the levels of global, national, and local political economy on physical planning practice can be easily recognised in the debated notions of the 'places wars' and 'inter-urban' and 'intra-urban' conflicts and its devastating social and environmental impacts both in the developed and less developed countries. It can also be recognised, since the mid 1980s, in the evident global shift in: the economic processes associated with capitalist development, the form of social relations, the role of state in capitalist development, and planning methodologies (see sections 2.1.3, 2.2.2.4, and 2.2.2.5 and table 2.4). In this sense, it is critically important to understand the link between the change of the global political economy and the national and local political economy contexts. Such critical understanding provides, on the one hand, the basic background upon which the change in the state-society relationship, specifically state-private sector relationship at the national and local levels, might be historically recognised, explored, analysed, and documented within a given time and space edge. On the other hand, it provides the tool by which the questions of who gets what, when, why and how could be explored and analysed.

The second entry point is a critical understanding of the environment of interactions between power and interests (i.e. the action environment) in society both at the national and local levels, which has an interlocking relationship with changes at the global, national and local political economy scales. Each country, and even locality, has its unique action environment that depends upon the interlocking dynamic relations between the unique historical development of its socio-political and socio-economic structures across time, the international as well as the national interests of the powerful agencies that influence changes in the political economy at the national and local levels, and the political leadership and the significantly powerful individuals in each society.

Figure 2.1 An Analytical Framework to the Understanding of Physical Planning Practice

Although, the first three identified factors can be easily recognised in both the developed and less developed countries, the latter factor (i.e. the political leadership and powerful individuals) is less influential in the context of countries with an extended history of constitutional democracy. In this sense, in contexts where practice of constitutional democracies were denied for long periods of time, such factor is seen as one of the most influential on the action environment and its outcome public policies and social institutions.

The environment of interactions between power and interests is seen as the driving force that determines as well as controls, on the one hand, the way in which the state decides upon future national and local course of events, and the goals and objectives of the development process. In other words, it is seen as the prime factor that controls the decision-making process upon which the national, regional, and local development policies are created, directed, and controlled in specific time-space edge. The action environment is also recognised as the triggering factor behind the adoption and application of specific aims and objectives of the national, regional, and local urban development policies and physical planning practice as well as the adoption and application of specific planning approaches to land and development in specific time-space edge. On the other hand, such environment is seen here as the driving force behind the establishment, the disappearance, as well as the empowerment and weakening, of certain institutions and agencies that significantly affect the urban development process and physical planning practice in specific time-space edge both at the national and local levels. In other words, it has a significant role in setting the parameters of the dynamics of the central/local government relationship. In this sense, the in depth understanding of the environment of interactions between power and interests (i.e. the action environment) provides a mean to document, explore, and analyse urban development planning process and the reasons behind decisions about physical planning practice within each society.

The third entry point of the analysis is the recognition of a link between the action environment and the institutional arrangements established to carry out the task of physical planning formulation and implementation at the national and local levels. These power and interests interactions are seen as the driving force behind the emergence, disappearance, empowerment and weakening of certain institutions and agencies within society with respect to urban development planning and physical planning practice. As such, it contributes to and influences the interaction environment

between an existing set of institutions and newly established ones. In this sense, the action environment is viewed as the prime force that on the one hand, affects and influences the way in which institutions are being arranged, and on the other hand, determines the resulting intra-institutional and inter-institutional conflicts and the power structures between and within such institutions and agencies responsible for the urban development planning process and physical planning formulation and implementation in specific-time and space edge. In other words, the action environment significantly affects and influences the environment of institutional interaction and its resulting power structures. The new institutional arrangements and its power structures result in triggering new international, national, local interests and values with respect to physical planning practice, which in turn significantly contribute to the changes in the action environment settings.

The fourth interlocking entry point to the analysis of physical planning practice is the critical link between the institutional arrangements and power structures and the decision-making process. It is clear that such a link is one of the most influential factors affecting physical planning practice where the distribution question, inclusion and exclusion debate, and the dilemma of addressing the 'public interest' could be empirically understood (see section 2.2). Critically understanding such link helps explore the impact of the action environment as well as the institutional interaction on physical planning practice. This is through examining the control of and access to the decision-making process as well as the domination of specific institutions, agencies, and individuals over the urban development process and physical planning practice decisions at the national and local levels in specific time-space edge. It also helps provide a set of tools with which the reasons and causes of the urban development planning process and decisions of physical planning practice might be recognised, explored, analysed and documented.

The final critical interlocking point is the reverse impact of the urban development planning process and physical planning practice on both the power and interests interaction (i.e. the action environment) and institutional interaction environment. This point is seen as crucial to understand when analysing physical planning practice at the national and local levels, where such practice results, in most case, in triggering an emergence of new international, national, and local interests. As a consequence, such new interests join the pace of the action environment both at the national and local levels that usually results, as explained above, in creating,

demolishing, empowering, or weakening of specific institutions and agencies to join the institutional arrangements of the urban development process and physical planning practice. And in turn, such institutions and agencies and their related newly arranged power structures join the institutional interaction environment to produce a new set of institutional arrangements and power structures that affects the decision-making process of the urban development planning process and physical planning practice at the national and local levels in specific time-space edge.

The following analytical chapters will use these entry points to explore, examine, analyse, and document the links between the changes in the national political economy context, the action environment, the institutional arrangements and power structure, and physical planning practice in the context of the case study to present the empirical evidence, which endorse the research hypothesis.

CHAPTER 3: THE STATE, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SETTLEMENTS IN EGYPT, 1974-2002

Table 3.4 Changes in National Development Planning in the Period 1970 - 2002

	SADAT ERA (1970 - 1981)		MUBARAK (1981- TILL PRESENT)	
	1970 - MARCH 1974	APRIL 1974 – 1981	1981 – 1991	1991 - 2002
ATTITUDE TO MARKET	Market-Critical Redressing imbalances and inequalities created by market processes	Market-led Correcting inefficiencies while supporting market processes (e.g. public sector reform, Investment Law 43 and 32, Public Sector Reform Law 111, Public Sector Labour Management Law 48, and encouraging private sector to take a major part in the development process)	Market-led Correcting inefficiencies while supporting market processes (e.g. the implementation of several social programmes such as urban upgrading and infrastructure provision projects, Investment Law 230, Town Planning Law 3, encouraging private sector to take a major part in the development process, the first attempt to adopt and apply the ERSAP in 1987)	Market-led Full and unlimited support to market processes while providing the basic and fundamental services seeking socio-political stability (e.g. Mubarak Housing for Youth) since the adoption and application of ERSAP in 1991, Investment Laws 203 and 8, joining the WTO in 1995, signing the free trade agreement with the EU 2001, and the L.E. de-peg from the $ in 2003
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF PLANNING	Provide the basic public services such as health, education, and provision of urban infrastructure, housing, and large-scale industrial projects seeking socio-political and socio-economic stability (e.g. low income housing projects) Management of urban and rural affairs in the name of 'public interest' Equal distribution of resources and opportunities (e.g. land, income and job)	Environmental improvement and management in the name of 'public interest' mainly through physical/spatial and socio-economic policies (e.g. New Map of Egypt policy, New Towns Programme, Open Door Economic policy, and Free Labour policy) Providing economic and spatial incentives to encourage private domestic and foreign capital to invest mainly in the industrial sector (e.g. Investment Law 43 and Law 59 for the new urban communities management and its economic incentives)	With the growing realisation of the need for investment in order to maintain social stability (given the food riots in 1977 and 1980), the main focus of the 1980-4 national plan was to meet housing requirements of growing population, review the subsidies and pricing policy, and to improve the coordination and management of public investments.	Enable market and promote city competitiveness internationally to achieve efficiency through minimal economic and physical/spatial intervention by state to support market (e.g. the adoption and application of ERSAP in 1991) Shift from state planning to private sector planning and management in order to promote investment growth and employment by intensifying the structural reform agenda through trade liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation and fiscal and financial sector reform

Continue Table 3.4 Changes in National Development Planning in the Period 1970 - 2002

	SADAT ERA (1970 - 1981)		MUBARAK (1981- TILL PRESENT)	
	1970 - MARCH 1974	**APRIL 1974 – 1981**	**1981 – 1991**	**1991 - 2002**
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF PLANNING			The liberalisation of the foreign sector and directing public and private sector towards export-orientated investment coupled with preparing the domestic market to join the international markets and benefit from globalisation and free-trade agreements (e.g. the Investment Law 230)	Improving the health and education systems through the application of comprehensive service reform programme which aims at the elimination of bureaucratic impediments to economic activities, improving the efficiency of government services, and building a cadre of well-paid and efficient civil servants
PLANNING METHODOLOGY	Scientific rational methodology	Scientific rational methodology	Scientific rational methodology	Scientific rational methodology
PLANNING TOOLS	Master Plan / Zoning urban programmes and projects to provide basic needs using national funding and/or foreign aid	Master plan / Zoning New Towns/ Settlements National/regional policy on urban development focusing on both rural and urban areas to lessen and control population growth in cities Partnership projects and programmes between the state and private sector Sectoral urban programmes and projects to provide basic needs using either national or international funding Urban upgrading projects	Master plan / Zoning New Towns/ Settlements National/regional policy on urban development focusing on both rural and urban areas to lessen and control population growth in cities Partnership projects and programmes between the state and private sector Sectoral urban programmes and projects to provide basic needs using either national or international funding Urban upgrading projects	Master plan / Zoning New Towns/ Settlements National/regional policy on urban development focusing on both rural and urban areas to lessen and control population growth in cities Partnership projects and programmes between the state and private sector Sectoral urban programmes and projects to provide basic needs using either national or international funding Urban upgrading projects Privatisation and structural adjustment policies Urban management programmes

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims at presenting, analysing and explaining the Egyptian context within which physical planning has been practised since 1974. This seeks an understanding of how and why decisions regarding national development policies are made, who makes those decisions and their influence on the formulation and implementation process of such policies, and on the ongoing changing roles, goals, and values of the Egyptian state and the private sector. This is not to say that this chapter only presents the values, interests and goals of the key actors involved in the national development planning process, but also the reasons and consequences of their actions with specific focus on the relationship between the institutions, agencies and individuals within the state and private sector during the study period (1974-2002).

Given the analytical framework constructed in chapter two and the entry points for the analysis of physical planning practice, this chapter provides empirical evidence for the direct, interlocking and dynamic relationship between planning practice and the socio-political and socio-economic context at the national level in Egypt. To achieve such aims, this chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section presents a brief background regarding Egypt's national development potentials and challenges including: population growth, human settlements, and economic challenges. The second provides an understanding of the power and authority structures of the decision-making process. This is illustrated by analysing the political and administrative machinery of the state and the different roles of its components within the national development process. This includes the central government (i.e. the Presidency, the Cabinet, Ministers, and their affiliated institutions), legislatives including the Peoples' Assembly (i.e. *majlis al-shaab*) and the Consultative Assembly (i.e. *majlis al-shoura*), the public sector institutions, and the local government.

The third section illustrates and analyses the main national development planning policies adopted by the state to face the national development challenges presented in the first section. This section focuses on the two main influential national development planning policies adopted: first, in April 1974, the 'Open Door Policy' (ODP) and its sub-policies including the Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP) and Egypt New Map Policy (ENMP). Second, the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) adopted and applied in 1991 under pressure and influence of both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB).

The final section illustrates and examines the consequences of such development policies on the relationship, roles, values, interests and perception of the institutions, agencies, and individuals within the state (including those in the public sector) and private sector in the development process and the effect of such ongoing change on the decision-making process at both the national and local levels.

3.1 EGYPT'S NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: POTENTIALS AND CHALLENGES

Egypt's history of national development since 1952, like that of many Third World countries, has been a long struggle for independent development[1]. Such struggle has been an arduous one with many obstacles and hurdles to overcome and its main feature has been the considerable efforts to strike a balance between the national development potentials and challenges (Zaalouk 1989). Understanding Egypt's national development potentials and challenges provides a background to the analysis of the case study and aids in explaining the adoption and application of certain national development policies in specific times and their consequences at the local level in TRC.

Despite Egypt's various national development potentials such as an abundant labour force, natural resources including oil and water, fertile arable land, tourism potentials, and fishing resources, the specific nature of Egypt's historical national development lies largely in its geopolitics. This is manifested in, first, its strategic location; second, its leading role in the liberation movement that took place in Africa during the 1950s and 1960s. It is also manifested in its political, economic, and social leading role in the Middle East Region.

Because of it Strategic location, Egypt was occupied by the British Empire since 1882 to safeguard its route to India, to protect its interests in the Middle East Region, and to control the West-East trade route through the Suez Canal. Later on, during the Cold War period, Egypt was seen as being vital to the security of the USA for its strategic location in the midway to the Soviet Union. This was evident in the report of

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[1] Social and political tensions in the late 1940s (i.e. 1948 Arab – Israel War) led to great unrest and widespread political alienation; and the need for reforms was advocated strongly by a growing number of intellectuals. In the first six months of 1952, Egypt had five different cabinets, one lasting only 18 hours. On July 1952, the army moved and seized power; and a new chapter of Egypt's political, social and economic life was initiated. The Free Officers' coup (revolution) of July 1952 was to represent a practical attempt to build both the institutional and economic foundation of a modern state. The banners were more 'socialistic' and the concept of social justice was explicitly pronounced to guide the state actions. (Aliboni *et al* 1984, p. 198; Ayubi 1991, p. xii)

Nicholas Veliotes, US Assistant Secretary of State in 1982, when trying to justify the AID money received by Egypt and other countries as follows:

> "…. The south-west Asian and Gulf Regions, a critical source of energy to the free world, is simultaneously threatened by the Soviets through Afghanistan and radical forces from within the area. Therefore, our programme (USAID) is directed at supporting our efforts to bolster the security of countries both in the region and en route which are critical for the United States' access and presence in the region in times of crisis" (Veliotes 1982 cited in Zaalouk 1989, p. 3)

By the End of the Cold War period, the Whole Middle East Region became of specific interest to the USA for its oil. Nevertheless, Egypt retains its vital strategic location as the gateway to the Gulf Region. This is documented in several USA administration key figures' speeches and writing (see Hilal 1982; Hiltermann 1985). A former Carter White House strategic analyst was quoted as having said:

> "…. We have no alternative to Egypt either in terms of the peace process […] or strategic position. If we could not get to the Gulf through Egypt, either overnight flights for example, we could be in very, very serious trouble" (Hiltermann 1985, p. 49-50)

Given the international importance of its location, Egypt was forced both to play a vital political, economic and social role within the Middle East Region and to enmesh quite early in the capitalist world economy. Since the early 1919 revolution, Egypt was perceived by colonised countries all over Africa, the Indian sub-continent, and the Gulf area as the leading figure and prime example for liberation struggle[2]. Nevertheless, such important and distinct location can be seen either as a potential or a challenge. The interests of global political, economic and military powers in the past and today were focused on Egypt for such location. For instance, the Soviet Union tried to help strengthen Egypt's economy, pacify its population, and stifle unrest in return for gaining a strong and stable ally midway to the USA and the UK. Moreover, the USA and the UN and its affiliated international finance institutions including the WB and IMF repeatedly tried to control the course of its national development process and decisions, in return for their loans and AID.

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[2] The 1919 revolution was the precursor of several nationalist independent movements, most significant of which was India's nationalist movement. Moreover, the 1952 revolution triggered a number of liberation wars in Africa and the Arab World. During the 1950s and 1960s Egypt was extremely active on the Third World international scene. Egypt supported various independent movements, instigated liberation struggles and helped to establish the non-aligned movement, which still stands as a symbol of liberation (Zaalouk 1989, p.3; Hilal 1982, pp. 16-33)

Given its national development potentials, successive Egyptian governments were faced with many persistent development challenges. The most important and daunting of all are the human settlements and economic challenges. This research argues that such challenges not only are recognised as the main obstacles to national development but also as the prime triggers for the adoption and application of Egypt's major national development policies between the 1970s and early 1990s.

3.1.1 Human Settlements Challenges

The human settlement challenge is a daunting obstacle to national development policies, where the imbalance between the inhabited and deserted areas, the rapid population growth and its negative consequences, the over expansion of urban areas over arable land, and the rising number of squatter areas, hinder development efforts and absorb any promising growth in the gross national product.

Human settlements challenges can be illustrated in five interlocking challenges. First, Egypt was divided into eight planning regions according to the presidential decree 495 in 1977, which was amended by the presidential decree 181 in 1986 whereby Egypt is to be divided into seven planning regions instead (figure 3.1 shows the seven planning regions). However, the planning regions' borders are not the same as the administrative borders of their governorates, for instance the case of the Red Sea governorate[3]. Such mismatch between planning regions' borders and the administrative borders of their governorates affects the decision-making process with respect to the allocation of resources towards services and infrastructure provision within each governorate and the local development processes within each planning region[4] (The

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[3] Egypt's planning regions according to the presidential decree 181 in 1986 are as follows: 1. Greater Cairo Region, which includes Cairo, Giza, and Qalubia governorate; 2. Alexandria Region, which includes Alexandria, Behera, and Matrouh Governorate; 3. Suez Canal Region, which includes North Sinai, South Sinai, Port Said, Ismailia, Suez, Sharkya, and the north part of the Red Sea governorate; 4. Delta Region, which includes Kafr El-Sheikh, Gharbia, Menofia, Domyat, and Dakahlia governorate; 5. North of Upper Egypt (*Shamal Elsaeid*) Region, which includes Bany Sweif, Fayoum, and Menia governorate; 6. South of Upper Egypt (*Ganoob Elsaeid*) Region, which includes Sohaag, Qina, Aswan, and the south part of the Red Sea Governorate; 7. Assiut Region, which includes Assiut and El-Wady El-Gadid governorate (National Report 1996, pp. 12-3)

[4] There are continuous adjustments for the administrative borders of many governorates all over Egypt to solve administrative and most of times governors conflicts regarding control and authority over local development and their share in resources and fund allocated by the central government to each planning region and governorate. For instance, the presidential decree 24 in year 1994 regarding the adjustment of the administrative borders of 6 governorates that are Bany Sweif, Menia, Assiut, Sohaag, Qina, and the Red Sea governorate. The presidential decree 102 in 1990 regarding the Adjustment of the administrative borders of Aswan with both the Red Sea and El-Wady El-Gadid governorate. The presidential decree 411 in 1981 regarding the adjustment of the administrative borders between Assiut and El-Wady ElGadid governorate (The Development and Construction Map 1998, p. 64)

Table 3.3 Main National and International Events that affected the National Development Planning Policies in the Period 1970 - 2002

	SADAT ERA (1970 - 1981)		MUBARAK (1981- TILL PRESENT)	
	1970 - MARCH 1974	**APRIL 1974 – 1981**	**1981 – EARLY 1991**	**1991 - 2002**
EVENTS	September 1970 Nasser's death May 1971 The Corrective Movement (*Haraket Al-Tashih)* followed by the major change in the political party system - from being a one party system to be controlled political pluralism. 1971 the promulgation of the Egyptian Constitution 1973 October War	April 1974, Open Door Policy 1974 application of Law 43 regarding the foreign investment in Egypt 1975 plurality of political orientation was practically permitted and political parties (i.e. *manaber*) to be established followed by the democratisation process of 1976 June 1975 the reopening of Suez Canal 1975 application of Law 111 regarding public sector management and reform 1977, the amendment of Law 43 of 1974 by Law 32 giving more incentives to foreign investment Jan. 1977 the food riots Nov. 1977 Sadat's visit to Jerusalem 1978 application of Law 48 regarding the public sector labour and management 1979 the sign of Egypt – Israel Peace Treaty	1981 the application of the State Emergency Law 1982 application of Law 3 regarding the urban and town planning practice 1985 the general election and constitutional changes 1985 the collapse of oil prices 1986 the mutiny of the Central Security Forces against the state authority 1987 the re-election of Mubarak for the second term in office and the first signs of push towards the adoption and application of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) 1989 application of Law 230 regarding the rules that guide investment, taxation and incentives, which was later on replaced by the Investment Law 8 in May 1997 - 1990/1991 the Gulf Crisis and the Desert Storm War	June 1991 the adoption and application of the ERSAP followed by major adjustments in tax system and tariffs 1991 application of Law 203 regarding the role of the public sector and rules governing its activities 1991 the launch of the privatisation policy and pegging the Egyptian pound (L.E.) to the USA Dollar ($) on the rate of 3.39 L.E./$ 1992/1993 major prices, tax and tariffs adjustment followed by severe economic stagnation 1995 Egypt became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 1997 the launch of TOSHKA project to develop the south-west desert of Egypt 1997 the tragedy of Luxour City terror attack and the severe decline in Tourism revenues

Continue Table 3.3 Main National and International Events that affected the National Development Planning Policies in the Period 1970 - 2002

	SADAT ERA (1970 - 1981)		MUBARAK (1981- TILL PRESENT)	
	1970 - MARCH 1974	**APRIL 1974 – 1981**	**1981 – EARLY 1991**	**1991 - 2002**
EVENTS		1979 the formulation of Law 59 regarding the physical planning and investment incentives in the new urban communities 1979 the break with the Arab Countries and the change of Egypt's formal name and flag 1980 the establishment of the consultative Assembly (*Majlis Al-Shoura*) 1980 the change in the constitution, approved by a referendum, which allows the president to be elected indefinitely (instead of for two terms only, six years each). 1981 assassination of Sadat		1997/1998 the collapse of the international oil prices followed by a long-run liquidity crisis in the Egypt 1998/1999 East Asian countries and Russian Market Crisis followed by the monetary tightening during 1999/ 2000 Jan. 2001 the first sign towards the L.E./ $ de-peg policy with exchange rate of 3.85 L.E/$ with band of 1% June 2001 EU-Egypt Free Trade agreement September 2001 the Twin Towers terror tragedy in New York 2003 the L.E. floating

Table 3.4 Changes in National Development Planning in the Period 1970 - 2002

	SADAT ERA (1970 - 1981)		MUBARAK (1981- TILL PRESENT)	
	1970 - MARCH 1974	**APRIL 1974 – 1981**	**1981 – 1991**	**1991 - 2002**
ATTITUDE TO MARKET	Market-Critical Redressing imbalances and inequalities created by market processes	Market-led Correcting inefficiencies while supporting market processes (e.g. public sector reform, Investment Law 43 and 32, Public Sector Reform Law 111, Public Sector Labour Management Law 48, and encouraging private sector to take a major part in the development process)	Market-led Correcting inefficiencies while supporting market processes (e.g. the implementation of several social programmes such as urban upgrading and infrastructure provision projects, Investment Law 230, Town Planning Law 3, encouraging private sector to take a major part in the development process, the first attempt to adopt and apply the ERSAP in 1987)	Market-led Full and unlimited support to market processes while providing the basic and fundamental services seeking socio-political stability (e.g. Mubarak Housing for Youth) since the adoption and application of ERSAP in 1991, Investment Laws 203 and 8, joining the WTO in 1995, signing the free trade agreement with the EU 2001, and the L.E. de-peg from the $ in 2003
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF PLANNING	Provide the basic public services such as health, education, and provision of urban infrastructure, housing, and large-scale industrial projects seeking socio-political and socio-economic stability (e.g. low income housing projects) Management of urban and rural affairs in the name of 'public interest' Equal distribution of resources and opportunities (e.g. land, income and job)	Environmental improvement and management in the name of 'public interest' mainly through physical/spatial and socio-economic policies (e.g. New Map of Egypt policy, New Towns Programme, Open Door Economic policy, and Free Labour policy) Providing economic and spatial incentives to encourage private domestic and foreign capital to invest mainly in the industrial sector (e.g. Investment Law 43 and Law 59 for the new urban communities management and its economic incentives)	With the growing realisation of the need for investment in order to maintain social stability (given the food riots in 1977and 1980), the main focus of the 1980-4 national plan was to meet housing requirements of growing population, review the subsidies and pricing policy, and to improve the coordination and management of public investments.	Enable market and promote city competitiveness internationally to achieve efficiency through minimal economic and physical/spatial intervention by state to support market (e.g. the adoption and application of ERSAP in 1991) Shift from state planning to private sector planning and management in order to promote investment growth and employment by intensifying the structural reform agenda through trade liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation and fiscal and financial sector reform

Continue Table 3.4 Changes in National Development Planning in the Period 1970 - 2002

	SADAT ERA (1970 - 1981)		MUBARAK (1981- TILL PRESENT)	
	1970 - MARCH 1974	**APRIL 1974 – 1981**	**1981 – 1991**	**1991 - 2002**
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF PLANNING			The liberalisation of the foreign sector and directing public and private sector towards export-orientated investment coupled with preparing the domestic market to join the international markets and benefit from globalisation and free-trade agreements (e.g. the Investment Law 230)	Improving the health and education systems through the application of comprehensive service reform programme which aims at the elimination of bureaucratic impediments to economic activities, improving the efficiency of government services, and building a cadre of well-paid and efficient civil servants
PLANNING METHODOLOGY	Scientific rational methodology	Scientific rational methodology	Scientific rational methodology	Scientific rational methodology
PLANNING TOOLS	Master Plan / Zoning urban programmes and projects to provide basic needs using national funding and/or foreign aid	Master plan / Zoning New Towns/ Settlements National/regional policy on urban development focusing on both rural and urban areas to lessen and control population growth in cities Partnership projects and programmes between the state and private sector Sectoral urban programmes and projects to provide basic needs using either national or international funding Urban upgrading projects	Master plan / Zoning New Towns/ Settlements National/regional policy on urban development focusing on both rural and urban areas to lessen and control population growth in cities Partnership projects and programmes between the state and private sector Sectoral urban programmes and projects to provide basic needs using either national or international funding Urban upgrading projects	Master plan / Zoning New Towns/ Settlements National/regional policy on urban development focusing on both rural and urban areas to lessen and control population growth in cities Partnership projects and programmes between the state and private sector Sectoral urban programmes and projects to provide basic needs using either national or international funding Urban upgrading projects Privatisation and structural adjustment policies Urban management programmes

Table 3.5 The Changing Role of the State, the Public Sector, and the Private Sector in the National Development Planning process

	SADAT ERA (1970 - 1981)		MUBARAK (1981- TILL PRESENT)	
	1970 - MARCH 1974	**From APRIL 1974 ················➤ Till EARLY 1991**		**1991 - 2002**
THE STATE	Neutral arbiter looking for stable society through economic, social, and urban development based on technical knowledge Redressing imbalances and inequalities within society (e.g. the corrective movement in 1971 and the construction of the Suez canal cities)	Neutral arbitrator looking for stable society through economic, social, and urban development based on technical knowledge Redressing imbalances and inequalities within society (e.g. Open Door Policy, allowing Egyptian labour to work abroad, mainly in the oil rich countries; and the construction of Salheya valley project)	Support powerful agents and market processes The state role has shifted from an overall developmental role to producer's role while continuing to stress its welfare function (i.e. separation of welfare function of the state from its industrialisation function) A partner working in alliance with domestic and foreign private capital The state becomes merely a large investor among other investors striving like others for profit and cooperating with international capital	Unlimited support of powerful agents (i.e. powerful private investors) and market processes Maintaining a certain degree of relative autonomy vis-à-vis the conflicting interests in the society However, it is open to group alliance internally and externally Cutting down on its welfare function while limiting it role to providing development projects (mainly social and urban projects) that support the regime to continue to govern (i.e. projects that help providing socio-political stability and controlling and keeping the lid on social unrest)
THE PUBLIC SECTOR	Since the second wave of nationalisation in1961 till the application of Law 111 in 1975, the public sector dominated all types of economic activities through the 50 established Public Organisations (i.e. *moassasat)*	Remained the primary instrument of carrying out any development plan and undertaking the basic projects that no other sector would embark upon (i.e. public sector would provide the private sector and foreign investments with essential services that they cannot do without)	Subjected to government pressure regarding the socio-political considerations sacrificing profit and financial productivity aspects where: 1) Personal and subjective criteria are generally more influential in organisational decisions than objective criteria related to work requirements increasing the loyalty to managers and top government officials	Its role is extremely limited to supply large –scale public services that could not be provided by the private sector (e.g. urban infrastructure); and to help assuring socio-political stability within society (e.g. low income and youth housing projects, employment, low price goods and services)

Continue Table 3.5 The Changing Role of the State, the Public Sector, and the Private Sector in the National Development Planning process

	SADAT ERA (1970 - 1981)		MUBARAK (1981- TILL PRESENT)
	1970 - MARCH 1974	From APRIL 1974 ·················➤ Till EARLY 1991	1991 - 2002
THE PUBLIC SECTOR	It is seen as the only sector that would achieve economic, social and urban development in the name of 'public interest' without risking the influence of internal domestic private interests and external forces (i.e. Western interests) over the national development planning policies.	For instance, the widely spread infrastructure projects in the New Towns, the construction of several low income housing projects all over Egypt, the many upgrading projects carried out within the urban agglomeration of the main cities, and many projects that aims at providing the rural areas with electricity and clean water supply.	2) Periodic structural reorganisation is applied to solve personnel problems, for promoting certain individuals, or to reflect power and authority relationship between different parts and levels of the public enterprise 3) Corruption has grown in scope and magnitude since the launch of the Open Door Policy through the ever growing close relationship between government personnel and the private sector 4) There are increasing imbalances in the skill structure with more and more unskilled and unproductive employees, 'experts', 'qualified' managers and technicians	" The government will implement social policies to tackle poverty, unemployment and infrastructure shortcomings in order to combat the Islamist threat and secure domestic stability […] this include investing in basic services and infrastructure in slum areas of the main cities and putting extra resources into education and health" (The Economist 1994, pp. 10-1)
THE PRIVATE SECTOR	Limited, or no, role in the development process Its activities were constrained, directed and limited, by the state, to small workshop businesses with limited finance availability or access to resources	Provide the needed investment to cover up the gap between demand and supply in all fields (e.g. employment and housing) while the required incentives, regulations and laws to create the stable environment for such investment would be guaranteed by the state	The private sector enters the nineties with a great deal of momentum. Its rising share in development process has been growing Powerful individuals and interest groups expanded their control of the means of production and administration as their main representatives were incorporated into the ruling class	The private sector is at its full swing, control, and influence over the decision-making process regarding public policies after the adoption and application of the ERSAP in 1991. It is considered as the main and only driving force in achieving economic growth

CHAPTER 4: PHYSICAL PLANNING PRACTICE:
THE FORMULATION PROCESS AND THE 'TRIANGLE
OF POWER'

INTRODUCTION

From the previous chapter, it has become evident that the directions, goals, interests, and agendas of both the state and the private sector have shifted dramatically since the early 1970s. On the one hand, while the state became merely an investor among many others striving for profit, cutting down on its developmental role and sacrificing its welfare commitments, the private sector became much more influential controlling all aspects of national development planning starting from setting its priorities and goals to decision-making process regarding their implementation. On the other hand, the approach to the formulation and implementation of national development planning policies had changed dramatically from being rational comprehensive planning during the 1970s and 1980s to a mix of dominant liberal entrepreneurial planning and less-dominant rational comprehensive planning approaches during the 1990s after the adoption of the ERSAP in early 1991, although carried out by the same institutional arrangements and controlled by the very same individuals. This is evident in the illustration of the different processes through which the state deals with the two categories of the private sector (i.e. 'the chosen ones' and 'the unfortunates') (see chapter 3, section 3.4).

It can be said that the frustration of the Egyptian state to find solutions for both the human settlements and economic challenges and the external (international) pressure imposed by the IMF and the World Bank as well as the internal pressure by the powerful interest groups within the elite circle and the private sector to direct and control Egypt's national development planning policies, presented and analysed in the previous chapter, were the main reasons that led to dramatic shift of the goals, objectives, focus, interests and directions of the state-private sector relationship. Moreover, it also resulted in the continuous shift in the allocation of power, authority and resources between the institutions, agencies and individuals affiliated to the central and local government and the private sector involved in the physical planning process that is within the 'triangle of power'. Given the focus of this research, this chapter aims at discussing and analysing the impact of the latter shift on the physical planning practice since 1974 with specific reference to Tenth of Ramadan City.

It is important to note that although the analysis of physical planning practice in the context of any city has to be presented within the context of the region to which it belongs (i.e. the Greater Cairo Region in this case), the research found evidence that

TRC is considered to be a unique case in this regard as it does not follow such logic as will be explained later. To achieve the above stated aim, this chapter examines the successive formulation processes of the physical plans in the context of TRC from three main aspects.

The first aspect is the institutional arrangements through which institutions, agencies, and individuals and their relative administrative positions, roles, and responsibilities will be examined. A discussion of the institutional arrangements is crucial to this study as the research found evidence that not only the structure of the institutions themselves but also their operational guidelines and procedures can critically affect the relationship between agencies, be they individuals or institutions, involved in the physical planning process. The objective is to critically emphasise the effect of political expediency on the way in which such agencies control resources and implement their agendas.

The second aspect refers to the political positions of the principal institutions, agencies, and individuals involved in the physical planning process. It explores and analyses the power structures between actors and illustrates the way in which they used their bargaining advantages and positions to their benefit and to increase their power and authority. This discussion emphasises the political expediency when actors had been involved in a political processes to influence the physical planning practice in a struggle for power, authority, and access to resources. Third, this chapter explores and analyses the interests of the different institutions, agencies, and individuals involved in the physical planning formulation and the way in which they influence the decision-making process and the outcome of the formulation process itself. This discussion emphasises the political expediency when civil servants and powerful private investors were found seeking spatial and personal advantages (e.g. the desire for money, position, power, and/or other things) rather than acting to pursue pre-stated 'public interest'.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section discusses the stated official process through which regional/local development planning is carried out by virtue of the various planning Laws, Presidential Decrees, and Ministerial Decrees. This section emphasises the uniqueness of the TRC physical planning process and how and why it did not follow such official process. The second section discusses and analyses the formulation of the successive physical plans of the industrial areas in TRC with specific reference to the three main aspects presented above. The latter section

provides empirical evidence, which emphasises political expediency through an understanding of how and why planning decisions were made, who made those decisions, and to what extent those decisions had an impact on the formulation of the successive physical plans of the industrial areas in TRC.

4.1 REGIONAL-LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PROCESS

According to Egypt's Constitution, regional-local development planning aims at implementing the general policy and objectives of national development policies; and it has to be carried out through coordination between the central government and localities acting together to foster development in all fields (e.g. social, economic, urban development, etc) and at all levels starting from the regional level, downwards to the governorate level and to the local units level. It has to be noted that regional-local development planning process takes two different sequences of steps according to the type of planning concerned. The research found that there are two different yet parallel regional-local socio-economic development planning and regional-local physical planning processes, examined and analysed as follows:

4.1.1 Regional-Local Socio-economic Development Planning Process

It has to be recognised that regional-local socio-economic development planning, as defined by the Ministry of Planning (1978), is associated with the development of resources (i.e. human and natural) with respect to the improvement of standards of living, culture, and productivity with less consideration to the spatial dimension, which has its implications on the physical aspects of planning. This clear separation between the socio-economic and physical aspects of planning is seen as a result of the ongoing conflict between the Ministry of Planning (MOP) and Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities (MOH) as will be discussed in further detail in the subsequent sections. Figure 4.1 illustrates the different steps of the regional-local socio-economic development planning process:

1. The Central Government informs Governorates and Local Authorities of the general policy and the main objectives of the national development policies, which Governorates study and then inform all affiliated Local Planning Units to set local socio-economic development plans.

2. Local Planning Units[1] are responsible for the preparation of local socio-economic development plans according to available local potentials, investment chances, and local public needs. Moreover they are responsible for suggesting the allocation of resources after setting priorities of development projects (i.e. the budget plan). The prepared local development and budget plans are reported to the Local Public Council[2], which in turn reports to the Governorate Public Council after securing its approval (see figure 4.2)

Figure 4.1 The Different Steps of the Socio-economic Development Planning Process

Source: adapted from Attia (1999, p. 253); Ibrahim (1993, p. 7); and Youssef (1989)

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[1] Local Planning Units are affiliates to Local Authorities at all administrative levels, and each of which is concerned with specific type of public services (e.g. Local Planning Units for Health Services, Local Planning Units for Education Services, Local Urban Planning Units, etc). Nevertheless, for the clarity of discussion, Local Planning Units refers to all Local Units with the exception of Local Urban Planning Unit where it gets involved in a different set of procedures with respect to regional-local physical planning process, as will be discussed in further detail later on.

[2] Local Public Councils are responsible for: first, approving projects identified within the socio-economic development plans and the annual budget, and the following up of its implementation. Second, defining and approving community participation plans in implementing local projects whether through self-help modes or financial contribution. Third, approving public projects that satisfy the requirements of housing and construction projects; and proposing necessary urban planning projects. Fourth, approving the implementation of public services and local productive projects. Finally, suggesting and approving local tax (see Ibrahim 1993)

3. The Regional Planning Authority[3], the Governorate Planning Authority, and Local Authorities study all proposed local socio-economic development plans and their budgets and prepare the annual socio-economic development plan of the Governorate and its budget to be reported to the Governorate Public Council for its approval (see figure 4.3).

4. After the Governorate Public Council approves the annual socio-economic development plan and budget, they are reported to the Higher Committee of Regional Planning[4], which coordinates the socio-economic development plans and budgets of all governorates within its region and prioritise the proposed projects according to available resources. The approved proposed annual socio-economic development plans and budget of the region are submitted to the MOP.

5. The MOP studies and prioritises the regional socio-economic development plans and their budgets in the light of the objectives of the national development planning; and coordinates with the Ministry of Local Authorities, the Ministry of Finance, and other relevant Ministries.

6. The approved regional policies, socio-economic development plans and budgets and their execution timetable are then reported to the Ministries and Governorates concerned for execution.

7. The Governorate Public Council, the RPA, and the HCRP follow-up and evaluate the execution of local socio-economic development plans. The following-up reports of executing such plans are submitted to both the MOP

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[3] Through Law 43 in 1979 the Ministry of Planning divided the Country into eight economic regions (the same planning regions stated in the Presidential Decree 495 in 1977 amended by Presidential Decree 181 in 1986), and established two planning agencies in each economic region that are: a Regional Planning Agency (RPA) and a Higher Committee for Regional Planning (HCRP). By virtue of the above law each RPA is responsible for, first, carrying out the necessary research and studies to determine the potentials (e.g. natural and human resources) of its concerned regions, ways to achieve its maximum development capacity, and suggesting the necessary socio-economic development projects. Second, setting the necessary technical departments to conduct such studies and research at the regional level (Arab Republic of Egypt 1979).

[4] By virtue of Law 43 in 1979, the Higher Committee for Regional Planning, headed by the Governor of the economic region's Capital composed of: Governors of the constituent governorates of the region, Heads of the Governorate Public Councils, Heads of the Regional Planning Agency as the Secretary General of the Committee, and representatives of the competent Ministries each appointed by concerned Ministers. Moreover, by virtue of the same law, each HCRP is responsible of, first, coordinating the development plans of Governorates within its economic region, and approving the development priorities suggested by the RPA. Second, considering the periodical reports for the implementation of the development plans following up, and studying any recommended changes that may be proposed by RPA during the implementation (Arab Republic of Egypt 1979).

and Ministry of Local Authorities according to the timetable schedule to be evaluated[5].

Figure 4.2 The Administrative Relationship between the Central Government and Local Authorities

Source: adapted from Ibrahim (1993, p. 153); Youssef (1989, p10); Al-Masry (1989, p.68)

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[5] According to Law 43 in 1979 and its amendment by Law 50 in 1981, the role and responsibility of the Executive Local Councils and its affiliated Executive Authorities in relation to local urban development planning are: first, to follow up jobs and tasks carried out by Executive Authorities while improving the level of performance of urban projects and services. Second, to work out budget plans of the administrative level concerned and to suggest the distribution of funds allocated for investment among local units. Third, to lay down the general rules of local management, administrative structures, investment, and disposal of land and other physical properties of the administrative level concerned. Finally, to lay down rules and regulations of physical planning (e.g. housing and other urban planning projects) (Arab Republic of Egypt 1979).

Figure 4.3 The Organisational Structure of the Regional Planning Agency

Source: Ibrahim (1993, p. 146)

From the above-presented planning process, it has become evident that the MOP is the most influential Ministry in regards to socio-economic development planning through its two main regional agencies (i.e. the RPA and HCRP) in the context of the new and existing settlements. However, it has to be mentioned that such influence becomes minimal when dealing with socio-economic development projects within localities that require preparing physical plans, or with regional-local physical planning. This includes land use planning, detailed planning, structure planning, zoning, master plans, legal plans, landscape planning, and service centres architectural and urban design (National Report 1996). The research has found evidence that the regional-local physical planning process takes another sequence of events and deals with different planning agencies as presented below.

4.1.2 The Regional-Local Physical Planning Process

In the case of the preparation of regional-local physical plans[6], it is by virtue of both Law 43 of 1979 and it amendments by Law 50 of 1981 that the Department of Urban Planning in each Governorate (i.e. the Governorate's Urban Planning Authority) within the concerned region is the prime responsible agency. It is responsible of the preparation of the physical plans of urban communities within the planning boundaries of the concerned Governorate whether they are new settlements, urban expansion of an existing community, or re-planning the existing towns, cities, and settlements. The department also has the choice of carrying out the preparation of such plans itself, seeking the help of planning experts, or commissioning consulting firms (domestic or foreign) to carry out the necessary studies, proposals, and physical plans, financed by the General Organisation of Physical Planning (GOPP)[7] together with the concerned Local Governments. By virtue of Presidential Decree 1093 of 1973 and Law 3 of 1982, before the allocation of the needed financial resources to the Governorates concerned for the execution of the prepared regional or local physical plan, the GOPP has to study, review, and approve it. It also has the authority to amend, demand changes, or refuse such plan completely (National Report 1996, pp. 1/1-1/3).

From figure 4.4, it can be seen that the regional-local physical planning process follows another sequence as follows:

1. According to the needs and demands of the local public within each locality at all administrative levels, the Local Urban Planning Unit submits a request

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[6] With the exception of the "priority regions" identified within the ENMP that are the Canal Zone, Greater Cairo Region and the North West Coast region (i.e. Alexandria Region). The Central Organisation for Construction (COR) was established after the launch of ENMP in 1974 to manage the implementation of such policy within areas identified as "Priority Region". Accordingly the COR established regional departments (e.g. Greater Cairo Region Development Authority (GCRDA)) located in the "priority Regions" to coordinate the implementation of ENMP with the General Organisation for physical Planning (GOPP), Local Governments, and the Ministry of Planning (MOP) and to supervise the implementation of regional infrastructure (National Report 1996, pp. 1/6-1/9).

[7] In 1973, the General Organisation for Physical Planning (GOPP) became one of MOH's organisations responsible for planning existing cities and their extensions. It was created to help Local Governments with insufficient planning capacity to prepare their physical development plans. In 1979 the framework of GOPP and its responsibilities were amended by a Ministerial Decree to include, first, the preparation of physical plans itself because of the incapability of the financial and human resources of Governorates of either preparing or commissioning private consultants to prepare the physical plans. Second, the preparation of physical plans of new towns and villages in addition to the existing settlements. In 1980, the Presidential Decree 655 amended GOPP's responsibility and framework to change GOPP from being, according to Presidential Decree 1093 of 1973, an Executive Agency for Planning Greater Cairo Region since 1965 (i.e. a service unit) to be the executive agency for the physical planning of Egypt. In 1991, Ministerial Decree 475 added the responsibility of creating the Regional Planning Agencies within Planning regions to the responsibilities of GOPP (National Report 1996, pp. 1/1-1/3).

for the preparation of physical plans needed to meet such needs and demands to the Department of Urban Planning within each Governorate. It has to be stressed that there is no officially stated process of consultation with local residents and/or firms, let alone participation. The process of addressing such needs primary depends on the 'democratically' elected local politicians, who are serving, in most cases, as members of the Local Public Councils and Governorates Public Councils.

Figure 4.4 The Regional-Local physical Planning Process

Source: Based on Presidential Decrees 1093 of 1973 and 655 of 1980; Law 43 of 1979, Law 50 of 1981; Law 3 of 1982; and National Report (1996)

2. The Department of Urban Panning in the Governorate together with Local Urban Planning Units and Physical Planning Consultancy Firm (if commissioned) carry out the needed studies and prepare the required physical plan(s) then reports to the Governorate Public Council seeking its approval while consulting the Local Public Council concerned.

3. After securing the approval of the Governorate Public Council and satisfying the Local Public Council concerned, the prepared physical plan(s)

has to be reported to the GOPP to be studied, reviewed, and approved then in turn informs the MOH regarding its approval.

4. After securing the approval of the GOPP and MOH (mainly the Minister), the Governorate Public Council reports the approved physical plan to the Higher Committee for Regional Planning to allocate the required resources for the execution. It has to be stressed that this step is only reporting to allocate resources and not reporting so as to seek its approval on physical plans attached.

5. The Higher Committee for Regional Planning reports to the MOP which in turn coordinates with the MOH, Ministry of Local Authorities, Ministry of Finance and Ministries of Services Affairs concerned to set the budget and timetable for execution.

6. The approved budget is reported to all Ministries and Governorates concerned.

Unlike the regional-local socio-economic development planning, the regional-local physical planning, within the context of old settlements and their urban extensions, is controlled and directed by the MOH through its affiliated agency, the GOPP. It is recognised that with respect to the regional-local physical planning, the role of the MOP, together with the Ministry of Finance, has an indirect influence through setting the annual budgets and allocation of resources to the Ministries and Governorates, is limited, if not neglected. It is evident that urban development in Egypt with respect to both new and existing settlements suffers from severe lack of integration between socio-economic and physical aspects.

Nevertheless, several studies and research including Salah (2001), Attia (1999), Salem (1997), Ibrahim (1993), and Meikle (1987) conclude that there is no evidence to support the view that the above formal regional-local socio-economic development planning and physical planning processes had been adhered to in most existing and planned new communities in Egypt. Salah (2001) identified a different sequence of steps in regards to the formulation and implementation of regional physical plans in the Greater Cairo Region, while Attia (1999) introduced another sequence of steps that took place in the North West Coast area within Alexandria Region. Moreover, Salem (1997) presented another physical planning process in Sharm El-Sheikh City with specific

reference to the water supply sector, while Ibrahim (1993) illustrated a different model when recognising the absence of Local Government and Ministry of Planning in the management of the urban development operation in new settlements. Finally Meikle (1987) identified different process model, regarding both the socio-economic and physical aspects, with specific reference to the reconstruction of the Canal Zone Region. With respect to Tenth of Ramadan City, this research has found evidence to support other models of the physical planning process that took place over time within the very same industrial areas during the study period (1974-2002) presented in the following sections.

It has to be stressed that such gap between the officially stated models of regional-local planning processes and the actually practised planning processes differs from project to project and even from one period of time to another within the same locality. Several research and studies (for instance, Salah 2001; Ibrahim 1993; and Daef 1986), adopted 'structuralism' frameworks (see chapter 2, section 2.1.1) to explore and discuss such gap, failed to analyse and explain those specific events that involve both the state institutions and agencies and the private sector entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, others (for instance, Hafez 2000; El-Khodary 1995; Saeid 2000; and El-Refaie 2000), have tried to adopt 'individualism and agencism' frameworks (see chapter 2, section 2.1.2) to explore and discuss the above gap, also failed to clarify and explain those events that involve inter-institutional and intra-institutional conflicts between state institutions and agencies over their roles and responsibilities in the urban development process. Such research and studies by and large also failed to take into consideration the factor of the centralised nature of the Egyptian bureaucracy and the relationship between central and local government.

Nevertheless, it has been recognised that the latter framework adopted to explain such gap is more popular among interviewees during the period of the fieldwork of this research. For instance, El-Wakeil[8] states that " regional-local development planning, including physical planning, is an 'individuals-based' and not an institutions-based process at all planning and administrative levels", while Serageldin[9] stresses that it is important to recognise that the flow of development planning decisions between central and local agencies does not always follow the same path. This depends on the

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[8] In an interview with the researcher in January 2002

[9] In an interview with the researcher in January 2002

relationship between local entrepreneurs and top government officials at all administrative levels, as he states the following:

> "…The whole issue of regional-local development planning process and physical planning practice is governed by the power of money and personal connections. This is to stress that local entrepreneurs either have close and business relationship with Governors and heads of administrative levels, or form a majority in the Governorate Public Councils. Although Public Councils 'theoretically' have the power to approve or reject physical plans, in reality the Governor has absolute power to either influence the decision-making process or decide for all Public Councils and Executive Councils within his/her governorate. Nevertheless, the wealthier and better connected local entrepreneur is, the more likely he/she gets what he/she wants and just forget about this illusion of the coordination between central and local government and not to mention rules, laws, and regulations...." (Serageldin 2002)

Nevertheless, given the shortcomings of the above-mentioned research and studies, among many others, which adopted either an agency-based or a structure-based theoretical framework to explain the physical planning practice at both the regional and local levels, the research challenges the two approaches with empirical evidence to support that urban development planning (at both the regional and local levels) in the context of Egypt not only suffers from lack of integration between socio-economic and physical aspects, but also suffers from: duplication and overlaps of roles and responsibilities of agencies involved in the planning process, inter-institutional and intra-institutional conflicts between state institutions and agencies, political expediency, lack of sufficient management, the centralised nature of the Egyptian bureaucracy coupled with weakness of Local Government, and agencism and individualism. This is discussed in further detail in the following sections with specific reference to the case study of the research.

4.2 PHYSICAL PLANNING FORMULATION

This section discusses the physical planning formulation process within the context of TRC. It aims at discussing such process through an understanding of, on the one hand, the dynamic relationship between the state institutions and agencies (both Central and Local Government), private sector, planning consultancy firms, and manufacturing workers involved. On the other, the institutional arrangements, power structures and interests of the above-mentioned agencies (actor groups).

Although there have been four physical plans prepared for TRC through the study period (i.e. the 1978, 1982, and 1999 physical plans), the research found evidence to show that the physical planning formulation process in each of the above physical plans followed a different sequence of events mainly as a result of the change in the state- private sector relationship, as analysed in the previous chapter. Each of those physical plans is presented in further detail in the subsequent sections, while stressing the missing link between the context of TRC and regional (i.e. Greater Cairo Region) and national (i.e. ENMP and NTP) physical planning objectives and policies.

4.2.1 The 1978 Physical Planning Formulation

All agencies, which influenced the physical planning formulation of the 1978 Plan, were found to be mainly Central Government agencies including: the President, MOH, MOP, MOD, and MOI, as presented in figure 4.5. The Local Government (both at the regional and local levels), the private sector, and manufacturing workers within the surrounding localities or within the Greater Cairo Region and Canal Region, were excluded from the 1978 Plan formulation process. The above-mentioned agencies had different agendas, interests, and objectives; while some of them had more power, authority, and influence over the decision-making process than others. This is explained in further detail in the following sub-sections, in specific reference to institutional arrangements, power structure, and interests and agendas of the above agencies.

Figure 4.5. The Institutional Arrangements Guiding the 1978 Physical Plan Formulation

MOH	Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities	MOI	Ministry of Industry and Technological Development
ACR	Advisory Committee for Reconstruction	GOFI	General Organisation for Industrialisation
ARP	Agency for Research and Projects	MOP	Ministry of Planning
TAMS	In-House Consultant	RDA	Regional Development Authority
MOD	Ministry of Defence		

4.2.1.1 The President

After the 1973 War, the Egyptian Government committed itself to face the national development challenges (see the previous chapter, section 3.1) through the adoption of the October Working Paper (OWP) policies in April 1974. As illustrated in the previous chapter, section 3.3.1, the two national development policies within the context of OWP, Egypt's New Map Policy (ENMP) and Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP), called for the expansion of urbanisation and industrialisation respectively, while protecting the precious arable land of the Delta and Nile Valley, within the 'Priority Regions'. As it was noticed from the analysis of ENMP that the President, together with the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction, Osman Ahmed Osman, not only identified the human settlement challenge as one of the prime challenges to national development, but also identified the 'Priority Regions' throughout the population would be accommodated and redistributed.

With respect to ENMP, the President's prime objective was to redistribute the concentration of population in the Delta and Nile Valley area throughout the whole country through the construction of many new settlements and towns across the dessert. His principal formula was: new settlements and towns across the desert + building strong economic base (mainly industrial) in those settlements and towns = redistribution of population throughout the country + protecting the arable land + increase and diversify the national income (see the previous chapter, section 3.3.1.2).

The President's involvement in the identification of the objectives and goals of the new settlements and towns, together with his close relationship with the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction at this time (see the previous chapter, footnote 54), his enthusiasm about the new settlements idea, and according to McDermott (1988), the President's urge to play up his role as *rabb-al-aila al-misriya* (Head of the Egyptian Family) extolling *akhlaq al-qarya* (village ethics), led both the President and the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction to choose a location of TRC. In late 1974, aboard a helicopter, they together chose the location of both TRC and Sadat City (see figure 4.6), as explained by Professor El-Rimaly[10]:

> "…. The planning decisions based on political influence or personal interests are destructive ones. For instance, Sadat and Osman, on board of a Helicopter, chose the location of 10th of Ramadan City. The choice

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[10] In an interview with the researcher in January 2002

of the city location was like a gift from the President to his daughter's father in-law and his Minister. As Osman's home city is Ismailia City, Sadat chose the city location on the Cairo-Ismailia Highway and in the mid distance between the Capital and Ismailia City. The same case happened in the context of Sadat City located on Cairo-Alexandria Desert Highway, as to be near to Menofia City, Sadat's home city, and under the authority of its Governorate"   (El-Rimaly 2002)

Figure 4.6 The Location of Tenth of Ramadan City

Source: (Shetawy, 2000, p. 205)

This is to stress that the choice of location, confirmed by Presidential Decree 259 of 1977, was based as much on personal interest as national interests. The implications of Sadat's titles was that he, like most fathers, knew what best served the interests of the 'national village'. This was amplified after the October 1973 War, where the Egyptian People acknowledge Sadat's role as the 'benevolent father' of the nation. As noticed from the previous chapter, he completely decided the course of government (and indeed the country) was to take, and therefore, his thoughts, ideas, and perception had to be implemented without proper appraisal and assessment, as well as his choice of Ministers and politicians was unarguable (see the previous chapter, sections 3.2.1.1 and 3.3.1).

In the period since the late 1974 when the location of TRC was chosen till the issuing of the Presidential Decree 259 of 1977 (almost three years), none of the planning agencies, carried out the task of the physical plan formulation, dared to question or adjust the President's choice of such location, given the critical problem of

the flood plain presented earlier. It was also confirmed that the planning agencies were working without the exact measurements of the chosen location during the same period. This is emphasised by Professor El-Rimaly as follows:

> "… The president's choice of location was dealt with like a law, no body whoever he/she and whatever his/her position in the government was, including Osman A Osman and his successors, dared to question the settings of the location or even move it away from the main flood plain running through. Everyone was so constrained, even you can say frightened, by the idea that Sadat would be very cross if he visited the city and discovered that its location had changed from his original choice. So, we had to work with what we had […] till the issuing of the Presidential Decree in 1977, the master plan was formulated within the 'approximate' measures of chosen location, as we did not know the exact measures"   (El-Rimaly 2002)

Figure 4.7. The Location of Wady El-Gafra Flood Plain

Source: (Shetawy, 2000, p. 216)

Despite the latter quotation, it would be biased to assume that the choice of location was only based upon the personal interests of the President and Osman A Osman, as claimed by Professor El-Rimaly. The research had found further evidence to support that the location of the city is a unique one. As may be noticed from figure 4.6, the city is located on one of the most important highways in Egypt connecting the Capital with Canal Zone, the Cairo/Ismailia highway (AAW, 1999, P.1/2). The choice

of location was also, according to Prof. Abdel-Aziz[11], based on political and economic reasons. The city was located in the east desert towards Sinai as a part of a defence strategy in case of future threats from Israel and near to the Suez Canal to facilitate the export of its industrial production.

4.2.1.2 Ministry Of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities

After the 1973 October War, the President identified the reconstruction of the Canal Zone and Sinai cities as a matter of priority and urgency (see the previous chapter, section 3.3.1.2). Therefore, the Ministry for the Development of the Canal Cities and Sinai was rapidly established in November 1973 to execute the programme of reconstruction of such region headed by Osman A Osman as a Minister. In January 1974, the Ministry was renamed to be the Ministry of Reconstruction, as it was charged not only with the reconstruction of the Canal Zone and Sinai Region but also other areas all over Egypt. This was confirmed after the launch of ENMP in April 1974 and the identification of the 'priority Regions' to be the prime responsibility of the Ministry. In October 1974, the Ministry of Reconstruction and Ministry of Housing were merged to be the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction headed by Osman A Osman. Later in April 1977, although the responsibility of the construction of new communities was affiliated to the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, the Ministry of New Communities was established to concentrate its efforts on the establishment of such communities. By virtue of Presidential Decrees 247 and 275 of 1978, the Ministry was renamed to be the Ministry of development and new communities[12]. Since 1978 the Ministry was renamed several times, as presented in figure 4.8, and from 1994 to the present the Ministry is named Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities.

Given the above background of the MOH, it had an unusual advantageous position in terms of its scope, responsibilities, the direct support of the President for its

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[11] In an interview with the researcher in January 2002

[12] According to Presidential Decree 247 of 1978, some of the responsibilities dedicated to MOH are: first, drafting the policy of urbanisation, and preparing and coordinating the development programmes and plans with the production and services development plans and programmes. Second, studying and preparing the plans of urbanisation in the context of existing towns, villages, new communities and desert regions in such a manner that guarantees the utilisation of both the geographical location and local environment, which has to be achieved through coordination with other concerned authorities. Third, setting up comprehensive regional plans for areas having socio-economic priorities and implementing projects that fall within the settings of such plans. Fourth, executing, following up the implementation of, and evaluating urban plans, while overcoming any financial or technical difficulties obstructing their implementation. Fifth, preparing the necessary studies for investing Arab and foreign capital within the field of development and construction. Finally, proposing, studying, and drafting rules and legislations falling within the field of interests of the Ministry (ARE Presidential Decree 247 of 1978).

role in reconstruction and development of the Canal Zone and Sinai as well as other areas, and though its budget and ability to bypass normal administrative procedures (for instance, among many others, the special law 62 of 1974, which gave Ministry the right to ignore general procurement and import regulations for all materials and equipments that were required for construction). The unusual position of the MOH was presented in the words of Welbank (1982) as follows:

> "… the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction became the leader of the post war up swell of enthusiasm for reconstruction of war-ravaged areas. A Ministry of idealism, hope, and determination […] there was a spirit of elitism and determination, which established the Ministry as a sort of super-power in government, a kin role of the Ministry of Defence in war. It achieved things, it did not expect to be questioned, it overrode-or sought to do so at any rate-other departments and agencies of government, including governorates"
>
> (Welbank 1982 cited in Attia 1999, p. 139)

On top of the above-mentioned advantages and superiority of the MOH, the special relationship between the President and his Minister, Osman A Osman (see the previous chapter, footnote 54) gave the Ministry unarguable and unquestioned authority regarding its decisions, interests and even demands and needs. This was manifested in the choice of TRC location and the full authority of the specially established planning agencies within the MOH over the physical planning formulation process of the 1978 Plan, as presented in figure 4.9.

In figure 4.9 it can be seen that three main agencies were established within the MOH, under the direct authority of the Minister of MOH, to supervise and control development and aid-funded projects as well as carrying out the formulation of the physical plans of future new settlements. The first agency is the Advisory Committee for Reconstruction (ACR) considered to be the most powerful agency, at the time, in the MOH if not in the entire administration after the President himself. The committee was formed under Ministerial Decree 103 of 1974. It was initially composed of four members (i.e. Dr. Hassan Marei, Prof. Nabih Younis, Soliman Abdel-Hai, and Ali Salem Hamza), each of whom held a Cabinet-level or Deputy Prime Minister rank and all had close association with Osman A Osman at the time[13]. Its main role was to call

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[13] Members of the ACR had had significant political authority and were chosen for their experience in the construction industry, especially with respect to the Aswan High Dam Project. Such experience was seen of great importance when the attention of the national development policies was focused on the reconstruction of the Canal Zone and Sinai Region in the mid 1970s.

for technical and financial offers submitted by urban planning consultants regarding major urban development projects, including the call for technical and financial submissions for the physical planning formulation of the TRC.

The second agency, having wide experience of large international consulting contracts and expertise in responding to Term Of Reference (TOR), the in-house consultant TAMS was established for reviewing and evaluating the submitted offers, mainly from technical and financial perspectives. The agency was named after the chosen four British and American consultants, Tippet, Abbott, MacCarthy, and Stratton, who had close association with the Minister at the time. The third Agency, the Agency for Research and Projects (ARP), was responsible for coordinating between the ACR, TAMS and the Minister, as well as enforcing the decisions of the ACR. Moreover, Ibrahim (1993) points out that the ARP was assigned for the preparation of studies for development projects, with respect to both socio-economic and physical aspects, carrying out feasibility studies of urban projects, and the supervising the implementation of terms of reference and design specifications required by the ACR and TAMS[14]. It was established to take over the responsibilities of TAMS in the future after gaining the required experience. The relationship between the above planning agencies was explained by El-Kafrawy[15] as quoted:

> "… We (the ACR) set the general ideas, urban development projects (including the new communities), and policies. The in-house American/British consultant, TAMS studies such ideas, projects, and policies and calculates their initial budgets then informs the ACR. The ACR reviews and evaluates such budgets and the feasibility of its implementation and then decides which ideas, urban development projects and policies would be feasible and worth implementing with respect to the goals and objectives of the national development planning policies (i.e. ENMP). TAMS, with the help of ARP, prepares

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[14] According to the MOH (1989) and National Report (1996), the ARP is responsible for: first, conducting technical research and studies for planning new communities and coordinating with the relevant authorities. Second, conducting research in the field of urban development and urbanisation as well as the feasibility studies of projects and establishing the technical specifications and design standards. Third, suggesting the ways and means of financing the development studies and drawing the policy of financing and investment according to priorities within the framework of national development planning. Fourth, conducting competitions between consulting planning firms and evaluating their proposals to determine the appropriate projects according to their feasibility and technical aspects. Fifth, managing the procedures of commissioning the consulting firms, preparing the terms of reference and ensuring their implementation, management, and follow up. Finally, setting up an information centre and recording all general and detailed plans.

[15] Hassaballah El-Kafrawy, the Ex-Minister of Housing, Utilities and New Communities from 1977 to 1994, in a discussion with the researcher in February 2002.

the TOR for the chosen projects and then calls for consultants offers. All submitted offers should be handed in to the ARP, which act as my (the Minister) technical secretariat and coordinates between the ACR and TAMS. Then TAMS studies the submitted offers and chooses the consultancy firm with the best offer (technically and financially) and informs the ACR and I to give our opinion, whether to agree on the chosen consultant or choose another one for his/her experience, or any other reasons. Then we inform the ARP to start the procedures of commissioning, preparing the contract, and so on"   (El-Kafrawy 2002)

From the later quote and the presented stated roles and responsibilities of ACR, TAMS, and ARP, it is recognised that there is a mismatch between such stated roles and responsibilities and its actual practice. Such mismatch was a direct result of the unique combination of those agencies and the context within which they acted. Both the ACR and TAMS had an important and influential role and authority, after the Minister of MOH, which had a direct impact on the relevance and execution of all urban development projects all over Egypt. This was not only because they had significant political influence but also for their technical expertise and position outside the formal civil service structure. It was also confirmed by El-Kafrawy that although acting as the technical secretariat of the Minister at the time of preparing the 1978 Plan, the ARP was established to replace the in-house consultant in the long run after gaining the know-how experience from its direct contact with TAMS. Therefore, planned to be the TAMS successor, while having direct access to TAMS and ACR, the ARP had a unique advantage and position in the Ministry.

This is not to assume that the power and authority of such agencies was out of control or even unquestioned and unarguable. As explained before in the previous chapter that Ministers could exert influence and pressure over the management of public enterprises and agencies affiliated to his/her Ministry to take the course of action and sorts of decisions required by the Government and, with respect to the TRC case, most of time required by the President. Moreover, as explained before, the loyalty of the management of any public enterprise and agency naturally rests with top government decision-makers, as being chosen for their social affiliation and political loyalty in the first place (see the previous chapter, section 3.4).

Figure 4.8 The Evolution of Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities in
the Period 1974-2002

Source: adapted and modified from Meikle (1987) and Attia (1999)

Figure 4.9. The Organisational Chart of the MOH during the 1976 Plan Formulation

ACR	Advisory Committee for Reconstruction
ARP	Agency for Research and Projects
GOHBPR	General Organisation for Housing, Building, and Planning Research
GOPP	General Organisation for Physical Planning
COR	Central Organisation for Reconstruction

Source: The World Bank, Urban Sector Report (1980) cited in Meikle (1987)

This was evident in the 1978 Plan formulation process, as the research found evidence that Osman A Osman, and later on his successor, Hassaballah El-Kafrawy, was able to influence the course of decisions and action taken by the ACR, TAMS, and ARP (e.g. his influence to choose the Egyptian consultancy firm COPA to be the urban

development consultant of TRC[16]), while using, on top of the President's authority, their power (mainly the ACR political power and TAMS expertise) to exert their influence on other public institutions and override any other department or agency of government which might constrain the MOH work (see section 3.3.1.2). In this sense, as analysed before, hence implementing ENMP according to Sadat's perception was necessary for Osman's survival, it can be said that Osman A Osman had worked to please the President to further his personal interests.

This was illustrated in the direct and continuous consultation between the President and Osman A Osman regarding the TOR for designing and constructing the city. According to El-Rimaly (2002) and Abdel-Aziz (2002) and confirmed by the 1976 Report, the President and Osman identified the general outlines of the city's TOR, as the target population would mainly be skilled and unskilled workers. Supported by such general outline TOR, TAMS, in coordination with ARP, identified that a mixture for the target population would be: 5-7% high-level managers and scientists, 25-30% middle-level officials and trades, 45-55% skilled and unskilled workers, 2-5% farmers, and 5% unemployed persons (Arab Republic of Egypt 1976, p. 6).

Since the creation of the Ministry for the development of the Canal Cities and Sinai in 1973, Hasaballah El-Kafrawy held one of the most powerful positions within its structure, as the head of the Agency for the Reconstruction of Canal Cities and Sinai (ARCCS). After the change of responsibilities and name of the Ministry in October 1974, the responsibility of the construction of TRC was given to El-Kafrawy in person for his experience in the construction industry, his close relation with Osman, and his post in the Ministry, as Osman A Osman was busy in following up the reconstruction of the Canal Cities (i.e. Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez). This was explained in the words of El-Kafrawy as follows:

> "… I was the Government's Chief Engineer and Osman was the main contractor in the High Dam project. Naturally there was always this love-hate, yet respect, relationship between us. After Osman was appointed as Minister of MOH, he asked Ibrahim Zaki Kenawy, the Vice Minister, to appoint me as the Head of ARCCS […] he asked Kenawy because my relationship with him was closer than my relationship with Osman at the time. Since then, Osman assigned me

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[16] This issue is explained in further detail when discussing the choice, power, and interests of the consultancy firms involved in the formulation process of the 1978 Plan.

the responsibility of supervision and following up the formulation and implementation of the TRC physical plan" (El-Kafrawy 2002)

It was evident that, with respect to the formulation of the 1978 Plan, El-Kafrawy had the authority and power of the Minister to influence the planning formulation, decision-making process, and therefore control over TAMS, ACR, and ARP. This was manifested in, for instance, his influence regarding the choice of the Swedish consultancy firm, SWECO, to share the responsibility of the formulation of the physical plan with COPA, as discussed later. El-Kafrawy retained his power over the formulation process of the 1978 Plan even after Hassan M. Hassan was appointed as the Minister in charge instead of Osman A. Osman in October 1976, then to become the Minister of MOH in April 1977. It is important to stress that, according to Attia (1999):

> "…. Hassaballah El-Kafrawy became the Minister of Reconstruction in 1977. Kafrawy not only had different values and objectives than his predecessor, Osman A Osman, but also his values and objectives had been changing to suit the changing political and socio-economic conditions in Egypt" (Attia 1999, p. 269)

After his appointment as the Minister of MOH in 1977, and the Head of Agency for New Urban Communities (ANUC)[17], El-Kafrawy followed the steps of his predecessor, Osman A. Osman, till 1978. He kept the structure of the MOH unchanged and the power and authority dedicated to ACR, TAMS, and ARP untouched. This was mainly for political reasons especially for his survival in office given the significant political power of the ACR members. Unlike Osman A Osman, who had a very close relation with, and direct access to, the President, El-Kafrawy felt threatened by the idea of losing such political support. Therefore, he, as expected, increased the power and authority of the ACR, in the name of 'democracy' [18]. However, the reason behind such move was aiming at, as confirmed by Professor Abdel-Aziz, seeking political support of the members of the ACR to ensure his survival in office. Such move allowed El-Kafrawy to gain the political support, and of course the power and authority, he wanted while members of the ACR gained more power and authority by becoming members of

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[17] ANUC was established in 1977 as an affiliate to the Cabinet headed by the Minister of MOH. In 1979, it became an affiliate to the MOH by virtue of Law 59 (a further discussion will be dedicated to such agency in section 5.2.2.1)

[18] The ACR under Elkafrawy was composed of: Dr. Hasan Marei, Eng. Soliman Abdel-Hai, Hassan M Hassan, Ramzy Estelo, Dr.Hassan Ismail, Ibrahim Nagib, Saad Faied, Ahmed El-Ghandoor, Prof. Nabih Younis, Soltan Abou-Ali, Ali El-Salmi. Each of which was either a working Deputy Prime Minister, Minister, Ex- Deputy Prime Minister, or an Ex-Minister (El-Kafrawy 2002)

the inner circle responsible for the implementation of one of the two most important and politically best supported policies at the time (i.e. the ENMP and ODEP).

Such increase of power came in the form of dedicating more responsibility to members of the ACR by giving them the right to choose the location of future new communities, their planning concepts and urban development consultancy firms, while being automatically appointed as Heads of Steering Committees for the planning and implementation of each future new community. This was presented in the words of El-Kafrawy as follows:

> "… I was the Minister of MOH for 17 years and no one could accuse me of anything because everyone participated in the decision-making process […] I formed a small Cabinet out of the ACR by appointing highly qualified Ministers and Deputy Prime Ministers as members in such committee […] each member has equal opportunity in presenting his ideas and thoughts about the future new communities. We discuss and analyse such ideas and choose the most reasonable and feasible one. The owner of the chosen idea automatically would have become the Head of a Steering Committee responsible for choosing the urban development consultancy firm, setting the planning concept of the new community, and its location and time of starting execution according to some factors, mainly political" (El-Kafrawy 2002)

With respect to TRC, such sequence of events had never happened because of its unique settings and context discussed above. It can also be said that El-Kafrawy would not allow anyone to threaten his power and authority, and though he was very protective in regards to TRC, as he recognised it was the main reason behind his appointment as the Minister of MOH. Since appointed as Minister of MOH, El-Kafrawy concentrated his efforts on both the construction of TRC and Sadat City to please and be closer to Sadat. In this sense, it is evident that the successive Ministers of MOH, senior civil servants, and politicians were found seeking spatial advantage through public policy.

4.2.1.3 Ministry of Planning

As discussed in the previous chapter, the early 1960s saw the effective nationalisation of most foreign and many privately owned firms, while national planning was instituted and large investments were made in heavy industry. The government through the central planning system at least in theory tightly controlled the economy in the 1960s. A Minister was responsible for each of the main sectors of the

economy: industry, trade, finance, and communication (see Ayubi 1991). They exercised their responsibilities through the established Public Organisations (POs), which were organised on a sectoral basis (see the previous chapter, section 3.2.1.3). The central planning system nominally carried out coordination, and therefore, a Ministry of Planning (MOP) was set up in 1961 to replace all other national planning bodies. The MOP was, and still is, formally in charge of coordinating national plans and investment throughout the economy. As discussed before in the case of MOH, the various Ministries controlling different sectors are responsible of the preparation for the specialised plans and projects.

This is to emphasise that the MOP has the authority to distribute investments among the different sectors of the economy through the allocation of financial resources to the economic and planning regions and coordinate the socio-economic planning and projects while following up the execution and evaluation performance (see section 4.1). In this sense, TRC, located within the Greater Cairo Region and Suez Canal Region, first, would receive its share from the national budget assigned to both regions for socio-economic development via its regional affiliates the RPAs and HCRP. Second, it would also receive its share from national budget assigned to the MOH according to five-years plan. However, given the nature and context within which TRC was created, the MOP has very little influence over the formulation and implementation of specialised (i.e. physical) plans and projects as the MOH had almost all the power and authority over such process backed up by the President himself. Such minimal influence and power arrangement between MOH and MOP was stressed by Mansour[19] as follows:

> "…. During the 1970s and much of the 1980s, TRC is considered to be one of the most important national projects assigned to the MOH. Therefore, no government institution or agency, including the MOP and Ministry of Finance, could question, argue, revise, or refuse the demands and needs of the MOH to complete the construction of this city […] everyone in the government recognised the fact that constraining the formulation and implementation process of the physical plans of TRC, in any form, would be a political and career suicide"   (Mansour 2002)

Given the above-discussed advantageous power of the MOH, it can be said that the MOP influence on the formulation process of the 1978 Plan was minimal. The

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[19] In an interview with the researcher in January 2002

Minister of MOP or any of his senior advisors could not question, argue, revise, or refuse, the financial support required by the MOH for implementing whatever activities to be included in the 1978 Plan. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that even without the unique background of TRC, the MOP is considered to be a traditionally weak Central Government institution, as emphasised by Ayubi (1991) (see also Rivilin 1985) as follows:

> "…. The Ministry of Planning in Egypt lacked the power or ability to balance inputs and outputs of different sectors or firms. There was no system for continuously recalculating the plan and its targets so as to improve its match of inputs and outputs at the microeconomic level. Rolling targets and plans meant a political or bureaucratic rewriting of overall objectives rather than technical or economic re-examination"

(Ayubi 1991, pp. 60-1)

4.2.1.4 Ministry of Industry and Technology

As discussed before in the previous chapter, section 3.2.1.3, the Egyptian Government has been interested in the manufacturing sector as a mean of accelerating growth and economic development since the 1952 revolution and made it active through the establishment of the National Council for Production (NCP). It was assigned with conducting the feasibility studies of some large-scale production projects including the Egyptian Iron and Steel Plant and Aswan High Dam. In 1956, two Central Government institutions were established to substitute the NCP. On the one hand, the Ministry of Industry (MOI) with the prime objective of formulating a long-term national industrial plan, and on the other hand, its newly established affiliate, the General Organisation for Industrialisation (GOFI)[20], to prepare and implement a five-year industrialisation programme. Much attention was given to investment in the manufacturing sector since 1957 with the launch of the first industrialisation programme prepared by GOFI (GOFI 2003).

With respect to the formulation of the 1978 Plan of TRC, the GOFI had direct influence over the type of industries to be accommodated within the industrial areas in

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[20] According to GOFI (2003), its main responsibilities include: first, identifying gaps in areas of development and suggests incentives to encourage industrial development. Second, on the individual enterprise level, acting as a consultant by utilizing its industrial database. Third, preparing a pre-feasibility study and if the project seems viable, carries out a more detailed feasibility study. Fourth, facilitating developing the industrial zones all over the country, whether within existing communities or newly established ones. Fifth, approving new production facilities. Sixth, planning and developing small and medium scale industries (Studies and guidance) (GOFI 2003)

TRC, as one of its responsibilities. GOFI was in contact with both TAMS and ARP, through the ACR members, to make sure that its agenda and interest would be respected and taken into consideration. It has to be mentioned that the MOI has been one of the most powerful Ministries in the Egyptian Administration since its creation. This is because it was assigned with preparing and implementing the national industrialisation programmes since the 1950s, as well as a crucial role in manufacturing many of the army equipments and ammunitions used in successive wars. It can be said that the MOI and its affiliate GOFI was much more powerful than the MOH, as they were established earlier and had major achievements on the national level.

Basically, GOFI considered the construction of TRC as an opportunity to expand its power and authority through acquiring large areas of land within the industrial areas with the excuse of its intention to invest in constructing a new Egyptian Iron and Steel factory. Such '*façade* excuse' was supported by the willingness to construct an extension railway line from Cairo-Ismailia railway (i.e. the Military railway line) line to transport row materials and then production for local market consumption and export via the Suez Port. Moreover, GOFI, like other Ministries, seized the chance to be at the heart of such a politically supported project. Practically, its request had been approved by Osman A Osman, and later on confirmed by Hassaballah El-Kafrawy, and then passed on to TAMS to be included in the TOR of TRC to be considered in the physical planning outcome. GOFI also retained such influential role during the implementation process as explained later on.

4.2.1.5 Ministry of Defence

There is no doubt that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is 'the' most powerful Ministry in Egypt at all times, specially after the end of the October 1973 War. Such power and authority was, and still is, only controlled by President Sadat, like all his predecessors and successor as a Military Officer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. As discussed before, it is important for anyone wanting to continue being the President of Egypt to please and yet control the army through the Ministry of Defence. Everyone either inside or outside the Government recognises the fact that the President cannot afford to upset the MOD (see the previous chapter, section 3.2.1.1).

But what did the formulation of a physical plan for a new city have to do with the MOD? This can be explained by giving two main reasons. On the one hand, the situation MOH was forced to be in by approving GOFI's request regarding the

construction of the new extension railway line to serve its future Iron and Steel Plant in the heavy industrial area. Being a Military supply line, the MOH had to secure the MOD's permission for the construction of such extension before starting the physical plan formulation. On the other hand, the location of TRC is very near to the *Hickstep* area that is one of the most important recruiting, defence, and ammunitions storage sites. Since the President chose the location, the later problem of national security was sorted out smoothly and rapidly. The real problem was in securing the MOD approval for the request regarding the railway. Somehow, the MOD approved such extension, though it was never implemented. Saadeldin[21] explained such power game between the MOH and MOD as follows:

> "…. In 1977, after securing the approval of the MOD for constructing the extension railway to the heavy industrial area, the MOH paid a 1 million Egyptian pounds cheque to the Organisation for Egyptian Railway (OER) to start constructing such extension. Somehow this whole subject went dead and after 10 years the OER contacted the MOH claiming that the extension line would cost 10 million Egyptian Pounds instead. So the MOH just cancelled such plan […] to be frank, I do not know why this railway line was not implemented but some claim it was because of the MOD and others said it was not worth constructing!!" (Saadeldin 2002)

Given the background of the MOD involvement in the formulation process, it can be explained that the MOD seized the chance to: first, show its authority and power to the newly established MOH, so that it could no longer think of playing the power game with in the future[22]. Second, prove to the President its loyalty by approving his commands and requests.

4.2.1.6 Urban Development Consultants

As mentioned before, after the choice of location of TRC, El-Kafrawy was responsible for the formulation and implementation process of the city backed by the Minister at the time, Osman A Osman, and indirectly by the President. Both Osman and El-Kafrawy had had much influence over the planning formulation and its decision-

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[21] In an interview with the researcher in March 2002

[22] Such explanation was supported by the case of Al-Amal City when the MOD stopped the formulation process of its physical plan, although Presidential Decree 505 of 1979 regarding its construction, claiming national security reasons. It was revealed that the site of such city was managed and exploited by some top MOD Generals in relations to their private quarrying business (Ashour, in an interview with the researcher in April 2002).

making process. This section illustrates such influence by presenting the context of the choice of the consultancy firms assigned to the planning formulation, while discussing their power and authority in the process. It also illustrates the impact of political expediency on the physical planning formulation process with respect to the context of TRC.

Before El-Kafrawy was dedicated the responsibility of supervising and following up the planning process of TRC in late 1974, Osman A Osman's office contacted the Consulting Office for Planning and Architecture (COPA) to be commissioned as the main consultancy firm. This was because of close family connections, as explained by Prof. El-Rimaly[23] as follows:

> "…. Osman's office contacted us (COPA) after we won the competition of 15th May City to be the planning consultancy firm of TRC […] actually, Osman was a close friend to my family and he manage to persuade the President to approve the choice of our office. He also asked me to form a highly qualified team for such mission as we were only four urban planners within COPA. Therefore, I called my friends in Zurich, to form the required team. […] By the end of 1974, soon after we started the needed planning studies, El-Kafrawy was appointed chief in charge of the TRC project backed by Osman […] to be frank, this was a major disaster for COPA, as he insisted on commissioning a foreign consultancy firm to share the responsibility of the formulation of the physical plan with us or else our contract with the MOH had to be terminated"   (El-Rimaly 2002)

All the four founders of COPA consultancy firm (i.e. Dr. Ismail Rida, Dr. Abdel-Aziz Soliman, Dr. Abdel-Megid Hassan, and Prof. El-Rimaly) were, at the time, young planners who had just acquired their PhD degrees from abroad and lacked the required experience to carry out the job they were assigned for by the MOH. According to El-Rimaly, such change in attitude towards COPA was a direct result of the assignment of El-Kafrawy, who wanted to show both Osman and the President his interest and enthusiasm about the values and general outlines of the ODP regarding the new attitude towards foreign firms. But also because of COPA's lack of the required know-how and experience regarding the technicalities of infrastructure networks. Such explanation was confirmed by El-Kafrawy as follows:

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[23] Professor El-Rimaly is the only living founder of COPA, as the rest had passed away during the 1990s.

"…. We (Osman and El-Kafrawy) discussed the commissioning of COPA as the planning consultant of TRC. I told him that you know that the President wants this project implemented as soon as possible. Therefore, we need to commission a foreign consultancy firm who has the know-how and extensive experience in the area of town planning alongside COPA. Given the pressure we were under, he approved my request"   (El-Kafrawy 2002)

After such meeting, somehow El-Kafrawy came across the Swedish cooperation, SWECO. It was revealed by El-Rimaly, and confirmed by many others, that SWECO was not a specialised urban planning consultancy firm but rather a multi-function cooperation that deals with, among many others, marketing, preparation of feasibility studies, solid waste management, expert advice in planning and pre-investment studies, integrated services in design and project implementation, engineering, environmental management and architecture (SWECO 2003). El-Rimaly points out that SWECO sent one of their representatives to meet El-Kafrawy after preparing some alternative conceptual sketches for the master plan of TRC and managed to secure his approval on one of them:

"…. Someone from SWECO, without our knowledge or coordination with COPA, managed to gain El-Kafrawy's trust. He showed him some conceptual sketches for the master plan of the city and secured his approval on one of them, the apple sketch as we named later. After 2 days El-Kafrawy called a meeting to inform us about our new partner and discuss our role and responsibility as well as our share in the contract (60%). In the same meeting, we were directed to follow the apple sketch presented by SWECO. In this sense the location of the city and its final shape and TOR were already identified"

                                              (El-Rimaly 2002)

El-Rimaly also says that SWECO was mainly responsible for the technicalities of the infrastructure networks such as electricity, sewage, water supply, communication networks, while COPA was responsible for the urban development planning. To be able to coordinate between the infrastructure networks' plans and the urban development plans, both SWECO and COPA created a steering office to review and approve drawings before their submission to the ARP. Given the natural and clear advantage of SWECO over COPA, it was confirmed by El-Wakeil (2002), Serageldin (2002), and El-Rimaly (2002), that although COPA was the main consultancy firm with respect to their

share in the contract, SWECO was more trusted by El-Kafrawy and so had authority over COPA.

In late 1976, COPA and SWECO managed to submit the TRC Master Plan Report to the ARP. This report included the regional planning studies, planning alternatives, its evaluation and choice of the 'best alternative' and the preliminary detailed plans of the industrial areas as well as the residential and services areas. The ARP, TAMS, El-Kafrawy, and Osman A Osman accepted the report and commissioned COPA and SWECO to start the detailed planning phase. From the moment of the approval of such report, El-Kafrawy started his arrangement towards the implementation process, as discussed in further details later on.

In 29th May 1977, while the two consultancy firms were actively preparing the detailed plans of the industrial and residential areas, President Sadat visited the TRC site to mark the start of implementation process. In such visit, 'unpredictably' as usual, Sadat announced the start of selling the land of TRC, as explained by El-Kafrawy as follows:

> "… Sadat went to the city to mark the start of the implementation process. I told him that we still have more than six months for the submission of the final report and detailed plans of the city and for finishing the storing process of the required building materials. "no … no Kafrawy I want the land to be sold today" Sadat replied. Then he went on a media conference confirming the selling of land at a very low price, 50 piasters/m^2 […] the next day I went to the Prime Minister, Mamduh Salem, asking for his help, as the price announced by Sadat would result in a great loss to the project and no drawings were prepared according to which we can sell land […] The recommended land price was around the margin of 5-7 Pounds/m^2. This was more than 10 times the announced price. Nevertheless, Salem replied that there is no way we can argue or question such decision. It is now a Presidential Decree. So if you want to get sacked go ahead but only yourself"
>
> (El-Kafrawy 2002)

According to El-Kafrawy, the MOH started selling the land in coordination with Misr Bank and Al-Ahly Bank. According to him, in the first 2-3 days, 3 million m^2 were sold. After selling such land, he started to sell the land at the same price (50 piasters/m^2) while adding 3 pounds/m^2 for the infrastructure. Such political decision by the President and the political response by El-Kafrawy hit hard the formulation process of the 1978

Plan, as El-Kafrawy pushed hard for an early submission of the final report and detailed plans to start construction work as fast as possible. Therefore, according to El-Rimaly, El-Kafrawy called for an urgent meeting to explain the situation to the consultants and increase the pressure on them to submit the needed drawings earlier than planned. Such political action by both the President and El-Kafrawy had a devastating impact on the preparation process of the detailed plans, as explained by El-Rimaly:

"… After Sadat's visit to the city and his announcement regarding selling the land, we (i.e. COPA and SWECO) recognised that this was the end of the story, even before our meeting with El-Kafrawy. After such meeting, we were just working to submit drawings with no philosophy. Actually we just did some editing to the preliminary drawings submitted with the 1976 Report. The deal was to submit the finished drawings as soon as possible then submit the 1978 Report as planned, so we did "   (El-Rimaly 2002)

The consultants only carried out the detailed planning stage for the heavy industrial area (A1), the Medium industrial areas (B1 and B2), and the light industrial area (C1). It was also discovered, according to El-Rimaly, that the planning concept of the A1 area had changed completely from the 1976 Report to the 1978 Plan as a result of the 'power game' that took place between the MOH, MOI, and MOD regarding the construction of the extension railway line discussed before (see Appendix I). The 1976 Report and 1978 Plan had two main advantages. On the one hand, with respect to the flood plain cutting across the city from the south to the north, both the 1976 Report and 1978 Plan emphasise the importance of protecting both the industrial areas, especially the heavy industrial area (A), and residential areas by keeping the flood plain zone as open area used for recreational and parks activities. On the other hand, it also emphasises the physical separation between the types of industrial and residential areas, as well as the physical separation between types of industrial areas (i.e. heavy industrial area (A), medium industrial areas (B), and small industrial areas (C)), as presented in figure 4.10, by introducing the different width buffer zones as presented in table 4.1.

In this sense, it is evident that the original master plan and the detailed land use plans of the industrial areas were environmentally sound in terms of the distribution of the industrial classes within the city, the buffer areas recommended to separate the industrial areas from the residential areas based on environmental criteria, the recognition of the flood plain, the distribution of the industrial classes within each

industrial area, and the orientation of the industrial plots regarding the dominant wind direction

Table 4.1 The Planning Criteria for the Types of Industrial Areas

Types of Industrial area	Industrial densities (worker/ha)	Land needed per plot (ha)	Railway needed	Water supply and sanitation needed	Recommended width of buffer areas (m)
Isolated (A)	Not determined	6-25	**	**	>500
Heavy (A)	25-40	1.5-6	**	**	500
Medium (B)	100-140	0.4-1.5	*	*	200
Light (C)	100-140	0.1-0.4	Not determined	*	50

** Extra need   * Medium need

Source: Arab Republic of Egypt (1976, pp. 34-4)

Figure 4.10 The Types of Industrial Areas and Flood Plain Location

Source: AAW (1999, p. 1/2)

Nevertheless, both the 1976 Report and 1978 Plan had a very serious disadvantage. Shetawy (2000), Salah (2002), Abdel-Aziz (2002), El-Wakeil (2002), and Serageldin (2002) argue that one of the serious planning mistakes that the consultants of the city had made was to apply European standards of physical planning to the context of Egypt. This was critically evident mainly in the size of the planned industrial plots (mainly within the heavy industrial area A1). This was explained and analysed by Professor Abdel-Aziz, also confirmed by Professor El-Rimaly, as follows:

"…. The idea of applying European physical planning standards on the context of the industrial areas in TRC was a complete disaster. It was this mistake that led to chaos during the early stage of the implementation process […] the industrial plots were extremely large for the type of industries in Egypt at the time […] yes the land was sold before the plan was finished, however, the size of the industrial plots sold to people was not the same size planned later on […] my explanation would be that at the time of the formulation of such plan (the 1978 Plan), there was no planning act for the industrial, or even residential, areas in Egypt and there was no reliable source of information to guide the planners to identify the proper plot sizes according to market forces"   (Abdel-Aziz 2002)

Given the context in which the planners formulated the 1978 Plan, it was recognised that the planners had no say as regards the choice of location and the setting of the goals and objectives of the plan. The physical planning formulation process followed the exact steps of a rational comprehensive planning methodology, as discussed in chapter 2. It is also evident that the government institutions and agencies, while excluding some interest groups, centrally controlled the planning process.

It has to be stressed that the above discussed problems and critical situations faced the planners in terms of the decision-making process and the control over the planning process itself has to be seen from the wider criticism of the rational comprehensive planning approach to physical planning, where the planner have no control over the political and economic context through which the planning process takes place. And where politicians, senior government officials, and other interest groups could easily manipulate the planning process. The formulation process of the 1978 physical plan provides a model example to the application of the criticism of the rational comprehensive planning (see chapter 2).

4.2.1.7 Excluded Agencies

The research found evidence that there were three main agencies excluded from the formulation process. Those agencies were: the Local Government, the private sector, and the manufacturing workers.

Firstly, with respect to the Local Government, the location of TRC belongs to the overlap desert zone between Cairo Governorate and Sharkia Governorate, which are located within the administrative and planning boundaries of the Greater Cairo Region

and Canal Region respectively. It was revealed that none of the Local Government agencies within the above governorates or regions was consulted. This was mainly because of the unique context within which the TRC was created as discussed before. The TRC project was recognised, at the time, as an urgent national project, and therefore, if the bureaucratic steps applied to other projects were to be followed, this would take time and delay its implementation. This is explained by El-Kafrawy as:

> "…The TRC project was recognised as one of the gifts the President wanted to give to the people after the victory of October War. He wanted to demonstrate to the people through this project the model that Egypt would follow when building the future new towns […] forget about Local Government, it was a project of national interest at the time and we would not have tolerated any delay because of some bureaucratic arrangements […] what change or help could they (Local Government agencies) provide when we (the Central Government) with the help of experts were at the heart of the planning process"
>
> (El-Kafrawy 2002)

Secondly, at the time of the 1978 Plan formulation, on the one hand, the private sector had just started to get used to the new social settings of the Egyptian society after the launch of the ODEP in 1974 (see the previous chapter, section 3.4). Moreover, at the time of the 1978 Plan formulation, the location of the city was desert land, like any desert land in Egypt, considered as derelict. In this sense, the motivation to get the private sector to organise some kind of active pressure group to influence the planning process was not there. This was confirmed by the un-official creation of the first private sector pressure group, the Tenth of Ramadan Investment Association (TRIA) in 1978 (i.e. after 1 year of the start of the implementation process) (TRIA 2002). On the other hand, it can be said that the Central Government was yet to get used to the idea of having on board the private sector having an important role to play in the development process, after too many years applying the central planning system during Nasser era (1956-1970) and the early years of Sadat's era.

Thirdly, given the context within which the Central Government was involved and yet the existing traces of the central planning system inherited from the 1950s and 1960s, on the one hand, the Central Government, as applying the rational comprehensive planning approach, was convinced that with the help of planners expertise, the 'public interest', including those of the manufacturing workers, would be arrived at. On the other hand, after the October 1973 War, the Egyptian people,

including the manufacturing workers, put their blind trust in the Government as being the source of power and authority that would be always, even at the time of this study, directed towards their benefit. This was evident in the perception of 74% of the manufacturing workers interviewed during the fieldwork that the Government knows better than them about issues of their welfare.

4.2.1.8 Concluding Remarks

From the above presented analysis of the institutional arrangements, power structures, and interests of institutions, agencies, and individuals involved in the formulation of the 1976 physical plan of the industrial areas in TRC, it is clear that the Central Government institutions, agencies, and individuals were the dominant and only actors within the 'triangle of power' while all other (i.e. Local Government agencies, private sector, manufacturing workers) were excluded. Nevertheless, it is evident that some of Central Government institutions, agencies, and individuals had more power and authority over others due to the uniqueness of the context within which the TRC was created. Moreover, it has been identified, through illustrative examples, that each agency and institution had its own preferences, interests (mainly personal and institutional as well as national interests), and agendas. Such preferences were in conflict with, and sometimes contradict, those of the other institutions and agencies. In addition, both the structure of the institutions and their operating systems had been affecting the relationship between agencies involved in the formulation process of the physical plan.

With respect to physical planning practice, it was illustrated that the consultancy firms, COPA and SWECO, were all physical planners and engineers focusing on infrastructure networks, urban planning design, and transport planning. In this sense, it is clear that all planning consultants of the city could be identified within the context of the classic (physical) traditions (i.e. urban design, town planning, regional planning, and transport planning traditions). It was also illustrated that the rational comprehensive planning approach to land use planning and its related scientific rational methodology were applied to the formulation process of the 1978 plan, as both consultancy firms had a European style and background of physical planning education where the above planning approach and methodology were the dominant approach to town planning at the time (see chapter 2).

4.2.2 The 1982 Physical Planning Formulation

This section examines the impact of the change of Egypt's political economy during the late 1970s and early 1980s including the poor performance of the economy and the assassination of Sadat in 1981, on the formulation process of the 1982 physical plan, while highlighting the institutional arrangements, power structure and interests and agendas of agencies involved. Unlike the formulation process of the 1978 Plan, the 1982 physical plan formulation followed a different sequence of events and involved different planning agencies with different, yet contradicting and conflicting, interests and agendas. Nevertheless, the research found evidence that like the 1978 Plan, some agencies involved in the formulation of the 1982 Plan had more authority and power over the other institutions and agencies concerned. Figure 4.11 illustrates the institutional arrangements that guided the formulation process of the 1982 Plan.

Figure 4.11. The Institutional Arrangements Guiding the 1982 Physical Plan Formulation

MOH	Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities	TRDA	Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority
ANUC	Agency for New Urban Communities	TRIA	Tenth of Ramadan Investors Association
ARP	Agency for Research and Projects	MOP	Ministry of Planning
ACR	Advisory Committee for Reconstruction	RPA	Regional Planning Authority

The three main Central Government agencies involved in the 1978 Plan were absent in the formulation of the 1982 Plan: the President, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Industry. Nevertheless, despite their absence in the formulation process itself, they had a major and indirect impact on such process. On the one hand, the indirect influence of the President was evident by issuing Presidential Decree 351 of 1980 alongside the Law 59 of 1979 putting ANUC within the administrative structure of the MOH instead of the Cabinet while identifying its role and responsibilities. On the

other hand, the MOD, as discussed above, kept resisting and complicating the implementation of the extension railway line to the heavy industrial area. Given the position taken by the MOD, the MOI was forced to cancel the industrialisation programme prepared for the heavy industrial area in TRC.

4.2.2.1 Ministry Of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities

Four fundamental changes took place within the administrative structure of the MOH in 1978 (i.e. since the Ministry became the Ministry of Development and New Communities, see figure 4.8). First, the in-house consultant TAMS was dismissed as the country was experiencing currency exchange problems in 1978 (see chapter 3, section 3.1.2). Second, as a consequence, in 1978, the ARP took over the responsibilities, power and authority of TAMS. Third, the ACR lost its privileged position as an advisor to the Minister outside the civil servants administrative structure to become one of the executive and administrative departments within MOH. The ACR did not lose its privileged position only because of some administrative structure adjustments but also because of the creation of a new planning agency, the Agency for New Urban Communities, that took over much of its role and responsibilities. Fourth, ANUC became an affiliate to the MOH instead of the Cabinet. Affiliating ANUC to the MOH, alongside the change in the country's political economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as discussed before, was the main trigger that changed the overall power structure and interests of agencies involved in the formulation of the 1982 Plan (see figures 4.12 and 4.13)

As discussed before that ANUC was established in 1977 alongside the Ministry of New Communities headed by El-Kafrawy. As an affiliate to the Cabinet, the main reason for its creation was to help the MOH in easing up and bypassing bureaucracy and in speeding up the implementation of the national policy of urbanisation while reporting its progress to the Cabinet. As discussed before, ANUC had no role in the formulation process of the 1978 Plan despite its establishment since 1977. This was mainly because of, first, the significant political power of the ACR, which encouraged the MOH to downgrade ANUC's power and authority. The second reason is the close and continuous consultation between El-Kafrawy, the Prime Minister at the time (Momduh Salem) and the President. This was illustrated by El-Kafrawy as follows:

> "…. ANUC was established since 1977 as an affiliate to the Cabinet,
> under my authority as the Minister concerned. It was mainly

established to report the progress of the national urban development policy (ENMP) implementation to the Cabinet. During the formulation of the 1978 Plan of the TRC, there was no need to have more Central Government agencies involved in the Plan formulation, as the President, Momduh Salem, Osman A Osman and I had direct and continuous consultation regarding this issue on a regular basis […] you can say that before becoming an affiliate to the MOH with different role and responsibilities since 1979, ANUC had no effective or clear role in the urban development process"   (El-Kafrawy 2002)

Figure 4.12 The Organisational Chart of ANUC

Source: Ibrahim (1993, p. 156)

Figure 4.13 The Organisational Chart of the MOH from 1978 to 1994

ACR	Advisory Committee for Reconstruction
ARP	Agency for Research and Projects
GOHBPR	General Organisation for Housing, Building, and Planning Research
GOPP	General Organisation for Physical Planning
COR	Central Organisation for Reconstruction
ANUC	Agency for New Urban Communities
TOMHAR	Training Organisation of Ministry of Housinf and Reconstruction
SCOR	Suez Canal Organisation for Reconstruction
NWCDA	North West Coast Development Authority

Source: adapted and modified from Attia (1999, p. 273)

By virtue of Law 59 of 1979[24], ANUC became the sole Central Government agency responsible for the creation and management of the new urban communities established outside the administrative and planning borders of the existing urban communities (i.e. cities, towns, and villages). It was also assigned for managing utilities and projects within new urban communities until their management and planning responsibilities were to be transferred to Local Governments agencies concerned after the completion of their construction. ANUC, like the case of Ministry of High Dam that was ceased after the Dam was constructed in 1960s and the case of the Ministry of Population that was dismantled after the Population conference was completed in the 1990s, was created to be a temporary Central Government agency assigned for the specific above responsibilities and should be dismantled after task accomplishment

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[24] Law 59 in 1979 provides substantial economic incentives to the private sector as well as new settlers to invest and settle in the new urban communities. Incentives targeting private sector investors in the manufacturing sector include: first, without the prejudice of better tax exceptions identified in any other law, including those identified in the Investment Law, the profits of manufacturing establishments are exempted from Tax on commercial and industrial profits and supplements for 10 years starting from the first financial year that follows the start of production. Second, all manufacturing investors are exempted from the general Tax on income for the same period of 10 years. Third, manufacturing investors and establishments and contracting parties are exempted from custom duties and other duties on imports necessary for production in accordance with Law 62 in 1974. Fourth, all the above tax exemption and other exemptions, identified by other existing laws, are also applied to agencies (i.e. contractors, subcontractors, and consultants) involved in the construction process of manufacturing establishments. Finally, foreign staff are permitted to transfer abroad, in foreign currency, no more than 50% of their salaries and bonus.

(Ibrahim 1993). It has to be stressed that to the date of this research, none of the new urban communities was transferred to Local Government agencies, as emphasised by Mansour, as follows:

> "….the responsibility of none of the new communities 'nationwide' constructed since the mid 1970s, yet to date, was transferred to Local Authorities. […] For instance, Cairo Governorate rejected the transfer of responsibility of the development and management of 15th of May City from ANUC to its Local Authorities. The main reasons were: first, ANUC was in much debt to the Investment Bank because of the many loans obtained to finish the construction of the City. So the transfer of responsibilities meant the transfer of debts as well. Second, the physical infrastructure of the city was in utter disaster because of the too long time ANUC spent constructing the city"   (Mansour 2002)

Given the below role and responsibilities of ANUC, presented in box 4.1, the role and responsibilities of the General Organisation of Physical Planning GOPP (see footnote 6), the role and responsibilities of the Agency for Research and Projects ARP (see footnote 13), and the role and responsibilities of the Central Organisation for Reconstruction COR (see footnote 5), it is evident that roles and responsibilities of the above planning agencies are overlapping, if not duplicated. Such overlap and duplication of tasks, roles and responsibilities resulted in widespread ill-feeling between planning agencies affiliated to the MOH.

Box 4.1 ANUC Roles and Responsibilities

- Proposing policies and working out plans and programmes of urban development for setting up new towns, and linking them to the plans and programmes of production and services;
- Studying and selecting the most suitable locations for the new towns;
- Organizing and coordinating the negotiations with the agencies, commissions and ministries working in the field of urbanization and its related fields. Also studying and executing regional utilities and services buildings for the new towns;
- Following up the execution of the new towns master plans and overcoming what may obstruct execution of technical or financial difficulties, as well as evaluating the plan's achievements;
- Working out the master plan and detailed plan for the selected sites, also, working a way at carrying out operations and projects through public invitation to foreign or local tenders or through direct contracting according to the rules and regulations of the organization, in addition to this, supervising the execution of such projects either by itself or through the New Town Development Agency (NTDA) found in each new community;
- Considering the best ways to carry out the regional utilities on the sites of the new community in such a manner as to ensure the economic feasibility for the projects included in them, also undertaking land plotting and implementing utilities in the new community, whether by the organization itself or through the NTDAs;
- Raising loans or getting funds according to the rules stated by the law, in addition to any other financial resources allocated for the authority to ensure sufficient finance for the projects;
- Helping in managing and supplying the equipment and materials necessary for carrying out projects;
- Promotion of selling, leasing or utilizing the lands of the new community among Egyptian and foreign investors with the aim of realizing an economic development of the projects.

Source: National Report (1996, p. 1/11); and Ibrahim (1993, pp. 139-140)

First, before the issuing of Presidential Decree 655 of 1980, there was a clear distinction between the roles and responsibilities of ANUC and GOPP. On the one hand, ANUC, as discussed before, was responsible for dealing with separate and independent new communities rather that existing communities and their expansion. On the other hand, GOPP was responsible for supervising Local Governments in preparing physical development plans of existing urban communities. However, since the amendment of GOPP's responsibilities in late 1979, the agency was assigned for, first, preparing the physical development plans of Local Governments rather than just reviewing and approving such plans, and second, preparing the physical plans of new towns and villages as well (see footnote 6).

Such amendment in responsibilities of GOPP was in line with the policy of freeing the public sector from bureaucracy and centralisation promoted by the ODP since 1974 (see chapter 3, section 3.3.1.1). In other words, the agency was substantially converted from being only a service planning agency to be a production planning agency striving like others for profit and competing with other agencies within the MOH and private urban development consultants in winning physical planning contracts and competitions. Such change in role and responsibilities of GOPP and the dedication of much power and authority to the newly established planning agency, ANUC, led to a direct and destructive conflict and ill feeling between the two agencies. With respect to the context of TRC, ANUC was assigned by the Minister, El-Kafrawy, to manage and follow up the formulation and implementation of the physical plans of the City, as a part of its assigned responsibilities.

Second, given the advantageous position the ARP gained after dismissing TAMS in 1978 as well as its role and responsibilities (see footnote 13), a direct conflict between ARP and ANUC was to be expected. ARP was no longer responsible for choosing locations of new urban communities, commission consultancy firms, or follow-up implementation. In this sense, the creation of ANUC meant stripping the ARP of much of its power and authority. Nevertheless, the conflict between ANUC and ARP was much softer than the conflict between ANUC and GOPP.

By Law 59 of 1979, ANUC became the sole owner of state public land dedicated to the construction of the new communities. This meant that all planning activities as such land were controlled by ANUC while planning new urban communities and urban expansions within the boundaries of existing localities was an

open ground for competition between ANUC and GOPP. In this sense ANUC was interested in expanding its authority by seeking the approval of the Minister to assign more land under its ownership, while the GOPP was interested, on the contrary, in shrinking ANUC's authority in order to expand its opportunities in winning more physical planning contracts.

Nevertheless, this was not the same case with respect to the ARP. Since its creation, the ARP was not given the responsibilities for preparing physical plans, as its responsibilities were mainly advisory and coordination responsibilities. In this sense, the ARP was not that much threatened to lose the increased finance that enabled higher salaries paid to staff from physical planning contracts as the case of GOPP, and therefore, its conflict with ANUC was much softer. Madbouly[25] presents the relationship between ANUC, GOPP and ARP as follows:

> "… ANUC was created to be the Central Government executive agency responsible for managing and following up the formulation and implementation process of the physical development plans of the new communities. As an executive agency, it has no capability of carrying out the physical planning of new communities. Therefore, it has the right either to commission any Government agency, such as GOPP, or urban development planning consultancy firm to carry out the physical planning formulation on its behalf; or to commission any Government research agency, such as ARP, to carry out the responsibility of such commissioning of either government planning agency or a private consultant on its behalf" (Madbouly 2002)

From the later quotation, it is evident that ANUC had full control over the context of new urban communities that led, as explained above, to the conflict between ANUC and GOPP. It was also evident that there was a conflict, as explained by Madbouly (2002), between the ARP and GOPP competing over the commissioning process of physical planning contracts. With respect to the case of TRC, ANUC had commissioned the ARP to carry out the commissioning of COPA, to supervise the physical planning formulation of TRC, and review and approve submitted physical plans on its behalf.

Finally, the Central Organisation for Reconstruction (COR) was established in 1974 to carry out the implementation of the ENMP within the 'Priority Regions' (see

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[25] In an interview with the researcher in January and March 2002

footnote 5). Given the role and responsibilities of COR, it is evident that ANUC overtook many of the responsibilities dedicated to COR. This was mainly because of, as Attia (1999) points out, the difficulty in differentiating between 'Priority Regions' which COR was responsible for and the new communities, which ANUC was supposed to be managing. It has to be stressed that the only evidence the research found to support the impact of the above discussed inter-institutional conflict within the MOH on the formulation of the 1982 Plan, was the commissioning of the ARP to supervise and follow up such process instead of the GOPP.

As discussed before, the MOH retained its unique and advantageous position within the Egyptian Administration as the commissioner and manager of human settlements development even after the appointment of El-Kafrawy as its Minister. Nevertheless, it is important to note that such unusual powerful position and piling up responsibilities, resulted in ill feeling with a number of Ministries and Governorates, each of which felt threatened by the MOH to loose their power and authority over agencies and localities under their administrative structure; or even lose the privilege enjoyed by their affiliate agencies and planning departments within localities with respect to regional-local planning formulation. While researching the topic of tourism development policy in the context of the North West Coast, Attia (1999) points out that:

> "…These positions remained (against the MOH) even after Osman left the Ministry, and had direct effects on coordination and implementation of MOH projects […] Other Ministers and Governors were not enthusiastic about coordination with the MOH […] it (the power and authority of MOH) also led to the departure of some experienced key civil servants who found it difficult to accommodate the new Minister's (El-Kafrawy) approach of giving more authority to ANUC and reducing the role of ACR; and ill feeling by some of those who remained within the Ministry towards the consultants who were brought by the Minister […] experts in other institutions did not complement the shortfall of MOH's expertise (mainly social and economic expertise) as a direct result of their conflicting interests due to the overlapping and supplication of responsibilities between institutions"   (Attia 1999, pp. 140-289)

From the above discussion, it emerges that both the inter-institutional and intra-institutional conflict had both a direct and an indirect impact on the formulation of the 1982 Plan. It is also recognised that personal and institutional interests, power and

authority, as well as the institutional arrangements guided and directed both the formulation process and the actions taken by different agencies concerned.

4.2.2.2 Ministry of Planning

The MOP had less and less influence over the formulation of the 1982 Plan especially after the issuing of both Law 59 of 1979 and Law 43 of 1979. On the one hand, Law 43 of 1979 triggered an ongoing conflict between MOP and Ministry of Local Authority over the control of the RPAs. The third clause of the above Law states that economic regions and regional planning agencies are to be affiliates to the Ministry of Local Authority, while the ninth clause in the same Law stresses that such planning agencies are to be headed and controlled by the Minister of Planning, and are to be formed according to his decisions (Arab Republic of Egypt, 1979).

On the other hand, Law 59 of 1979 triggered another ongoing conflict between the MOP and MOH. Given the role and responsibilities assigned to both ANUC and RPAs (see footnote 2), it is clear that there are overlaps and duplications of such roles and responsibilities, which triggered the above conflict. Such conflict increased as a result of the establishment of the department of housing, utilities and urban planning, department of drafting and developing regional plans, and department of following-up the execution of regional plans, as a part of the administrative structure of the RPAs. Meanwhile, it worsened by the establishment of the departments of regional planning studies within the RPAs responsible for drafting and developing physical regional plans as well as socio-economic plans, following up the implementation of such plans and the implementation of the national development plans with each concerned region (see figure 4.3) (Ibrahim 1993).

Given the above discussed and explained power, authority, and unusual advantageous position of the MOH over the MOP in relation to the regional-local physical planning formulation, and the full control of ANUC over the land assigned for the construction of new urban communities by virtue of Law 59 of 1979, it has to be stressed that the MOP's role in the formulation of the 1982 Plan was only to coordinate the needed finance with the Ministry of Finance and other state agencies for the construction of TRC. Nevertheless, such unusual power of the MOH resulted in an intra-institutional conflict between MOP and MOH. The impact of such conflict as

explained by Shaaban[26] was evident in delaying the approval of budget plans directed towards the formulation and implementation of the MOH projects, including the TRC project, and was also evident in the lack of coordination between the two Ministries.

4.2.2.3 Private Sector

During the formulation of the 1982 Plan, the private sector was present in the Tenth of Ramadan Investors Association (TRIA). TRIA was first established in 1978, soon after the start of the implementation process of TRC in 1977, and later was officially declared in 1986 as an independent Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) and non-profitable organisation, under Law 32 of 1964 under the authority and supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. TRIA's members should have industrial establishments or other economic projects (e.g. commercial, agriculture, etc) within TRC. The association was primarily established for, according to Helmy[27], creating a business environment that would enable private sector companies in TRC to achieve a significant role in the process of economic development, tackling various economic and social issues that would have an impact upon the performance of the activities of its members, and providing its members with relevant services. Box 4.2 presents the officially stated activities of TRIA.

Box 4.2 Officially Stated Activities of TRIA

- Publishing all correspondence of importance to the investors received from external agencies.
- Participation of members of the association in conferences, sessions, and meetings organised by TRIA to study their interests.
- Presentation of problems and interests of members to external agencies.
- Formatting of divisions and committees within association regarding the interest of each industrial activity and providing their requirement services.
- Providing the chance to obtain different investment opportunities whether in financing, export, industrial, or commercial activities.
- Carrying out training sessions to serve employees working in the companies and firms within TRC.
- Organising and establishing internal and external exhibitions.
- Organising and reception official or commercial visits to TRC and its industrial areas
- Establishing database about investors activities and their submission to members

Source: TRIA (2000)

During the period of formulation of the 1982 Plan of the heavy industrial area (A), the influence of TRIA on the formulation process took an indirect form. According to Hilal[28], during the late 1970s till 1986, although TRIA had no direct influence on the

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[26] In an interview with the researcher in March 2002
[27] In an interview with the researcher in January and February 2002
[28] In an interview with the researcher in February 2002

urban development process and its related planning decisions in TRC, the association was acting as both a communication centre and public relations office for its members. It was mainly the place where investors could meet to discuss their interests and to empower each other by getting connected to the circle of power and authority within the central government. It can be said that TRIA was the direct result of the ODEP within the context of TRC, alongside the impact of such policy on the collapse of public sector management and the widespread corruption and bureaucracy (see chapter 3, section 3.3.1.1).

The main interests of TRIA during the formulation process of the 1982 Plan were mainly, on the one hand, helping its members to acquire land needed for their investment projects whether through its well connected and well financed members, almost all of whom were ex-ministers (including the Minister of Industry and Technology), top officials, politicians, and senior civil servants. On the other hand, aiding its members to acquire the land they chose, instead of what was actually planned for in terms of location of industrial class and environmental considerations. It has to be mentioned that the investors class was not as homogeneous as it looked, according to Hilal (2002), as the powerful and well connected members could achieve their personal interests without needing extra help from other members within associations, while the less powerful and less connected members were always those who were pushed around seeking help. It was revealed, as will be discussed later on, as a result of such heterogeneous grouping of investors within TRIA, in 1996, the later group of investors cancelled its membership with TRIA and established their own NGO to help those investing in medium and small industries.

The more opportunities manufacturing investors discovered in TRC, the more pressure, mainly through personal connections and financial means, was put on the Central Government to produce and release more industrial land for sale to meet the demand of awaiting investors and land speculators, who seized the opportunity for a fast and easy profit. Yet it has to be stressed that TRIA and its members, at the time, still lacked the official means and tools (or the permission we can say) to penetrate the Central Government's decision-making machine with respect to physical planning formulation process. Nevertheless, it was confirmed that investors interest, with respect to the sizes of industrial plots, was respected by the government, as will be discussed later on.

4.2.2.4 Urban Development Consultant

After submitting the 1978 Master and detailed physical plans, the contracts of both COPA and SWECO came to an end. After the assassination of Sadat in 1981, the MOH re-commissioned the Egyptian consultancy firm COPA to plan the heavy industrial area (A), the medium industrial areas B3 and B4, and the light industrial areas C2, C3, and C4 industrial areas. On the one hand, it has to be stressed that SWECO was not re-commissioned because of the wider change in the economy in the early 1980s (see chapter 3, section 3.1.2). With respect to such change, Attia (1999) explained the actual reasons behind excluding foreign consultancy firms from the planning formulation process of urban development planning project all over Egypt since 1981 as follows:

> "…when the regime changed after Sadat's assassination 1981, Kafrawy's approach changed. Sadat's successor, President Mubarak, initially called for decreasing government expenses, caring for low-income classes, structural adjustment, and economic reform. It was revealed that the President, in his early speeches, gave the impression of a return to socialist ideals. Accordingly, Kafrawy withdraw the ideas of modernisation and openness to the outer world […] The concern for 'not upsetting the regime' to remain in office was stronger than implementing policy objectives" (Attia 1999, p. 294)

On the other hand, clarifying the reason behind the choice of the above industrial areas to be planned is crucial to understand the context within which the government took the decision to re-commission COPA, although the formulation of the 1978 Plan was not that far away. First, it can be said that the growing demand on the specific sizes of industrial plots (small and medium) did not match the supply of such plots with respect to the heavy industrial area (A). Second, all of the industrial plots within both B1 and B2 industrial areas were sold out for manufacturing investment and the construction of C1 area was not started at the time. Such delay in the construction of C1 area was mainly because of the lack of infrastructure provision within its zone. Therefore, the need to plan both C3 and C4 industrial areas, attached to B1 and B2 industrial areas respectively, was extremely urgent. Finally, the reason behind the choice of B3, B4, and C2 industrial areas to be planned was to complete the detailed planning process of all the industrial areas within the first and second stages of implementation to be ahead of demand on the industrial land in the future (see figure 4.14).

Figure 4.14 Location of the Industrial Areas Planned in the 1982 Plan

Source: TRIA (2000)

As discussed before, ANUC commissioned the ARP to supervise and follow up the formulation process of the 1982 Plan. As a result of the direct orders of the Minister at the time, El-Kafrawy, the ARP commissioned the Egyptian consultancy firm COPA to be the urban development consultant for formulating the detailed plans of the industrial areas specified above. Moreover, the ARP, under the full authority and control of El-Kafrawy, identified the terms of reference (TOR) of the contract. It has to be emphasised that the TOR included two main significant conditions that had a direct impact on the formulation process later on.

On the one hand, as discussed before, as the flood plain (*Wadi El-Gafra*) cuts through the heavy industrial area (A), the 1976 report and 1978 Plans and final report recommended the protection of the heavy industrial areas from eventual heavy floods,

calculated at once in 100 years, by restricting the construction of any manufacturing establishments on it, given the risks involved. However, such recommendation was not respected by El-Kafrawy himself, when identifying the TOR of the planning contract:

> "…. I ordered the detailed planning of the flood plain sector within the heavy industrial area when I found the extreme demand on the industrial land […] I did not have this much choice, the political and economic pressure on the MOH was piling up to release more land for sale and we only had limited number of industrial areas according to the master plan of the city" (El-Kafrawy 2002)

On the other hand, the size of the industrial plots within all new industrial areas was identified according to the demand of the market and not to the needs of each industrial class stressed before in the 1978 Plan (see table 4.1). The new sizes of the industrial plots, identified by the MOH (mainly the Minister) and passed on to COPA, varied from 0.8 hectare to 3.8 hectare (Shetawy 2000, p. 245). In this sense, the whole design module of the industrial areas was changed to suit such condition, as stressed by El-Rimaly:

> "…. We had nothing to do with the identification process of the TOR. It was an internal process within the MOH, directed and controlled by Kafrawy. We just signed the contract upon the provided TOR which included the detailed planning of the flood plain sector within the heavy industrial area (A) and the sizes of plots we had to take into consideration while planning […] we could not argue or question such conditions. It was like 'take it or leave it' situation and most probably Kafrawy would have found another consultancy firm to do it for him. So why lose the contract then!" (El-Rimaly 2002)

Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that although such significant impact of the TOR on the planning process with respect to the environmental considerations emphasised in the 1978 Plan, the detailed plans of the industrial areas of the 1982 Plan respected much of the recommendations of the predecessor Plan. First, it respected the location of industrial classes within the broader context of TRC (i.e. the location of the heavy, medium and light industrial areas) according to the environmental considerations of wind direction and buffer zones between the industrial and residential areas stressed before. Second, it also took into consideration the industrial clustering within each industrial area emphasised in the 1978 report, mainly for the environmental risk attached to haphazard location of industries. Third, like the 1978 Plan, the 1982 Plan

emphasised the construction of a service centre within each industrial area to serve manufacturing firms and their workers and employees (See Appendix I).

It should be evident by now that the MOH continued its centralised planning approach when setting the main objectives and design settings of the 1982 Plan trough dictating the TOR of the city. It is also evident that the consultants, COPA, had no chance, or we can say no intentions, to manipulate, question, argue, or even reject such TOR, as it was driven by their personal interests of winning the physical planning contract. In sum, the physical planning process was largely driven and controlled by personal interests, as regards both El-Kafrawy and COPA, more than by national interests. It also has to be emphasised that, like the formulation process of the 1978 Plan, the 1982 Plan excluded some other vital groups in the planning process with respect to the regional-local development planning, as will be discussed in the following sub-section.

4.2.2.5 Excluded Agencies

Although private sector interests were taken into consideration, Local Government agencies and local manufacturing workers interests and agendas were excluded from the formulation process of the 1982 Plan.

First, Local Government agencies within the Governorates and planning and economic Regions within which TRC was located were excluded since the creation of the city (and are still excluded), as a result of the unique context of TRC. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Local Government, here, refers to the Local Authority established by the MOH in 1982 to manage and supervise the implementation process within the TRC site and not to the Local Government institutions and agencies affiliated to Cairo governorate and planning region within which TRC is located (see sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, and chapter 3, section 3.2.2). It also has to be mentioned that between 1977 (i.e. the marking of the start of implementation) and 1982, the Local Authority within the TRC site was composed of no more than seven people appointed by El-Kafrawy to supervise and manage the contractors' activities in the implementation process. El-Sharmah[29] stresses such arrangements as follows:

> "…. Before the issuing of the Ministerial Decree in 1982 regarding the
> establishment of Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority (TRDA),

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[29] In an interview with the researcher in January 2002

we were only six engineers headed by General Shahin, a close friend of
El-Kafrawy, to manage the site and the implementation process"

(El-Sharmah 2002)

Although such arrangements had a major influence over the implementation process discussed in the following chapter, the research did not find any evidence to suggest that such group had any influence (direct or indirect) over the formulation process of the 1982 Plan. This was mainly because, on the one hand, the formulation process of the 1982 Plan was considered to be a Central Government affair rather than a coordinated process between Central and Local Authorities. On the other hand, the Local Authority of site management group was only created to be the nucleus upon which TRDA was established in 1982, as an executive rather than a development agency, as will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter.

Second, local manufacturing workers remained excluded from the formulation process, even with respect to identifying the type of services within each service centre in the industrial areas. Local manufacturing workers here refer to manufacturing workers within cities, governorates, and planning regions planned to supply their surplus of manufacturing workers to TRC industrial areas. This was because the consultant, COPA, dictated such process based upon "scientific standards" as confirmed by El-Rimaly as follows:

> "…. In regards to the services within each industrial area, we (COPA) identified the type of services according to the European planning standards, mainly the Swedish (recommended by SWECO in the 1978 Plan) and the Swiss planning standards […] yes but how could we identify such services in coordination with local manufacturing workers. Not a single constructed manufacturing firm in TRC had started production at the time. Moreover, taking the perceptions and opinions of manufacturing workers within cities, governorates, and planning regions related to the location of TRC about the type of services within the industrial areas would have been a time consuming process, which was not an option to start with"   (El-Rimaly 2002)

4.2.2.6 Concluding Remarks

From the above discussion and analysis, it should be evident that the formulation process of the 1982 Plan followed the rational comprehensive planning approach, in terms of setting the TOR of the city, the identification of the types of services according to scientific rational standards, the exclusion of vital agencies from the formulation

process, the total dependence on expertise, and the centralised decision making dictated by senior civil servants, etc. Despite the centralised nature of the planning process, the private sector indirectly had an effective influence on such process through personal connections with top government officials, politicians, and senior civil servants, as well as by virtue of their financial power. This is to emphasise that despite the dominant control of the Central Government institutions, agencies, and individuals over the formulation process of the 1982 Plan, the allocation of power and resources within the 'triangle of power' started to slightly shift towards the private sector, while local authority remained excluded.

The formulation process was influenced by both the inter-institutional and intra-institutional conflict within the MOH and between the MOH and other Central Government institutions and agencies as a direct result of the unique and advantageous power and authority dedicated to the MOH in general and ANUC specifically. Moreover, it was illustrated that the officially sanctioned overlap and duplication of roles and responsibilities of Central Government institutions and agencies, by the successive Laws in 1979, had much influence on the planning process as well through lack of coordination and ill-feeling generated among different institutions and agencies. Furthermore, personal, institutional interests (political and financial) and short-term benefits were key factors, more than the national public interest, in controlling and directing the formulation process of the 1982 Plan. This was found applicable to Central Government institutions, agencies, and individuals.

In this sense, the above discussion shows that political expediency determined many of the actions of key institutions, agencies and individuals involved in the formulation process of the 1982 Plan. The concessions that were awarded to ANUC to gain more power and authority over the already established planning agencies were major constraints to the formulation process when ANUC dictated almost all aspects of the process under the authority of the Minister. Also the desire to remain in authority influenced the direction of the planning process and prioritising objectives (e.g. the orders given by El-Kafrawy to expand the heavy industrial area on the flood plain sector despite the environmental risks involved, and the subject of re-commissioning SWECO as discussed above).

Nevertheless, the research found evidence, supported by many documented cases and events, that not only the institutional arrangements and power structures were

constraining the actions of agencies and institutions involved to achieve their political and economic agendas and interests but they were also enabling specific agencies and individuals to gain more power, influence, and authority over other involved agencies. This depended upon the level of personal and institutional connections with top government officials and politicians. This is to stress that the theoretical principles of the structuration theory, discussed in chapter 2, were found applicable in the context of the formulation process of both the 1982 Plan and the 1978 Plan.

4.2.3 The 1999 Physical Planning Formulation

After the relative economic stability of the mid 1990s, the Local Authority (TRDA) backed by the Board of Trustees (BOT)[30], sent an official request to ANUC asking for a plan for the extension of the heavy industrial area (A) as well as the third and fourth stages of the city. This was mainly, as confirmed by, among many others, Mikhaeil[31], Abdel-Maksoud[32], El-Faramawy[33], El-Sharmah (2002), Saadeldin (2002), Mansour (2002), because of the high demand on both the industrial and residential land. It can be said that the main objective of the physical plan for such extension was, like the 1982 Plan, to keep ahead of demand. The words of the head of the industrial planning department of TRC reveal the following:

> "… the planning process follows powerful political and economic interests and not scientific interests. Not a single non-biased official evaluation was carried out with respect to the formulation and implementation process of the physical planning […] during the mid 1990s, we were selling more than 100 industrial plots/day, although such figure dropped dramatically to 10 plots/year since 2001. Given such boom and yet the political and economic pressure in the mid 1990s, TRDA requested the MOH to approve and commission the physical planning formulation process of the industrial extension to keep ahead of the rising demand" (Abdel-Hakam 2002)

The formulation of the 1999 Plan included some new powerful institutions as well as agencies established during the 1980s and 1990s as presented in figure 4.15. Such new and existing agencies, like the case of ANUC and GOPP, had evident

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[30] TRDA and BOT were newly established affiliates to ANUC since 1982 and 1986 respectively. The role, responsibility, and interests of the two agencies will be discussed in further detail in the context of the Local Authority discussion.

[31] In an interview with the researcher in February 2002
[32] In an interview with the researcher in January 2002
[33] In an interview with the researcher in February 2002

political conflict, which had much impact on the formulation process. This was mainly because of first, the empowerment of some agencies while weakening others. Second, the assignment of a new Minister of MOH in 1993, Mohamed Ibrahim Soliman, who had a different perception than his predecessor (El-Kafrawy) and held a different set of values and interests in relation to the physical planning process of the MOH projects. Third, the dramatic change in the political economy of Egypt that took place in the early 1990s with the introduction of the ERSAP (see chapter 3, section 3.3.2) and its unique impact on the state-private sector relationship (see chapter 3, section 3.4). In the following sub-sections, each institution and agency involved in the formulation of the 1999 physical plan will be analysed in the context of power structures and its interests.

Figure 4.15 Institutional Arrangements Guiding the 1999 Physical Plan Formulation

MOH	Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities	TRDA	Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority
ANUC	Agency for New Urban Communities	BOT	Board of Trustees
ARP	Agency for Research and Projects	TRIA	Tenth of Ramadan Investors Association
ASMINC	Association for Developing Small and Medium-Scale Industries in the New Cities		

4.2.3.1 Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities

This sub-section discusses and analyses the change that happened in the institutional arrangements of the MOH during the 1980s and 1990s and the inter-institutional and intra-institutional power structures within the MOH and the Egyptian Administration respectively as well as individual and institutional interests. To achieve such aim, this subsection mainly discusses two substantial topics that had a major influence on the formulation process. First, it discusses the change in the attitude of the MOH towards market processes and the private sector alongside the change in the national political economy since the early 1990s analysed before. This was associated

with the appointment of Soliman in 1993 as Minister. Second, it also discusses the substantial change within the organisational and administrative structure of the MOH and the political conflict that arose from such change.

As discussed before in chapter 3, section 3.3.2, in the early 1990s Egypt was forced to adopt the ERSAP in an attempt to face its human settlements and economic challenges and to rescue the deteriorating and fast collapsing economy. It was also emphasised that since the adoption of such national development policy (ERSAP), the main focus of the Government was to free the economy and give the lead to the private sector in the development process. Salheen[34] explains the link between such economic and political context and urban development policy at the time:

> "… Since 1991, the social aspect of the development process can be recognised as a great delusion, as it was (is) used only for national security reasons and for power and authority protection […] the only aims and objectives of the Government in relation to urban development policies since that date, yet so far, were: first, increasing state revenues by introducing several marketing schemes in the process of urban development. Second, getting rid of the responsibility of land of the new urban communities […] For those two objectives, Ibrahim Soliman was appointed as Minister of MOH in 1993, after 17 years of El-Kafrawy in power […] you can say that El-Kafrawy could not deliver what was needed, he just could not 'hit the nail'; and not to mention the magnitude of the earthquake catastrophe in October 12, 1992, which was mainly blamed on the MOH"   (Salheen 2002)

Many academics, senior civil servants, politicians, and urban development consultants, interviewed in the fieldwork trip, confirmed the above claims by Salheen (2002). Since his first day in office, Soliman started to construct the new agenda and interests of the MOH emphasising the important role of the private sector in urban development. According to Sorour (2002), Soliman's equation to urban development is:

> "… the new towns would never be able to survive if its management approach remained the same. We have to attract the rich upper class to those new towns. The low and middle-income class can never live alone. They need the rich upper class to provide the needed investment that would produce job opportunities for them and financial resources for the city development. One rich upper class family can sustain more than four low and middle-income class families […] Soliman changed

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[34] In an interview with the researcher in January 2002

the prime 'role of the game'. The new role is to plan to sell the new towns both at the national and international levels, and not to plan for development" (Sorour 2002)

In October 1994, the Ministry of Reconstruction and New Communities and the Ministry of State for Housing and Utilities were merged under the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and New Communities headed by Mohamed Soliman (see figure 4.8). Since 1978 till 1994, the organisational structure of the MOH was not changed, despite the many newly established executive agencies under the authority of both ANUC and COR. After merger, the organisational structure of the MOH changed dramatically, as presented in figure 4.16. Three substantial changes took place: first, the organisational structure of the MOH was divided into two main divisions (i.e. the housing and infrastructure division and the reconstruction and new communities division), which reflects the merging of the two Ministries. Second, the creation of TRDA and BOT and the resulting ongoing conflict between them.

Figure 4.16 Organisational Chart of the MOH since 1994

ACR	Advisory Committee for Reconstruction
ARP	Agency for Research and Projects
GOPP	General Organisation for Physical Planning
COR	Central Organisation for Reconstruction
ANUC	Agency for New Urban Communities
NTDA	New Towns Development Authority
ATV	Agency for Toristic Villages
APO/ANUC	Agency for the Protection of Ownership of ANUC in the North West Coast Region
NWCDA	North West Coast Development Authority

Source: The Development and Construction Map (1998)

Third, although headed by the Minister in person, ANUC lost some of its privilege to the COR. This was considered as a natural and direct result of the high number of responsibilities assigned to ANUC during Kafrawy's term in office. Therefore, on the one hand, since 1993, ANUC was only responsible for the construction and management of the new towns, while supervising and controlling eighteen New Towns Development Authorities (NTDAs) established successively since 1982 when El-Kafrawy issued Ministerial Decree 36 of 1982 regarding the establishment of NTDA in TRC and Sadat City[35]. On the other hand, the COR became the agency responsible for supervising, following up and managing the construction of 'Priority Regions' through its affiliates, the New Regions Development Agencies (NRDAs), and for managing the construction within Governorates and Localities through its established 72 building and construction agencies.

It has to be stressed that despite such substantial change within the organisational chart of the MOH, the above discussed inter-institutional and intra-institutional conflict within the MOH and between the MOH and other Ministries during the formulation of the 1982 Plan remained unchanged (see section 4.2.2.1). Despite the relatively clear defined roles and responsibilities of ANUC, GOPP, and ARP alongside the new organisational chart, the ill feeling, lack of coordination, and political and economic conflict remained the same. For instance, this research has found that the Minister of MOH commissioned the GOPP, as the chairman of ANUC by virtue of Law 59 of 1979 through the ARP to be the main urban development consultancy agency responsible for the formulation of the 2003 Physical Plan of TRC[36]. Paradoxically, both the ARP and GOPP were not informed by the existing 1999 Plan. It was revealed that both lacked the required technical and managerial skills to manage the formulation process of the 2003 plan. This is evident in the words of the senior project manager within ARP:

> "… I do not know what planning means, as I am a civil engineer. I am
> trying to know more about planning by reading the reports of new
> communities submitted to the ARP in the past […] I have no idea that
> the city had an updated physical plan in 1999 and I did not even visit
> the city to be frank […] the new proposal plan looks awful. It is like

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[35] Further detailed discussion regarding the organisational chart, role, responsibility and power of the NTDAs is presented later on.

[36] At the time of the fieldwork, the 2003 physical plan of TRC was not finalised or approved by the MOH. A preliminary report was the only submitted document to ARP in late April 2002 and had not been approved yet.

someone was enjoying a 'cut and paste' game […] the chairman of TRDA and the chairman of GOPP are the 'only' people who have the authority and power to reject, ask for editing, or approve such proposal. My job is only the coordination between GOPP and ANUC and not taking decisions"   (El-Korashy 2002)

Moreover, given the claim about the decisions regarding the approval of the plan, it was revealed by, Fouad Madbouly, the vice-chairman of the GOPP that the future 2003 Plan has to be reviewed and approved by a steering committee formed by the ARP, and mainly by the very same senior manager in ARP (El-Korashy)! Such committee is expected to include representatives of TRDA, GOPP, as the consultant, and a large number of the TRC investors and to report its their feedback to ANUC.

The formulation of the 1999 Plan was commissioned to the Egyptian consultancy firm AAW through the very same ARP. Given the above statement of the senior project manager in ARP regarding her lack of knowledge about the 1999 Plan, it is evident that there is a clear lack of coordination not only between agencies within the MOH but also within the same agency's departments and even the individuals within the same department. The vice-chairman of ANUC says that the Ministry changed its approach to the physical planning of the new cities, including TRC, since the mid 1990s. The new approach was mainly directed towards preparing physical plans that are based on short-term goals while being flexible to coup with the fast changing political and economic environment. Selling the city internationally and nationally to foreign and domestic entrepreneurs and investors became the main focus of the whole planning process. Such new approach, as emphasised by Madbouly (2002), influenced the formulation process of the 1999 Plan:

"… the goals of the 1999 physical plan were short-term goals and objectives because the context within which TRC, like all other new communities, had been developing, was rapidly changing. Identifying short-term goals and objectives gave us the flexibility to re-plan the city in case of rapid or sudden change in the national political and economic environment. It is not only here in Egypt that we follow such approach; it is applied all over the developed world such as in the USA and UK. Long-term planning is no longer valid as the change in the global political, economic and social context is dramatically and rapidly changing"   (Madbouly 2002)

From the above discussion and the previously discussed adoption of the ERSAP in 1991, Egypt as membership of the WTO in 1995, and the many new Laws and regulations pushing towards globalisation and privatisation, it seems that the MOH's new approach towards the physical planning formulation falls within the settings and principles of the 'entrepreneurial planning' approach discussed in chapter 2.5.4. Such recognition will be confirmed and emphasised while discussing other planning agencies in the following sub-sections.

4.2.3.2 Local Authorities

Two Local Authorities planning agencies were involved in the formulation process of the 1999 Plan: Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority (TRDA) and the Board of Trustees (BOT). Besides discussing and exploring the power structure between the two agencies and their institutional interests, this section provides their composition, sources of fund, roles and responsibilities in the urban development process, and their relationship with the Central Government institutions and agencies.

Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority (TRDA)

As discussed before in section 4.2.2.5, the Minister of the MOH, El-Kafrawy, issued Ministerial Decree 36 of 1982 regarding the creation of the development authority both in TRC and Sadat City. Law 59 of 1979 gave the full authority and power to the Minister of the MOH to create a sort of temporary Local Government agency within each newly established new town until the transfer of its development responsibilities to the Ministry of Local Affairs affiliated to which all Governorates and Localities. By virtue of Law 59 of 1979, the TRDA, like all other New Town Development Authorities (NTDAs), is considered a branch of ANUC. It was assigned with supervising all implementation activities and evaluating their operations while strictly implementing physical plans and socio-economic planning programmes approved by ANUC. It was also assigned with representing ANUC in contracts, applying for loans to the Investment Bank through the Housing and Construction Fund, preparing the draft annual budget of the TRC, and presenting the final balance budget to concerned authorities. In other words, it was created to imitate the role and responsibilities of the Local Authorities within governorates till transferring the TRC development responsibility to the Ministry of Local Affairs and then to either Cairo Governorate or Sharkya Governorate.

The delay of the establishment of such agency since 1977 (i.e. the starting date of implementation) was due to the special context in which the city was developed and its plan implemented. This is clearly illustrated in the words of El-Kafrawy as follows:

"… although we officially started the implementation in 1977 when President Sadat visited the City, TRDA was officially established in 1982. There was no need to establish such agency before 1982, as the city was not ready yet. Between 1977 and 1982, we were just carrying out the construction process of the residential neighbourhoods and its services and laying down the main infrastructure utilities within both the residential and industrial areas […] Once the first district and its services were constructed and the responsibilities of such services were transferred to the concerned Ministries, it was extremely urgent to establish TRDA to manage the city's socio-economic (e.g. health services, education, post office, police station, etc) aspects of development while continuing the physical implementation of the master plan"   (El-Kafrawy 2002)

Figure 4.17 Organisational Chart of Prototype New Towns Development Authority

Source: TRDA (2002)

From figure 4.17, it is seen that the TRDA is composed of five main divisions: the Chairman division; Projects Affairs; Execution Affairs; Administrative, Financial, and Property Affairs; and Development and Management Affairs. According to Ibrahim

(1993) and Amin (1986), the Chairman of the TRDA had to approve every single planning and administrative decision within the TRC, while having the authority to suggest socio-economic projects and physical planning criteria and standards within TRC. Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that despite such absolute centralisation of power dedicated to the Chairman, he/she has no authority to set or even modify the socio-economic and physical planning policies and plans prepared for and approved by the MOH through its affiliate ANUC. Moreover, by virtue of the Ministerial Decree concerning the creation of TRDA, the Chairman has no authority or power to evaluate the implementation process of either the residential or industrial services. It can be said that the role of the Chairman of TRDA is officially considered to be mostly administrative and organisational.

As noted, TRDA comprises five central departments, which in turn are divided into a number of general departments. Ibrahim (1993) emphasises that such division and sub-division were decided upon to match the policy, adopted by the Central Government during the 1970s and 1980s, of providing jobs for high cadre personnel (mainly early-retired army officers) more than being an administrative necessity coping with volumes of work. It was also revealed that a number of those departments do not exist while others have no work or were assigned with different responsibilities than those officially stated.

However, Attia (1999) and Ibrahim (1993) point out that there is a contradiction in the organisational structure of the NTDAs (including TRDA), in the sense that it is not clear whether they are considered to be executive agencies or agencies that have the power and authority to set and implement policies and programmes within an independent management system. Such confusion over the role of NTDAs and their affiliated central departments resulted from the non-issuing of the executive resolution of Law 59 of 1979, which was supposed to identify in full details the roles and responsibilities of the above agency and its affiliates. It is only article 44 in Law 59 of 1979 that mentioned the issue of the organisational and administrative chart of the New Towns Development Authorities in general with no specific reference to any of the new towns, including TRC.

According to some ex-chairmen of TRDA (i.e. Mansour 2002, Saeid 2002, and Shehatah 2002) interviewed for this study, NTDAs have no investment capabilities and they have to rely upon, on the one hand, the annual budget assigned for either the MOH

or the planning and economic regions (i.e. Greater Cairo Region and Suez Canal and Sinai Region) within which TRC is located. On the other hand, they had to rely on loans from the Investment Bank affiliated to the Ministry of Finance in coordination with the Housing and Construction Fund. This was explained by Mansour as follows:

> "…. The MOP is responsible for financing the construction of regional public infrastructure and the main infrastructure and public buildings within TRC. As regards the regional public infrastructure, the MOP provides, according to the five-years national budget plan, quarterly instalments for its construction, while allocating yearly instalments, through the MOH and other concerned Ministries, for the construction of public services' buildings within TRC borders. However, in case of shortage of funds during the implementation process, the Minister of MOH either directly contacts the Minister of MOP for extra funds, or submits a request for a loan to the National Investment Bank through the Housing and Construction Fund within the MOH to be approved by the MOP and Ministry of Finance"   (Mansour 2002)

Given the above-discussed legal shortcomings of Law 59 of 1979 and the absolute financial dependence on the MOH (i.e. through the annual budget), the roles and responsibilities assigned for each department and central department within TRDA were identified and controlled by its Chairman, whose absolute loyalty is a natural and guaranteed affiliate to the senior civil servants in ANUC and the Minister. In this sense, ANUC and its Chairman, the Minister, maintained the full authority and control over the physical and socio-economic planning and administrative decisions within TRC.

Nevertheless, the research found evidence that despite the above discussed legal, administrative, and financial constraints, TRDA and its successive chairmen enjoyed absolute power and authority over the socio-economic and physical planning   decisions within TRC since its creation till 1986, as will be shown in the discussion about the implementation process in chapter 5. TRDA and its successive chairmen started to be continuously weakened and stripped of their power and authority since the establishment of the Board of Trustees (BOT) in 1986 as will be illustrated below. Given the assigned responsibility of TRDA regarding the suggestion of physical planning criteria and standards, TRDA was the concerned planning agency, backed by the BOT, that sent the official physical planning request to ANUC to approve the start of the commissioning of urban development consultancy firm regarding the formulation of the 1999 Plan. However, to be able to understand the actual role of TRDA in the

formulation process, it is crucial to clarify the nature of the relationship between TRDA, BOT, and TRIA as discussed in further detail in the following sub-sections.

Board of Trustees (BOT)

As discussed in chapter 3, section 3.3, the year 1986 witnessed the first actual attempts towards adoption of ERSAP, including government measures to adjust the economy towards the application of such policy, such as freezing salaries of government employees, gradual decrease of subsidies, and lifting of price controls. As also discussed before, such measures and actions towards cutting down on social welfare resulted in the largest ever-witnessed mutiny of the Central Security Forces against the state in 1986. As a consequence, the government took the decision to neutralise, and even abandon, the conditions of the IMF credit packages and the adoption of the ERSAP. Nevertheless, the economic situation continued to deteriorate, where the effect of the collapse of international oil prices and the military unrest within the Gulf and Middle East area in the late 1980s and early 1990s continued to hit hard the Egyptian economy.

Given such background, El-Kafrawy introduced the BOT agency within each new community to keep in line with the above-mentioned Central Government measures in the mid 1980s that aimed at giving an active role to the private sector institutions and entrepreneurs in the development processes. The idea was to introduce a new type of agency through which entrepreneurs would be able to participate actively in the decision-making process, though still under Central Government control. As a consequence, in 1986, the Minister of MOH at the time, El-Kafrawy, issued Ministerial Decree 101 regarding the establishment of the Board of Trustees (BOT) for the TRC to be headed by the Deputy Chairman of ANUC for economic, financial and administrative affairs, and composed of 18 members representing the following agencies:

1. ANUC (3 members)
2. TRIA (6 members)
3. Representatives of the concerned Ministries to which public services belong (4 members)
4. Manufacturing workers (3 members)
5. Housewives representative (1 member)
6. Youth representative (1 member)

Box 4.3 Role and Responsibilities of the Board of Trustees

- Propose the necessary development plans, projects, and programmes and following up their implementation
- Assisting TRDA to implement the construction plans in different stages
- Participating in the preparation of development programmes of services
- Proposing a stable and clear policy for TRC according to long and short-term objectives
- Solving the problems of settlers as well as those of investors with respect to services and infrastructure utilities within TRC
- Planning for the best way possible to develop and invest in TRC and supervising the development projects that could be implemented by local investors
- Recommending and proposing the financial and administrative systems that would ensure a balanced and comprehensive development in TRC within the following fields:
    - Assigning land for housing and public services projects within the framework of the approved master plan and the priorities of its implementation
    - Setting the general rules and regulations to manage and utilise land in the light of the related Laws and Regulations while proposing the implementation priorities in order to achieve the coordination and integration of different projects
    - Setting the necessary procedures to maintain and manage the state properties and to regulate their investment and disposal
    - Setting the rules for granting the rewards to the employees of the development and service activities

Source: Arab Republic of Egypt (1986)

It can be said that as TRDA was established to mirror the functions of Local Authorities within each Governorate, the BOT was established to imitate the Local Public Council within each city. This is evident when reviewing the role and responsibilities assigned to BOT, as presented in box 4.3. The relative importance of Tenth of Ramadan Investors Association (TRIA) and its influential role over the decision-making process within the BOT is evident, as the number of investors and manufacturing workers represent half of the members of the Board. When interviewed, Mahrous (2002), the Board Secretary, stated that the representatives of the manufacturing workers used to be those chosen by TRIA from the manufacturing workers within industrial establishments owned by its members and not chosen by general elections held among all workers. In this sense, the loyalty of the three members representing manufacturing workers to TRIA was guaranteed and secured. It was also revealed that it was the same case with both housewives and youth representatives as chosen by the Chairman of TRDA to guarantee their loyalty.

Given the role and responsibilities of the BOT, it is evident that BOT undertook much of the responsibilities of TRDA and its Chairman. By the virtue of Ministerial Decree 101 of 1986, the Chairman of TRDA has no influence over the decisions of the BOT as not being even a member of such Board. Nevertheless, despite such exclusion of the Chairman of TRDA from the BOT, El-Sharmah (2002) revealed that the

Chairman of TRDA retained his power and authority over the decision-making process within TRC, as he had to approve and authorise all decisions regarding the physical planning aspect of development. It is also important to note that there was an evident power conflict created after the establishment of such Board between the Chairman of TRDA who enjoyed a fairly close relationship with the Minister, and the Vice-Minister for economic, financial and administrative affairs, as the Chairman of the BOT. It can be said that the decisions regarding the physical planning aspect of development within TRC, till the early 1990s, depended upon the relative power of the above three persons, in terms of personal and family connections with the administration elite circle, as confirmed by Mahrous:

> "… Fouaad Osman El-Ashry, Abdel-Aziz Helmy, Mohammed Abdel-Latif, and Hassan Abdel-Metaal (the successive Chairmen of the BOT from 1986 till 1994, as Vice-Minister for economic, financial and administrative affairs) barely attended the regular meetings of the BOT […] although the Ministerial Decree 101 in 1986 states that in case of the Chairman's absence the elder member has to chair the BOT meeting, it was usually left to the Chairman of TRDA to chair the meeting on behalf of the Vice-Minister given his administrative position. All decisions regarding the physical planning development were usually decided upon directly between the Chairmen of the TRDA and the Minister as they usually enjoyed close friendship and family connections, which gave the Chairmen of TRDA direct and full access to the Minister at anytime as well as the Vice-Minister"
>
> (Mahrous 2002)

Moreover, although Ministerial Decree 101 of 1986 clearly identified the rules and regulations that govern the process of decision-making within the BOT as presented in box 4.4, it is clear that the decision making process followed a different sequence of events and procedures, as the Chairman of TRDA kept his power and authority over both the physical and socio-economic planning development decisions. Since the establishment of the BOT, there has been a clear separation between the socio-economic and physical planning sides of development. While TRDA retained its power and authority over the physical side of development, the BOT, through the representatives of the concerned Ministries, had power and authority over socio-economic development. In either case, the Chairman of TRDA enjoyed the control and authority over both aspects of development through his official post and through his personal and

family connections with the Minister, his Deputies, and other senior civil servants and politicians.

Box 4.4 Rules and Regulations that Govern the Decision-making Process of the BOT

- The BOT is to be formed for three years period starting from the date of the first meeting and has to be re-formulated within 60 days before the end of the above period.
- The BOT should have regular monthly meetings (at least ones a month) called for by its Chairman. Also there can be urgent meetings called for by either its Chairman or two third of its members that might be held outside the city in the condition that all the members should be notified no less than three days before the date of the meeting.
- The BOT has the right and authority to invite whoever recognised to be of great benefit to the meeting provided his/her experience, however, without having any voting power
- The BOT meeting would be considered illegal without attending the majority of its members. The decisions should be taken on a majority basis of the attended members. Nevertheless, in case of equal votes, the side that includes the vote of the Chairman would be considered the valid decision. The decisions of the BOT should be valid and final; and should be reported to the Chairman of ANUC (i.e. the Minister) within one week of its issuing. The Minister has the authority to object, modify, or reject such decisions within 10 days of its delivery to ANUC. If the BOT did not receive any response from the Minister within the above 10 days, such decisions should be considered as valid and final as Ministerial decisions.
- In case of the absence of the Chairman of the BOT, the elder of the attended members should chair the meeting and overtook the Chairman's role and responsibilities
- The BOT has the right to form internal committees from its members that could be assigned for some of its responsibilities.
- The members of the BOT could dedicate the power and authority of the BOT to its Chairman to take decision on their behalf during the whole period of its formulation (i.e. three years) or within specified periods and related to specific tasks.
- The head of the department of development and management in TRDA is to be a BOT member and the General Secretary of the Board

Source: Arab Republic of Egypt (1986)

Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that the Chairman of TRDA enjoyed such power and authority alongside the rising power and authority of the investors in TRC, on the one hand, through their majority in the BOT, and on the other through their financial and personal connections with the elite circle as discussed before. Given the power and authority of both the Chairman of TRDA and investors, it can be said that there had been a natural and ongoing conflict between such two agencies. Mansour explains such conflict as follows:

> "… the problem here is that all the involved institutions and agencies within BOT used to show their power and authority to gain access to the city's resources (including land) and to advance their institutional and personal agendas. You can say that if the Chairman of TRDA has no backing by the Minister and others in the Central Government, all decisions of the BOT would have been issued in favour of investors"
>
> (Mansour 2002)

It was noticed that Ministerial Decree 101 of 1986, among many other Ministerial Decrees, identified the financial resources and system that would support the BOT. From box 4.5, it is clear that TRIA and its members have the main share in the funding of the BOT. TRIA and its members used such advantageous position as an effective pressure tool in their ongoing conflict with the Chairman of TRDA. This could be understood when knowing that the main interest of the Chairman of TRDA was (is) to show the Chairman of ANUC his positive attitude towards a rapid development of the TRC to guarantee staying in office. In this sense, it can be said that such ongoing conflict would not help the Chairman of TRDA in achieving his personal interests unless he could fight back and had more or less the same level of power and authority as those of TRIA and its members.

Box 4.5 Financial Resources and System of the BOT

A bank account is to be opened for the local development and services in TRC under the control of the BOT, and the following resources would be assigned for:

- The financial resources assigned for the BOT from ANUC
- The annual fees applied to all shops, clubs, commercial establishments, and industrial establishment within TRC according the Law 453 in 1954 as a requirement of obtaining opening or production license. Such annual fees, collected in January every year by TRDA, are to be as follows:
    - 20 piasters/m2 for each industrial plot
    - 200 pounds/year for each class (A) establishment
    - 150 pounds/year for each class (B) establishment
    - 100 pounds/year for each class (C) establishment
    - The classification of establishments is the responsibility of the BOT after consulting TRDA
- The profits of the investment projects managed and funded by the BOT
- All donations of TRIA for the development of the city
- All donations of investors and settlers for the development of the city
- The profits from parties, shows, fairs, and games organised by the BOT
- All other donations of TRIA, its members, and settlers accepted by ANUC
- Other resources assigned for the BOT

The BOT should identify the internal rules and regulations, approved by the Chairman of ANUC, regarding the spending of the above financial resources

The above financial resources are to be considered public money that should be spent within the framework of the responsibilities of the BOT

The withdrawal of money is to be authorised by the Chairman of the BOT or his/her Deputy.

Source: Arab Republic of Egypt (1986, 1990, 1994)

In the late 1990 alongside the Central Government preparation to adopt the ERSAP in the early 1991, Ministerial Decree 74 added new responsibilities and assigned more power and authority to the BOT over TRDA and its Chairman as a consequence. Such Ministerial Decree was mainly issued to implement the practical leading role of the private sector in the urban development process in the new

communities while withdrawing the control of the public sector over such process alongside the basic principles of the ERSAP discussed in the previous chapter. It gave the BOT the authority, first, to follow-up the implementation and urban development process of TRC and to study and continuously review and evaluate the periodical technical, financial, and administrative reports of TRDA. Second, to set the general rules and regulations for TRDA through which it would deal with the public in all aspects and to identify the specific rules and regulations for infrastructure provision in TRC. Third, to apply local tax and public fees on economic activities within TRC and to review, adjust, or cancel existing local tax and public fees within the framework of Law 59 of 1979. Fourth, to suggest the establishment of tax free zones and joint investment companies and projects between TRDA and Arab and Foreign investor and other NTDAs.

Ministerial Decree 74 of 1990 also stated that the Chairman of TRDA would be the Vice-Chairman of the BOT and to chair the meetings in case of Chairman's absence. It has to be mentioned that the Chairman of the BOT was the Vice-Chairman of ANUC, Vice-Minister, for economic, financial and administrative affairs. In this sense, theoretically, the MOH was still in control over of the decisions of the BOT through the loyalty of both the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the BOT. However, in practice this was not ever the case. Given such empowerment of the BOT over TRDA and its Chairman, both TRIA and its members (i.e. investors) had a greater influence on every aspect of the urban development of TRC through their majority within the Board. It can be said that since the issuing of the latter Ministerial Decree, ANUC and its affiliated TRDA lost their absolute control over the urban development process in TRC and all other new communities while marking the start of the total liberalisation of the private sector.

After the official adoption of the ERSAP in early 1991 and the issuing of the many Laws and regulations that followed (see chapter 3, section 3.3.2), upon his appointment as the new Minister in charge in the late 1993 (see figure 4.8), Mohammed Ibrahim Soliman issued two Ministerial Decrees that reduced the power and authority of TRDA and its Chairman to rubble. It transformed TRDA and its Chairman from being a partner (albeit not an equal partner) with the BOT controlling the urban development process in TRC to become an affiliate of the BOT. The Ministerial Decrees 152 and 153 of 1994 assigned more responsibilities, power, and authority to the BOT and its members. First, it was officially confirmed that the Chairman of the BOT must be one

of the investors of TRC and a member of the TRIA chosen by the Minister of the MOH. With respect to the above point, it appears that seeking the satisfaction of the President and other powerful members of the Central Government, the Minister of the MOH appointed the Ex-Minister of Industry, Mohammed Abdel-Wahab, as the Chairman of the BOT for being one of the most active and powerful members of TRIA, the owner of the Egyptian Flat Glass industrial establishment in TRC, and finally his significant political power. Provided such empowerment of TRIA and its members, the authority and power of the Chairman of TRDA was 'stripped to the bare bones'. After the issuing of such Ministerial Decrees in 1994, TRDA and its Chairman lost all of their authority and control over the urban development planning (socio-economic and physical) process within TRC.

Second, the BOT was assigned for, alongside the previously dedicated responsibilities, studying the reasons behind the delay in transferring public services' buildings to the concerned Ministries while having the Minister's power and authority in dealing directly with other Ministers and government agencies. All official letters, reports, and decisions of the BOT in relation to other Ministries and government agencies had to be sent from the BOT office and signed by the Chairman of the BOT and not the Chairman of TRDA since 1994. In other words, TRIA and its members were given the green light to gain direct and unconditional access to the Ministerial rank and above, as confirmed by Helmy (2002) and Hilal as follows:

> "… The power ceiling of TRIA and its members is the Ministerial rank and above. In other words, we are playing with the Ministers, either they show us the green light to raise our power ceiling to higher levels or just stop us from going any further […] all Local Government agencies responsible for services and other Local Authorities agencies including TRDA are afraid of TRIA and its members. This is because they have direct and full access to the Ministerial rank and above"
>
> (Hilal 2002)

It has also to be stressed that although the number of investors within the BOT did not increase, it is by virtue of Ministerial Decree 153 of 1994 that no more manufacturing workers representatives were to be included as members of the BOT. Theoretically, it looks like TRIA and its investors lost their majority in the BOT, as they lost the number of counted votes of appointed manufacturing workers. Practically, it was revealed that all invited experts to the meetings of BOT were (are) only the powerful TRIA members, although officially stressed that such invited members should

have no counted votes. Even without voting powers, the investors would still be able to implement their personal and institutional agendas through, on the one hand, the absolute power dedicated to the Chairman of the BOT, and on the other hand, their personal and institutional well-connected relations with the top elite circle in the Central Government. This is evident in the words of the Chairman of the BOT:

> "… There are 43 members of the BOT, 30 of which are TRIA members including me. The Chairman of TRIA chooses nine members who represent TRIA and I choose the rest. From those members I choose, three investors representing settlers, three investors representing manufacturing workers, another three representing all investors in TRC, and the rest for their experience […] actually the choice of investors, you can say, depends upon so many criteria most of which are related to political and economic reasons, so they have the needed power to help and support me implement the decisions of the BOT […] I take the final list of names and go to the Minister to discuss it. He has the right and authority to modify or add new members […] only in one case I wanted to take one of names out of the list but the Minister refused as such person had higher political connections" (Helmy 2002)

From this quote, it is evident that there was (is) a wide gap between the officially stated rules governing the choice, composition, and number of the members of the BOT as well as the decision-making process and the implemented practice. Such gap is illustrated in: the counted votes of the invited TRIA members; the dramatic number of investors in the BOT (i.e. 3 times the officially stated number), the denial of manufacturing workers to have their own elected representatives while securing their votes to TRIA members, securing the settlers votes to TRIA members, and the absolute power assigned to the Chairman of the BOT as having the absolute and automatic power to decide for the Board without securing the permission of the members.

Such implemented practice, of course backed by Ministers and higher levels, had a major impact on the relationship between the BOT, TRIA and TRDA. It was revealed and confirmed by many interviewees from the different actor groups that the members of TRIA had no appreciation (or even respect) for either TRDA and its chairman or the representatives of the Ministries concerned with different services. It became evident that the change in the relationship between the state institutions and agencies and the private sector at the national level in the early 1990s had a major

impact on the urban development process and its institutions in TRC and the other new communities all over Egypt[37].

In 1995, the Ministerial Decree 33 was issued assigning yet more power to the BOT through re-stating the various financial resources supporting the Board. Two additional funding resources were assigned to the BOT as follows: first, the classification system of economic activities were to be cancelled and instead applying annual public fees (20 piasters/m2) on all land, be it sold or to be sold for industrial, residential, commercial, and services activities. Second, assigning 1% of the total revenue from the sales of land, residential apartments and villas, and commercial shops to finance the BOT activities within TRC. Such additional financial sources gave more authority to the BOT with respect to its investment abilities independent from TRDA and ANUC.

Given the above-discussed change in power structure between TRDA, BOT, and TRIA, it is clear that the decision requesting ANUC to start the physical planning formulation of the 1999 Plan did not come from TRDA in the first place. It was mainly TRIA members and the Chairman of the BOT who directed TRDA, through the BOT decision in the mid 1996, to submit such request. The TOR of the physical planning for the industrial and residential areas was identified in coordination between TRIA and the Chairman of the BOT and then was passed on to TRDA to be attached to the physical planning request to ANUC while being reported directly to and approved by the Minister, as the Chairman of ANUC, through the Chairman of the BOT.

4.2.3.3 The Private Sector: TRIA and its Members

Given the above-discussed environment through which the local physical and socio-economic planning decisions were taken, it is crucial to recognise the important role of the private sector (TRIA and its members) in the urban development process and their influence on such decisions. Also as discussed before, TRIA and its members had gained continuous increase in power and authority at both the local and national levels since the early 1990s after the adoption of the ERSAP. Given this background, a

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[37] It was pointed out that it had become a natural practice to find TRIA's members employ either Ex-Chairmen of TRDA or Chairmen who were still serving their period in office. This was confirmed when revealing that one of the TRIA's members investing in the real-estate sector employed two successive Chairmen of TRDA after completing their term in office, while another member employed three successive Chairmen of TRDA in his manufacturing project. Moreover, not to mention the ever-growing number of TRDA's employees employed by TRIAs investors in either part-time jobs or full-time jobs after their working hours at TRDA.

distinction has to be made between TRIA as an agency and its members as individuals. Such distinction was emphasised in many interviews carried out in the fieldwork period:

> "…. The Association (TRIA) usually interferes in the collective interests of investors. Nevertheless, sometimes it might act on behalf of individual investors. This would depend upon the power of such individuals and their relations with the members of the Board of TRIA […] of course any investor, as a member of TRIA, has the right to ask for the help of TRIA by sending his/her problem to the headquarter in TRC […] make no mistake that TRIA did (does) not deal with individual problems at the same level. Within TRIA, investors used to have an unwritten classification for its members - we would not be better than the Government, would we? The 'Big Fat Cats' would be treated as such and *vice versa*, every class experience different levels of attention […] to be frank, the powerful investors always have the needed power to solve their own problems and do not wait for TRIA's help"   (Hilal 2002)

It can be said that the relationship between TRIA and its powerful individuals is a two-way benefit relationship. TRIA would benefit from the significant political and economic power of its well-connected powerful members, while such individuals would benefit from the outcome of TRIA's fights for positively achieving the collective interests of investors without getting involved in person. This is the same case of the relationship between the state institutions and agencies and TRIA and its members. The state would benefit from the powerful investors of TRIA in investing their financial resource in projects that would generate economic growth and solve some socio-economic problems, while such powerful individuals would benefit from the dedication of more power and authority in the absolute sense. This is clear when knowing that all the powerful well-connected investors in TRC joined the Parliament, as MPs, within the past 10 years (see chapter 3, sections 3.3.2 and 3.4). The above discussed developed relationship between TRIA as an agency, its powerful individual members, and the state institutions and agencies was consistently explained by many of the interviewees within the widely recognised and accepted new Central Government's framework of managing national and local development activities as follows:

> "Show us your financial capabilities and seriousness in investment and take in return all the power, authority, and privilege you aim for"
>
> (Sorour 2002)

Given such 'triangle of power' in the context of TRC (i.e. the central and local government and the private sector institutions, agencies and individuals), the reasons behind the clear distinction between the members of TRIA can be recognised. Such 'triangle of power' not only had a major impact on the way TRIA is structured but also on the way in which the state dealt with the different classes of investors. This impact was illustrated in the criteria with which members of TRIA elect its Board and the criteria with which the Chairman of the BOT (as a powerful well-connected investor) and the Chairman of TRIA choose the members of the BOT[38]. This is illustrated as follows:

> "….the 15 members of the Board of TRIA are elected within a democratic environment. Nevertheless, they are unconsciously chosen for their financial power and well-connected relations with the Ministerial rank and above. Above all they are chosen for being able to fight for the interests of investors in specific and TRIA in general without having much conflict with their personal interests and the interests of the other powerful investors. The Chairman of the Board and his/her Deputy are chosen through an internal elections between the 15 elected members, and of course the same criteria are applied"
>
> (Helmy 2002)

> "…. The Minister of the MOH according to personal, family, and business relationships directly chooses the Chairman of the BOT. This choice is absolutely outside the influence of TRIA and away from its Board […] the choice of the members of the BOT usually carried out in coordination between the chosen Chairman of the BOT and the Board of TRIA […] it was (is) always about business, family, and friendship"
>
> (Hilal 2002)

In late 1996, ANUC received an official request from TRDA to start the formulation of the 1999 Plan according to the suggested preliminary TOR. As discussed before, such TOR had been already reviewed and approved by the Minister through the regular meetings with the Chairman of the BOT. The suggested TOR included two substantial conditions. First, cancelling all the previously planned industrial areas in the third and fourth stages in the 1978 and 1982 Plans. Second, planning the extension of the heavy industrial area southward of the existing area. The two conditions had direct and related links with the interests of powerful investors.

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[38] There is a well-established custom within TRIA to give the chosen Chairman of the BOT an honorary Chairmanship of the Board of TRIA alongside its elected Chairman.

On the one hand, the third and fourth development stages of the residential areas were recommended, like all residential areas all over the new towns at the time, to be high class residential neighbourhoods that would be privately developed by individuals or by investors. Given the evident environmental problems resulting from the industrial areas located either on the edges of or within the residential areas, the powerful investors via the TRIA and the BOT explicitly stated their interest of abandoning the idea of having any industrial areas within the third and fourth development stages, as it would affect the feasibility of carrying out such recommended type of residential areas and dramatically reduce their substantial financial profits.

On the other hand, alongside the relative stability of the Egyptian economy and the investment environment in the mid 1990s, the demand on the industrial land increased dramatically. Such increase in demand was mainly directed towards four main new communities: TRC, 6th of October, Sadat, and Al-Amerya City. This targeted and focused demand increased the competition between such new communities to attract more manufacturing investors to invest within its industrial areas. Nevertheless, despite being the first choice of most of manufacturing investors because of its unique location near the Suez Canal, TRC was the only city of those mentioned that did not have available land to meet such demand at the time. In this position, it has to be mentioned that the level of power of the investors associations, established all over the new communities, depends primarily upon the number of its members and the political and financial power they have. In this sense, TRIA and its members pushed towards the planning of the extension of the heavy industrial area while doing their best in attracting more powerful investors to the TRC. Hence, it has to be stressed that the whole physical planning process was about selling the city to national and international investors and not about social or environmental development. Nevertheless, such trend was not of specific nature to the context of TRC, but since 1993 had been the new national urban development planning trend. This was illustrated in the words of Prof. Abdel Aziz (2002) as follows:

> "…. Since 1993 (i.e. the appointment of Mohammed I Soliman as the Minister of the MOH), the physical development planning tends to be a drawn development and not a planned development – engineering and technical drawings with no social or environmental consideration. All the physical plans of the new and existing towns took a commercial planning approach […] The whole planning system became loose and the state investment resources were directed towards real-estate

investment and selling land instead of industrial development […] ANUC became merely an office for the production of 'take-away' physical plans to serve the interests of the powerful investors with no recognition to the social, environmental, or even economic aspects of development […] it is all about personal and institutional interests of specific agencies and individuals that govern the new trend of the urban development policy all over the country […] managing the state affairs from technical and security perspective is something and from business perspective is another thing"   (Abdel-Aziz 2002)

Support the above quote comes from the fact that TRIA in coordination with their appointed members of the BOT and its Chairman identified the investors' collective interests as well as the powerful individuals' interests to be explicitly stated within the TOR of such plan. In this sense, it is important to emphasise that from the three local planning agencies (i.e. TRIA, powerful individuals investors, and TRDA) only the former two agencies were dictating the identification process of the preliminary conditions of the TOR of the formulation of the 1999 Plan. However, this research found evidence that the third agency (TRDA) was actively involved in finalising the TOR in coordination with ANUC as will be discussed in further detail in the following sub-section.

4.2.3.4 Urban Development Consultant

The above-discussed new approach to physical planning at both the national and local levels, including the TRC, affected the choice of the urban consultancy firm commissioned for the formulation of the 1999 Plan, AAW. The consultancy firm (AAW) had no experience in the area of urban development planning before its commissioning, it was a consultancy firm only for technical infrastructure networks design (i.e. water supply, sewerage, electricity, transportation, and communication networks). Such firm did not even have an urban planning department to start with.

Nevertheless, AAW was commissioned for the formulation of the 1999 Plan for three main reasons. First, the owner of AAW, Prof. Abdel-Warith and his son Dr. Ahmed Abdel-Warith as well as most of his family members are considered to be a well-connected family with the elite circle of the Egyptian administration, starting from the Ministerial rank and upwards. Second, the project manager, Eng. Salah Abdel-Ghany, had a close relationship with the Vice-Chairman of ANUC at the time, Eng. Lila Kamel Barsoom. And finally, such consultancy firm was and is still considered to be

one of the top five Egyptian consultancy firms with respect to technical infrastructure networks design and the to the very close relationship with foreign interests working in Egypt through their aid funded projects. After being commissioned by ANUC through the ARP, AAW started to form its urban planning team headed by Prof. Ali El-Faramawy, a close friend of Ahmed Abdel-Warith. The head of the urban planning team and some of its senior members used to have regular meetings with the planning departments' staff at ANUC and TRDA to discuss in further details the TOR of the city before starting the actual physical planning. During such meetings, additional conditions were added to the TOR with respect to the physical planning of both the heavy industrial area and the residential areas.

As discussed before in chapter 3, sections 3.3.2 and 3.4, there was growing social unrest in Egypt since the early 1990s, which reached its peak around the mid 1990s, after the adoption of the ERSAP and its following new laws and regulation and the rise of the new entrepreneurs' class, which resulted in a growing income gap between social classes. Such social unrest had a significant impact on the formulation process of the 1999 Plan. First, the planning staff of both TRDA and ANUC, controlled by the Minister and directed by the President through the Cabinet, insisted on adding a number of small industrial plots within each newly planned industrial area to encourage the youth and low-income groups to start their own small industrial projects and to be financially supported by flexible loans from Nasser Social Bank. The TOR of such newly imposed industrial plots was centrally identified through coordination between ANUC and TRDA. Second, two districts within the third and fourth development stages were assigned to Mubarak Youth Housing Projects, which were introduced to the context of the New Towns (including TRC) in the mid 1990s to counter the above explained social unrest.

In this sense, as Sorour (2002), Abdel Aziz (2002), El-Khorazaty (2002), Barrada (2002) and Serageldin (2002) stress, the main reason to trigger the action of the Government to influence changes in the TOR of the city's new plan was to cope with and neutralise such growing social unrest. It is also evident that there were double standards applied to the identification process of the physical planning objectives and the TOR. On the one hand, TRIA and the BOT identified the main objectives and the conditions of the TOR so they matched the interests of the TRIA members in general and the powerful individual entrepreneurs specifically, with no interference from the Government (Central and Local). On the other hand, the Association for Developing

Small and Medium-Scale Industries in the New Cities (ASMINC) were not consulted neither were the many small and medium-scale establishments and businesses located in TRC. Nevertheless, the Central Government with the help of TRDA dictated the identification of the TOR conditions with respect to the newly added small industrial plots within each sub-area of the heavy industrial area (A). In separate interviews with the researcher during the fieldtrip, Prof. El-Adley (2002) and Prof. Abdel-Maksoud (2002), and Prof. El-Wakeil (2002) stressed that such double standards reflected the political economy change at the national level and its evident impact on the relationship between the state institutions and agencies and the private sector agencies at the time.

Moreover, many interviewed senior civil servants and the members of the urban development planning consultancy team revealed that the MOH totally marginalized the influence of the Ministry of Industry (MOI) in the formulation process, as it stressed that the classification of the industrial plots would be according to the size of the plots and not to the types of manufacturing activities, as in the case of the 1978 and 1982 Plans. In this sense, the influence of the MOI would be focused only on the implementation process through securing its approval on the assigning of industrial land to manufacturing projects in such new industrial areas. In other words, the MOH channelled the power, authority, and influence of MOI to the newly investing entrepreneurs and not to the formulation and implementation process of the 1999 Plan itself, as will be discussed in further details in the following chapter.

According to some senior members of the physical planning team of the 1999 Plan, such as Prof. El-Adley (2002), Prof. Abdel-Maksoud (2002) and Prof. Fahmy (2002), " AAW was acting as a 'machine like system' only interested in the volumes and numbers of drawings and its deadline submissions rather than the urban development process in all of its aspects". Prof. El-Adley (2002), Prof. Abdel-Maksoud (2002), Prof. Fahmy (2002), and Eng. Abdel-Ghany (2002), the heads of several planning departments in AAW, emphasised that the whole planning formulation process took a linear type process starting from dividing the third and forth stages and the extension of the heavy industrial area to districts and neighbourhoods and sub-industrial areas respectively. Then the design of the preliminary detailed plans that were passed on to the roads department to design the roads cross-sections and network, then back to the urban planning department to readjust the urban detailed plans in coordination with the road network. After the editing and adjustment process, the final detailed plans were passed on to the sewerage, the water supply, and the communication networks

departments to make the necessary designs, then returned back to the urban planning department to review and coordinate all infrastructure and urban detailed plans. Finally all the reviewed physical plans were sent to the ARP for submission (see Appendix I).

In this sense, it is evident that AAW had only technical influence over the formulation process of the 1999 Plan within the strictly provided TOR framework, although with no interest in the socio-economic aspect of the urban development process. AAW consultancy firm managed the formulation process from a pure technical perspective, as the city was seen as a primarily physical environment, created as a single model rather than an incremental creation responding to piecemeal demand. The very same senior members of the planning team state that the AAW firm was only interested in finishing the task of planning on time, as it used to do with other infrastructure networks design projects.

4.2.3.5 Excluded Agencies

Two main groups were excluded from the formulation process of the 1999 Plan: the manufacturing workers group, and the Association for Developing Small and Medium-Scale Industries in the New Cities (ASMINC) and other small and medium-scale manufacturing NGOs.

First, as discussed above that since the establishment of the BOT in 1986 till 1994, the representatives of the manufacturing workers were chosen by TRIA to guarantee their absolute loyalty with respect to the Board's decisions and voting process. It was also illustrated above that although officially blocking the manufacturing workers from having representative members in the BOT since 1994, in practice TRIA seized the chance to increase its influence and power over the BOT decisions by appointing three of its powerful members to represent manufacturing workers with the agreement of the Minister and the Central Government agencies. In this sense, it has to be emphasised that such denial and blocking of access to manufacturing workers to the decision-making process was one of the evident impacts of the change in the national development planning approach, which took place during the late 1980s and early 1990s, on the local urban development process (see chapter 3, sections 3.3.2 and 3.4).

Second, it has to be clarified that although the researcher only interviewed one industrial development NGO (i.e. ASMINC), there are two other local industrial development NGOs that are fully registered under the Law 32 in 1964 (i.e. the

Association for the Development of the Small-Scale Industries in B3 Area, and the Association for Complementary Industries in B3 Area). However, the research found evidence that those latter NGOs have no recognisable activities either at the local level (i.e. within B3 area) or at the city level, and have no offices or representatives within TRC.

ASMINC was established in 1996 after a bitter internal conflict between TRIA's members. As discussed before, TRIA was established in 1986 to look after all investors' interests within TRC, which was not the case as illustrated before. The classification of investors within TRIA, as stated by Eng. Nasr Soliman, the General Manager of ASMINC, resulted in the separation of the small and medium-scale investors from TRIA to establish ASMINC in 1996 to look after the interests of such specific class of investors. It was also revealed that, in retaliation, TRIA directed its efforts to block ASMINC to gain access to the decision-making process within the BOT by continuously showing its lack of power and abilities to carry out major investment projects. Actually the financial arrangements of ASMINC helped such retaliation act to be an easy task for TRIA and its members. Unlike TRIA, ASMINC lacked the required fund to support either the interests of its members or its stated activities[39]. Therefore, it had to depend on external financial resources out of its control that are: the social fund of the Nasser Social Bank, the Friedrich Ebert Sifting Foundation, Ministry of Industry, the European Union, and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Cairo branch. Given the limited power, authority, and financial capabilities of ASMINC, it is not surprising that it was excluded from the formulation process of the 1999 Plan especially in the context of the new state-private sector relationship at the time (see chapter 3, section 3.4).

4.2.3.6 Concluding Remarks

From the above discussions, it becomes evident that the political economy change in the early 1990s after the adoption of the ERSAP had a significant impact on the allocation of power and resources within the 'triangle of power' as well as on the inter-institutional and intra-institutional power structures. It should be evident that some specific powerful private sector agencies and individuals were granted the control over

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[39] There is a wide gap between the financial capabilities and political and economic powers of TRIA and its members and ASMINC and its members. For instance, the annual membership fee of TRIA (apart from the generous donations of its powerful members) is 1000 L.E. compared to 100 L.E. annual membership fee of ASMINC.

the formulation process of the 1999 Plan through the critical dedication of significant political and financial power, while the Central Government institutions, agencies and powerful individuals have lost most of their privileged position enjoyed during the formulation processes of the 1978 and 1982 Plans. Nevertheless, TRDA's role remained absolutely minimal, if not neglected, when TRIA and its powerful members and the MOH opened the way to the private sector agencies and individuals to lead the urban development process in TRC in line with the conditions and objectives of the ERSAP.

On the one hand, the prime objectives and aims of urban development planning at the national level changed dramatically from those in the 1970s and 1980s. It is no longer about planning seeking balanced development with respect to all aspects of planning – it is no longer planning seeking a comprehensive development – but rather merely a technical tool used for producing the type of drawings, plans, and projects that help attracting national and international investments. On the other hand, within the new settings of the above relationship, there was no active role to be played by the state institutions and agencies in the development process as the private sector took full control over the process. The bureaucracy of both the Central Government institutions and agencies and Local Authorities can no longer serve these new aims. Therefore, every government and social institution or agency that would constrain, or even delay, the application of the new settings of social structure and urban development planning approach had to be excluded from the decision-making process.

In many ways, the management of the formulation (as well as the implementation) of the physical development in the new communities since the early 1990s followed much of the steps of the development of the London Docklands area in the UK with respect to the formation of a quasi-government body (i.e. London Dockland Development Cooperation), the exclusion of the Local Authorities from the decision-making process, the affiliation of such newly established board to the Central Government, the explicit stated interests of the powerful investors, and the availability of financial resources to actively develop the decisions and plans of the LDDC away from the control of any State institution or agency (see Brindley *et al* 1996).

The reasons behind the Central Government intervention in the identification process of the TOR of the physical plan were also discussed here. It is clear that such intervention was in line with the minimal required role of the State intervention for correcting inefficiencies while supporting market processes. Nevertheless, it the context

of TRC, and the new communities at large, the state intervention was not only triggered merely to seek the above aims but also to protect the administration itself from social unrest. It became clear that the identification process of the TOR of the 1999 Plan, unlike the 1978 and 1982 Plans, applied two conflicting planning approaches (i.e. the rational comprehensive planning approach and the entrepreneurial planning approach), and two conflicting methodologies as a consequence.

It was also clear that in the absence of the MOP and Local Government agencies, there was a striking lack of concern with the new communities, including TRC, as specialised elements in a national territorial economy or as complexes of social interactions (where normally economic and social interaction determine the physical form rather than the reverse). Moreover, it was recognised that new communities require long periods of gestation (25-30 years) and it becomes almost impossible to sustain programmes of public investment over such long period of time, especially when administrations change and external economic events force radical change in urban development policy at both the national and local levels. Furthermore, it was also recognised that the problem of overlapping and duplication of the role and responsibilities of many public institutions cannot be merely solved by giving more power and authority to some over the others, but need an active coordination between such institutions.

Finally, policies and plans designed to provide economic growth and employment cannot be divorced from the interests and power of those who formulate and implement them. The formal organisation of the State institutions is assumed to serve long-term public interests by creating and maintaining conditions conductive to the efficient use of resources, subordinating the conflicting short-run interests of the capital to the long-run interests of the public. What happened in the context of TRC and the new communities at large was the opposite. The state supported and adopted short-term approaches to urban development to serve its own interests to the neglect of the long-term interests of the public.

CHAPTER 5: PHYSICAL PLANNING PRACTICE:
     THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND THE
     'TRIANGLE OF POWER'

INTRODUCTION

Given the discussion and analysis presented in chapter 4 regarding the physical planning formulation process of the industrial areas in TRC since 1974, it is evident that not only the structural arrangements but also the power structures as well as the interests of the various key actors had a major impact upon such process. It was also empirically shown that the short-term political expediency, at all levels and the continuous shift in the allocation of resources and power within the 'triangle of power' were of the main factors that directed and affected the main goals and objectives of the formulation process. Finally, it was also illustrated that there was a constant deliberate blocking of specific key actors (e.g. manufacturing workers and ASMINC) from gaining access to the decision-making process. Given these observations with respect to the physical planning formulation process, this chapter aims at examining the effect of the above aspects (the continuous shift in the allocation of resources and power within the 'triangle of power', institutional arrangement, power structure, and interests and agendas of the key actors) on the implementation process since 1979. It also aims at exploring the gap between the formulation and implementation process in terms of the excluded key actors from the implementation decision-making process.

It has to be stressed that such examination and analysis of the implementation process, like those of the formulation process, will be presented within the empirical framework of the changing relationship between the state institutions and agencies and private sector individuals and agencies provided in chapter 3 and the analytical framework provided in chapter 2. It would be also illustrated with specific reference to the changing political economy of Egypt since 1974 and the various impacts of the national development planning policies adopted during the 1970s and 1990s (see chapter 3). To achieve the above aims, this chapter is divided into three main sections with respect to the change of the state-private sector relationship. The first section presents the period between 1979 till 1986 where the state institutions had full and direct control over the implementation process. Hence, this period will be named the state-dominated period. The second section provides the analysis of the implementation process in the period of 1986 till 1994, where the state and private sector shared the control over the implementation process. Therefore, this period will be referred to as the transitional period. The final section illustrates the domination and control of the private sector on the implementation process during the period of 1994 till 2002.

5.1 THE DOMINATION OF THE STATE (1979-1986)

Although the implementation process officially started in 29th May 1977 by Sadat's visit to the city and the issuing of the Presidential Decree 259 in 1977 regarding the identification of the TRC location, the actual implementation process of the industrial areas started in the early 1979 after the submission of the final report and all the detailed physical plans of the 1978 Plan. During the period between 1977 and the early 1979, the MOH was actively constructing the regional and main physical infrastructure networks of the city (e.g. water supply, electricity, and sewerage networks) and storing the needed building materials for the construction of the residential neighbourhoods. During this period, as discussed in chapter 5, El-Kafrawy created the TRC implementation team headed by General Shahin and composed of 5-6 civil engineers of different specialisations to manage the implementation process. As discussed before in chapter 5 such team were in direct contact on a day-to-day basis with El-Kafrawy in person. In 1979, by virtue of Law 59 in 1979, ANUC was established to take over the responsibility of the implementation process of the new communities including TRC. The creation of ANUC marked the start of the institutionalisation of the implementation process.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the institutional arrangements that guided the implementation process during the period of 1979 till 1986. Although reference is made to most of the institutions presented in figure 6.1, the research found evidence that the power structure and interests of such institutions changed dramatically with respect to the implementation process. It was revealed that some of the most powerful institutions (e.g. TAMS, ACR, and ARP) involved in the physical planning formulation of the 1978 and 1982 Plans were completely excluded from the implementation process decision-making while some of the less powerful institutions (e.g. TRDA and GOFI) had excessive and unlimited authority and influence over the implementation process. Moreover, the research also found evidence that new institutions were introduced as key institutions affecting the implementation process (i.e. the Prime Ministry and its affiliate GAIFZ).

However, It was also revealed that the power, influence, and interests of some institutions remained unchanged. For instance, the power, influence and interest of the MOP and MOF remained the same in terms of financing the implementation process through the regional annual budget and the construction loans coordinated between the

Housing and Construction Fund and the Ministry of Finance (see chapter 4, section 4.2.3.2). However, as discussed before in chapter 4, section 4.2.1.3, given the unique context through which TRC, as well as all new communities, was created and planned the influence of the MOP and MOF on both the physical planning formulation and implementation process was minimal specially with the direct and personal involvement of President Sadat. Moreover, the power and interest of the MOD regarding the implementation of the railway extension south of the heavy industrial area remained the same (see chapter 4, section 4.2.1.5). The position of the MOD with respect to such extension was criticised by the Vice-Minister of the MOH as follows:

> "…. The railway extension line should have been implemented as a crucial element in fostering the industrialisation process in TRC by targeting those types of leading heavy industries. Although the MOD gave its blessings to the construction of such line, there were so much hustle and philosophical arguments not only regarding its location but also about the cost and benefits of its construction in terms of 'security' aspects […] To be frank, it is all about power, authority, and control over land"   (Madbouly 2002)

Figure 5.1 The Institutional Arrangements Guiding the Implementation Process during the period 1979 - 1986.

MOH	Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities	MOI	Ministry of Industry and Technological Development
ANUC	Agency for New Urban Communities	GOFI	General Organisation for Industrialisation
ARP	Agency for Research and Projects	GAIFZ	General Authority for Investment and Free Zones
ACR	Advisory Committee for Reconstruction	MOP	Ministry of Planning
TAMS	In-house Consultant	RDA	Regional Development Authority
TRDA	Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority	MOF	Ministry of Finance
TRIA	Tenth of Ramadan Investors Association	MOD	Ministry of Defence

Furthermore, the research found evidence that manufacturing workers and Local Government institutions and agencies were still blocked from having any access to the implementation decision-making process during the concerned period. In the following sub-sections, the institutional arrangements, power structure and interests of the key actors will be presented seeking an understanding of the explicit and implicit reasons behind the gap between the original physical plans and the implemented land use patterns.

5.1.1 Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities

Despite the influential role played by TAMS, the ACR and ARP regarding the physical planning formulation of the 1978 and 1982 Plans (see chapter 4, section 4.2.1.2), the above institutions had no role in the implementation process. This was mainly because of, on the one hand, the newly established procedures and regulations regarding the reservation and assigning of land gave ANUC and its affiliates (i.e. NTDAs) full control over the implementation process of the new communities. On the other hand, neither TAMS, nor the ACR, nor ARP had the executive capacity to carry out the management of the implementation process. As discussed before in chapter 4, their role was a consulting one with no executive authority of their own or affiliated to them.

As the Chairman of ANUC as well as having the personal support of the President Sadat, Minister El-Kafrawy had unlimited and unquestioned control over the implementation process. Provided such significant political power dedicated to the Minister, the decisions regarding the implementation process were completely protected from gaining access to by any other state institutions and agencies. El-Kafrawy clearly understood that as long as he could block the access of other state institutions and agencies to the decision-making of the implementation process, he would remain in charge. This understanding, as revealed by Prof. El-Rimaly (2002), Prof. Abdel-Aziz (2002), Prof. Shafak (2002), Prof. Serageldin (2002), and many others, led to the appointment of one of his close friends to head the implementation team of the TRC while assigning him significant authority over the local decision-making of the implementation process.

Some of the early appointed civil engineers within the implementation team interviewed during the fieldtrip, El-Sharma (2002) and Saadeldin (2002), stress that the decisions regarding the implementation process where taken between El-Kafrawy and

General Shahin by phone on a day-to-day basis. They also emphasised that not only the head of the team had such significant powers but also the team members had the same power over the assigning of land as follows:

> "…. I do not know the actual reasons behind the establishment of ANUC or even the BOT […] since the beginning of the implementation process till the mid 1980s, we (the implementation team members) could take decisions no Minister can take today. For instance, when the Prime Ministry (PM Ali Lotfy) asked for the assignment of 40 industrial plots to foreign investors, we decided to sell the land assigned for the service areas within each industrial area as there was a shortage of the industrial plots at the time […] we just needed the approval of the head of the team as this was the practice at the time"
>
> (El-Sharma 2002)

After Sadat's assassination in 1981, his successor, President Mubarak, continued to dedicate his support to the MOH projects at large and specifically the TRC. Such support was seen as politically crucial at the beginning of President Mubarak's period at office as not to be seen in disagreement with Sadat's popular policies at the time (i.e. ENMP and ODEP). In this sense, El-Kafrawy continued to exercise the exact level of power enjoyed at Sadat's era. The only change that took place after Sadat's assassination in 1981, with respect to the institutional arrangements of the implementation process, was the creation of TRDA in 1982. Many observers and analysts stress that the creation of TRDA and other NTDAs affiliated to ANUC was mainly, on the one hand, a direct result of President Mubarak's call to crack down on the ever-growing corruption in the public sector by regulating the relationship between public sector employees and private sector individuals and agencies referred to as '*mafia al-infitah*' (the Mafia of the Open Door Policy) (see Ayubi 1991). On the other hand, its creation was to control and regulate the state expenditure within the urban development sector as the result of the deteriorating economic situation in the 1980s (see chapter 3 for a detailed economic background). Nevertheless, many researchers, analysts, practitioners and scholars emphasise that neither of the above aims were practically realised as will be shown in the following sub-section.

5.1.2 Local Authorities

After the creation of TRDA, the original implementation team continued to form the core of its organisational chart. The head of the implementation team was appointed

as Chairman of TRDA while the other members of the team were assigned for the heads of local departments positions. Even today, three of the five members are still serving in the same positions. The power and authority concentrated in such team was one of the main reasons behind the gap between the planned and implemented land use patterns. This was evident when, as mentioned before, the team members decided on selling the land assigned for services within each industrial area, as it was enough to secure the head of the team's approval to implement any planning decisions in coordination with El-Kafrawy. It was also evident when the implementation team decided on dividing the larger plots to be sold as small plots as a result of the piling demand on such type of plots. The implementation team not only divided the larger plots with no consideration to the industrial location factor but also re-planned the land assigned for, first, the crucial service elements, such as industrial training schools, within the industrial areas and, second, land assigned for buffer areas between residential and industrial areas.

However, putting the whole blame on the local implementation team (i.e. TRDA) would be unfair and incomplete analysis. The research found evidence that not only the implementation team lacked the experience and knowledge about physical planning and its impact on the surrounding environment, but also there was a good deal of political and financial expediency practiced during the implementation process. For instance, it was revealed that in his efforts to secure political support after being assigned as the Minister of the MOH in 1977 and after Sadat's assassination in 1981, El-Kafrawy allowed and dedicated full access to the Prime Ministry and the ministerial rank to the decision-making of the implementation process. This was alongside, as discussed before in chapter 4, sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.2.1, the change of the composition of the ACR membership and powers dedicated to its members. Saadeldin (2002) stress the following:

> ".... The re-planning of the industrial areas and the physical planning decisions were considered to be valid and confirmed by only securing the approval of the Chairman of TRDA. It was considered as an internal process with no interference whatsoever from ANUC and its affiliated technical department […] we were working with no laws or regulations forced upon us. We were just out of the 1973 War period and all of us wanted to do anything we could for the sake of Egypt [….] we cannot deny that there were political and financial benefits governing the implementation process. But this was not only happening in the context of TRC but also all over the new communities"

It is crucial to this research that there is evidence that TRDA and ANUC had conflicting perceptions regarding the role of TRDA with respect to the implementation process. This is clear when presenting the following statements provided by the Vice-Chairman of ANUC, Ex-Chairman of TRDA, and one of the original implementation team's engineers respectively:

"…. Anything however tiny such as joining, dividing, or re-planning industrial plots and areas had (has) to be reported to the technical affairs department in ANUC. This is absolutely clear without a doubt and everyone here in ANUC and TRDA knew about such regulations since the starting of the implementation process"   (Madbouly 2002)

"…. The re-planning and editing of the master plans was the full responsibility and under the absolute authority of TRDA. The technical affairs in ANUC started to interfere in such processes since 2001 where TRDA had to secure its approval on any change however minor"

(Mansour 2002)

"…. Joining, dividing, and re-planning industrial plots and areas had nothing to do with the MOH, ANUC, or the consultant. This issue was done internally within TRDA according to the market processes (demand and supply on industrial land). Eng. Abdel-Hakam was the engineer responsible of such issues in coordination with the successive Chairmen of TRDA, as the head of the industrial planning department […] the only affair that TRDA had to secure the approval of ANUC on was any major change in the master plans such as moving the service areas of the industrial areas from its original place. However, even such major changes till the last year (2001) was done internally as well"

(Saadeldin 2002)

From the above discussions, it is evident that the relationship between ANUC and TRDA was not as it was planned. These agencies had conflicting agendas with respect to the implementation process. ANUC wanted to secure its full control over the implementation process giving the national political significance of TRC at the time, while TRDA wanted to control the process seeking political and financial advantages. In this sense, it was recognised that, on the one hand, in those situations when the Prime Ministry or Ministers were involved seeking personal favours with respect to the assignment of land, it was ANUC who had full and central control over the implementation process backed by the Minister of the MOH in person. On the other

hand, in those situations when investors and senior civil servants were involved, TRDA's employees stepped ahead to provide such favours.

The aim of the creation of TRDA to help in cracking down corruption and reducing public expenditure in the field of urban development proved to be illusive. It was revealed that the business relationship between powerful individuals in the private sector (e.g. Ex-Ministers) and agencies and TRDA's employees continued to be as strong as ever. Many interviewees stress that it has become common practice to find the employees of TRDA (e.g. Chairmen of TRDA) either invest in manufacturing projects within TRC, land speculation, or work in part-time jobs within manufacturing establishments owned by private investors (see chapter 4). Almost all of the interviewees emphasise that the greater the deterioration in the national economy, the more the government (i.e. ANUC and TRDA) employees strengthen their ties with the private sector.

In this sense, decision-making about the implementation process and the gap between the planned and implemented land use patterns as a consequence were not only influenced by the TRDA's personnel lack of experience and planning knowledge but also by the political and financial expediency at all levels in the government. Such political and financial expediency practiced by the civil servants (senior and junior) was alongside the rise of the private sector interest with respect to industrial land. Hilal (2002), a businessman investing in the industrial areas in TRC revealed the following:

> "…. At the beginning of the implementation process and the assigning process of the industrial plots, you had the right to choose the location of your establishment regardless of the environmental risks and social impact […] till now you can still choose the location of your establishment but you need the financial and political power to do so […] if you had such power any plot of land could be assigned to you even if it was already assigned to someone else. It was all about politics and financial power" (Hilal 2002)

It can be said that the relationship developed between government institutions and agencies as well as the relationship between such institutions and powerful individuals and agencies in the private sector were the main reason behind the gap between the planned and implemented land use patterns. In other words, it was this 'triangle of power' that directed and controlled the implementation process.

5.1.3 The Private Sector

As discussed in chapter 4, sections 4.2.2.3 and 4.2.3.3, TRIA was established in 1978 as an independent Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) and non-profit organisation, under the Law 32 in 1964 under the authority and supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. It was originally established to help create a business environment in TRC. As discussed before, in the beginning it acted as the external affairs representative of the TRC investors as well as being the agency through which individual investors could strengthen their personal connections with senior civil servants. Given the discussion in chapter 3, section 3.4, regarding the change in the state-private sector relationship after the launch of the ODEP, it was revealed that such change affected the way in which TRIA and its members dealt with TRDA and ANUC.

As many of the senior civil servants left the public sector to invest privately after the launch of the ODEP in 1974, too many of those officials still enjoyed good contacts (personal and business) with the still serving colleagues at the time. As a consequence, the newly established business environment and its related corruption cases were growing rapidly out of control. It was considered to be common practice to hear about the business relationship between the new entrepreneurs of the 1970s and much of the 1980s and government employees (see chapter 3, section 3.2.1.3). With this background as well as the fact that most of the manufacturing investors in TRC were found to be ex-senior civil servants or family members, it can be easily recognised that the private manufacturing investors used their personal, mainly family relations, and business relationship with their serving colleagues to gain access to the decision making process of allocating industrial land.

It can be said that the higher the contacts individual investors had with the public sector managerial levels, the more the state institutions and agencies influenced the implementation process. For instance, when the Ex-Minister of Industry and Technology decided to invest in TRC, the Minister of the MOH got involved in person in the assigning of land needed for his manufacturing project. It was the same case regarding the assignment of land needed for foreign investors backed by the Prime Ministry as stressed by some of the members of the original local implementation team:

> "…. You can say that the implementation process followed the political
> and financial interests of some of the powerful individuals and agencies
> inside the MOH, including ANUC and TRDA, and the Government

institutions at large [....] for instance, in 1986 the Minister (El-Kafrawy) sent us (TRDA) a Ministerial decision to assign 65 industrial plots to some foreign investment projects requested by the Prime Ministry. We had no choice other than to re-plan and divide the large plots in the heavy industrial area (A1) to some smaller plots the next day to abide with such decree. The same case happened when the Prime Ministry asked the Minister to provide 40 industrial plots to foreign manufacturing investment and we (TRDA) had to re-plan the location of the 4 originally planned schools in the light industrial area (C1)"

(Abdel-Hakam 2002)

In this sense, although the private sector represented in TRIA and its members did not have direct influence on the implementation process, as they were not the official key decision-makers, they had a powerful indirect impact on the decision-making of the implementation process through their political and business connections with the public sector civil servants at all levels. The changes in the national political economy during the 1970s and much of the 1980s, after the launch of the ODEP in 1974, and its impact on the state-private sector relationship, discussed in chapter 3, section 3.4, were echoed at the local level in the context of the TRC implementation process.

5.1.4 General Authority for Investment and Free Zones

As discussed in chapter 4, the early 1970s were years in which Egypt moved closer to the oil-rich Arab States. Coming from small and often weak states, capital imports from Arab oil producers were not felt to be a threat to Egypt. The long experience of colonialism had made many worry of allowing foreign investment by Western firms. Arab oil funds were considered a safe alternative (Cooper 1982; Zaalouk 1989). Therefore, the first stage in liberalisation of foreign investment controls was in the direction of Arab investment, and the Central Authority for Arab Investment and Free Zones was established in 1971. Such newly established agency was affiliated to the Prime Ministry at the time headed by the PM Hegazi with the prime objective to attract and facilitate Arab Investment. The most important economic project promoted by such agency after its establishment was the Suez-Mediterranean oil pipe (SUMED) followed by many of bilateral Egyptian-Arab cooperation such as the Egyptian-Kuwaiti Investment Company and similar companies created as joint venture companies with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar after the 1973 War.

As a result of the break of the Egypt-Arab relationship after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the above agency was renamed as the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAIFZ) to be responsible for approving foreign, both Western and Arab, and joint venture investment projects all over Egypt. However, Ayubi (1991) stresses that in considering the way in which investment capital was utilised in Egypt, it is apparent that foreign and joint venture projects approved by GAIFZ and carried out under the laws of the ODEP did not really fare much better in terms of implementation capacity. This was analysed and explained as follows:

> "…. A number of factors led to the delays in implementation including, notably, problems of dealing with the Egyptian 'bureaucracy'. Investors complained frequently that GAIFZ initially took a long time to study a project before deciding to approve or reject it […] the difficulty was that GAIFZ did not decide by itself on projects, and did not perform all the procedures on its own. Quit often it was to consult the GIA (General Industrialisation Authority) or some other ministries or public organisations that were particularly involved, and to coordinate with a large number of government authorities"
>
> (Ayubi 1991, pp. 46-7)

Box 5.1 The Required Documents for Land Assignment

The required documents:
- The reservation instalment cheque payable to ANUC
- The establishment contract
- The approval of GOFI/GAIFZ and any concerned State institution or agency according to the type of economic activity of the project
- A draft drawing showing the way in which land would be managed and exploited
- A timetable for the construction of the project within maximum period of 3 years
- The needed water supply and electricity of the project
- The feasibility study
- A declaration confirming the obligation to pay of the total land price according to the stated rules and regulations at the time of land assignment

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Source: The Industrial Areas Guide (1995, p. 9)

In 1978, in an attempt to cut down the bureaucracy regarding the approval of foreign and joint venture projects, representatives of the concerned state institutions and agencies (i.e. General Organisation for Industrialisation, Central Bank of Egypt, Ministry Of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, and the Tourism Development Agency) were appointed as members of the board of directors of GAIFZ. New responsibilities were assigned for GAIFZ including: procuring all licenses required for the establishment and operation of investment projects on behalf of investors (e.g.

notarisation of related deeds, issuance of residence permit, and work permits). Second, assisting investors in site selection and land acquisition - whether for agricultural, industrial or touristic activities (see box 5.1). Third, certifying the dates of commencing production and helps the investor to take full advantage of the tax holiday granted according to location (GAIFZ 2003).

Box 5.2 The Required Documents for the Construction Licence

The required documents:
- A copy of the assignment of land document
- A copy of the land contract and the land acquiring log
- A copy of the approval of GOFI/GAIFZ and any concerned State institution or agency according to the type of economic activity of the project
- A copy of the poof of identification
- A copy of the timetable for the construction of the project within maximum period of 2 years starting from the land acquiring date, attached to the manufacturing projects form
- Signing the attached declarations
- A certificate from the Property Affairs Department in TRDA confirming the instalments plan and financial status
- The required Architectural and infrastructure drawings of the project

Source: The Industrial Areas Guide, 1995, p. 10

Provided the above background, it is clear that, on the one hand, foreign and joint venture projects had the full political support of the Prime Ministry in many aspects including the acquiring of land in TRC. On the other hand, the MOH could not, under any circumstances, either assign land or issue licence of construction for foreign and joint venture industrial projects without the approval of GAIFZ (see Boxes 5.1 and 5.2). Moreover, it can be said that like the MOH who was interested in showing the President its achievements regarding the rapid physical construction of the new communities, GAIFZ was mainly interested in showing its efforts in attracting as much foreign (Western and Arab) investment as possible. Given such interests, as discussed before in chapters 3 and 4, the research found evidence that much of the 'red tape' bureaucracy was abandoned and many rules and regulations were sacrificed.

5.1.5 Ministry of Industry and Technological Development

As discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2.1.4, GOFI, an affiliate to the MOI, was actively involved in identifying the industrialisation plans with respect to the type of industries to be implemented in the industrial areas of TRC. It was also illustrated that GOFI had a major influence on the TOR identification of the Physical planning formulation of the 1978 Plan (see chapter 4, section 4.2.1.4).

Like its role in the physical planning formulation process, GOFI was actively involved in the implementation process, on the one hand, as having a permanent representative in the board of directors of GAIFZ to centrally approve foreign and joint venture manufacturing projects. On the other hand, it was assigned for approving projects funded by domestic (public and private) investment to ensure that its industrialisation plan of TRC was fully complied with (see Boxes 5.1 and 5.2). Nevertheless, given the deteriorating state of the economy by the late 1970s till the end of 1980s, it was revealed that such industrialisation plan was completely abandoned for the sake of attracting and encouraging foreign investment. The implementation of some major planned publicly-funded projects in such industrialisation plan, such as the construction of the Egyptian Iron and Steel factory and the Cement factory, were cancelled as a direct result of both the lack of public financial resources and the intra-institutional conflict with other powerful ministries at the time (see chapter 4, sections 4.2.1.4, 4.2.1.5, and 4.2.2.1).

However, it can be said that as the economic situation was rapidly deteriorating during the first half of the 1980s, GOFI started to approve any manufacturing projects regardless of its original industrialisation plan and the environmental risks and potential social impacts involved. In other words, GOFI, of course backed by the Central Government, was desperate to encourage and attract domestic investment, while GAIFZ was doing the same with foreign investment. Actually, such attitude had a devastating impact on the implementation process in TRC, as the requests from both GAIFZ and GOFI in assigning land to investment were dealt with like written laws. No one, regardless of his/her position, could question their approval of investment projects. In this sense, TRDA was obliged to assign the needed land regardless the environmental risks and social impacts involved (see El-Khodary 1995). Given the pressure on TRDA and the previously discussed lack of experience and planning knowledge of its members, the decision to sell the services and buffer areas within the industrial areas and between the industrial and residential areas respectively, as well as the haphazard allocation of industrial projects, could be recognised of the main factors that led to the gap between the planned and implemented land use patterns in the industrial areas.

5.1.6 Excluded Agencies

The research found that most of the agencies that had a major influence over the physical planning formulation process during the 1979s and 1980s were excluded from

the institutional arrangements of the implementation process. First, as discussed above in section 5.1.1, the politically influential ACR, TAMS, and the ARP were blocked from having access to the decision-making of the implementation process. The main reason, as discussed before, was their lack of the required executive power, as being consulting agencies. Second, the Local Government institutions and agencies had no recognised role in the implementation process. They did not even have the right to modify, reject, or discuss the physical plans and their implementation process with respect to the type of economic activities planned to be accommodated within their administrative and planning borders. Given the unique environment through which TRC was created and managed (see chapter 4), providing the Local Government institutions and agencies access to the decision-making process (regarding both the formulation and implementation process) was considered by the Central Government to be a waste of time and no-benefit arrangement. This was because of, among many factors, bureaucracy that would hinder the 'rapid' physical development of the city.

Third, it has also to be stressed that the urban development planning consultants of the 1978 and 1982 Plan (SWECO and COPA) were cut off from the planning process after completing the formulation stage. Such attitude by the Central Government towards the above consultants generated growing ill feelings between the MOH and private consultants. This is illustrated in the words of Prof. El-Rimaly:

> "… All commissioned private (foreign and domestic) urban planning consultants to steer and manage the physical planning formulation of the new towns at large and TRC in specific were blocked from having any access to the decision-making of the implementation process […] our (COPA/SWECO) commissioning contract had no article to guarantee us the right to interfere in the implementation process in any form or shape […] of course this was absolutely expected, as the Government would not need other planning agencies (specially non-governmental agencies) to judge its performance. Therefore, it was decided that the public sector construction companies affiliated to the MOH would act as the contractors and ANUC would be the supervising body […] how come you can be the contractor and supervisor at the same time. We had no possible way to reject or fight back such arrangements"   (El-Rimaly 2002)

Finally, the sample survey done for this research shows that all of the 116 workers confirmed that neither they nor any representative body were consulted in any shape or form with respect to the selling of land assigned for the service centres in the

industrial areas, buffer zones between the industrial and residential areas, the flood plain sector within the heavy industrial areas, and finally to the manufacturing establishments allocation within the industrial areas. Such emphasis was confirmed by 86 percent of the same workers who just gave up being concerned about the implementation process, as their views were (are) not taken into consideration anyway.

5.1.7 Concluding Remarks

During the period 1979 to 1986 state institutions and agencies had a major influence and control over the implementation process. This is not to say that the private sector agencies and individuals had no influence as well but rather to acknowledge the fact that the private sector agencies and individuals had an indirect and unofficial access to the official decision-making process. As illustrated above, such indirect impact was exercised through the powerful well-connected individuals rather than through TRIA. In this sense, the institution, agencies, and individuals within the central and local government dominated the decision-making process of the implementation process and within the 'triangle of power' during the stated period.

Nevertheless, it has also been stressed that despite such domination, there was an evident inter-institutional conflict within the MOH as well as intra-institutional conflict between the Central Government institutions and agencies. The inter-institutional conflict within the MOH, between ANUC and TRDA, had led to a severe lack of coordination and mistrust between the two agencies, widened the gap between the planned and implemented land use patterns through the uncoordinated planning decisions specially in relation to foreign investment projects, and increased the level of corruption within the above agencies through their fights to convince investors about having full control over the implementation process. Although there is much evidence of such conflict and direct confrontation between the two agencies, El-Kafrawy always managed to keep the lid on things through his direct and continuous involvement in the implementation process.

The intra-institutional conflict had also much impact on the implementation process. For instance, the cancellation of the construction of the railway extension line because of the ever-growing power conflict between the MOD and MOI. The growing public expenditure in the area of urban development resulted from the ongoing conflict between the MOH and MOP where the MOP had no control over the needs and

requirements of the MOH, backed by the President, with respect to the financing of the implementation process (see chapter 4, sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3).

As illustrated above, political expediency was manifested when the private sector individuals were found seeking political, financial, and spatial advantages through their financial and political power. It was also manifested when civil servants (seniors and junior) were found seeking personal financial gains by getting involved in land speculation activities and facilitating the assignment and acquiring of land to private sector individuals. It was also evident when senior civil servants were found using the implementation process to seek political gains, for instance, through the reckless efforts to show the President their achievements with respect to attracting foreign and domestic investment; and through allowing the Ministerial rank and higher unlimited access to the decision-making process.

Finally, it has to be stressed that some of the main key actors of the formulation process (e.g. the consultants, TAMS, ACR, and ARP) of the 1978 and 1982 Plans were blocked from having any access to the decision-making process while the manufacturing workers and Local Government institutions and agencies suffered the same practice of exclusion across the planning process (formulation and implementation). The interviewees explained such exclusion from two main angles. On the one hand, there is evidence to support the argument that those agencies were neither executive agencies nor had executive agencies affiliated to them. Therefore, there was institutional constraint that structurally provided the reason behind their exclusion from the decion-making process of the implementation. On the other hand, there is evidence, although only partially valid, to support the idea that such agencies lacked the required political and financial power to secure their engagement in the implementation process. This argument is valid in the case of the Local Government institutions and agencies, the manufacturing workers case, TAMS, ARP, and the urban development consultants. However, on the contrary, it is invalid in the case of the ACR as all of its members had significant political power and influence (see chapter 4, section 4.2.1.2). In this sense, the constraining and enabling factors were evident in the implementation process however connected to specific elements (i.e. the financial and political power).

Given the above remarks, it can be said that the implementation process through the concerned period (1977-1986) was a prime example of the criticisms of the rational comprehensive planning approach (see chapter 2, sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.2.1). This was

evident in the total separation between the formulation and the implementation stages of the planning process and the different attached institutional arrangements as a consequence. It was also evident in the on-going political manipulation of the decision-making process of the implementation as well as the urban planning consultants' lack of control over the above process. Moreover, it was manifested in the lack of recognition of the local and regional context and economic processes when the MOH applied the same type of implementation structure to all new towns and communities.

5.2 THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (1986-1994)

Since the late 1986, two main institutional changes took place that had an impact on the power structure of the institutions and agencies involved in the implementation process. On the one hand, as discussed before in chapter 4, the BOT was created to manage the development process (both physical and socio-economic) of the city. On the other hand, for the first time since the start of the construction of TRC, each industrial establishment in TRC as well as in all the new towns had to acquire a production license for its production processes. The new arrangements of such required license led to the involvement of additional institutions and agencies in the implementation process through the Committee for Industrial Production Licenses (CIPL).

It has to be stressed that the interests and power of the institutions (i.e. MOD, MOF, MOP, MOI, and Prime Ministry) involved in the implementation process during the period of 1986 till 1994, presented in figure 5.2, were not dramatically changed. Each of these retained the same level of involvement in and influence over the implementation process during the period of 1979 till 1986 discussed in the previous section. A significant change in the power structure took place between ANUC, Local Authorities, and TRIA, as more power was dedicated to the private sector while stripped from the public sector both at the central and local levels. Nevertheless, the public sector still retained a degree of control over the implementation process through the control over the physical development of the city while the private sector had much control over the socio-economic development. Such new power structure will be discussed in further detail in the following sub-sections.

As discussed before, ANUC was established in 1979 by virtue of Law 59 to manage and control the physical planning activities within the context of the new communities (see chapter 4, section 4.2.2.1). Since its establishment, there was a heightened conflict with the local implementation team, appointed by El-Kafrawy in

1977, over the control of the implementation process (see sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2). Such conflict was primarily linked to the interests of the powerful private sector agencies and individuals within TRC. It was also shown earlier how ANUC and TRDA shared the dominating position over the implementation process and how and when each was seeking to show off such domination during the period of 1979 till 1986 seeking political and financial gains.

Figure 5.2 The Institutional Arrangements Guiding the Implementation Process during the period 1986 - 1994.

MOH	Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities	TRIA	Tenth of Ramadan Investors Association
ANUC	Agency for New Urban Communities	MOI	Ministry of Industry and Technological Development
ARP	Agency for Research and Projects	GOFI	General Organisation for Industrialisation
ACR	Advisory Committee for Reconstruction	GAIFZ	General Authority for Investment and Free Zones
TAMS	In-house Consultant	MOP	Ministry of Planning
TRDA	Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority	RDA	Regional Development Authority
BOT	Board of Trustees	MOF	Ministry of Finance
CIPL	Committee for Industrial Production Licenses	MOD	Ministry of Defence

5.2.1 Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities

Nevertheless, the research found evidence that although such conflict continued even after the establishment of the BOT in 1986 by virtue of the Ministerial Decree 101 the balance of power had shifted towards ANUC mainly for political and economic reasons. As discussed before in chapter 4, section 4.2.3.2, the deteriorating economic situation in the mid 1980s forced the Egyptian Administration to accept 'reluctantly' the conditions of the aid package of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), aimed at increasing the role of the private sector in the development

process in general and cutting down on state welfare programmes, resulting in dramatic social unrest in the form of the widely spread Central Security Forces mutiny in 1986.

However, in its preparation for the adoption of the ERSAP conditions in the mid 1980s, the Egyptian Administration pushed towards the centralisation of decision making within all sectors of the economy (including the urban development sector) seeking a smooth transition towards its current policies at the time. As a consequence, ANUC was given more authority over TRDA including, first, reporting any 'major' change in the master plan to the technical affairs department in ANUC to secure its approval before its execution. Second, the appointment of the Vice-Minister for economic, financial and administrative affairs as the head of the BOT instead of the Chairman of TRDA (see chapter 4, sections 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.2). It can be said that the above-illustrated shift in the power structure between ANUC and TRDA took place as a result of the change in the political economy at the national level at the time.

It has to be stressed that such centralisation in power theoretically gave more power and authority to the Minister (El-Kafrawy) as being the Chairman of ANUC. Nevertheless, as discussed before, because of the close relationship between El-Kafrawy and the successive heads of the implementation team and later on the successive Chairmen of TRDA, the shift of power balance towards ANUC was continuously resisted (see chapter 4, section 4.2.3.2). This was evident when the successive Vice-Chairmen of ANUC intentionally missed all the BOT's monthly meetings, which was headed by the successive Chairmen of TRDA as a consequence (see chapter 4, section 4.2.3.2). As a 'counter attack', stressed by Madbouly (2002), ANUC used the new rules regarding the reporting and securing the approval of the technical affairs department on any 'major' change in the master plan as a powerful tool to continuously interfere and control the activities of TRDA.

5.2.2 The Local Authority

Since late 1986, two main agencies were added to the local planning institutions affecting the implementation process. The first agency was the Board of Trustees (BOT) established by virtue of the Ministerial Decree 101 (see chapter 4, section 4.2.3.2). The second agency was the Committee for Industrial Production Licenses (CIPL). In addition to the ongoing conflict between TRDA and ANUC, the research found evidence that there was another heightened local conflict between TRDA and the local entrepreneurs over the control of the decision-making process within the BOT. As

discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2.3.2, since its establishment, the BOT was given much of the responsibilities and authority of TRDA and its chairman. It was also shown how the BOT stripped TRDA from almost all of its power and authority by virtue of the successive ministerial decrees discussed in the previous chapter.

On the one hand, an emphasis had been made in the previous chapter regarding the influential role of the private sector individuals as members of the BOT and TRIA in the same time; and the way in which they managed to protect the interests of the local entrepreneurs through the partial control over the decision making process within the BOT, given their majority votes in the board. However, it was also emphasised that the MOH, represented by ANUC, and Local Authority, represented by TRDA, retained some kind of autonomy through their partial control over the decision-making process within the BOT, as the head of the BOT used to be the Vice-Minister for economic, financial and administrative affairs and later on to be the successive Chairmen of TRDA. Given the dedicated significant authority and power of the Chairman of the BOT during the period of 1986 till 1994 and the majority of the local entrepreneurs in the BOT, there was always this balance of power between TRDA and the local entrepreneurs with respect to the decision-making process of the BOT (see chapter 4, sections 4.2.3.2 and 4.2.3.3).

On the other hand, it has to be stressed that since the start of the implementation process in 1977, marked by the visit of the President Sadat to the city, till 1986 there was no required industrial production license to start the production processes in any industrial establishment all over the new communities including TRC. As a way of controlling the type of manufacturing activities to be settled within the context of the new communities as well as their 'environmental impact', the Central Government, presented in the Prime Ministry decreed the establishment of the CIPL in each new community[1]. Such committee is to be affiliated to the Projects Department in TRDA and includes representatives of the following concerned institutions and agencies:

1. Civil Defence and Fire Fighting Office (or the Industrial Safety Office, *Al-defaa Al-madany Wa Al-hareek*) affiliated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs

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[1] The environmental impact was defined in a general and vague sense as "those industrial hazards (air, liquid, and solid industrial waste pollution) that put manufacturing workers health at risk, destroy the public domestic sewerage network, and pollute the surrounding environment" (Industrial Areas Guide 1995, p.12).

2.   Health and Safety Office (*Maktab Al-salamah wa Al-seha Al-Maanyah*) affiliated to the Ministry of Work Force[2]

3.   Health Office (*Maktab Al-Seha*) affiliated to the Ministry of Health

4.   The Laboratory of Sewerage (*Maamal Al-Sarf Al-Sehy*) affiliated to the General Administration for Infrastructure (*Al-Idarah Al-amah Lel Marafek*) in TRDA[3]

Box 5.3 The Required Documents for Acquiring an Industrial Production Licence and its Procedures

The following documents are to be submitted to the Projects Department in TRDA:

- The form of the industrial production licensing request
- A copy of the construction license
- A copy of the approval of GAIFZ/GOFI regarding the type of the establishment activity
- The receipt for the establishment inspection
- A copy of the log of the acquiring of land
- Lay out drawing which includes the location of the establishment within the plot and its physical relation with the road network
- 3 registered and signed copies of the architecture drawings that show plans, elevations, sections, production lines, internal sewerage network, and the location of the fire distinguishers and water outlets for industrial safety as well as the total cost of construction and production lines.

The concerned CIPL would review the documents according to the Law 453 in 1954 and its amendments and inspect the establishment within the next week of the submission of the above documents.

The owner or whom acting on his/her behalf has to check for the decision of the CIPL after 15 days of the submission of the required documents.

Source: the Industrial Areas Guide, p. 12

It has to be pointed out that during the period of 1986 till 1997 the procedures of acquiring industrial production license, illustrated in Box 5.3, had not changed. From Box 5.1, it can be noticed that the approval of GAIFZ/GOFI on the type of the manufacturing project as well as the construction license and the report of the LS issued from TRDA were the most important documents to be presented for the CIPL. In this sense, TRDA, through its control over the production licensing procedures, had a powerful pressure tool used in the ongoing bargaining environment with local

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[2] The Health and Safety Office ensures the compliance of the manufacturing establishments with Law 453 in 1954 regarding the manufacturing workers' insurance and work environment

[3] The Head of the Department of the Environment in TRDA, Chemist Ahmed Abdel-Moula, points out that the Laboratory of Sewerage (LS) was established in 1985. However, it had no equipments till 1989. Its main objective is to analyse the industrial sewerage samples of each establishment to confirm its compliment with Law 93 in 1962 and its amendment in 1989 regarding the general guidelines and standards for the discharge on the public sewerage networks. It has to be stressed that the LS was involved in the licensing process when the industrial discharge destroyed much of the sewerage infrastructure pipes as it contained high levels of acidity.

entrepreneurs with respect to the decision-making process within the BOT. This was emphasised by El-Sharma (2002) as follows:

> "… Since the introduction of the industrial production licenses in the mid 1980s till the mid 1994, when the new Minister was appointed, the whole issue of the production licensing was used by TRDA as a powerful tool in pressuring local entrepreneurs to approve TRDA's suggestions in the BOT and to comply with the regulations of the physical planning development in the industrial areas […] you can say it was like an arm twisting business"   (El-Sharma 2002)

Furthermore, for the first time after nearly 15 years from the start of the construction of TRC, Local Government institutions and agencies were given access to decision-making in the implementation process. This was manifested when four representatives of the concerned Ministries to which public services in the TRC belonged (i.e. the representatives for health, education, local security, and food and beverage services) were appointed as members in the BOT in 1986. Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that in spite of such assigned access to the decision-making process, the represented Local Government institutions and agencies had absolutely no control over the physical planning practice (see chapter 4, section 4.2.3.2). Their only concern was to manage and implement the socio-economic objectives of the master plan each in its concerned service as well as reporting the recommendations and decisions of the BOT to the Ministries to which they are affiliated. Their role and responsibilities imitated those of the Executive Councils in each local authority in the Local Government system discussed in chapter 3, section 3.2.2. Also it has to be emphasised that the research found evidence that such representatives had no power to influence the inner 'triangle of power' between ANUC, TRDA and TRIA. On contrary, such representatives kept a very low profile in the meetings of the BOT seeking personal political (and most of times financial) benefits.

5.2.3 The Private Sector

A clear distinction was shown earlier between TRIA as a private sector agency and its members as powerful individual entrepreneurs. As discussed before, TRIA was officially declared in 1986 as an independent Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) and non-profitable organisation, under the Law 32 in 1964 under the authority and supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Such declaration came alongside the Ministerial Decree 101 in 1986 regarding the establishment of the BOT in TRC. It can

be said that before its official involvement in the membership arrangements of the BOT, TRIA had no direct, or even effective, role in the decision-making of the implementation process. This is to stress that before 1986, the concentration of power and authority was in the hands of some well-connected individual members of TRIA and only because of whom TRIA was respected and feared within the local context in TRC. (See chapter 4, sections 4.2.3.2and 4.2.3.3)

Over the same sections in chapter 4, it was also stressed that the declaration of membership arrangements of the BOT assigned much power and authority to TRIA by giving it the right to choose the representative members of local entrepreneurs within the BOT. It can be said that, since the late 1986, TRIA had become independent from its well-connected powerful individual members, although yet still using their power to gain political advantages and social 'prestige' at both the local and national context. In other words, it gained power and authority of its own right. Such dedicated new power and authority, as discussed before, put TRIA on a collision course with TRDA and it successive Chairmen, who saw TRIA as an interfering agency in its 'internal affairs' where physical planning was (is) considered to be the specialisation activity of TRDA.

It must be stressed that during the period of 1986 till 1994, like TRIA, the well-connected local entrepreneurs were still using their power to gain political and economic advantages. This was evident when powerful investors had the official right to choose the location of their manufacturing establishments regardless of the rules and regulations governing the allocation process at the time. It was also manifested when they used their political and financial power to pressure TRDA's planning department to sell land assigned for services within the industrial areas and for buffer zones between the industrial and residential areas. It was also present, as Helmy (2002) revealed, when they refused to pay the electricity and water supply costs of their production processes for more than 20 years since they started investing in TRC!

Despite the significant political and financial power and authority of the well-connected local entrepreneurs and TRIA, TRDA still had the tools by which it could control their unlimited and uncontrolled short-term business interests (for example, the industrial production license approval). In this sense, it can be said that during the period of 1986 till 1994, the private sector agencies and individuals and TRDA shared the control over the decision-making of the implementation process while each of which was still fighting for more control. On the one hand, TRDA was yet in a strong hold in

its conflict with TRIA and its members where it was seen by the Central Government and the MOH as a powerful and important agency in securing balanced development and social stability especially after the Central Security Forces mutiny in 1986 and the fear of repeating such events after the adoption of the ERSAP in 1991. On the other hand, TRIA and its members kept their powerful profile where they were seen as a crucial sector in promoting and speeding up the process of urban development, especially with the deteriorating economic situation during the 1980s and the inability of the public sector to cope with the growing demands of population at the time (see chapter 3 for an analysis of the economic and human settlements challenges of the successive Egyptian Administrations since 1974).

5.2.4 Excluded Agencies

The period of 1986 till 1994 had shown, except from the Local Government institutions and agencies represented in the BOT, a continuous blockage of the previously excluded groups during the period of 1979 till 1986 from having any access to the decision-making of the implementation process (see section 5.1.6). First, the ACR and ARP affiliated to the MOH were still officially excluded while TAMS was dismantled because of the deteriorating economic situation and shortage of foreign exchange (see chapter 4, section 4.2.2.1). Second, by virtue of the commissioning contract between COPA and the MOH, sponsored by the ARP, the urban development consultant, COPA, had no right to interfere, object, or sue the MOH for whatever gap between the outcome land use patterns and the originally submitted master and detailed plans. In this sense, COPA was legally blocked from the decision-making process under its own consent.

Finally, as discussed before in chapter 4, section 4.2.3.3, by virtue of the Ministerial Decree 101 in 1986, the manufacturing workers should be represented by three workers in the BOT. Nevertheless, the representatives of the manufacturing workers used to be chosen by TRIA from those employed in the industrial establishments owned by its members and not to be locally elected. This is to secure their loyalty to TRIA and its members. Such arrangements continued over the concerned period to be changed by late 1994, which is discussed in further details over the following section. In this sense, theoretically, fellow workers officially represented the local manufacturing workers in the BOT. However, in practice, such representatives were tied up by their absolute loyalty and financial means to continually approve the

policies and endorse the recommendations and suggestions of the representatives of TRIA within the BOT. Actually, it was revealed that the so called 'workers representatives' had never, in reality, met their fellow workers to discuss their problems and needs, as all the workers interviewed in the field had no idea about the existence of such representatives and their responsibilities. This was also evident in the words of Mansour (2002):

> "…. The manufacturing workers used to submit their complaints to the development and management department affiliated to TRDA addressed to the Chairman of TRDA and/or to the social affairs department and/or the Employment Office affiliated to the concerned Local Government […] there was no provision for any kind of meetings between the manufacturing workers and their representatives. Actually, in most cases the representatives of the manufacturing workers did not inform their fellow workers about their post in the BOT and kept it secret not to be harassed and bullied for their close relations with local entrepreneurs" (Mansour 2002)

As seen from the above quote, the manufacturing workers, in practice, had no effective channel to be heard, not to mention neglecting their perception about the physical planning practice across the implementation process. It was revealed that submitting complaints to the department of development and management headed by the General Secretary of the BOT (who used to be an Army General, with no experience in the area of community development) would go nowhere and would have made no difference. This is because such person had (has) to build very close and strong relations with the private sector agencies and individuals, on the one hand, to secure their consent on 'implementing ' the socio-economic objectives of the planning policy. On the other hand, it is also to protect his personal interests with respect to keeping his post as long as possible. It has also to be stressed that submitting complaints to the social affairs department (*Maktab Al-sho'on Al'gtmaa'yah*), affiliated to the Ministry of Social Affairs, and to the Employment Office (*Maktab Al-a'mal*), affiliated to the Ministry of Work Force, in the Local Government would make no effective difference. This is because such department and office, first, already have no access to the decision-making process in the BOT and TRDA, and second, are under the full control and influence of the financial power of the local entrepreneurs.

5.2.5 Concluding Remarks

The implementation process during the period of 1986 till 1994 was characterised by four significant developments regarding the institutional arrangements and power structure and interests of the key actors involved. The first development was the growing inter-institutional conflict within the MOH with specific reference to the conflict between ANUC and TRDA over the control of the implementation process (see figure 5.2). Such conflict was analysed from the spectacles of the changed political economy at the national level at the time when the administration had tried to introduce some economic and political measures before adopting the conditional WB and IMF package in the mid 1980s (see chapter 3). It was also explained from the administrative structure perspective where TRDA was seen as a part of the Local Government system (specially after the establishment of the BOT imitating the local public councils) instead of being recognised as an affiliate to the Central Government (i.e. the MOH). Such recognition pushed TRDA to the heart of the centralisation and decentralisation of decision-making process debate, when much centralised decision-making process was needed to smoothen the first attempts of the adoption of the ERSAP in the mid 1980s and later on after the actual adoption of the ERSAP in 1991. It has to be stressed that such conflict retained its pace even after the adoption of the ERSAP in the 1991 till 1994, when TRDA was still recognised as being important to absorb any social unrest that might take place in TRC.

Such a push towards more centralised urban planning decision-making, especially after the adoption of the ERSAP in 1991, stripped TRDA of much of its authority and power over the implementation process (e.g. the reporting of the master plan editing to the technical affairs department in ANUC). Nevertheless, TRDA kept much of the key tools that enabled it to fight back for its own survival within the new political economy environment at the time (e.g. the head of the BOT post and the close relations between the successive Chairmen of TRDA and the Minister) while, at the same time, yet to be recognised as an important planning agency to secure social stability within society. Given the political economy change at the national level in 1991 with specific reference to the adoption of the ERSAP, one could expect to find a much clearer echo in the institution and power arrangements of the implementation process. However, the inter-institutional conflict and the balance of power between ANUC and TRDA continued at the same pace. This was explained when the Minister at the time, El-Kafrawy, theoretically gave ANUC more power over TRDA to secure the

centralised planning decisions, despite his close relations with the successive Chairmen of TRDA, who resisted the practical application of such intended shift in power.

The second development was the intra-institutional conflict between TRDA and TRIA and its members. Such conflict was seen as the unavoidable vicious conflict in the 'triangle of power' between ANUC, TRDA, and TRIA. It was illustrated how TRIA gained much ground over time from TRDA with respect to the implementation process since its official creation in late1986. Yet TRDA, backed by ANUC and the Minister of the MOH, was given some key pressure tools to restrain TRIA and its members when pursuing destructive short-term business interests (e.g. the control of the industrial production licensing process and the Chairing of the BOT). Although the adoption of the ERSAP in 1991 followed by a wide range of responsibilities and more dedicated power and authority to the private sector at the national level (see chapter 3), yet there was a balance of power between TRDA and TRIA and its members, as both of them where seen as crucial and important agencies in seeking balanced development and speeding up the urban development process at the local level.

This is not to downgrade the significant and influential role of the powerful well-connected local entrepreneurs in the implementation process when they were found seeking personal profits using their political and financial power increased after the adoption of the ERSAP in 1991. Like the inter-institutional conflict, the intra-institutional conflict between TRDA and TRIA had continued at the same pace after 1991. Although El-Kafrawy dedicated much power to TRIA and the local entrepreneurs through the BOT, his fear of losing control over the implementation process in TRC to the private sector led him to assign greater power to ANUC and TRDA to 'counter' such assigned power of TRIA and its members.

The third significant development was the continuation of the exclusion of some of the 'supposedly' key actors. The most important of which was the manufacturing workers. It was illustrated that not only the manufacturing workers were blocked from participating in the local decision-making process but also were manipulated through the appointing process of their representatives in the BOT. They were also manipulated when provided by 'deadlock' routes to present their complaints.

Finally, Local Government institutions and agencies were guaranteed access to the decision-making process in relation to the socio-economic planning objectives. Four representing posts were assigned for local services in TRC. Nevertheless, the

representatives of such local services had no control over the decision-making process and were sidelined, as well as manipulated, by the powerful representatives of ANUC, TRDA, and TRIA. Such representatives were found seeking political and financial gains through their continuous appeasement to and avoiding confrontation with the powerful members of the BOT. It can be said that practically they had no effective role in the urban development process, instead of acting as a bridge between the BOT and the concerned Ministries they were affiliated to. Nevertheless, they have the authority to take prompt decisions with respect to the day-to-day management of the local services. This is to stress that such authority and power of the local representatives of the local services were used and abused by the powerful members of the BOT through their close relations with the very same Ministers to which they are affiliated.

Given the power structure and conflict within the 'triangle of power', it can be said that during the period of 1986 till 1994 there was no dominant institution or agency controlling the implementation process. The public sector (represented in ANUC and TRDA) and the private sector (represented in TRIA and its members) shared control over the implementation process mainly because of political and economic reasons, as discussed before. Such shift in the concentration of power from the dominant public sector to be shared almost equally between the public and private sector had significant effects on the implementation process, where the private sector was given the legal and official tools to promote and achieve its short-term agenda, although partially controlled by the public sector, which were struggling for its survival within the transitional period environment (see chapter 3, sections 3.2.1.3 and 3.4).

5.3 THE DOMINATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR (1994-2002)

During this period of the implementation process, two significant changes took place with respect to the institutional arrangements and power structure and interests of the key actors as a consequence. The first change was the appointment of the new Minister of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities (i.e. Mohammed I Soliman) followed by major changes in urban development planning policy directions and objectives focusing on the private sector as the leading sector in the urban development process (see chapter 4, section 4.2.3.1). The second change was the formulation and establishment of the national environmental policy and the environmental law 4 in 1994 followed by some institutional adjustments to introduce the environmental dimension to the implementation process in TRC in 1998. This is to stress that the environmental

dimension was not yet officially fully integrated within the planning formulation practice at the time of commissioning AAW as the urban development consultant of the 1999 Plan in 1996 (see chapter 4, section 4.2.3).

Figure 5.3 Institutional Arrangements Guiding the Implementation Process during the period 1994 - 2002.

MOH	Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities	TRIA	Tenth of Ramadan Investors Association
ANUC	Agency for New Urban Communities	MOI	Ministry of Industry and Technological Development
ARP	Agency for Research and Projects	GOFI	General Organisation for Industrialisation
ACR	Advisory Committee for Reconstruction	GAIFZ	General Authority for Investment and Free Zones
TAMS	In-house Consultant	MOP	Ministry of Planning
TRDA	Tenth of Ramadan Development Authority	RDA	Regional Development Authority
BOT	Board of Trustees	MOF	Ministry of Finance
CIPL	Committee for Industrial Production Licenses	MOD	Ministry of Defence
MSEA	Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs	AAW	Ahmed Abdel-Warith Consultancy Firm
EEAA	Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency	ASMINC	Association for Developing Small and Medium-Scale Industries in the New Cities

* AAW had been involved in the physical planning formulation of the 1999 Plan since 1996 as the commissioned urban development planner of the city

** Although the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs was originally established in 1982 as an agency (i.e. EEAA) affiliated to the Prime Ministry, it had been actively involved in the implementation process of the TRC only since 1998

It has to be emphasised that the interests and power of most of the institutions involved in the implementation process during the period of 1986 till 1994 (i.e. MOD, MOF, MOP, MOI, and Prime Ministry), presented in figure 5.3, were not changed, as each of them retained the same level of influence over and involvement in the implementation process. The following sub-sections will discuss in further details the context in which the EEAA was established and its assigned responsibilities and power

with respect to the implementation process of the TRC during the concerned period. Nevertheless, seeking a deep understanding of the institutional change with respect to the introduction of the environmental dimension to the decision-making of the implementation process, a critical examination of the new power structure between ANUC, TRDA, and TRIA, critically linked to the appointment of the new Minister of the MOH in 1994, is crucial. The research found solid empirical evidence to confirm that the new power structure within the 'triangle of power' resisted (actually blocked) the introduction of the environmental dimension to the implementation process and its decision-making as discussed below.

5.3.1 Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities

As discussed before in chapter 4, section 4.2.3.1, after the appointment of the new Minister of the MOH, fundamental changes took place within the organisational chart of the Ministry (see figure 4.16). As a result of those changes, ANUC lost it privileged position enjoyed during El-Kafrawy period in office. After being the dominant agency within the MOH headed by the Minister in person and controlled almost all aspects of the MOH activities, it was assigned only for managing the urban development planning processes within the context of the new urban communities including TRC. It can be said that ANUC was finally recognised as the type of agency it was created and established for. It was finally recognised as an executive agency responsible for the physical development planning within the context of the new urban communities and were to be dismantled after fulfilling its objectives and handing in the responsibility of such communities to the concerned Local Government institutions and agencies.

It has to be emphasised that although the new organisational structure within the MOH reduced much of the dedicated privileges to ANUC, as discussed above, it concentrated greater authority and power on such agency regarding the control over the implementation process of the new communities at large and TRC in specific. Such organisational change and the difference of values and style of management between El-Kafrawy and Soliman gave ANUC (mainly the senior civil servants in ANUC) the so long-awaited pressure tools by which it would have the full authority and control over TRDA rather than this undecided power domination and conflict between the two agencies during the period of 1986 till 1994, as discussed in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to understand the reason behind assigning such greater power to ANUC at this specific period of time. Such understanding has to be approached from the broader perspective of the changing political economy at the national level at the time. As discussed in chapter 3, Egypt was forced to adopt the ERSAP in 1991 under the conditions of the WB and IMF. Giving the aim of dedicating more leading role to the private sector in the development process, El-Kafrawy had failed to achieve such aim by keeping much control in the hands of the public sector through ANUC, TRDA, and the BOT. His actions to be seen as an institutional reformer by establishing the BOT and guaranteeing access for the local entrepreneur to the decision-making process did not impress the leadership. This was because such actions were seen as false and insincere actions when dedicating, at the same time, the 'counter' power to the public sector to resist the required change.

By the end of 1993, El-Kafrawy was seen as an element of the 'old Egypt', which had significant power of resistance to the new settings of the 'economic game'. Therefore, having a business wise mentality and believing in the neo-liberal approach to economy, promoted by the WB and the IMF at the time, Soliman was appointed Minister to push ahead the reform that should have been done by his predecessor, as well as crushing any form of resistance to the implementation of the principles and basics of the ERSAP within the urban development sector. As a consequence, since day one at office, Soliman concentrated his efforts to establish the new 'rules of the game' by issuing many Ministerial Decrees assigning more power and authority to the private sector over the public sector while keeping the 'keys of power gates' in the hands of ANUC to control any unpredicted and uncalculated moves of the private sector.

The allocation of power and authority to ANUC mainly was not because of its role in the development process but rather than a way of concentrating the full and unquestioned power in the hands of the Minister of the MOH, as the head of ANUC. This concentration of power in the hands of Soliman was of great importance in speeding up the liberalisation of the economy in the context of the urban development sector. It seems contradictory but the Central Government desired, in coordination with Soliman, the exclusion of Local Government institutions and agencies and any other institution or agency that might delay, hinder, or resist the fast track centralised planning decisions, to avoid repeating the instance when El-Kafrawy was in charge. The research found evidence that such change in values and attitude of the Central Government towards the public sector institutions and agencies had a major impact

upon the state-private sector relationship as well as the central-local relationship as discussed in further detail in the following sub-sections.

5.3.2 The Private Sector

There is no doubt that the new attitude towards the private sector, triggered by the adoption of the ERSAP in the early 1990s and promoted by the Minister of the MOH, changed the power structure of the institutional arrangements and agencies involved in the implementation process. This was manifested in setting the new rule of appointing a local entrepreneur as the Chairman of the BOT while assigning the Chairman of TRDA as his/her Deputy. It was also seen when demolishing the existing Ministerial Decrees at the time explicitly supporting the appointment of three manufacturing workers representatives as members of the BOT, where the new Ministerial Decrees 152 and 153 in 1994 assigned their membership to local entrepreneurs instead. Both Ministerial Decrees presented the private sector with the required and crucial administrative and legal tool to finish off the authority and power of TRDA and its Chairman over the implementation process (see chapter 4, section 4.2.3.2).

Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that till 1994 there was neither an official nor openly announced classification for individual entrepreneurs. The objectives and aims of the newly adopted national development policy (i.e. ERSAP) in the early 1990s alongside the new attitude and values of the MOH towards the private sector, discussed before, led the Central Government at large and the MOH in specific to make an explicit classification for entrepreneurs. The so called 'businessmen classification' differentiated between entrepreneurs in the process through which they could acquire land for their investment projects at large and manufacturing projects in specific in TRC. It was revealed by El-Batran (2002) and confirmed by 70% of the interviewees that entrepreneurs were classified into two groups matching the classification of businessmen at the national level discussed in chapter 3, section 3.4. The first group was those investing in projects that required plots of land over 5 feddans. The second was those who required less than 5 feddans.

As confirmed by an Ex-Chairman of TRDA, Mansour (2002), the first group of entrepreneurs had no link or dialogue with TRDA or any agency within the context of Local Authority. They were guaranteed full and unlimited access to the Ministerial rank and above. They would also discuss their business plans directly with the senior civil

servants in ANUC and the Minister in person, where land was assigned for them during the same meeting. In other words, such group were the 'chosen ones' group, mentioned in chapter 3, section 3.4, most of whom were elected as Members of Parliament within the past 10 years. The second group was kept under the full and direct control of TRDA through the stated rules and regulations of the MOH. They had to follow the strict procedures and apply all stated laws and regulations. As discussed before in chapter 3, section 3.4 and chapter 4, sections 4.2.3.2, 4.2.3.3, and 4.2.3.5, such group of local entrepreneurs were from the 'unfortunates' group who were mainly investing in the medium and small manufacturing industrial projects in terms of the size of the capital involved. The Head of ASMINC, Eng. Nasr Soliman, revealed that such explicit distinction created inter-agency conflict within TRIA, which in turn resulted in the split of the medium and small-scale entrepreneurs from TRIA to form ASMINC in 1996 (see chapter 4, section 4.2.3.5).

Figure 5.4 TRC's Urban Agglomeration and Administrative Borders

Source: The Industrial Areas Guide (1995, p. 5)

Given such significant financial and political power of the former group (i.e. the 'chosen ones'), TRIA managed to strip TRDA and its Chairman of its authority and power over the implementation process to the bare bones. This happened because of two main reasons. On the one hand, TRDA and its Chairmen were no longer seen by the

Central Government as an important agency in seeking social stability and in securing control over the local private sector institutions and agencies. On the contrary, it was seen as a hindrance and constraining agency to the new style of management to the urban development process within the context of the new communities in general and TRC in specific. On the other hand, linked to this, TRDA had already done its part in securing local social stability for the three years followed the adoption of the ERSAP in 1991 (see chapter 4, section 4.2.3.2 and 4.2.3.3). Such significant control over the decision-making of the implementation process by the private sector's powerful entrepreneurs rested the land allocation process as well as physical planning decisions in the hands of a handful of short-term motivated powerful local entrepreneurs. This was clearly manifested in the physical planning formulation process of the 2002 Plan when powerful local entrepreneurs, using their close relations with the Minister and higher levels in the administration, demanded the physical planning of the area between the urban borders and administrative borders of the TRC originally planned as the green buffer zone of the city (see figure 5.4) to match their short-term interests as confirmed by Shaaban (2002) as well as Prof. Barrada (2002) and others:

> "… the powerful local entrepreneurs are well-connected to the Ministerial level and above. Sometimes we receive direct orders from higher authorities than the Minister to take certain 'interests' into consideration during the physical plans formulation without having any right to find out the reasons behind such interests [….] those powerful entrepreneurs pay our salaries, make us active, and keep us busy […] The power and authority of the entrepreneurs are increasing every second because of the new national policy direction since the early 1990s […] Egypt had no options other than to depend on the private sector (however its attached social and environmental impact) as the government was no longer able to provide the cash required to sustain the implementation of the urban development policy. Therefore, the government had to prioritise the interests of the private sector over other interests to encourage the entrepreneurs to pay on its behalf for the implementation process in TRC and other new communities, which had a destructive backfire action represented in increasing their political and financial power to the limit it could not be controlled anymore"   (Shaaban 2002)

From the above quote, it should be clear by now that not only TRIA and its members gained control over TRDA and its successive Chairmen as well as all Local Government institutions and agencies, but it also started to use such growing power as a

bargaining tool to pressure ANUC and the Minister himself to deliver the required decisions that serve their short-term interests. This was clear in the words of the Chairman of the BOT, Captain Redallah Mohamed Helmy:

> "…. The decisions of the BOT are taken according to a majority voting system […] of course the representatives of local entrepreneurs in the BOT can form an explicit lobby to block any decisions that may harm their interests […] being an investor and a member of TRIA, I have to take their side. However, given my sensitive position as Chairman of the BOT, publicly I cannot afford to be seen taking their side. Therefore, I used to have meetings with the representatives of TRIA in TRIA's head office in TRC before the meetings of the BOT to discuss and arrange any required actions regarding any subject with specific interest to the local entrepreneurs […] the recommendations and decisions of the BOT are discussed directly with the concerned Ministers in person. Given my post, I go to the concerned Ministers to discuss and bargain the demands of the BOT [….] as long as the Minister approves and supports my demands, we (local entrepreneurs and TRIA) support and defend him/her when the public opinion is against him/her. In other words, it is a two-way benefit relationship"

> (Helmy 2002)

5.3.3 The Local Authority

Because of the significant political and financial power of the private sector institutions and agencies as well as the very centralised nature of the planning decisions in the hands of the senior civil servants in ANUC and the Ministerial rank and above, TRDA lost all crucial battles for its very survival. It lost the battle with ANUC over the control of the physical planning decision-making process within the local context while losing the battle with the private sector institutions and agencies over the control of both the physical and socio-economic planning decisions within the BOT. Within the new urban management environment applied in the mid 1990s, it can be said that TRDA and its Chairman were seen as merely an affiliated department to ANUC and its employees as low-level cadre government employees who have no business mentality and would not be able to cope with the new liberal approach to the implementation process. As a consequence, TRDA was left to deal with small and medium-scale domestic entrepreneurs who had neither political nor financial power to enable them to deal with the Central Government institutions and agencies in a direct and face-to-face manner.

What happened to TRDA was the same that was applied to the Local Government representatives in TRC and the BOT. They lost any sense of control over the day-to-day socio-economic planning decision-making process. They were no longer perceived by TRIA and its powerful entrepreneurs as important agencies to prioritise their interests over other local interests because of their guaranteed unlimited access to the ministerial rank and above. In this sense, the power of CIPL was no longer valuable to TRDA as a pressure tool in its conflict with TRIA (see section 5.2.2), as the powerful entrepreneurs could bypass the bureaucratic procedures to centrally obtain their production licenses directly from GOFI /GAIFZ who followed the same 'businessmen classification' criteria as well as the centralised approach to the decision-making process.

Given the ever-growing political and financial power and authority of the powerful local entrepreneurs, TRDA was left isolated to implement the unorganised centralised orders of ANUC with respect to the assignment of land to the "chosen ones" group without having any right to argue, study, or even reject such orders. It was revealed by some Ex-Chairmen of TRDA that the two parallel administrative procedures, resulted from the 'businessmen classification', had a devastating impact upon the implementation process where everything was left to the political and financial relationship between the Central Government institutions and agencies and the private sector powerful entrepreneurs. Such lack of coordination between TRDA and ANUC is evident in the words of many interviewees. For instance,

> "… of course businessmen are not the same. They are categories and levels […] within the 'new era' settings, started after the appointment of Soliman, the powerful businessmen had special treatment as they were guaranteed direct access to the Minister to finalise their business plans and to choose the land they desire for their future projects […] the land were assigned for them by the Minister in person regardless the fact that such land had already been assigned for someone else or not […] if you have the financial power and personal connections, you could do what you want and achieve what you desire regardless the social and environmental impact attached"   (Sorour 2002)

> "…. Why someone like [name omitted] would come to TRDA, he could discuss his business plans and the assignment of land instantly at ANUC with the Minister in person […] this parallel sets of procedures resulted from the classification of businessmen had negative impact on the implementation process and the arrangement of land use activities

within TRC [….] we had no longer control over, or even predict the day-to-day process of, the allocation of land as we (TRDA) lost any sense of coordination with ANUC"   (Mansour 2002)

From the above analysis of the local authorities involved in the implementation process during the period of 1994 till 2002, it is evident that the BOT was transformed from being a government agency controlled by government employees and civil servants to be a quasi-government agency under the full authority and power of the private sector institutions and agencies that deals directly with the Central Government institutions and agencies bypassing the Local Government system. At the same time, TRDA and its affiliated CIPL lost their partial control over the process of the assignment of land to local entrepreneurs as a result of the newly introduced 'businessmen classification' criteria in the mid 1990s. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that although TRDA kept some of its control over the assignment of land to small and medium-scale entrepreneurs, given the official rules and regulations attached to such issue, the local civil servants were no longer able to manipulate the local land use plans in favour of some political or financial gain. This was mainly because of the newly applied centralised nature of the decision-making since the mid 1990s where TRDA had to report every minor editing or correction of land use plans to the technical affairs department in ANUC to secure its approval before starting the implementation of such corrections.

It has also to be stressed that by the mid 1990s, the construction of the originally planned industrial areas in the context of the first and second stages of urban development of TRC was completed and 90% of all industrial land had been already sold out to domestic and foreign entrepreneurs (Shetawy 2000). As discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2.3, the above point was one of the main reasons that triggered the call for commissioning the urban development consultant AAW to start the physical planning formulation of the third and fourth stages of the residential areas as well as the extension of the heavy industrial area (A) south the city in 1996. Nevertheless, appendix VIII presents the existing land use pattern and visual environment of the sample industrial areas studied during the fieldwork in March 2002, confirming the lack of services and the deterioration of the built environment within such areas.

5.3.4 Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs

The EEAA, the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, was officially established by virtue of the Presidential Decree 631 in 1982. It was established as an affiliate to the Prime Ministry and was recognised as the highest authority in Egypt responsible for promoting and protecting the environment and coordinating adequate responses to environmental issues. This included setting the standards and reviewing the environmental impact assessment reports for investment projects submitted by both the public and private investors while leaving the enforcement of the environmental law to the ministries dealing with each kind of development (e.g. Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Tourism) (Gomaa, 1997).

The EEAA, re-established by virtue of Law 4 in 1994, was to replace the Agency established by Presidential Decree 631 in 1982 in all its rights and obligations. The former Agency's staff were to be transferred to the EEAA with their grades and seniority and were to be assigned to the administrative sectors of the EEAA by a Decree issued by the Agency 's Executive Head. In February 1995, the decrees necessary for the implementation of Law 4 in 1994 were adopted and in June 1997, the responsibility of Egypt's first Minister of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) was assigned as stated in the Presidential Decree 275 in1997[4]. From thereon, the new ministry has focused, in close collaboration with the national and international development partners, on defining environmental policies, setting priorities and implementing initiatives within a context of the national environmental sustainable development policy framework stated in Law 4 in 1994 (see Box 5.4 for the responsibilities assigned for the EEAA by virtue of Law 4 in 1994). Nevertheless, it was not until March 1998 that the provision for the protection of industrial pollution took effect and the approval of EEAA on the EIA reports submitted by investment projects is to be one of the core requirements for acquiring the production and construction licenses within the context of the new communities at large and TRC in specific (EEAA 2003).

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[4] The Board of Directors of the MSEA is to be composed of The Minister in charge, the Chief Executive Officer of the EEAA, who also acts as Vice Chairman of the Board, representatives of, the Ministries concerned with environmental issues, Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the State Council, the Public Business Sector, the Universities and Scientific Research Centres. Moreover, the Environmental Protection Fund was to be established for managing the public fund allocated to the MSEA from the national budget, donations and grants presented by national and foreign organizations concerned with environmental protection, fines and compensation awarded by courts of law or via out-of-court settlements for damage caused to the environment, as well as revenues from the protectorates fund (EEAA 2003).

Box 5.4 Responsibilities Assigned to the EEAA by virtue of Law 4 in 1994

- Formulating environmental policies
- Preparing the necessary plans for Environmental protection and Environmental development projects, following up their implementation, and undertaking Pilot Projects
- The Agency is the National Authority in charge of promoting environmental relations between Egypt and other States, as well as Regional and International Organizations
- Preparing draft legislation and decrees related to the fulfilment of its objectives
- Preparing state of the environment studies and formulating the national plan for environmental protection and related projects
- Setting the standards and conditions to which applicants for construction projects must adhere before working on the site and throughout operations
- Setting the rates and proportions required for the permissible limits of pollutants
- Periodically collecting national and international data on the actual state of the environment and recording possible changes
- Setting the principles and procedures for mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of projects
- Preparing Environmental Contingency Plans and supervising their implementation
- Participating in the preparation and implementation of the national and international Environmental
- Monitoring Programs and employing data and information gained thereof
- Establishing Public Environmental Education Programs and assisting in their implementation
- Coordinating with other empowered authorities for the control and safe handling of dangerous substances
- Managing and supervising the natural reserves of Specially Protected Areas
- Following up the implementation stages of International Conventions concerned with the environment
- Suggesting an economic mechanism, which encourages the observation of pollution prevention procedures
- Implementing pilot projects for the preservation of natural resources and the protection of the environment against pollution
- Listing of national establishments and institutions, as well as experts qualified to participate in the preparation and implementation of environmental protection programs, and coordinating measures with the Ministry in charge of international Cooperation to ensure that projects funded by donor organizations and states are compatible with environmental safety
- Participating in the preparation of an integrated national plan for the coastal zone management of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea areas
- Participating in the preparation of a plan to prevent illegal entry into the country of dangerous and polluting substances and waste
- Preparing an annual report on the state of the environment to be submitted to the President and the Cabinet of Ministers

Source: EEAA (2003)

With respect to the context of TRC, Abdel-Moula (2002) shows that the department of environment was originally established as a unit affiliated to the department of development and management in TRDA since 1986. It was originally established to be responsible of implementing the general policy of the Ministry of Health regarding pests control and protection of wild animals in coordination with the Infrastructure Police (*Shortet El-marafek*). In 1995, the department of environment, still affiliated to TRDA, came under the authority of the EEAA and was assigned for the

following up of the environmental situation within TRC. It was not until 2001 that a representative of the EEAA was permitted a membership in the BOT. Until such date, the EEAA and the Department of Environment in TRDA was only represented in the Committee for Environment affiliated to the BOT, headed by one of the local entrepreneurs representing TRIA and its members, and composed of: the Head of the Department of Development and Management as the General Secretary of the Committee, the Vice-Chairman of TRDA as its Deputy, the head of the department of environment in TRDA, the head of the department of environment in any local manufacturing establishment, and two local entrepreneurs. It is evident that all decisions and recommendations of such committee were under the full control and authority of local entrepreneurs.

According to Abdel-Moula (2002), in August 1998 the Department of Environment was to be recognised as an independent department within the organisational structure of TRDA instead of being an affiliated unit to the Department of Development and Management during the period of 1986 till august 1998. Such institutional change took effect because of the Environmental Pollution Protection Project (EPPP) funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) under the management of *Roche Intelec Consortium* for 18 months starting from August 1998 (EEAA 1999). Given the aim of presenting TRC as the first 'environment-friendly' city in Egypt, the establishment of the department of environment as an independent department was crucial to get rid of the hindering bureaucratic procedures that might constrain the implementation of the EPPP and the following up process of environmental monitoring in TRC later on (EEAA 1999, 2000, 2001).

During the period of August till December 1998, the EEAA, in coordination with the department of environment in TRDA, started the first stage towards such aim by constructing an environmental database for the manufacturing establishments and evaluating the environmental situation in the city. From January till March 1999, the second stage, the EEAA started the first follow up stage to enforce the environmental law by classifying the factories into two categories. On the one hand, the first category included those manufacturing establishments with no environmental problems. On the other hand, the second group included those having environmental problems and yet did not take any actions towards solving such problems (EEAA 1999). In the third stage, from April to June 1999, the EEAA continued the following up and the enforcement of the environmental law where it classified the factories into four categories as follows:

1.   Factories with no environmental problems

2.   Factories investing in better cleaner technology

3.   Factories started or had plans to implement cleaner technology

4.   Factories did not take any further steps towards their environmental problems.

Finally in the fourth stage from July to August 1999, the EEAA sent invoices to polluting factories to start solving their environmental problems threatening legal action. During such period, the Minister of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) visited the city in person and closed seven factories for non-compliance. However, by the end of November 2001, there were 81 factories classified as heavy polluting factories most of them located on the planning boundaries of the residential areas (EEAA 2001). Nevertheless, the research found evidence, confirmed by the Head of the Department of Environment in TRDA, that even after the application of the CIDA projects, the EEAA and the Department of Environment had failed to pressure manufacturing establishment, within the context of the new communities at large and the TRC in specific, to comply with the requirements of the Environmental Law. Some insight explanations were provided in relation to such point during the fieldwork period as presented in Box 5.5.

Box 5.5 Some Reasons for the Failure of Full Compliance with the Environmental Law within the Context of the New Communities and TRC.

- The EEAA was dealing with the industrial pollution as a short-term problem that could be solved by applying clean technology production processes once and for all.
- The lack of coordination between the physical planning practice and the environmental policy in the context of the new communities where the only coordination could be recognised in relation to urban expansion of the existing cities on arable land
- The Department of Environment in TRDA was primarily interested in solving the environmental problems within specific polluting establishments rather than the impact of their pollution on the built environment of the surrounding residential areas as well as the users, manufacturing workers, health.
- The political and economic expediency in relation to short-term interests and agendas of the powerful local entrepreneurs.
- Lack of coordination between the department of environment in TRDA and the EEAA
- The lack of regular monitoring mechanism as the Department of Environment in TRDA had no pollution measuring equipments.
- The incomplete standards regarding the hazardous waste standards

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Source: collected from interviews conducted with Abdel-Moula; Mansour; El-Sharma; Tolba, Saadeldin; Ezzat; Abdel-Glil; Allam; and Higazy during the filedtrip in 2002; also see Attia 1999.

5.3.5 Excluded Agencies

Like all the previous periods of the implementation process, presented in this chapter, There was a mixture of the previously excluded Agencies (i.e. the ACR, ARP, and manufacturing workers) and newly added ones (i.e. AAW and ASMINC). With respect to the former group, on the one hand, it has to be stressed that the environment through which the ACR and ARP operated and the responsibilities assigned to them was not dramatically changed. As discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2.3.1, the ACR lost its privileged position experienced under El-Kafrawy since the appointment of Soliman in 1994 as the concerned Minister, where it was no longer detached from the administrative structure of the MOH. Nevertheless, both agencies were still recognised as consulting and research agencies respectively and had no access to the implementation process, which was assigned only to ANUC.

On the other hand, the local manufacturing workers were completely kicked out of the decision-making process. Their right to be represented in the BOT was taken away by the Ministerial Decrees 152 and 153 and their basic right of complaining was made even more difficult by the control and authority of the local entrepreneurs over the Local Government institutions and agencies. Over 95% of the manufacturing workers interviewed confirmed (supporting their claims by personal stories) the suspicious relationship developed between the local entrepreneurs and the local employment office to block the development of workers' complaints submitted to the office. Actually, 56% of the manufacturing workers claimed monthly quotas were regularly paid to the employees of the employment office to guarantee their loyalty. The complaints related to the conflicts between manufacturing workers and local entrepreneurs should be submitted to the local employment office, while all other complaints should be submitted to TRDA. The Head of the Department of Development and Management confirmed that most complaints submitted to TRDA were related to the issue of pollution in the built environment and lack of services within the industrial areas as well as the residential areas. This was confirmed when 73% of the workers stressed that there are no services within the industrial areas studied while only 6% (all respondent working in manufacturing establishments owned by powerful local entrepreneurs) claimed that there are more than enough services in the industrial areas. This was also confirmed when 68% of workers claimed serious environmental and health problems within the work environment most of which are related to industrial pollution.

Moreover, the research revealed interesting, yet contradictory, responses to the subject of the decision-making of the implementation process and the interests of each key actor group involved in such process. This was evident when over 55% of workers claimed that the prime interests of TRDA are the outside appearance of the city to its visitors and the appeasement of local entrepreneurs while over 60% still believe that TRDA is in full control over the urban development process and 40% believe that TRIA and its members are those in control. Although the majority of responses of the manufacturing workers supported the assumption that they were very sensitive to the evolving and continuously changing relationship between the State and private sector, the majority of them still acknowledge the State, presented in ANUC and TRDA, as the protective guard who has the full authority and power over all societal groups. This was evident when 74% of workers abstained from providing any answer to the questions related to their satisfaction about the implementation process, where they stressed that TRDA and ANUC know best for them and the built environment in TRC.

The urban development planning consultant (AAW) and the private sector agency ASMINC were excluded from having access to the decision-making of the implementation process. On the one hand, the conditions of the commissioning contract applied to COPA and SWECO were like those applied to AAW. This is to stress that even before signing the contract with the ARP, AAW realised that their task was only to provide the required physical plans for the third and fourth stage of the residential areas and the extension of the heavy industrial area with no right to claim any further responsibilities with respect to the implementation process. In this sense, AAW, like its predecessors both COPA and SWECO, was legally excluded from the decision-making process of implementation under its full consent. On the other hand, as discussed in chapter 4, sections 4.2.3.3 and 4.2.3.5, as a result of the newly established classification of the local entrepreneurs as well as the separation of the small and medium-scale entrepreneurs from TRIA and the growing conflict between TRIA and ASMINC as a consequence, ASMINC was excluded from the decision-making process. Given the full control over the BOT, TRIA and its powerful entrepreneurs managed to keep ASMINC isolated, weak, and barely surviving.

5.3.6 Concluding Remarks

During the period of 1994 till 2002, powerful entrepreneurs in the private sector were at full swing. Such domination over the implementation process had four

significant developments to characterise the concerned period of analysis. The first development is related to the institutional conflict within the MOH between ANUC and TRDA. It may be seen in the way in which ANUC gained full control and authority over TRDA by downgrading the power of its chairman in the BOT as well as the application of the newly introduced internal rule regarding the reporting of every required editing to the local land use plans (however minor) to the technical affairs department in ANUC. In this sense, as presented, the conflict between ANUC and TRDA was finally over, where TRDA lost the battle of its very survival. It has to be stressed that such change of power structure between the two agencies was directly linked to the political economy change at the national level echoed in the appointment of the new Minister of the MOH with different interests and values from his predecessor and the centralised push towards smoothing the transition from the public sector to the private sector-led urban development process. It can be said that at the time where many factors constrained TRDA to continue its battle with ANUC over the control of the implementation process, there were many enabling factors put ANUC ahead in such conflict and all related to the political economy change at the national level at the time.

The second development is related to the institutional conflict between TRDA and TRIA and its members. After the issuing of the Ministerial Decrees 152 and 153, any hope that TRDA would manage to keep ahead in such conflict was washed away. Weakened and controlled by ANUC, while TRIA and its members were significantly empowered, TRDA was in no gaining situation of such conflict. Nevertheless, as illustrated, TRDA kept some kind of control over the 'unfortunates' group where they lacked the financial and political power to enable them the access to the Central Government institutions and agencies. In this position, it has to be emphasised that the 'businessmen classification' value, introduced to the context of Egypt after the adoption of the ERSAP in 1991, as well as the continuous shift in the institutional arrangements and power structures and allocation of power and resources within the 'triangle of power' and its analysed impact over the implementation process presents solid empirical evidence to support the validity of the analytical framework and its entry points of analysis. This was clearly manifested in the introduction of above classification based on the degree of power (mainly financial and political) of individual entrepreneurs and upon which his/her action could be either enabled or constrained and upon which the Central Government would decide the procedures through which it can

deal with each individual, seeking the financial help needed to sustain the national development policies by trading power and authority.

The implementation process during the concerned period can be described not only as complete chaos but also as a *schizophrenic* process, where the same institutions and agencies as well as the very same individual senior civil servants had conflicting values, agendas, and actions. On the one hand, they supported the newly introduced market-led approach to the land development when dealing with the 'chosen ones' group by minimising the state intervention in the urban development process, reducing bureaucracy, and bypassing local authorities. On the other hand, they supported the market-critical approach to land development when dealing with the 'unfortunates' group by expanding their control over the physical planning formulation and implementation processes, increasing bureaucracy, and applying the strict rules, regulations, laws, and command and control mechanisms. Logically, as illustrated, such situation was impossible to go on for a long time without more complications and conflicts at both the national and local levels where planning institutions and agencies were internally confronted by negative impact of the practical application of such conflicting approaches to land development.

The third development is illustrated in the deliberate exclusion of the manufacturing workers from the decision-making process. On its unlimited support to the private sector institutions and agencies as well as the application of its very centralised style of the decision-making process, the MOH demolished any hope of applying the very basics of 'pluralism' while praising the notion of 'entrepreneurialism'. Within such newly applied values and attitude towards the private sector, there was, naturally, no pressure to provide manufacturing workers any access to the decision-making process. On the contrary, the newly established urban development politics called for more local entrepreneurs in the BOT and more private sector-style management in TRC and the new communities at large. As illustrated, given this newly established urban management-style environment, where there was no place (or even respect) for the weak, manufacturing workers were easily manipulated, blackmailed, and bullied as a consequence.

The final development is seen in the complete alienation to the environmental aspects of the urban development process, despite the reckless and growing efforts by the MSEA and EEAA, supported by foreign agencies and aid, to correct the negative

environmental impact of the haphazard and chaotic implementation process where politics and economic aspects were in full control since the very start in 1977. After almost two years of collecting environmental data, monitoring, following up, and helping local manufacturing establishment to comply with the Environmental Law, by the end of 2001 there were 81 manufacturing establishment, most of which were located within residential areas, were recognised as hazardous to the built environment, nature, and health of manufacturing workers and residents surrounding pollution points. Provided such fact, one can just imagine the status of the built environment before the start of the EPPP in 1998. In this position it has to be emphasised that, provided the complete domination of the private sector over the implementation process as well as the weakening of the Local Authority and ANUC as a consequence, the trade-off the environmental aspects within the urban development process can be easily recognised.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

6.1 OVERVIEW

This research set out to answer the question: why, despite the significant political and financial support of successive Egyptian governments to the urban development of Tenth of Ramadan City and its industrial areas, did the physical planning practice fail to achieve the pre-stated goals and objectives of the successive urban development policies and local physical plans in the period of 1974 till 2002? The research shows that there are no simple answers to the above question: there does not seem to be an unequivocal explanation for such failure. The research, nonetheless, postulates that the reason behind such failure resulted from the continuous shift in the allocation of power and resources within the 'triangle of power' (i.e. the institutions, agencies and individuals of the central government, local authorities, and private sector), as the national political economy, institutional arrangements and power structures at the national and local levels continuously changed during the study period. The above hypothesis proved to be workable and effective, as it theoretically and empirically guided the research to cast light on the complexity of the administrative, technical, political and social processes underpinning physical planning practice and the urban development process.

The research succeeded in achieving the pre-stated objectives introduced in chapter 1. It has reviewed the different theoretical stands, positions, claims, arguments and debates within the field of urban development planning theory and practice from within a historical perspective while debating the underpinning conceptual thoughts of each approach with specific reference to social structures. Given the focus of this research, it has to be stressed that the analysis of the different approaches to social structures is not based upon the broad perspective of social theory but rather upon the specific understanding of a conceptual dichotomy in social theory, that of the notion of structure and agency, which proved to have strong and valuable implications for the analysis of urban development planning theory and practice.

As well as exploring and analysing the theoretical connections between the above areas of knowledge, this study also has succeeded in casting light on the gap in the literature with respect to the reasons behind the emergence of new interests, values and institutions in society in specific time and space edge. It has built a workable analytical framework to explore and analyse urban development planning policies and practice in the context of the case study. Although the analytical framework was built to

explain and analyse the urban development planning and physical planning practice in the context of Egypt in general and TRC in specific, the conceptual arguments upon which it was built are relevant for many other countries.

Empirically, the research presents a history of Egypt's national development challenges (i.e. human settlements and economic challenges) and the national development policies adopted to face such challenges by successive political regimes since 1974 till 2002. It also empirically succeeded in exploring and analysing links and interactions between changes in the global political economy environment, international and national powerful interest groups, the political leadership, and the existing socio-political and socio-economic structures and their impact on the objectives and goals of national urban development planning policies. While analysing the interaction of power and interests between the above structures, agencies and individuals, the research provided an insight into the reasons for differences and conflicts between the objectives of national development policies and subsequent urban development policies adopted to help confront a range of national development challenges and their outcomes.

Using the case study methodology, the research illustrated the empirical links between successive urban development planning policies adopted to face human settlements and economic challenges and the physical planning practice in the context of Tenth of Ramadan City (TRC). It shed light into, while demonstrating the reasons for, the decision-making cycle, the effectiveness of administrative structures, and the inherited constraints associated with both the urban development planning formulation and implementation processes. This research provides a degree of clarity and understanding of the politics of physical planning practice as well as the constraints in urban development planning formulation and implementations processes.

6.2 THE THEORETICAL SCOPE AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This research is interested in the relationship between physical planning practice, institutional arrangements and power structures, and political economy change. In order to explore and analyse the above relationship, an understanding of the wider theoretical context of the different approaches to social structures with specific reference to the notion of structure and agency lies at the core of this research. The understanding of such approaches provides the theoretical base upon which the state institutions, agencies and individuals relate to the different interest groups, agencies and individuals in society. It also provides the theoretical base for exploring and explaining

the reasons and causes behind the emergence, as well as the disappearance, of specific interests and values in society in specific time-space edge. From the literature review and theoretical analysis introduced in chapter 2, it can be said that an understanding of the theoretical bases upon which such social relationships are built, explained by the different approaches to social structures, lies at the heart of urban planning theory.

Following the above, this thesis critically illustrates and examines the theoretical debates with respect to the constraining and enabling factors of social structures and agencies as well as their interaction. It also provides a critical understanding of the planning paradigm. Given Kuhn's (1963) definition of a 'paradigm' and Safier's (1990) and Moser's (1993) definition of physical planning practice, presented in chapter 2, the planning paradigm can be said to have three dimensions: traditions (professional specialisation), a body of theory, and methodologies. First, this research adopts Safier's (1990) classification of planning traditions, which comprises three main groups: the physical (classic) traditions, the applied traditions, and the transformative traditions. As illustrated in chapter 2, the research also chronologically traces the planning traditions by exploring their origins, disciplines within which they were developed, foci, objectives, methodologies, globally supporting institutions, views about society (i.e. perception about social structures), and models of economic process upon which they built their profession.

Second, while providing a critical understanding and analysis of the various urban development planning theories and approaches to land development, this research emphasises the challenge of the stereotype assumptions about households and planning intervention as well as stressing the global shift from modernist to post-modernist thinking in the field of urban planning practice. Third, the research also critically examines and analyses the development of the planning methodologies adopted by practitioners, analysts, researchers and policy makers across time since the emergence of the planning paradigm and the recognition of urban planning as a profession.

Supported by the examination and analysis of the above areas of knowledge and bodies of theories, the research introduces an analytical framework through which the physical planning practice in the context of Egypt in general and TRC in specific could be explored, analysed and explained. Supported by the theoretical debates, analysis and criticism presented in chapter 2, the analytical framework stresses five critical entry points for the analysis of physical planning practice, with respect to the formulation and

implementation processes. In doing so, the analytical framework emphasises the significant impact of the interaction of power and interests among the political leadership and powerful individuals, existing socio-economic and socio-political structures, and international and national interest agencies and institutions on physical planning practice at both the national and local levels. It proved to be an effective and workable tool through which the impact of the continuous shift in the allocation of power and resources within the 'triangle of power' on the physical planning practice and urban development process within the context of the case study could be systematically documented, examined, analysed, and explained.

Given the above emphasis, the research succeeded in critically exploring and examining the links between urban development planning and physical planning practice and the wider political economy environment and its underlying links to institutional arrangements and power structures. It also explained the reasons and causes behind the emergence and disappearance of specific interests and values within society in specific time-space edge. The analysis of physical planning practice in the context of the case study from the institutional arrangements, power structure, and interests and values of actors involved in such practice, proved to be effective entry points upon which the analytical framework was built.

6.3 THE METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

The methodology of the research went through several refining stages since its original design. Each stage was based upon the findings of several pilot trips conducted prior to the actual fieldwork trip. Although the methodology was based upon a combination of the two main approaches to research methodology (i.e. qualitative and quantitative approaches), it adopted a dominant-less-dominant style in dealing with such combination. Given the explanatory and exploratory nature of this study, qualitative methods, supported by quantitative methods, were the dominant methods adopted throughout the data collection stage. Despite the methodological shortcomings of the case study strategy adopted by this research (see chapter 1), the final version of the research methodology proved to be an effective mechanism to conduct the case study.

6.3.1 The Case Study Choice

Tenth of Ramadan City proved to be a good case for examination. As explained before, TRC has a fairly unique context in which the power and interests interaction

between the political leadership, interest groups, and the constraining socio-political and socio-economic structures could be traced and documented. Due to its relatively recent construction, since 1976, TRC proved to be a 'mild' and 'manageable' case in terms of the complexity of social relationships and power interactions. The exploration and explanation of the relationship between the political economy change, both at the national and local level, the institutional arrangements and power structures, and physical planning practice in the context of TRC, helped greatly in the analysis of the decision-making cycle and the reasons behind the gap between the physical planning formulation and the resulting land use patterns from the implementation process.

6.3.2 The Research Methods

The documentation and archival records proved to be a very valuable source of information. They helped in providing the background upon which the process of data collection was conducted in the field. They were simultaneously consulted to trace the names and official roles of key actors and institutions, physical plans, maps, administrative structure of institutions and agencies, and the different perceptions of the study population about various aspects of the urban development process and physical planning practice at the national and local levels. They also helped in the process of judging the validity and reliability of data collected via the interviews. The direct observation method was also a very helpful tool in supporting the validity and reliability of the data collected through the documentation and archival records. It helped in documenting the existing land use patterns in the industrial areas, as well as updating the database of the industrial establishments records upon which the sample survey was conducted.

The semi-structured interviews also worked well in obtaining data and tracing the history of specific socio-political and socio-economic structures in specific time-space edge. Nevertheless, it proved possible to obtain more than one interpretation of a situation, which enriched the discussions and analysis of the case study by providing various explanations of the very same situations and issues. Discussions were held with a total of 84 informants classified in four main groups: the government (both at the central and local levels), the interest groups, the consultants, and the manufacturing workers.

The research also adopted the sample survey method in obtaining data about the perception of manufacturing workers with respect to the urban development planning

process and physical planning practice in TRC. The main aim of this exercise was to complement the data collected from the semi-structured interviews. The sample survey was conducted in 29 establishments out of a total of 129 (i.e. 20% of the total number of the manufacturing establishments within A1, B1, and C3 industrial areas) and with 116 workers. It proved an effective method when almost all the semi-structured interviewees failed to provide reasons behind the exclusion of the manufacturing workers from the decision-making process. It also proved a helpful method in illustrating different perceptions, yet sometimes conflicting, about certain issues with respect to the urban development process.

6.3.3 The Analytical Criteria

Analysing the physical planning practice in the context of TRC from the institutional arrangements, power structures, and interests of key actors criteria, added significantly to the understanding of the reasons and causes behind the emergence and disappearance of interests and values in certain time and space edge, as well as the constraining and enabling factors controlling the decision-making process of the physical planning formulation and implementation.

6.3.4 Limitations

On the one hand, the research is based on a case study approach and therefore has the attendant limitations associated with generalising the findings. The findings of the research are specific to Egypt, and in some aspects to the TRC context, which are not necessarily applicable countrywide, let alone in the Middle East Region as a whole. Therefore, this research does not offer a blue print but rather guidelines for the analysis of the physical planning formulation and implementation processes. Nevertheless, it calls for formulating and implementing context-aware (to include political economy, socio-political and socio-economic, power and interests and institutional interactions, and physical dimensions) physical planning practice as well as national and regional urban development policies.

On the other hand, given the political nature of the research, the limited financial resources and time available to the researcher, as well as the constraints experienced in the fieldwork with respect to safety and security, proved to be limitations that inevitably coloured the findings. This became clear, for instance, in the nervousness of the interviewees when discussing issues related to the political economy and decision-

making process; and when the sample survey designed to be conducted with residents around the industrial areas had to be cancelled for safety and security reasons as explained in chapter 1.

6.4 THE FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH

This section is divided into three subsections: the political economy environment in Egypt since 1952, the institutional arrangements and power structure, and the physical planning practice in the context of TRC. Each section provides overall findings as well as stressing the link with the other sub-sections.

6.4.1 Political Economy Environment

Given Rees's (1999), Albrechts's (1991), Beauregard's (1996), Begg's (1988) and others stress on the shift from modernist to post-modernist thinking in the 1980s and its impact on the national and local political economies around the world as well as on planning theory, presented in chapter 2, the research sketches the history of Egypt's political economy since 1952 - since the regime change in the 23rd July Revolution - till 2002. Reference to Harvey's (1989a, 1989b), Ashworth's (1989), Solesbury's (1987) and others emphasis on the effect of globalisation and the introduction of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) on regional and local urban planning policies, and the emerging of the "places wars" debate, the "placeless powers and powerless places" phenomenon, and the "intra-urban" and "inter-urban" competitions into the field of planning, the research illustrates the effects of political economy changes on national development policies and more specifically on the national urban development planning policies adopted by the government to confront the on-going human settlements and economic challenges.

Such background provides a valuable base for analysing the impact on the physical planning practice and urban development planning process in the context of the case study when Egypt adopted the Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP), the New Towns Policy (NTP) and the ERSAP to the resolution of the above challenges. It illustrates the connection between changes in the global political economy and the different objectives of the above policies while providing a base for the analysis of the reasons behind the emergence and disappearance of specific interests and values within the Egyptian society in specific time-space edge. Jencks (1985), Hutcheon (1987), Albrechts (1991), and Beauregard (1996) point out, the focus of urban development

planning dramatically shifted from how to minimise the socially negative consequences of urban development through redistributive measures during the 1960s and 1970s, to how to maximise opportunities given to individuals within the changing conditions on the global scale since the 1980s. Thus, the research documents, through various examples, the changes in the attitude of the Egyptian administration towards the economic processes and the private sector's participation in the urban development planning and decision-making processes.

Reference to Giddens' (1995, 1998, 2000) emphasis on the link between the power interaction between the enablement conditions in society, which trigger the creation and empowerment of certain institutions, agencies and individuals in specific time-space edge, and the constraining conditions of existing social structures, which either admit or resist such empowerment, the research succeeded in documenting and analysing the constraining and enabling factors of social structures as well as the powerful interests within the Egyptian society and their impact on the urban development planning process and physical planning practice in the study period. Such analysis provides valuable information on the political, economic, and social contexts within which the national development policies, as well as the national urban development policies, were formulated and introduced to the Egyptian public.

Moreover, as Giddens (1995, 1998, 2000) stresses the link between 'power' and 'resources' and its impact on existing social structures and on the emerging 'third way' approach into the field of political science, the research contributed to an understanding of the nature of the power interaction and conflicts of interests between the actor groups over the control of resources and decision-making process. It also highlights the impact of the allocation of power and resources, the continuously changing institutional arrangements and power structures, and the changing interests and values of the key actors on the urban development planning process and physical planning practice at the national and local levels.

Furthermore, given the various perceptions, arguments, claims and interpretations of scholars and analysts, including Giddens (1995, 1998, 2000), Walsh (1998), Bottomore and Rubel (1965), Carlstein (1981), Layder (1981), Cohen (1968), Bhaskar (1979) and others, regarding the reasons and causes behind the creation of certain social institutions in specific time-space edge, the analysis of the political economy environment illustrates and provides an understanding of the power

interaction between the existing institutions and agencies and the newly created institutions in specific periods. It reveals the reasons behind the emergence of new institutional arrangements and power structures and shows the effect of such new arrangements on the power interaction within the political economy environment at both the national and local levels.

Given the various perceptions and debate among scholars and analysts including Durkheim (1982), Bottomore and Rubel (1965), Walsh (1998), Giddens (1995), Archer (1982), Runciman (1978, 1983) and others, over the notion of agency and its role in changing existing social structures, the analysis of the political economy environment in the context of Egypt also confirms the significant effect of powerful individuals, namely the successive Presidents and powerful Ministers, and the international and national powerful interest groups on the decision-making cycle with respect to national urban development policies. It also identifies a range of problems such as corruption, lack of coordination between the state institutions and agencies at both the national and local levels, the inter-institutional and intra-institutional conflicts, waste of resources, overlapping of responsibilities, political expediency, the powerful interest groups' (within the public and private sectors) impact on the decision-making process, the lack of urban management skills, and the gap between the official urban development planning process and the implemented patterns.

6.4.2 The Institutional Arrangements and Power structures

Testing the claims, arguments and debate among scholars and analysts including Skeffington (1979), Davidoff (1996), Lindblom (1982), Clavel (1994), Healey *et al* (1982), Krumholz (1994) and others over the notions of 'diversity' and 'public interest' and their impact on the decision-making of physical planning practice and urban development process, the research found empirical evidence of the way in which the institutions and agencies (public and private) were arranged to carry out the formulation and implementation of the national urban development policies, as well as the power structures between and within such institutions and agencies, have a significant effect on the physical planning practice through the fierce struggle for power and authority to control resources. While examining Krumholz's (1994), Krumholz and Foster's (1990) and Marris's (1994) emphasis on the impact of diversity on power structures within the decision-making process and the role of equity planners to address power inequalities and disproportional distribution of resources, the research shows that the different

institutions, agencies, individuals, and interest groups had different agendas to promote their various interests and objectives, which in most cases conflicted with the original objectives and goals of the national urban development policy and local physical plans. This also contributes to an understanding of the lack of coordination, overlapping of responsibilities, and ill feelings between and within such institutions and agencies.

Following the criticism of advocacy planning by Healey *et al* (1982), Clavel (1994), Krumholz (1994), Harvey (1996, 1989a, 1989b), Scott and Roweis (1977), McDougall (1982) and others regarding the recognition of the disproportional distribution of power among interest groups, the research shows that decisions regarding both the formulation and implementation throughout the physical planning process did not necessarily reflect the public interest but were rather affected by the officials' self interests as well as various political influences. It also documents that the power conflicts and interactions between the institutions, agencies, and individuals resulted in continuous and repeated change in the administrative structures of such institutions and agencies during the physical planning formulation and implementation process. Such continuous change was the dominant tool to solve the problems of coordination, overlapping responsibilities, inter-institutional and intra-institutional conflicts and waste of resources as well as increasing or decreasing the influence of specific institutions, agencies, and individuals in specific time edge.

As Levy (2003), Harvey (1989a, 1989b), Ashworth (1989), Solesbury (1987), Albrechts (1991), Brindley *et al* (1996) and others debate the effect of globalisation on the change in relationship between the institutions, agencies and powerful individuals of the state and private sector as well as the stress on market mechanisms to guide the urban development process and physical planning practice represented in the emergence of notions such as "urban productivity", "urban management", "enabling" market to work, "partnership", and "privatisation" in the field of planning theory, the research, moreover, succeeded in exploring, analysing and illustrating the effect of the successive political regimes and economic changes at the national level on the relationship between the public and private sectors. It reveals that since the adoption of the ODEP in 1974 the private sector was granted access to the decision-making cycle in all aspects of the Egyptian economy including manufacturing industry, tourism, and the construction sector. Nevertheless, despite the un-official power given to the private sector since 1974, the research empirically proves that it was not until the adoption of the ERSAP in the early 1990s that the private sector had a major official and institutionalised impact

on the decision-making process of the urban development process and the physical planning practice both at the national and local levels.

Further emphasis on the important role of agency to change existing socio-economic and socio-political structures stressed by the individualism scholars as well as scholars such as Giddens (1995, 1998, and 2000) and Walsh (1998) and others, the research documents and stresses that the empowerment of the private sector's institutions, agencies and individuals over the public sector directed and influenced the course of events across the physical planning formulation and implementation process as well as the original social and environmental objectives of TRC. It also helped in explaining and clarifying, among many other factors, the reasons behind the gap between the successive original physical plans and the implemented land use patterns.

In short, from the analysis of the institutional arrangements and power structures, the research stresses, on the one hand, the power and institutional interactions, which result in the emergence of new institutional arrangements and power structures, controls the decision-making process of the urban development process and physical planning practice, where the answer to who gets what, when and why lies at the heart of such process and practice. On the other hand, the significant impact of the institutional arrangements and their related power structures on the physical planning formulation and implementation process are not restricted to TRC in Egypt. While actors' interests and values change and the allocation of power and resources within the 'triangle of power' shifted, a new set of admissible and constraining rules that govern the power and institutional interaction at the national and local levels emerges, which could be universally applicable to any context within which urban development planning and physical planning practice take place.

6.4.3 Physical Planning Practice

The research shows that the urban development planning policy, adopted after the introduction of the Open Door Policy in 1974 by President Sadat, namely the Egypt's New Map Policy (ENMP), to contribute to the resolution of the ongoing human settlements and economic challenges, had a significant influence over the physical planning formulation and implementation of the industrial areas in TRC. Given these challenges, economic and urbanisation objectives have loomed much larger than in many other countries. These have included aims to increase national and regional

income, expand industry, diversify and improve employment opportunities, attract long-term foreign and domestic investment and geographically redistribute population.

Despite past national urban development and economic policies adopted prior to 1974, it was not until the launch of the Open Door Policy that Egypt started to adopt a set of 'comprehensive' policies to tackle the national challenges mentioned above. One such policy was the ENMP, which had the redistribution of population and building strong economic bases as its main aims. Seen as part of ENMP and New Towns Programme (NTP) as well as the National Security Policy, TRC had significant and unique political and financial support by the Egyptian administration, and was backed by President Sadat at the time. Since 1974, TRC went through three physical planning formulation processes (i.e. the 1978, 1982, and 1999 physical plans) and three distinctive periods of physical planning implementation processes (i.e. the periods between 1979-1986, 1986-1994, and 1994-2002).

Following the above findings, the research stresses three critical factors that had significant implications on the physical planning practice in the context of the industrial areas in TRC. First, it stresses the great influence of the relationship between the institutions, agencies and individuals in the central and local government. The stress on such relationship provides the reasons and causes behind the inter-institutional and intra-institutional conflicts affecting the decision-making process and distribution of power to control resources. Secondly, it emphasises the changing relationship between the public and private sector with specific reference to the interaction and allocation of power, which had great impact on both the urban development process and physical planning practice decisions. Finally, it highlights the debate of inclusion and exclusion of key actors in the decision-making process with respect to the formulation and implementation processes of the physical plans. It also highlights the diversity of interest and power interaction and provides an answer to who gets what, when, and why in the context of TRC in specific and Egypt at large, which had great implications for the notion of 'public interest'.

The emphasis on the above three factors affecting the physical planning practice provides a critical understanding of the shift of urban planning approaches to land development adopted by the government since 1974. The research reveals that the Egyptian physical planning practice has double standards and suffers from parallel processes. It shows that as the political economy dynamically changed at the national

level, the government found itself trapped in middle way. On the one hand, it could not seriously proceed towards a complete and clear free-market entrepreneurialism approach to land development. On the other hand, it also could not step back by only adopting the rational comprehensive approach in dealing with land development with respect to all interests in society. Step-by-step the rational comprehensive approach was adopted when dealing with issues of land development that would prevent social unrest and political insecurity. On the other hand, the entrepreneurial planning approach was adopted in times when powerful individual investors are actively involved in the urban development planning policy and physical planning practice. Paradoxically, the two processes co-exist in the same time-space edge and are applied by the very same institutions, agencies and individuals. It can be concluded that the current physical planning practice in Egypt is an agency and power-based process, which contributes to an understanding of, and helps explain, the gap between the original physical plans and implemented land use patterns.

6.4.3.1 The central-local government relationship

Given the emphasis on the highly centralised nature of the Egyptian government by several scholars and analysts including: Mayfield (1996), Stewart (1996,1999), Ayubi (1980, 1989,1991), Zaalouk (1989), Kharoufi (1994) Rivlin (1984, 1985), Cooper (1982) and others, the research documents and illustrates that local government institutions and agencies were not, by any criteria, allowed to participate in the formulation of either the ENMP or NTP, which were considered as critical parts of national security and interest. It also confirms the claim that only a handful of very powerful individuals within the central government decided the course of events Egypt would take for the coming 15 years. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that actions and decisions of such powerful individuals were, to some extent, constrained and influenced by the existing socio-political and socio-economic structures and the national and international powerful interests at the time.

The analysis of the physical planning formulation processes reveals that the local government institutions and agencies of the region within which the TRC was located not only were continuously excluded from the formulation and implementation process of the national urban development policies but also were banned from participating in the physical planning formulation and implementation process of TRC in the period of 1974 till 2002. The research reveals that despite such consistency in the

relationship between the central and local government institutions and agencies at the regional level, the relationship between the central government and local authorities within TRC kept changing across time. Such change took place alongside the political economy change at the global and national levels where the empowerment of the private sector was seen as one of the main pillars for achieving high rates of economic growth.

The research shows that the relationship between the central government, local authorities, and private sector agencies and individuals, referred to as the 'triangle of power', was the main factor controlling both the formulation and implementation process of successive physical plans. The allocation of power, authority, and resources within such a triangle kept changing across time. Consequently, the control over the decision-making process was continuously shifting, as well as the goals and objectives of the physical planning practice. Moreover, the research illustrates that such conflict of interests within the 'triangle of power' resulted in overlapping responsibilities, continuous change in the administrative structures of key institutions and agencies, lack of administrative and political coordination, waste of resources, and lack of supervision and monitoring.

The analysis of the physical planning formulation processes confirms Giddens's (1995) underlying theoretical stand that agency and individuals continuously interact with each other and with existing social structures, and in doing so they constitute society. Examining Giddens's (1995) emphasis that the level of change in existing social structures that agency can achieve depends on the power and resources it has. Given the analysis of the Egyptian political economy in chapter 3 and the analysis of the physical planning formulation and implementation process in chapters 4 and 5, it becomes apparent that the problems resulting from the process of interaction between interests at the national and local levels cannot be solved by giving more power, authority, and access to resources to some institutions, agencies, and/or individuals over others; or creating new institutions and agencies to over-rule the responsibilities of others.

The above problems could instead be solved through coordination and clear definitions for the role(s) of each and every institution, agency and individual participating in the urban development process and in physical planning practice. It also requires a clear mechanism by which the administrative and political coordination could be achieved as well as effective supervision and monitoring. Furthermore, it should be

recognised that such a mechanism cannot be effective without awareness, training, research, negotiation and consultation. It has to be stressed that, however, the above conclusion needs to be tested in future research, as this research only managed to document the negative impact of the opposite conditions on the physical planning practice and urban development process in the context of Egypt and more specifically in the industrial areas in TRC.

6.4.3.2 The public-private sector relationship

The story of the public- private sector relationship in the context of Egypt is not a unique or an exceptional one. It could be easily recognised in many countries all over the world when trying to plug into the globalisation process as stressed by Beauregard (1996), Albrechts (1991), Rees (1999), Harvey (1989a, 1989b), (Healey 1996, 1997) and others. The research has provided a critical understanding of the reasons and causes behind the ongoing change in such relationship with specific reference to the global and national political economy context. It also succeeded in tracing, exploring, and analysing the impact of such change on the emergence of new institutions and agencies across time as well as on the physical planning formulation and implementation processes since 1974.

By exploring and analysing the modern history of Egypt's political economy (i.e. since the 1952 Revolution), it is shown that it was not until 1974 that the private sector was granted a 'controlled unofficial access' to the urban development process and physical planning practice decision-making process. Access via bribes, corruption, political power, and social networks to the decision-making process granted the private sector the initial step towards the unlimited and uncontrolled influence over the physical planning practice at the national and local levels. Theoretically, in the period of 1974 till 1986, the central government and local authorities were in full control over the formulation and implementation of the physical plans of TRC; however, in practice, they shared much of their power and authority with the private sector agencies and individuals in return for political and financial gains.

Such status of unofficial access to the decision-making process of the physical planning practice and the urban development process remained partially hidden from the vast majority of the Egyptian 'public' where the Egyptian administration turned a blind eye on the suspicious activities of the private sector at the national and local levels. In 1986, such status was to be changed with specific reference to the physical

planning practice and urban development planning process at the national and local levels through the introduction of the Board of Trustees (BOT) in the local authorities' administrative structures where both the public and private sectors officially share power and authority over the urban development process and physical planning practice in the context of TRC. Such empowerment of the private sector had devastating effects on the urban development planning processes and physical planning practice where the original social and environmental objectives of the city were completely neglected, and even scrapped.

During the period of 1986 till 1994, the bargaining and negotiating processes between the public and private sectors with specific reference to the physical planning practice in TRC took a new dimension in reaction to the period prior to 1986. Prior to 1986, the private sector's main aim was to search for entry points to gain access to the decision-making process that would grant financial gains. However, during the period of 1986 till 1994, the main interest of the private sector shifted dramatically towards securing the financial gains not only by participating or having access to the decision-making process but also by controlling such process. At the same time the public sector's institutions, agencies, and individuals were trying their best to hold on power and control over the very same process as a matter of survival. Such struggle for power, authority, and control over resources and decision-making process left its obvious marks on the resulting land use patterns in the industrial areas till this very moment.

After 1994, the public-private sector relationship entered its final phase after the appointment of a new Minister of the MOH, Mohamed Soliman, in 1993. The rules that govern the physical planning practice and urban development process were dramatically changed. A new style of urban management was introduced focussing on the private sector to lead the urban development process. Such new style resulted in a dramatic shift in the power balance towards the private sector agencies and powerful individuals. The public institutions and agencies were stripped to the bare bones from any power or authority over the decision-making process of the urban development planning. The outcome was a strong dose of private business driven urban development planning process. Nevertheless, not all the private sector agencies and individuals experienced the same level of power and authority over the decision-making process. The private sector individuals were classified into two main categories upon which their level of influence could be measured and upon which the process of gaining access and

controlling resources, including land for development, could be determined and established.

Such double-standards in the practice of officials as well as the dramatic empowerment of powerful individuals proved to have a devastating impact on the outcome land use patterns of TRC in general and the industrial areas in specific. In short, if urban development, as Attia (1999, p. 332-3) concludes, is "an integrated process of incremental change leading to high physical standards of living and cultural, social and psychological well-being for the majority of local people as well as guaranteeing their effective participation in political decision-making", what happened in TRC and its industrial areas cannot be described as urban development but rather as a form of development driven by powerful short-term interests.

6.4.3.3 Inclusion and exclusion

Given Cornwall (2002), Desai (1996), and Goetz and O'Brien (1995) elaborate debate, introduced in chapter 2, over the notion of 'participation' in the decision-making process and its impact on planning theory, this research documents and illustrates the reasons and causes behind the exclusion of specific institutions and agencies from having access to the formulation and implementation process decision-making in the context of the case study in specific time edge. Local people and manufacturing workers were unable to exercise their interests over both the regional and local urban development processes as the local government institutions, agencies and individuals were excluded from the decision-making process since 1974 till 2002. Nevertheless, although local authorities as well as the powerful agencies and individuals in the private sector were given access to such process, there was no effective or enforced mechanism to guarantee residents and workers participation as well as the less powerful interest groups in the decision-making process.

In short, the research shows that the absence of local government, local residents and workers, as well as the less powerful private sector agencies and individuals from the decision-making process had been a major factor in the failure of physical planning practice to achieve its original objectives. The research also documents and illustrates how the participation in the decision-making process got manipulated and sacrificed in favour of the powerful institutions, agencies and individuals of the 'triangle of power', as Cornwall (2002) and Desai (1996) emphasise that substantive local participation in the physical planning practice as well as the urban development process requires well-

defined and well-established local powers, training, awareness, and democratic system of elections. In fact the inclusion of the less powerful actor groups is crucial, as they are the legitimate legal representatives of local communities.

Finally, the research documents and illustrates, through several examples in the case study analysis, that in the absence of local powers, training, awareness, and democratic system of elections, unrepresentative local government personnel, the existence of corruption, lack of effective supervision and monitoring pave the way for extreme political expediency and a system of inclusion and exclusion based on 'common powerful interests' rather than on 'public interest'.

6.5 ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This research critically examined and analysed a wide range of hotly debated issues as well as widely recognised critical problems within the field of urban development planning and physical planning practice. Further in-depth understanding of specific issues that arose from the findings of this research would require future research. It is important to note that the suggested and recommended issues for future research below are not in any particular order of importance.

1. While this research provides a critical examination of the politics of physical planning practice and urban development process in the context of Egypt in general and TRC in specific in the period 1974-2002, future research is needed to provide a critical comparison between the politics of physical planning practices and urban development planning process in developing and industrialised countries. Such a comparison would provide the fundamental understanding of the areas of similarities and divisions, and would enrich the contextual awareness of urban planners, analysts, researchers, and policy makers when adopting or recommending the adoption of particular urban planning approaches to land development in specific time and space edge.

2. Further research is also needed to build an analytical framework to enable measuring and comparing the degree of influence and importance of, on the one hand, the internal relationships of the urban development process and physical planning practice (e.g. allocation of power, administrative structures, allocation of resources, control over the decision-making process, the inter-institutional and intra-institutional conflicts, central-local government relationship, etc), and

on the other hand, the context (e.g. political economy, socio-political and socio-economic structures, domestic and international powerful interests, public-private relationship, etc) within which the urban planning process and practice takes place on such process and practice.

3. While studying a state sponsored physical planning practice and urban development planning process, this research calls for an empirical comparative research focusing on the areas of similarities and divisions between cases where the state is fully-engaged and less-engaged in the urban development process and physical planning practice. In other words, it calls for critically testing and analysing the impacts of the progressive and conservative role of the state on the urban development planning process and physical planning practice.

4. So far almost all literature tends to support the claim that more community participation results in more 'desirable' and widely accepted outcomes of the physical planning practice. Nevertheless, few studies have tried to illustrate the counter claim by arguing that the more actors participate in decision-making process the more conflicts of interests are likely to exist, which may have a negative impact on the outcome of the urban development planning process and physical planning practice. Empirical comparative research and studies are required to either endorse or reject such a counter claim.

5. This research paves the way for further research on the impact of the hotly debated issue of centralisation/decentralisation on the urban development planning process and physical planning practice. Empirical comparative research is also required for assessing and examining the outcomes of such processes and practices. Such research would provide scholars, academics, as well as practitioners and policy makers with the needed foundation for building an effective urban management framework to formulate and implement future urban policies, programmes, projects, and physical plans.

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
APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: LAND USE PLANS FOR THE INDUSTRIAL AREAS IN TRC

1. The original detailed land use plan model for the heavy industrial areas (A1) (SWECO/COPA), 1976
2. The original detailed land use plan model for the heavy industrial areas (A1) (SWECO/COPA), 1978
3. The original detailed land use plan model for the medium industrial area (B1) (SWECO/COPA)
4. The original detailed land use plan model for the medium industrial area (B2) (SWECO/COPA)
5. The original detailed land use plan model for the medium industrial area (C1) (SWECO/COPA)
6. The original detailed land use plan for the heavy industrial area (A) (COPA)
7. The original detailed land use plan for the medium industrial area (B3) (COPA)
8. The original detailed land use plan for the medium industrial area (B4) (COPA)
9. The original detailed land use plan for the light industrial area (C2) (COPA)
10. The original detailed land use plan for the light industrial area (C3) (COPA)
11. The original detailed land use plan for the light industrial area (C4) (COPA)
12. The original detailed land use plan for the extension of the heavy industrial area (A) (AAW), 1999
13. The existing land use pattern for the heavy industrial area (A) (April 2002)
14. The existing land use pattern for the medium industrial area (B1) (April 2002)
15. The existing land use pattern for the medium industrial area (B2) (April 2002)
16. The existing land use pattern for the medium industrial area (B3) (April 2002)
17. The existing land use pattern for the medium industrial area (B4) (April 2002)
18. The existing land use pattern for the light industrial area (C1) (April 2002)
19. The existing land use pattern for the light industrial area (C2) (April 2002)
20. The existing land use pattern for the light industrial area (C3) (April 2002)
21. The existing land use pattern for the light industrial area (C4) (April 2002)
22. The updated master plan of the TRC (GOPP), 2002

The original detailed land use plan model for the heavy industrial area (A1) (SWECO / COPA)

Source: Arab Republic of Egypt, 1976

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The original detailed land use plan model for the heavy industrial area (AI) (SWECO / COPA)

Sources: Arab Republic of Egypt, 1978.

365

The original detailed land use plan for the medium industrial area (B1) (SWECO / COPA)

Source: Arab Republic of Egypt, 1976

The original detailed land use plan model for the medium industrial area (B2) (SWECO / COPA)

The original detailed land use plan for the light industrial area (C1) (SWECO / COPA)

Source: Arab Republic of Egypt, 1976

North

The original detailed land use plan for the heavy industrial area (COPA)

Source: Shetawy, 2000, distribution of industrial activities within the industrial areas and the environmental impact, case of Tenth of Ramadan City, Ain Shams University, Master Thesis, Cairo, p. 246

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North

medium industries (0.4-1.5) hect
light industries (0.1-0.4) hect
buffer area
green area

The original detailed land use plan for the medium industrial area (B3) (COPA)

Source: Shabwy, 2000, Distribution of Industrial Activities within the Industrial Areas and its Environmental Impact Case of Tenth of Ramadan City, Ain Shams University, Master Thesis, Cairo, P. 251

The original detailed land use plan for the medium industrial area (D.4) (COPA)

North

■ heavy industries (1.5-6) hect

■ medium industries (0.4-1.5) hect

■ light industries (0.1-0.4) hect

○ buffer areas

Source: Shehawy, 2000, Distribution of Industrial Activities within the Industrial Areas and its Environmental Impact Case of Tenth of Ramadan City, Ain Shams University, Master Thesis, Cairo, P. 252

The original detailed land use plan for the light industrial area (C2) (COPA)

Source: Shatawy, 2000, Distribution of Industrial Activities within the Industrial Areas and its Environmental Impact Case of Tenth of Ramadan City, Ain Shams University, Master Thesis, Cairo, p. 254

Legend:
- light industries (0.1–0.4) hect
- small industries (less than 0.1) hect
- buffer areas
- service area

North

The original detailed land use plan for the light industrial area (G3) (COPA)

Source: Shalaby, 2000, Distribution of Industrial Activities within the Industrial Areas and its Environmental Impact Case of Tenth of Ramadan City, Ain Shams University, Master Thesis, Cairo, p. 254

light industries (0.1-0.4) heat

buffer areas

North

The original detailed land use plan for the light industrial area (C4) (GOFA)

Source: Shalawy, 2000, Distribution of Industrial Activities within the Industrial Areas and its Environmental Impact Case of Tenth of Ramadan City, Ain Shams University, Master Thesis, Cairo, p. 255

light industries (0.1-0.4) heat

buffer areas

North

large industrial plots (> 10000 m2)
medium industrial plots (6000 - 10000 m2)
small industrial plots (< 6000 m2)
raw materials and products storing plots
services
green areas

north

The detailed land use plan for the extension of the heavy industrial area (A)

To Cairo

To Belbis

To Badr City

industrial extension zone

isolated industries (6-25) hect.

heavy industries (1.5-6) hect.

medium industries (0.4-1.5) hect.

light industries (0.1-0.4) hect.

buffer areas

service areas

A1

A1

A2

A2

A3

To Ismailia

North

Source: Fieldwork trip, January – April 2002

The existing land use pattern (April 2002)

The existing land use pattern for the medium industrial area (B1) (April 2002)

Source: Fieldwork trip, January – April 2002

Legend:
- isolated industries (6-25) hect
- heavy industries (1.5-6) hect
- medium industries (0.4-1.5) hect
- light industries (0.1-0.4) hect
- buffer areas
- service area

North

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The existing land use pattern for the medium industrial area (B2) (April 2002)

Source: Fieldwork trip, January - April 2002

Legend:
- isolated industries (6-25) heat
- heavy industries (1.5-6) heat
- medium industries (0.4-1.5) heat
- light industries (0.1-0.4) heat
- buffer areas
- poultry
- high voltage electro plant

North

Source: Fieldwork trip, January – April 2002

The existing land use pattern for the medium industrial area (B9) (April 2002)

North

Legend:
- heavy industries (1.5–6) hect
- medium industries (0.4–1.5) hect
- light industries (0.1–0.4) hect
- parking lot
- buffer areas

Source: Fieldwork trip, January - April 2002

The existing land use pattern for the medium industrial area (B4) (April 2002)

North

heavy industries (1.5-6) hect
medium industries (0.4-1.5) hect
light industries (0.1-0.4) hect
buffer areas
green area

The existing land use pattern for the light industrial area (C1) (April 2002)

Legend:
- medium industries (0.4-1.5) hect
- light industries (0.1-0.4) hect
- small industries (less than 0.1) hect
- buffer areas
- service area

North

Source: fieldwork trip, January – April 2002

Legend:
- heavy industries (1.5-6) hect
- light industries (0.1-0.4) hect
- small industries (less than 0.1) hect
- buffer areas
- service area

Source: Fieldwork trip, January – April 2002

The existing land use pattern for the light industrial area (C2) (April 2002)

North

The existing land use pattern for the light industrial area (C3) (April 2002)

Source: Fieldwork trip, January – April 2002

medium industries (0.4-1.5) hect

light industries (0.1-0.4) hect

buffer areas

North

The existing land use pattern for the light industrial areas (C4) (April 2002)

Source: Fieldwork trip, January – April 2002

medium industries (0.4-1.5) hect

light industries (0.1-0.4) hect

buffer areas

North

384

Source: GOPP, 2002

The updated master plan of the TRC (GOPP)

North

Appendix II: RESEARCH METHODS AND THE RELATED STUDY POPULATION AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

Research Methods	Study Population	Techniques
Documentation		
Archival Records		
Direct observation	Update land use plans	
Semi structured interviews	Central government officials	
	- MOH	Purposeful
	- ANUC	Purposeful
	- ARP	Purposeful
	- GOPP	Purposeful
	Local government officials	
	- Department of planning	Purposeful then snowballing
	- Department of Engineering	Purposeful then snowballing
	- Chairman of TRDA	Purposeful
	- Board of Trustees members	Purposeful
	- TRIA	Purposeful
	Economists	Purposeful then Snowballing
	Politicians	Purposeful then Snowballing
	Entrepreneurs	
	- Establishments owners	Quota
	- Establishments managers	Quota
	City planners	
	- GOPP	Purposeful
	- COPA	Purposeful
	- AAW	Census
	- Department of planning in the local government	Purposeful
	Analysts and academics	Purposeful then Snowballing
	Workers community leaders	Purposeful
Structured interviews (sample survey)	Manufacturing Workers	Systematic random sampling

<u>APPENDIX III</u>: LIBRARIES AND DOCUMENTATION CENTRES CONSULTED

1. In London

- University College London Libraries
- The Documentation Centre in the Development Planning Unit, University College London
- British Library of Political and Economic Science, London School of Economics
- Senate House, University of London
- The British Library

2. In Cairo

- Ain Shams University Libraries
- Cairo University Libraries
- Al-Azhar University Libraries
- The British council
- The American Cultural Centre
- New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA)
- Central agency for Population Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS)

APPENDIX IV: THE KEY QUESTIONS OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

The questions of the semi-structured interviews conducted in the fieldwork period are divided into three major categories that reflects the entry points of the analysis of the urban development process and physical planning practice in the context of Egypt at large and TRC in specific in the period of 1974 till 2002. The three categories are: the dynamic change of the national political economy context, the institutional arrangements and power structures, the physical planning practice.

A. The Dynamic Change of the national political economy context

1. What is the historic link between Egypt's political economy change and the influential international development institutions and agencies (i.e. the WB and IMF) and the aid countries (i.e. the USA and Russia) since the July 23rd Revolution in 1952?

2. To what extent did Egypt's political economy change direct the role of the state, public and private sectors and their inter-relational power structures with respect to the formulation of the successive national development policies?

3. To what extent did the dynamic change of Egypt's political economy impact upon the successive political and administrative structures, responsibilities, and power of the main key institutions, agencies, and individuals within the Egyptian state?

4. What were the main national development challenges? And what were the key national development policies adopted by the successive regimes and governments to face such challenges since 1952?

5. To what extent did such challenges direct the domination of specific economic sector (e.g. industry, agriculture, tourism) in leading the development process?

6. How did the determination of the goals and objectives of such policies, including the urban development planning policies, result in the emergence, disappearance, empowerment, and weakening of specific institutions, agencies, and individuals at the national level?

B. The Institutional Arrangements and Power Structures

1. How did the dynamic change of the political economy context and action environment affect and direct the establishment and empowerment of specific institutions and agencies (central/local and public/private) participating in the formulation and implementation of the successive national development planning policies?

2. What were the effect of such empowerment on the existing institutional arrangements and power structures with specific reference to the outcome intra-institutional and inter-institutional conflicts?

3. Who (institutions, agencies, and individuals) were involved in the formulation and implementation of the national urban development planning policies with respect to their responsibilities, technical and development management experience, dedicated power and authority over the decision-making process, allocation of resources, and interests?

4. What was the impact of the outcome intra-institutional and inter-institutional conflicts on the decision-making process of the formulation and implementation of the urban development planning policies and physical planning practice with respect to the determination of the goals and objectives, choice of urban planning consultants, allocation of resources, agreeing on plans, policies and projects, setting TORs parameters, and the domination of certain interests in specific time edge?

5. To what extent did the institutional arrangements and power structures of the formulation and implementation of the national urban development planning processes result in triggering new powerful interests and values within the Egyptian society?

C. The Physical Planning Practice

1. What was the exact nature of the historic relationship between the national urban development policies, new towns programme, and the urban development process in TRC? Why?

2. What is the fundamental contextual difference between TRC and any other new town? And how did such difference contribute to the obvious gap between the official urban development process and physical planning practice, by the virtue of Laws, and the implemented patterns of such process and practice?

3. How many physical planning formulation processes did the city go through? And what were the distinctive contextual differences of each process with respect to the interlocking relationships between political economy change, action environment, and institutional arrangements and power structures?

4. Who (institutions, agencies, individuals) (central/local and public/private) were involved in each formulation process with specific reference to their experience, responsibilities, political and financial powers, control over the decision-making process, interests and agendas, and access to resources?

5. To what extent did the dynamic relationships between public/private sectors, central/local government affected the decision-making process of each process with respect to the issue of inclusion and exclusion? And how did such effect impact upon the goals, objectives, and outcome in each physical planning formulation process of the industrial areas?

6. How many distinctive successive physical planning implementation processes could be empirically recognised in TRC? And what were the empirical nature of the relationship between such successive processes and the national political economy change and institutional arrangements and power structures with specific reference to the central/local government and public/private sector relationships?

7. Who (institutions, agencies, individuals) (central/local and public/private) were involved in each implementation period with specific reference to their experience, responsibilities, access to resources, political and financial power, interests and agendas, and control over the decision-making process?

8. To what extent did the national political economy change, action environment, institutional arrangements and power structures affect the inclusion and exclusion of the identified key actors in the decision-making process in each period?

9. What are the different perceptions of key actors (included and excluded) regarding the urban development process and physical planning practice in the context of the industrial areas in TRC? And what are the reasons and causes behind such difference?

<u>**APPENDIX V:**</u> **STRUCTURED INTERVIEW CONDUCTED WITH THE SAMPLE MANUFACTURING WORKER**

Date/time:……………………………………………………………………………

Location:…………………………………………………………………………..

Please tick ☐ the appropriate answer.

Section (1): Background

1.1 Sex: ☐ male ☐ female

1.2 Age: ☐ 20-29 ☐ 30-39 ☐ 40-49 ☐ 50-60 ☐ >60

1.3 Marital status: ☐ single ☐ married ☐ widow ☐ divorced

1.4 Occupation:……………………………………………………….………...

1.5 Originally from:…………………………………………………….………..

1.6 Qualifications:…………………………………………………….………..

1.7 For how long have you been working in 10th of Ramadan City?

☐ <1 year ☐ 1-5 years ☐ 5-10 years ☐ 10-15 years ☐ > 15 years

1.8 Before working in this factory, where have you been working?

☐ In my home city ☐ In another factory in 10th of Ramadan City

☐ In Cairo ☐ In another new city

☐ Others, please state:……………………………………………………

1.9 If you have the chance to work in one of the new cities, which new city would you choose?

☐ 10th of Ramadan City

☐ Another new city, please state which one:…………………………………

If you choose another city, what are the main reasons? (You can tick ☐ more than one choice and write your opinion)

☐ It is near to my home city

☐ It has better job opportunities

☐ The wages are higher than here

☐ It has more green areas

☐ It has more services

☐ It is cleaner than 10th of Ramadan City

☐ Others, please state:…………………………………………………

1.10 Are you living in 10th of Ramadan City?

☐ Yes ☐ No ……………………..[If no, go to section (2)]

If yes, when did you move in to 10th of Ramadan City?

☐ mid 1970s ☐ late 1970s ☐ early 1980s ☐ mid 1980s

☐ late 1980s ☐ early 1990s ☐ mid 1990s ☐ late 1990s

What were the main reasons upon which you chose 10th of Ramadan City rather than any other place?

………………………………………………………………………………….…

Section (2): Physical Planning Practice and the Built Environment

2.1 How do you usually go to work?

☐ Walking ☐ Bicycle ☐ Motor bicycle

☐ Public bus ☐ Car ☐ Factory bus ☐ Others,………….

2.2 Roughly, what is the percentage between the workers who live in 10th of Ramadan City (X) and the worker who are commuting everyday to their home cities (Y) in your factory? (Please tick ☐ the percentages between X: Y)

☐ 1:1 ☐ 2:1 ☐ 3:1 ☐ 4:1 ☐ 5:1 ☐ > 5:1

☐ 1:2 ☐ 1:3 ☐ 1:4 ☐ 1:5 ☐ > 1:5

2.3 Are there enough services and facilities in this industrial?

    ☐ more than enough   ☐ enough   ☐ need to be more   ☐ no services

2.4 What kind of facilities does your factory have? (you can tick ☐ more than one choice)

    ☐ A place to pray   ☐ Canteen

    ☐ Stores   ☐ Communication centre

    ☐ Show rooms   ☐ Maintenance centre

    ☐ Educational and training facilities   ☐ Health centre

    ☐ All of the previous   ☐ No facilities

    ☐ Others please state:……………………………………………………...

2.5 Do you have lunch break?

    ☐ Yes   ☐ No   [if No, go to the question 2.6]

If yes, from where do you usually buy your lunch if not bringing it with you?

    ☐ From the factory canteen

    ☐ From the service area inside the industrial area

    ☐ From the shops in the residential areas next to us

    ☐ From the city service centre

    ☐ There is no need because my factory provides my lunch

    ☐ Others, please state:……………………………………………………

2.6 If you are working on a Friday shift, where do you usually pray?

    ☐ At the factory's with my colleagues

    ☐ At the mosque in the industrial area service centre

    ☐ At the mosque in the industrial area next to this one

    ☐ At the mosque in the residential areas next to us

    ☐ At the mosque in the city service centre

    ☐ I am a Christian

    ☐ Others, please state:……………………………………………………..

2.7 In case of emergencies, how can you call your home?

    ☐ From the factory's communication centre

    ☐ From the communication centre in industrial area service centre

    ☐ From the shops inside the residential areas next to the industrial area

    ☐ I have to wait till returning back home

    ☐ Others, please state:……………………………………………………..

2.8 If you had a training course in relation to your factory, where did you have it?

    ☐ At the factory

    ☐ At the training centre in the industrial area service centre

    ☐ In Cairo

    ☐ In 10th of Ramadan City service centre

    ☐ Others, please state:……………………………………………………..

2.9 From where does the factory obtain further maintenance assistance in case of emergencies?

    ☐ From maintenance canters in the city service centre

    ☐ From maintenance centres in the industrial area service centre

    ☐ From maintenance centres in the residential areas service centres

    ☐ From Cairo

    ☐ I don't know

    ☐ Others, please state:……………………………………………………..

2.10 In case of work accidents that need an immediate medical attention, which health centre is the nearest to the factory?

    ☐ The industrial area health centre

    ☐ The health centres in the residential areas next to the industrial area

    ☐ The hospital at the city service centre

    ☐ Cairo Ambulance service

    ☐ I do not know

    ☐ Others, please state:……………………………………………………..

2.11 In your opinion, does your factory have any environmental problems with its neighbouring factories and the surrounding residential areas?

☐ Yes ☐ No (if no, please go to question 2.12)

If yes, what kind of environmental problems?

☐ Air pollution (e.g. smog, heavy smells, acids, dying, oil vapour, etc)
☐ Industrial solid waste
☐ Industrial liquid waste
☐ Noise
☐ Others, please state:……………………………………………………..

2.12 Regarding the green areas, this industrial area:

☐ more than enough ☐ enough ☐ need to be more ☐ no green areas

2.13 Who is responsible for the industrial solid waste collection?

☐ The factories ☐ the TRDA
☐ Private companies ☐ private traders
☐ No one ☐ I do not know
☐ Others, please state:…………………………………………………………..

And where do they usually get rid of the industrial waste? (you can tick ☐ more than one choice and state others as well)

☐ dump it on streets
☐ dump it on the desert next to the city
☐ Sell it as scrap
☐ dump it in the dump areas next to the city
☐ I do not know
☐ Others, please state:………………………………………………………

Section(3): The Decision-making Process and Land Development

3.1 What is (are) the main interest(s) of the TRDA regarding the city development? (you can blank ☐ more than one choice if needed)

☐ Social development ☐ Economic development
☐ Environmental protection ☐ land development
☐ All the previous
☐ I do not know
☐ Others please state:……………………………………………………….

3.2 In your opinion, who controls the decision-making process regarding the industrial land development?

☐ The TRDA ☐ the central government
☐ The investors ☐ the residents
☐ The workers ☐ all the previous
☐ I do not know
☐ Others, please state who:………………………………………………..

3.3 Are the rules and regulations regarding the industrial areas development applied equally to everyone?

☐ No ☐ Yes
☐ Maybe ☐ I don't know

2.4 how do workers choose their representatives in the local authority?

☐ Local elections ☐ appointed by the local authorities
☐ Others, please state how: ……………………………………………………

3.5 If you and your colleagues need more services and facilities or have common problems need to be solved, what would you do?

☐ Negotiate with the factory administration
☐ Contact the workers representative
☐ Contact the employment authority
☐ I will be annoyed for a while then forget about it
☐ I will not do anything because I know nothing will happen

☐ Others, please state:…………………………………………………………..

3.6 Are you satisfied with the local authorities interest in the city workers' welfare?

☐ Very satisfied ☐ Satisfied ☐ I am not satisfied

☐ They are not interested in such a thing

If not satisfied, what do you suggest to improve workers welfare?

☐ Invest more in the industrial services ☐ Develop more industrial land

☐ Give more attention and rights to workers

☐ Protect the environment from industrial pollution

☐ I don't know

☐ Others, please state your opinion:………………………………………

3.7 why don't you and your colleagues present your ideas and perceptions to the Board of Trustees and the TRDA?

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

Thanks for your help and your time dedicated to complete this questionnaires

APPENDIX VI: LIST OF INFORMANTS

Actor Groups	Name	Position
MOH	Hassaballah Al-Kafrawy	Ex-Governor of Dumiat Ex-President of ANUC Ex-Minister of MOH Consultant
	Milad Hanna	Ex-Minister of Housing Consultant and Writer
	Mostafa Hifnawy	Ex-Chairman of ARP Ex-Minister of Housing Consultant
	Talaat Tawfeek	Ex-Mister of Housing
GOPP	Hussein El-Gibaly	Chairman of GOPP
	Shawki Shabaan	Vice-Chairman of GOPP
	Michele Fouad	Ex-Chairman of GOPP Consultant
	Mohamed Shalata	Ex Vice-Chairman of GOPP Ex-Chairman of ARP
	Mohamed El-Ghayaty	Senior Director of the Department of Infrastructure
	Manal Batran	Senior Manager of the Department of physical Planning Researcher
	Nahid Nagib	Senior Director of the Department of the Urban Planning for Upper Egypt
ANUC	Fouad Madbouly	Vice-Chairman of ANUC Ex-Chairman of GOPP
	Abdel-Haleem El-Rimaly	Ex Vice Chairman of ANUC Consultant Professor of Urban Planning
	Hayaat Sabet	Senior Director of the Department of Technical Affairs
	Nashwa Bashandy	Manager, Department of Physical Planning Researcher
	Mohamed Mostafa	Manager, Department of Physical Planning
	Ibrahim Saleh	Manager, Department of Transportation
	Adel Husein	Manager, Department of Environmental Planning
TREIU	Ibrahim Abdel-Glil	Chairman of EEAA
	Ahmed Allam	Ex Vice-Chairman of EEAA Ex Chairman of TREIU
	Ibrahim Higazy	Senior Manager, EEAA Vice-Chairman of TREIU
ARP	Abla El-Korashy	Head of the ARP
	Nabil Rashid	Project Manager

	Mohamed Hilal	Project Manager
	Mostafa Ryad	Project Manager
	Hala Fekry	Project Manager
	Maha Abdel-Samee'	Project Manager
	Omayma Osman	Project Manager
	Andaleeb Abou-Elsouad	Project Manager
ACR	Wagdi Shabaan	Ex Member of ACR Consultant
Local Government		
TRDA	Mohamed Saeid	Ex-Chairman of TRDA
	Mahmoud Mansour	Ex-Chairman of TRDA
	Mohsen Shehata	Ex-Chairman of TRDA
	Ashraf Ahmed	Chairman of TRDA
	Mahmoud Eid	Vice-Chairman of TRDA
	Magdy Badawy	Director of the Department of Development and Management General Secretary of the BOT
	Nabil Morsy	Director of the Department of Legal and Administration Affairs
	Samya Wasef	Director of the Department of Technical Affairs
	Mohamed Zaky	Deputy Director of the Department of Technical Affairs
	Fathy Nada	Manager, the Department of Technical Affairs
	Mohamed El-Sharma	Director of the Department of Physical Planning
	Abdel-Hakam Tolba	Director of the Department of Planning for Industrial Areas
	Harb Saadeldin	Senior Engineer, the Department of Implementation
	Ahmed Ezzat	Engineer, the Department of Infrastructure Implementation
	Ahmed Abdel-Moula	Director of the Department of Environmental Affairs Member of the BOT
BOT	Rida Helmy	Chairman of BOT EX-Chairman of TRIA Honored Chairmanship of TRIA Owner and Chairman of TAKI Factory Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce in Sharkia Governorate Member of the Board of the Egyptian Industries Union Chairman of the Wood Industries Chamber Chairman of the Council for Wood Industries

	Mahmoud Soliman	Chairman of TRIA Chairman of Erkwarzo Co. Vice-Chairman of the Chamber of Chemical Industries Chairman of the Coating and Paint Chamber in the Egyptian Industries Union
	Walid Helal	Member of the BOT Member of the Board of TRIA Member of the Board of the Chemical Industries Chamber in the Egyptian Industrial Union Vice-Chairman of El-nigma welhilal Elzahabya Co.
	Sameir Mahrous	Secretary of the BOT
Interest Groups		
TRIA	Abou-Bakr Allam	Senior Director of the Financial and Administration Department in TRIA
	Mohamed Reiad	Chairman of *Raitex* Co.
	Ahmed Soliman	Chairman of *Lashein Plastic*
	Sameir Abdel-Sattar	Director of the Production Processes in *Kromax* Factory
	Mohamed Nigm	Director of the legal and Administration Department in *ABB Co.*
	Hosny Ismail	Director of the Legal and Administration Department in *IBCO Co.*
ASMINC	Nasr Soliman	Chairman of ASMINC
	Fathy Abdel-Kader	Chairman of Top Body Factory
	Saied Darweish	Director of Alfa Factory
	Mohamed Ibrahim	Director of the Egyptian American Food Factory
	William Georgy	Director of *Elmasrya Lelbalaat* Factory
	Mahmoud Ibrahim	Financial Director of *Anwar Elwaleid* Factory
Urban Planning Consultants	Prof. Mohamed Serageldin	Ex-Member of COPA Head of the Department of Urban Planning in Al-Azhar University
	Prof. Shafak El-Wakeil	Ex-Member of COPA Head of the Department of Urban Planning in Ain Shams University
	Dr. Ahmed Abdel-Warith	President of AAW
	Eng. Salaah Abdel-Ghany	Vice-President of AAW
	Eng. Mohamed Helmy	Project Manager, AAW
	Prof. Ali El-Faramawy	Senior Urban Planning Consultant, AAW General Manager of UNDP Middle East
	Prof. Fisal Abdel-Maksoud	Senior Urban Planning Consultant, AAW

	Prof. Maarouf El-Adley	Survey Consultant, AAW
	Prof. Saeid Fahmy	Transportation Consultant, AAW
	Sahar Gado	Senior Urban Planner, AAW
	Dina Maarouf	Senior Urban Planner, AAW
Academics, Researchers, and Practitioners	Prof. Abdallah Abdel Aziz	Prisedint of PUD Consultants
	Dr. Tamer El-Khorazaty	President of Okoplan
	Eng. Saeid Sorour	President of Okoplan
	Dr. Mohamed Salheen	Lecturer in the Department of Urban Planning Ain Shams University Consultant
	Dr. Amr Attia	Lecturer in the Department of Urban Planning Ain Shams University Consultant
	Prof. Abdel-Mohsen Barrada	Prof. Of Urban Planning Ex- Dean of the Faculty of Urban Planning Studies, Cairo University Consultant
	Dr. Ghada Hafez	Lecturer in the Faculty of Urban Planning Studies, Cairo University
	Dr. Ahmed Salah	Lecturer in the Department of Urban Planning Ain Shams University Consultant
	Dr. Ghada Farouk	Lecturer in the Department of Urban Planning Ain Shams University
	Prof. Atef Hamza	Prof. Of Urban Planning, Department of Urban Planning in Al-Azhar University Consultant
	Eng. Amal Eldebeky	PhD Researcher
	Eng. Marwa Aboul-Fotoh	PhD Researcher

APPENDIX VII: PHYSICAL PLANNING PRACTICE AND CONSTRAINTS

1. PHYSICAL PLANNING POTENTIALS

Physical planning potentials can be recognised in several ways according to who defines it. Physical planning roots in architecture and landscape architecture, in the 19th century Europe, were reflected in the early views of planning. Physical planning, from architects point of view, was seen as doing for the city what architecture does for the home, which means that the planning main purpose is to improve the built environment to promote health, safety, and convenience using the location tool in distributing activities in the built environment. From the political roots, physical planning is one of the most powerful tools used by government to promote the general or public interest, regarding land consumption, over the conflicting interest of different society agencies. Moreover, professional economists view physical planning as a tool of the public policy to serve economic growth in favour of capitalists (Klosterman 1996). Although these different recognitions trying to explain the potentials of physical planning and planners, analysts and theorists dealing with physical planning are still concerning with the location issue which underpins the important role of physical planning to manage the location of mixed activities within the built environment such as industries, service centres, hospitals, and schools as Harvey (1996) summarises:

> "…. It is a truism to say that we all plan. But planning as a profession has a much more restricted domain […] professional planners find themselves confined, for the most part, to the task of defining and attempting to achieve "successful" ordering of the built environment. In the ultimate instance the planner is concerned with the proper location, the appropriate mix of activities in space of all diverse elements that make up the totality of physical structures" *(op. cit.*, p. 176)

Trying to present physical planning potentials, Healey (1997) argued that physical planning in several instances could be traced back to concerns dealing with land development and land speculation and the production of more orderly land market in terms of land production and consumption (Healey 1997, pp.145-151). This important role of physical planning can be observed in many countries: in Germany, land use zoning policy was formulated to regulate urban expansion and to help the government to formulate adequate infrastructure provision policy (Sutcliffe 1981). In Los Angles, land use planning was introduced to reduce land speculation and to protect community builders who provide serviced plots from other interest groups who sold un-serviced plots in locations which were costly to serve (Weiss 1987)

Furthermore, physical planning potentials are not only the matter of proper location and distribution of activities, preparation of land use plans followed by implementation to meet the needs of different interest groups within society[1], reduction of land speculation, and directing development or urban expansion of cities to control the unplanned development but also it includes the idea of " social planning"[2]. In this sense, "physical planning"[3] can be seen as an object-specific subset of "social planning". Healey et al (1982) claim, it has been argued that

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[1] Much of literature, before the late 1970s, early 1980s, on implementation seemed to imply that implementation is a distinct step coming after planning. This view seemed to be indicated by the oft-repeated concept of "missing link" between planning and results (see for example Hargrove, 1975). This perspective began to change after many annalists and theorists including Healey (1979) and Barrett (1980) who argued that this view is vestige of the rational approach and it must be seen as a part of the planning process not as a separate step.

[2] "Social planning" is the idea of using a plan or planning process as a programme through which society controls and directs itself (Healey et al 1982, p. 18).

[3] "Physical planning" is defined as a concern of a physical development of an area emphasizing primary form and function. Therefore, the physical planning has been concerned with a single, end-state plan reflecting an overriding public interest and the size, scope, legal standing and position of this plan relative to derivative regulations (e.g. land use planning, zoning,) (Mocine 1966, p. 33).

whenever the relationship between "physical planning" and "social planning" has been made explicitly, the physical outcome land use pattern has been vaguely specified the different interests within society. As a connection to the previous argument, many analysts and theorists argue that "social planning" regarding the needs and preferences of society is a reaction to the functional and efficiency orientation of "physical planning" and is intimately concerned with the systematic distribution of resources to counter social inequality. This concern of the distribution and inequalities has proved to be connected with the political, economic, and environmental arenas (Peattie 1968).

Physical planning is not only connected with "social planning" but also is directly linked, affected by and effects "economic planning", which is concerned with the same issue of distribution of goods, including land, and services and with the question of who controls what? Which leads to the scope of control, power relations, the role of the state and society agencies, and decision-making arena (Campbell and Fainstein 1996). Finally, as presented in appendix 1.1, physical planning plays an important role in environmental risk management. This is because environmental risks[4] typically have spatial consequences (O'Riordan 1979). As Walker (1998) claimed that the physical planning role may be characterised as one of risk evaluation and risk control in terms of simplified models of risk management process (Walker et al 1998). As a consequence, since the early 1970s "physical planning" has gradually taken on board a range of pollution and environmental risks concerns, which are usually connected with industrial areas implemented inside or near to residential areas (i.e. industrial location) (Wood 1989; Owens 1994; Walker et al 1998; Bernstein 1994, p.1).

2. PHYSICAL PLANNING CONSTRAINTS

Although the physical planning potentials, it faced and is still facing lots of constraints. A fundamental constraint of physical planning is its limited ability to change current pattern of land use. Whilst new development may be controlled, it is rare to find planning powers being used to change existing land uses (where development has taken place) in anything but an incremental manner. This creates a powerful land use inertia, which is compounded by the late recognition of most forms of environmental risks, generally long after many of these have become part of established urban and/ or rural landscape. Moreover, it creates a dilemma of control (Collingridge 1980), which can fundamentally frustrate attempts to utilize powers of spatial control to reduce levels of risk exposure.

Moreover, there is a common agreement between theorists about the role of the physical planners. Most of theorists argue that physical planners do not have the monopoly on power and they work within the constraints of the political and economic arenas. Foglesong (1986) supported such argument by his claim, when physical planners call for a type of development to occur, they cannot command the resources to make it happen. They also work within the constraints of democracy and of bureaucracy of governments. Regarding the industrial location, the rational approach in dealing with industrial location focusing on the economic growth dimension gives little attention to the environmental considerations of such location. Many theories, dealing with industrial location from the economic perspective, such as the cost minimizing, profit maximizing, transportation cost, labour force, and externality theories were introduced to the physical planning field (for more see Harrington et al 1995).

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[4] The environmental risks induce systematic and often-irreversible harm. They are connected to scientific knowledge, mass media, and legal system. Therefore, the environmental risk concept became a key issue in social and political positions (Beck 1997). Moreover, environmental risks are conflicts arising out of the interaction of differently empowered groups of people with respect to access to and control of and relationship with nature. This means these conflicts are not only about distribution of power and authority but also the distributions of cost and benefits within society (Dobson 1998).

In many cities of developing countries, efforts to manage the spatial character of urban and industrial growth within built environment using physical planning have proven to be inadequate. This is because the lack of attention given to the industrial location aspects of earlier industrial development emphasising the need for building industrial capacity quickly. This aim, as Devas (1993) claims, is usually targeted using national economic development plans with a special attention to create suitable environment for large-scale investment in the industrial sector along with agriculture sector. This is usually happening without establishing a proper relationship between such plans (i.e. economic development plans) and the physical planning at the city level (Devas 1993, pp.77-78). Following the same argument, on the effectiveness of industrial estates[5] in developing countries, UNIDO (1978) claimed that in many developing countries, the issue of industrial location has been usually managed by economic incentives (e.g. tax exemptions, land prices, credit facilities, and low infrastructure tariffs) to attract foreign capitals to be invested in industry targeting specific cities, regions, and sites within cities (UNIDO 1978 pp.14-15). As a consequence, inadequate industrial location control and a spontaneous industrial development occurred.

Unlike the economic rationality, ecological rationality approach in dealing with such issue (i.e. industrial location) emphasises the important role of physical planning using the location tool to protect environment from pollution and to reduce health hazards as a consequence (Bernstein 1991, pp.41-43). However, both approaches give little attention to the social forces behind the choice of such location. For both of them it is a matter of science, technology, and finance. Both Mattingly (1993) and Devas (1993) claim, regarding physical planning constraints in developing countries, little consideration was given to the capacity to control industrial development in developing countries in terms of legislation, institutional capacity, enforcement mechanisms, decisions about budgets, infrastructure development, service provision, and the lack of coordination in sectoral programme. Mattingly and Devas referred these problems to the legislative weakness, bureaucratic failure and corruption; and both of them linked physical planning constrains to the failure of its tools to be flexible to deal with the socio-economic change usually happens in developing countries and the lack of sufficient political and public support (Mattingly 1993, p.113; Devas 1993, pp. 73-74).

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[5] The term "industrial estate" refers to an industrial cluster within a defined geographical area. Industrial zones, areas, districts, and parks terms are found to be used in the same sense (Van Di jk 1993, p. 176)

APPENDIX VIII: THE VISUAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL AREAS (A1, B1, AND C3) IN MARCH 2002

1. The Visual Environment of the Heavy Industrial Area (A1) in March 2002

2. The Visual Environment of the Medium Industrial Area (B1) in March 2002

3. The Visual Environment of the Light Industrial Area (C3) in March 2002